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Movements	  for	  new	  States	  in	  India	  are	  often	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  an	  increasing	  democratisation	  
and	  decentralisation	  of	  political	  power.	  They	  are	  read	  as	  expressions	  of	  an	  “aware	  citizenry”	  which	  
demands	  its	  rights	  and	  entitlements	  from	  the	  state,	  formulated	  in	  the	  language	  of	  recognition	  and	  
autonomy.	  Contrary	  to	  such	  positive	  assumptions	  this	  thesis	  contends	  that	  instead	  of	  enabling	  a	  
greater	  participation	  of	  the	  population	  in	  governance,	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  and	  concessions	  
for	  autonomy	  can	  entail	  the	  establishment	  of	  regional	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  where	  a	  
dominant	  ethno-­‐regional	  party	  regularly	  violates	  principles	  of	  substantial	  democracy.	  	  
To	  underline	  this	  argument	  I	  draw	  on	  insights	  from	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Here,	  
the	  largely	  Nepali	  speaking	  population	  demands	  a	  new	  union	  State	  to	  be	  carved	  out	  of	  northern	  
West	  Bengal.	  Succeeding	  the	  allegedly	  corrupt	  and	  repressive	  rule	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  
Front,	  in	  2007	  a	  new	  party,	  the	  Gorkha	  Liberation	  Front	  (GJM),	  revived	  the	  long	  standing	  demand	  for	  
statehood.	  Under	  the	  slogans	  of	  “non-­‐violence”	  and	  “democracy”	  the	  GJM	  also	  proclaimed	  a	  new	  
political	  culture	  free	  from	  corruption	  and	  violent	  repression.	  Yet,	  the	  GJM	  dominates	  Darjeeling	  while	  
allegedly	  repressing	  other	  regional	  parties	  advocating	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda.	  The	  party	  is	  now	  
the	  sole	  voice	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  recognised	  by	  the	  government.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  
of	  why	  a	  presumably	  “aware	  citizenry”	  participating	  in	  a	  movement	  voiced	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
“democracy”	  and	  “non-­‐violence”	  follows	  a	  party,	  when	  its	  alleged	  corrupt	  and	  repressive	  practices	  of	  
ruling	  contradict	  such	  aspirations.	  Why	  did	  the	  succession	  in	  2007	  and	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  statehood	  
movement	  not	  entail	  an	  overall	  regime	  change	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  set-­‐up?	  
This	  study	  has	  two	  aims.	  First,	  it	  intends	  to	  account	  for	  statehood	  movements’	  effects	  on	  regional	  
political	  regimes,	  and	  for	  what	  they	  mean	  to	  those	  involved.	  It	  seeks	  to	  dismantle	  the	  “movement”	  
paradigm	  by	  accounting	  for	  the	  movements’	  internal	  fractures,	  issues	  of	  representation,	  inclusion	  
and	  exclusion,	  and	  their	  conflation	  with	  party	  politics.	  Defying	  clear-­‐cut	  distinctions	  between	  
“movement”	  and	  “party”,	  I	  frame	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  as	  a	  “party-­‐political	  movement”	  and	  
the	  dominant	  party	  as	  a	  “movement	  party”.	  This	  conceptualisation	  allows	  analysing	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  party	  political	  contestations	  enshrined	  by	  broader	  state	  policy.	  	  
The	  second	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  analyse	  the	  dominance	  of	  an	  ethno-­‐regional	  party	  in	  the	  statehood	  
movement	  and	  in	  Darjeeling.	  It	  seeks	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  political	  authority	  of	  the	  GJM	  is	  
constructed.	  To	  do	  so	  it	  explores	  the	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  employed	  by	  the	  party	  and	  its	  leaders	  and	  
contrasts	  these	  with	  their	  perception	  and	  evaluation	  by	  those	  over	  whom	  they	  seek	  to	  rule.	  	  
Conceptionally,	  I	  draw	  on	  two	  bodies	  of	  work:	  studies	  on	  authoritarian	  regimes	  based	  in	  comparative	  
politics	  and	  anthropological	  studies	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  South	  Asia.	  The	  
former	  identify	  repression,	  co-­‐optation/patronage,	  and	  legitimacy	  as	  major	  strategies	  used	  by	  
incumbents	  to	  maintain	  their	  power.	  Anthropological	  approaches	  complement	  these	  theories	  by	  
underlining	  the	  context-­‐specific	  and	  socially-­‐contested	  conditions	  for	  ruling.	  This	  includes	  their	  
capability	  to	  approach	  the	  considerations	  and	  constraints	  of	  the	  ruled	  in	  supporting	  or	  resisting	  an	  
incumbent.	  Thereby	  they	  better	  account	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  deriving	  from	  a	  






In	  terms	  of	  methodology,	  I	  chose	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  grounded	  in	  the	  constructivist	  paradigm.	  I	  
employed	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  to	  account	  for	  the	  multiple	  sites	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  
authority	  and	  performances	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  movement.	  Aside	  from	  party	  offices	  and	  sites	  of	  
political	  performance	  such	  as	  public	  meetings,	  tea	  plantations	  were	  of	  particular	  importance	  as	  
contested	  sites	  for	  political	  support	  in	  regional	  politics.	  	  
My	  study	  identified	  the	  GJM’s	  construction	  and	  reference	  to	  the	  imaginative	  geography	  of	  
Gorkhaland,	  the	  leaders’	  investment	  in	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  strong,	  generous,	  and	  honest	  person,	  the	  
establishment	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  over	  the	  developmental	  state,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  hard	  repression	  
and	  violence	  against	  rivals	  as	  major	  strategies	  for	  ruling.	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  GJM	  is	  supported	  by	  
the	  regional	  autonomous	  council,	  which	  institutionalised	  the	  dependence-­‐relation	  between	  the	  
government	  and	  the	  dominant	  party.	  
The	  success	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  dependent	  not	  only	  on	  a	  continuous	  supply	  of	  governmental	  
patronage	  resources	  but	  also	  strongly	  related	  to	  specific	  historic	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  factors,	  which	  
frame	  their	  reception	  amongst	  the	  ruled.	  Although	  the	  ruled	  evaluate	  leaders	  according	  to	  different	  
moral	  principles,	  for	  a	  majority	  pragmatic	  concerns	  and	  the	  longing	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  security	  
pose	  the	  main	  hindrances	  to	  speak	  up	  against	  perceivably	  “bad”	  leaders.	  This	  renders	  the	  “aware	  
citizens”	  in	  Darjeeling	  ultimately	  silent	  and	  has	  serious	  implications	  for	  the	  course,	  meanings,	  and	  
effects	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement.	  
Instead	  of	  giving	  people	  a	  voice,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  is	  ultimately	  detrimental	  for	  a	  more	  
substantial	  democracy	  in	  Darjeeling:	  The	  privileging	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  forecloses	  
alternative	  ways	  to	  negotiate	  citizens’	  relations	  with	  the	  state	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  state	  as	  
the	  sole	  enemy	  of	  people	  obscures	  the	  roles	  local	  political	  leaders	  play	  for	  sustaining	  the	  very	  
conditions	  against	  which	  people	  protest.	  Instead	  of	  uniting	  the	  population,	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  rhetoric	  
creates	  distinctions	  between	  so-­‐called	  Gorkhaland	  lovers	  and	  enemies.	  This	  underlined	  the	  GJM’s	  
attempt	  to	  monopolise	  the	  movement	  as	  part	  of	  a	  struggle	  over	  political	  power,	  while	  denying	  rivals	  
the	  right	  to	  contend	  for	  the	  common	  cause.	  Such	  party	  political	  capture	  eventually	  weakens	  the	  
movements’	  programmatic	  base.	  
Ultimately,	  guided	  by	  pragmatism	  and	  material	  aspirations,	  a	  movement	  for	  decentralisation	  and	  
“democracy”	  became	  an	  arena	  to	  acquire	  and	  struggle	  over	  material	  resources.	  For	  many	  followers,	  
paying	  lip-­‐service	  to	  Gorkhaland	  was	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  “winning	  











Bewegungen	  für	  die	  Gründung	  neuer	  Unionsstaaten	  in	  Indien	  werden	  oft	  als	  Zeichen	  einer	  
zunehmenden	  Demokratisierung	  und	  Dezentralisierung	  politischer	  Macht	  gedeutet.	  Sie	  werden	  als	  
Ausdruck	  einer	  „bewussten	  Bürgerschaft“	  gelesen,	  die	  ihre	  Rechte	  gegenüber	  dem	  Staat	  mittels	  einer	  
Sprache	  von	  Anerkennung	  und	  Autonomie	  einfordern.	  Im	  Widerspruch	  zu	  solch	  emanzipatorischen	  
Lesarten	  zeigt	  meine	  Dissertation,	  dass	  Bewegungen	  für	  neue	  Staaten	  und	  Autonomiekonzessionen	  
nicht	  unbedingt	  zu	  verstärkter	  politischer	  Partizipation	  der	  Bevölkerung	  führen,	  sondern	  stattdessen	  
die	  Etablierung	  kompetitiver	  autoritärer	  Regime	  auf	  der	  regionalen	  Ebene	  fördern	  können.	  In	  diesen	  
Regimen	  verletzt	  eine	  dominante	  ethno-­‐regionale	  Partei	  regelmäßig	  und	  systematisch	  Prinzipien	  
substantieller	  Demokratie.	  
Um	  dieses	  Argument	  zu	  belegen,	  beziehe	  ich	  mich	  auf	  die	  Bewegung	  für	  einen	  Unionsstaat	  
Gorkhaland	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Hier	  fordert	  die	  überwiegend	  Nepali	  sprechende	  Bevölkerung	  die	  
administrative	  Abspaltung	  von	  Gebieten	  des	  nördlichen	  West	  Bengalen.	  Im	  Jahr	  2007	  beendete	  dort	  
eine	  neue	  Partei,	  die	  Gorkha	  Liberation	  Front	  (GJM),	  die	  als	  korrupt	  und	  repressiv	  kritisierte	  
Herrschaft	  der	  Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  und	  revitalisierte	  die	  seit	  langem	  bestehende	  
populäre	  Bewegung	  für	  einen	  neuen	  Unionsstaat.	  Unter	  den	  Schlagworten	  „Gewaltlosigkeit“	  und	  
„Demokratie“	  proklamierte	  die	  GJM	  eine	  neue	  politische	  Kultur	  frei	  von	  Korruption	  und	  gewaltvoller	  
Repression.	  Dennoch	  wurde	  auch	  ihr	  bald	  vorgeworfen,	  Darjeeling	  mittels	  Repression	  anderer	  
regionaler	  Parteien,	  die	  ebenfalls	  die	  ethno-­‐regionale	  Agenda	  vertreten,	  zu	  beherrschen.	  Auch	  die	  
Regierung	  erkennt	  einzig	  die	  GJM	  als	  Sprachrohr	  der	  Bewegung	  an.	  Dies	  wirft	  die	  Frage	  auf,	  warum	  
scheinbar	  „bewusste	  Bürger/innen“,	  die	  sich	  in	  einer	  als	  „demokratisch“	  und	  „gewaltfrei“	  
präsentierten	  Bewegung	  engagieren,	  einer	  Partei	  folgen,	  deren	  augenscheinlich	  korrupte	  und	  
repressive	  Herrschaftspraktiken	  solchen	  Prinzipien	  widersprechen.	  Warum	  führten	  der	  
Machtwechsel	  2007	  und	  die	  Wiederbelebung	  der	  Gorkhaland-­‐Bewegung	  nicht	  zu	  einem	  Wandel	  des	  
politischen	  Regimes	  hin	  zu	  mehr	  Demokratie?	  	  
Vor	  diesem	  Hintergrund	  verfolgt	  die	  vorliegende	  Dissertation	  zwei	  Ziele:	  Erstens	  strebt	  sie	  an,	  die	  
Auswirkungen	  von	  Bewegungen	  für	  neue	  Staaten	  auf	  regionale	  politische	  Regimes	  nachzuzeichnen	  
und	  die	  Bedeutungen	  solcher	  Bewegungen	  für	  die	  Beteiligten	  offen	  zu	  legen.	  Sie	  will	  die	  internen	  
Brüche,	  Belange	  von	  Repräsentation,	  Inklusion	  und	  Exklusion	  innerhalb	  von	  sogenannten	  
Bewegungen	  und	  deren	  Verschmelzung	  mit	  Parteienpolitik	  aufdecken.	  Dabei	  werden	  
Unterscheidungen	  zwischen	  „Bewegung“	  und	  „Partei“	  überbrückt,	  indem	  die	  Gorkhaland-­‐Bewegung	  
als	  „parteipolitische	  Bewegung“	  und	  die	  dominierende	  Partei	  als	  „Bewegungs-­‐Partei“	  
konzeptionalisiert	  werden.	  Dies	  erlaubt	  es,	  die	  Bewegung	  in	  einem	  Kontext	  parteipolitischer	  Kämpfe	  
-­‐	  eingerahmt	  durch	  Politik	  auf	  anderen	  Ebenen	  -­‐	  zu	  betrachten.	  	  
Das	  zweite	  Ziel	  der	  Studie	  ist,	  die	  Dominanz	  der	  regierenden	  ethno-­‐regionalen	  Partei	  innerhalb	  der	  
Bewegung	  sowie	  in	  Darjeeling	  zu	  analysieren.	  Um	  zu	  verstehen,	  wie	  die	  politische	  Autorität	  der	  GJM	  
konstruiert	  wird,	  erkunde	  ich	  die	  Herrschaftsstrategien	  der	  Partei	  und	  ihrer	  Anführer/innen	  und	  






Konzeptionell	  beziehe	  ich	  mich	  auf	  Studien	  zu	  autoritären	  Regimen	  aus	  der	  vergleichenden	  
Politikwissenschaft	  und	  auf	  anthropologische	  Studien	  zur	  Konstruktion	  politischer	  Autorität	  in	  
Südasien.	  Die	  ersteren	  identifizieren	  Repression,	  Kooptation/Patronage	  und	  die	  Schaffung	  von	  
Legitimität	  als	  Hauptstrategien	  von	  Herrschenden	  zum	  Machterhalt.	  Anthropologische	  Ansätze	  
ergänzen	  diese	  Theorien,	  indem	  sie	  betonen,	  dass	  die	  Bedingungen	  für	  Herrschaft	  immer	  
kontextspezifisch	  und	  sozial	  umkämpft	  sind.	  So	  werden	  auch	  die	  Überlegungen	  und	  Einschränkungen	  
der	  Beherrschten	  berücksichtigt,	  die	  deren	  Unterstützung	  von	  oder	  Widerstand	  gegen	  einen	  
Herrscher	  beeinflussen.	  Politische	  Autorität	  wird	  hier	  demnach	  als	  Resultat	  einer	  qualitativen,	  
umkämpften	  und	  dynamischen	  zweiseitigen	  Beziehung	  zwischen	  Herrschenden	  und	  Beherrschten	  
begriffen.	  	  
Methodisch	  verfolgt	  diese	  Arbeit	  einer	  qualitativen,	  konstruktivistisch	  basierten	  Herangehensweise.	  
Um	  die	  multiplen	  Orte	  der	  Konstruktion	  politischer	  Autorität	  einerseits	  und	  der	  Performanz	  von	  
Politik	  und	  der	  Bewegung	  andererseits	  zu	  betrachten,	  verwende	  ich	  den	  Ansatz	  der	  „multi-­‐sited	  
ethnography“.	  Neben	  Parteibüros	  und	  Orten	  der	  politischen	  Performanz	  (wie	  etwa	  öffentliche	  
Parteiveranstaltungen)	  waren	  insbesondere	  Teeplantagen	  als	  Orte,	  in	  denen	  Parteien	  um	  politische	  
Unterstützung	  ringen,	  von	  besonderer	  Bedeutung.	  	  
Als	  wichtigste	  Herrschaftsstrategien	  der	  GJM	  identifiziert	  meine	  Studie	  die	  Konstruktion	  und	  den	  
Bezug	  der	  Partei	  auf	  die	  imaginative	  Geographie	  von	  Gorkhaland,	  die	  Reputation	  ihres	  Anführers	  als	  
stark,	  grosszügig	  und	  ehrlich,	  die	  Etablierung	  eines	  Ressourcenmonopols	  über	  
Entwicklungsprogramme	  des	  Staates	  sowie	  Repression	  und	  Gewalt	  gegen	  Rivalen.	  Die	  Dominanz	  der	  
GJM	  wird	  dabei	  von	  einem	  regionalen	  autonomen	  Council	  unterstützt,	  welcher	  die	  
Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen	  zwischen	  der	  West	  Bengalischen	  Regierung	  und	  der	  dominierenden	  Partei	  
institutionalisiert.	  	  
Der	  Erfolg	  dieser	  Strategien	  hängt	  nicht	  nur	  von	  der	  fortwährenden	  Versorgung	  mit	  Patronage-­‐
Gütern	  der	  Regierung	  ab,	  sondern	  auch	  von	  spezifischen	  historischen	  und	  sozio-­‐ökonomischen	  
Kontextfaktoren,	  welche	  ihre	  Wahrnehmung	  unter	  den	  Beherrschten	  beeinflussen.	  Obwohl	  die	  
Beherrschten	  die	  Herrschenden	  anhand	  unterschiedlicher	  moralischer	  Prinzipien	  bewerten,	  halten	  
pragmatische	  Überlegungen	  und	  der	  Wunsch	  nach	  sozialer	  und	  ökonomischer	  Sicherheit	  die	  
Mehrheit	  von	  ihnen	  davon	  ab,	  als	  „schlecht“	  erachtete	  Anführer	  offen	  zu	  kritisieren.	  Dies	  macht	  die	  
„bewussten	  Bürger/innen“	  in	  Darjeeling	  letztlich	  schweigsam	  und	  hat	  ernste	  Auswirkungen	  auf	  den	  
Kurs,	  die	  Bedeutungen	  und	  die	  Effekte	  der	  Gorkhaland-­‐Bewegung.	  	  
Statt	  den	  Belangen	  der	  Menschen	  eine	  Stimme	  zu	  geben,	  steht	  die	  Bewegung	  damit	  einer	  
Demokratisierung	  in	  Darjeeling	  entgegen.	  Das	  Priorisieren	  der	  ethno-­‐regionalen	  Agenda	  schliesst	  
alternative	  Möglichkeiten	  für	  die	  Bürger	  zur	  Verhandlung	  ihre	  Beziehungen	  zum	  Staat	  aus.	  Mit	  ihrer	  
Darstellung	  der	  West	  Bengalischen	  Regierung	  als	  Hauptfeind	  der	  Menschen	  verschleiert	  die	  
Gorkhaland-­‐Rhetorik	  die	  Rolle	  von	  lokalen	  politischen	  Führern,	  die	  genau	  die	  Bedingungen	  
aufrechterhalten,	  gegen	  die	  die	  Menschen	  protestieren.	  Statt	  die	  Bevölkerung	  zu	  vereinen,	  spaltet	  
die	  Rhetorik	  der	  regierenden	  Partei	  sie	  in	  sogenannte	  Gorkhaland-­‐Befürworter	  und	  -­‐Gegner.	  Dies	  
unterstreicht	  den	  Versuch	  der	  GJM,	  in	  ihrem	  Kampf	  um	  politische	  Macht	  die	  Bewegung	  zu	  
monopolisieren	  und	  Rivalen	  das	  Recht,	  für	  das	  gemeinsame	  Ziel	  zu	  kämpfen,	  zu	  verwehren.	  Eine	  






Geleitet	  von	  Pragmatismus	  und	  materiellen	  Ansprüchen,	  wurde	  eine	  Bewegung	  für	  Dezentralisierung	  
und	  „Demokratie“	  zu	  einer	  Arena	  des	  Kampfes	  über	  materielle	  Ressourcen.	  Das	  Lippenbekenntnis	  zu	  
Gorkhaland	  wurde	  für	  viele	  zu	  einer	  notwendige	  Bedingung,	  um	  Teil	  der	  „Gewinnerkoalition“	  der	  
regierenden	  Partei	  zu	  bleiben.	  Diese	  bezieht	  sich	  weiterhin	  auf	  die	  ethno-­‐regionale	  Agenda,	  um	  ihre	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  Marxist	  
CPRM	   Communist	  Party	  of	  Revolutionary	  Marxists	  
*funded	  in	  1996	  by	  rebel	  leaders	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  CPI-­‐M.	  R.B.	  Rai	  
is	  its	  president.	  
DDUDF	   Darjeeling	  Dooars	  United	  Development	  Foundation	  
*”non-­‐political”	  body	  floated	  in	  2013	  by	  M.P.	  Lama	  
DDCC	   Darjeeling	  District	  Congress	  Committee	  
DGHC	   Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  
EIC	   East	  India	  Company	  
GATA	   Gorkha	  Adivasi	  Territorial	  Administration	  
GDF	   Gorkha	  Democratic	  Front	  
GJM	   Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Morcha	  (Gorkha	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front)	  
*Established	  in	  October	  2007	  by	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
GLP	   Gorkhaland	  Personnel	  
GNLF	   Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  
*Founded	  in	  April	  1980.	  Its	  president	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  initiated	  a	  
violent	  campaign	  for	  Gorkhaland	  from	  1986-­‐1988.	  Subsequently	  
he	  became	  chief	  of	  the	  DGHC.	  
GRC	   Gorkha	  Rastriya	  Congress	  (Gorkha	  National	  Congress)	  




GRNM	   Gorkha	  Rastriya	  Nirman	  Morcha	  (Gorkha	  National	  Creation	  Front)	  
GTA	   Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  
GVC	   Gorkha	  Volunteer	  Cell	  
*Militant	  frontal	  organisation	  of	  the	  GNLF	  
ILTA	   Indigenous	  Lepcha	  Tribal	  Association	  
JMM	   Jharkhand	  Mukti	  Morch	  
INC	   Indian	  National	  Congress	  
KMS	   Krantikari	  Mutki	  Sena	  (Revolutionary	  Liberation	  Army)	  
MLA	   Member	  of	  the	  State	  Legislative	  Assembly	  
MLLDB	   Mayel	  Lyang	  Lepcha	  Development	  Board	  
MGNREGS	   Mahatma	  Gandhi	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  
MP	   Member	  of	  Parliament	  (Lok	  Sabha	  or	  Rajya	  Sabha)	  
PM	   Prime	  Minister	  
PMGSY	   Pradhan	  Mantri	  Gram	  Sadak	  Yojanna	  
*state	  financed	  road	  construction	  scheme	  
RTI	   Right	  to	  Information	  
SC	   Scheduled	  Castes	  
ST	   Scheduled	  Tribes	  
TMC	   All	  India	  Trinamool	  Congress	  
UNNF	   United	  Nepal	  National	  Front	  




List	  of	  Nepali	  terms	  	  
(as	  used	  in	  Darjeeling)	  
āndolaṇ	   agitation;	  movement	  
bāhira	   outside	  
bandh	   general	  strike	  
bastī	   village	  on	  the	  country	  side	  
bhitra	   inside	  
bhrasṭachār	   corruption	  
bhumī	  pūjā	   religious	  prayer/ritual	  to	  sanctify	  the	  ground	  
chamchā	  	   literally:	  spoon;	  term	  derogatorily	  used	  for	  “yes-­‐men”,	  
sycophants,	  creepers,	  bootlickers	  
chamchāgirī	   the	  behaviour	  of	  chamchās	  
chaukidār	   watchmen;	  for	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  the	  term	  carries	  a	  derogatory	  
meaning	  
chhyāsī	  	   the	  number	  86;	  here:	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  between	  1986-­‐
1988	  
gaṇatantra;	  gaṇatantrik	   democracy;	  democratic	  
ghoṭālā	   scam,	  cozenage;	  in	  Darjeeling	  refers	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  personal	  
benefits	  from	  contract	  work	  by	  skimming	  money,	  e.g.	  by	  using	  
minor	  construction	  materials	  or	  faking	  bills	  
gherau	   form	  of	  protest	  where	  persons/structures	  are	  encircled	  by	  a	  chain	  
of	  persons	  	  
jagā	   land,	  ground	  
jantā	   people	  
jāti	   race,	  kind,	  sort;	  here	  mostly:	  ethnic	  group	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  
kāryakartā	   political	  activist;	  party-­‐worker	  
khukurī	   long	  knife	  with	  an	  inwardly	  curved	  edge;	  in	  Nepal	  and	  Darjeeling	  
it	  is	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  and	  a	  weapon	  alike	  
māthi	   up;	  above	  
māṭo	   soil,	  ground	  
netā	   political	  leader	  
prashakhā	   smallest	  party-­‐unit	  on	  the	  village	  level	  
sabhashād	   elected	  member	  of	  a	  council	  (here:	  DGHC,	  GTA)	  




sachet	  jantā	   “aware	  people”	  
samāj	   socially	  inclusive,	  non-­‐political	  organisation	  at	  the	  village	  level	  
shakhā	   local	  party-­‐unit	  on	  the	  village	  level;	  one	  shakhā	  consists	  of	  several	  
prashakhās	  
talako	  keṭāharu	   “the	  young	  men	  from	  down”;	  idiom	  derogatorily	  used	  by	  town	  
people	  for	  those	  stemming	  from	  the	  lower-­‐lying	  tea	  plantation	  
areas	  
	  




Map	  of	  Darjeeling	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Above:	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  West	  Bengal	  in	  India.	  Below:	  Darjeeling	  district	  with	  its	  surrounding	  areas.	  







When	  I	  explained	  to	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  study	  was	  Gorkhaland,	  I	  often	  got	  the	  
impression	  that	  the	  expectations	  towards	  me	  as	  an	  “international”	  researcher	  were	  very	  high.	  My	  
project	  provided	  an	  international	  audience	  for	  their	  cause.	  While	  many	  were	  positively	  surprised	  and	  
lauded	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  foreigner	  in	  their	  struggle	  for	  statehood,	  others	  often	  sarcastically	  expressed	  
their	  disappointment	  with	  the	  seeming	  failure	  of	  the	  agitation	  since	  2007.	  But	  this	  study	  is	  neither	  a	  
book	  for	  nor	  against	  Gorkhaland,	  and	  I	  am	  sorry	  to	  disappoint	  those	  who	  asked	  me	  to	  conclude	  that	  
“Gorkhaland	  was	  both	  necessary	  and	  possible”.	  Rather,	  this	  book	  presents	  an	  attempt	  to	  look	  behind	  
the	  “movement”	  and	  the	  struggle.	  It	  situates	  it	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  dominant	  
party,	  which	  Darjeeling	  has	  experienced	  since	  the	  1980s	  and	  which	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  people’s	  
struggle	  for	  autonomy.	  	  
I	  did	  not	  find	  it	  easy	  to	  give	  justice	  to	  my	  research	  subject	  and	  present	  it	  with	  the	  necessary	  depth,	  
detail,	  and	  sensitivity	  that	  it	  certainly	  deserves.	  During	  my	  research	  I	  came	  across	  a	  big	  variety	  of	  
different	  opinions,	  persons,	  and	  interpretations,	  which	  often	  made	  it	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  
broader	  structures	  in	  which	  the	  struggle	  over	  power	  in	  Darjeeling	  was	  situated.	  My	  attempt	  to	  draw	  
an	  expansive	  story	  line	  forced	  me	  to	  selectively	  draw	  on	  certain	  events	  and	  details.	  I	  apologise	  in	  
advance	  if	  I	  might	  have	  omitted	  discourses,	  which	  others	  see	  of	  equal	  importance.	  The	  particular	  
choice	  of	  data	  I	  present	  here	  certainly	  arrives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  only	  began	  my	  research	  in	  2010,	  
when	  the	  revived	  agitation	  for	  statehood	  had	  already	  calmed	  down	  a	  bit,	  and	  people	  began	  to	  see	  
things	  more	  critically.	  Probably,	  this	  book	  would	  have	  been	  written	  differently	  if	  I	  had	  been	  in	  
Darjeeling	  in	  2006	  and	  2007.	  	  
I	  also	  hope	  my	  study	  reflects	  the	  pace	  and	  dynamics	  of	  political	  events	  in	  Darjeeling,	  which	  might	  at	  
times	  be	  confusing	  for	  the	  reader.	  While	  I	  was	  writing	  the	  last	  lines	  of	  this	  study	  in	  January	  2015,	  
Subash	  Ghisingh,	  the	  controversial	  president	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  and	  initiator	  of	  
the	  first	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  in	  the	  1980s,	  died	  at	  the	  age	  of	  79.	  Ghisingh	  had	  ruled	  Darjeeling	  for	  
more	  than	  20	  years	  and	  his	  dead	  sent	  shockwaves	  through	  the	  always	  contested	  political	  landscape	  
in	  Darjeeling.	  Owing	  to	  my	  decision	  to	  end	  the	  time-­‐frame	  of	  this	  book	  with	  the	  2014	  national	  
elections,	  however,	  I	  have	  not	  further	  commented	  on	  Ghisingh’s	  demise	  here.	  
Despite	  the	  study’s	  critical	  and	  often	  depressive	  outline,	  I	  hope	  I	  could	  give	  justice	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation	  and	  to	  those	  who	  –	  inspite	  of	  all	  the	  “politics”	  –	  believe	  that	  their	  lives	  would	  improve	  





A	  note	  on	  transcription	  and	  transliteration	  
Most	  of	  this	  research	  has	  been	  conducted	  in	  Nepali	  and	  English.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  many	  in	  
Darjeeling	  mix	  their	  Nepali	  accounts	  with	  English	  words.	  For	  instance,	  the	  term	  “identity”	  was	  usually	  
expressed	  in	  English;	  also	  “democracy”	  was	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  the	  Darjeeling-­‐Nepali	  
gaṇatantra.	  I	  indicated	  such	  English	  words	  in	  Nepali-­‐accounts	  through	  simple	  quotation-­‐marks	  and	  
[Engl.]	  in	  brackets	  (e.g.	  ‘identity’	  [Engl.]).	  To	  further	  qualify	  the	  meaning	  of	  certain	  Nepali	  terms	  in	  
citations	  I	  sometimes	  added	  them	  in	  parentheses	  and	  italics	  behind	  the	  English	  translation	  (e.g.	  
democratic	  (gaṇatantrik)).	  For	  these	  terms	  I	  used	  the	  transcription	  system	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  United	  
States	  Board	  on	  Geographic	  Names	  and	  the	  Permanent	  Committee	  on	  Geographical	  Names	  for	  British	  
Official	  Use	  (see:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/	  
file/324997/Nepali_Romanization_System.pdf).	  If	  necessary	  I	  pluralised	  these	  terms	  by	  adding	  an	  ‘s’	  
like	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  I	  did	  not	  use	  this	  transcription	  system	  for	  the	  names	  of	  organisations	  and	  
instead	  have	  adopted	  the	  transliterations	  as	  used	  by	  them	  in	  their	  own	  presentations.	  	  
Pseudonymity	  
The	  political	  nature	  of	  my	  research	  subject	  made	  it	  necessary	  to	  render	  the	  names	  of	  many	  persons	  
and	  places	  anonymous.	  I	  marked	  pseudonyms	  with	  an	  asterisk	  (*).	  However,	  I	  used	  the	  real	  names	  of	  
most	  public	  persons	  (such	  as	  political	  leaders)	  and	  of	  some	  respondents	  who	  explicitly	  agreed	  on	  
appearing	  under	  their	  real	  names.	  I	  made	  an	  exception	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  where	  I	  used	  the	  real	  place	  










1 Introduction:	  “Aware	  citizens”,	  movements	  and	  authoritarian	  
regimes	  	  
	  
1.1 The	  research	  puzzle	  
The	  7th	  of	  October	  2007	  promised	  to	  be	  a	  special	  day	  in	  Darjeeling,	  a	  district	  in	  the	  foothills	  of	  the	  
Indian	  Himalaya,	  in	  northern	  West	  Bengal.	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  a	  prominent	  political	  leader	  of	  the	  region,	  
announced	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  organisation,	  the	  Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Morcha	  (Gorkha	  People’s	  
Liberation	  Front,	  GJM	  or	  Morcha).	  At	  the	  founding	  meeting,	  attended	  by	  almost	  20,000	  excited	  
people	  at	  the	  Motor	  Stand	  (TT,	  8.10.2007)1	  close	  to	  the	  town’s	  main	  bazaar,	  Gurung	  not	  only	  
promised	  to	  revive	  the	  long-­‐standing	  demand	  of	  the	  largely	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  population	  for	  a	  
separate	  Indian	  Union	  State2	  of	  “Gorkhaland”,	  he	  also	  proclaimed	  an	  end	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  
National	  Liberation	  Front	  (GNLF).	  Bolstered	  by	  the	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  (DGHC),	  which	  was	  
established	  in	  1988	  as	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  GNLF	  to	  end	  the	  party’s	  
violent	  statehood	  agitation	  from	  1986-­‐88,	  the	  GNLF	  had	  ruled	  Darjeeling	  for	  the	  last	  20	  years	  under	  
the	  leadership	  of	  Subash	  Ghisingh.	  	  
Before	  a	  cheering	  crowd,	  Gurung	  began	  his	  speech	  by	  proclaiming	  a	  “new	  dawn”	  in	  Darjeeling	  
(symbolised	  by	  the	  golden	  sun	  on	  the	  new	  party’s	  flag,	  see	  Picture	  2	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  Coming	  down	  
heavily	  on	  Ghisingh	  and	  his	  aides’	  way	  of	  ruling,	  Gurung	  not	  only	  criticised	  their	  self-­‐aggrandisement	  
at	  the	  cost	  of	  poor	  people	  through	  their	  “eating	  up”	  of	  development	  funds	  to	  the	  DGHC,	  but	  also	  
alleged	  that	  they	  had	  “pawned”	  the	  Darjeeling	  hills	  to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  while	  giving	  up	  
the	  struggle	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  return	  for	  personal	  benefits.	  Proclaiming	  an	  end	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  practice	  
of	  buying	  political	  support,	  he	  announced:	  “Our	  brothers	  and	  sisters	  are	  sachet	  [conscious].	  That’s	  
why	  you	  cannot	  buy	  them	  with	  money	  anymore,	  because	  they	  love	  their	  mother	  [Darjeeling]	  and	  
they	  love	  their	  land.”	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  proclaimed	  “new	  dawn”	  was	  Gurung’s	  announcement	  that	  he	  would	  lead	  the	  struggle	  for	  
Gorkhaland	  in	  a	  “democratic	  (gaṇatantrik3),	  non-­‐violent/peaceful	  (shāntipriya)	  and	  Gandhian”	  way,	  
in	  contrast	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  armed	  uprising	  of	  1986	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  In	  Gurung’s	  rhetoric,	  the	  new	  
movement	  should	  be	  inclusive	  and	  not	  party-­‐political.	  People	  should	  stand	  at	  the	  apex	  and	  control	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  As	  I	  quote	  from	  it	  many	  times,	  I	  shall	  use	  TT	  as	  an	  abbreviation	  for	  the	  The	  Telegraph	  newspaper.	  	  
2	  I	  use	  the	  upper	  case	  “State”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  administrative	  unit	  (e.g.	  the	  State	  of	  West	  Bengal),	  and	  the	  lower	  
case	  “state”	  for	  the	  larger	  polity.	  
3	  Unlike	  in	  Nepal,	  where	  gaṇatantra	  stands	  for	  “republic”	  and	  the	  term	  prajātantra	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  
“democracy”,	  the	  term	  gaṇatantra	  is	  used	  to	  mean	  democracy	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Leaders	  used	  both	  the	  English	  
“democratic”	  and	  the	  vernacular	  gaṇatantrik	  interchangeably	  in	  speeches	  and	  interviews.	  




the	  leaders.	  These	  announcements	  are	  expressed	  in	  the	  vernacular	  of	  the	  sachet	  jantā	  or	  the	  
aware/conscious/awake	  person,	  who	  will	  no	  longer	  allow	  leaders	  to	  betray	  them	  and	  their	  
aspirations.	  Such	  proclamations	  clearly	  catered	  to	  those	  who	  had	  felt	  oppressed	  and	  neglected	  by	  
Ghisingh	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  and	  appeared	  to	  usher	  in	  a	  “new	  era	  in	  local	  politics”	  (The	  Hindu,	  
15.3.2008).	  Within	  six	  months,	  Gurung	  put	  an	  end	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  rule,	  and	  successfully	  established	  
himself	  as	  the	  new	  majority	  leader	  and	  the	  GJM	  as	  the	  new	  dominant	  party	  in	  Darjeeling.	  He	  
simultaneously	  initiated	  forceful	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland,	  mainly	  through	  public	  disobedience	  
directed	  at	  the	  communist-­‐led	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government.	  	  
The	  statehood	  demand	  stands	  in	  a	  broader	  historical	  context	  (see	  Chapter	  3	  for	  details).	  The	  Nepalis4	  
of	  Darjeeling	  form	  a	  minority	  within	  the	  Bengali-­‐dominated	  West	  Bengal	  State.	  Though	  this	  version	  is	  
contested,	  popular	  history	  holds	  that	  the	  ancestors	  of	  most	  modern	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  hill	  district	  
originally	  stemmed	  from	  the	  previous	  Gorkha	  Kingdom	  (present-­‐day	  Nepal).	  The	  British	  colonial	  
government	  had	  enticed	  thousands	  of	  them	  away	  by	  creating	  employment	  opportunities	  in	  the	  
British	  Indian	  Army	  as	  “Gurkha”	  soldiers,	  or	  on	  the	  newly	  established	  tea	  plantations	  (Subba	  1992;	  
Samanta	  2000).	  Most	  of	  present-­‐day	  inhabitants	  of	  Darjeeling	  -­‐	  who	  interchangeably	  call	  themselves	  
“Gorkhas”	  or	  “Nepalis”	  (see	  Chapter	  1.4.2)	  -­‐	  believe	  that	  a	  separate	  State	  would	  guarantee	  their	  full	  
recognition	  as	  Indian	  nationals,	  and	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  their	  perceived	  exploitation	  and	  neglect	  by	  the	  
government.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  can	  be	  read	  as	  expressing	  their	  heightened	  
awareness	  of	  their	  supposed	  political	  rights	  and	  a	  longing	  for	  justice	  as	  part	  of	  their	  political	  
subjectivities.	  Bimal	  Gurung	  garnered	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  public	  support	  by	  catering	  to	  such	  aspirations.	  
When	  I	  began	  to	  study	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  three	  years	  after	  the	  GJM’s	  foundation,	  however,	  
this	  optimist	  mood	  had	  dissipated.	  As	  early	  as	  2010	  the	  party	  had	  begun	  to	  engage	  in	  negotiations	  
about	  an	  autonomous	  “interim	  council”	  instead	  of	  statehood.	  Eventually,	  in	  2011,	  the	  Morcha	  signed	  
an	  agreement	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA),	  an	  
autonomous	  council	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  newly	  elected	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government;	  this	  
entity	  was	  to	  replace	  the	  former	  DGHC.	  Furthermore,	  various	  accounts	  criticised	  the	  GJM	  –	  a	  
recognised	  political	  party	  since	  2008	  –	  for	  ruling	  through	  political	  patronage,	  corruption	  and	  the	  
intimidation	  of	  regional	  rival	  parties	  that	  are	  also	  demanding	  Gorkhaland.	  It	  seemed	  that,	  contrary	  to	  
Bimal	  Gurung’s	  proclamations	  of	  a	  “new	  dawn”	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  sachet	  jantā,	  the	  change	  of	  party	  had	  
not	  led	  to	  a	  genuine	  change	  of	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Even	  after	  2007	  this	  regime	  continued	  
to	  be	  characterised	  by	  the	  reign	  of	  a	  dominant	  party	  that	  claims	  to	  lead	  the	  statehood	  movement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  There	  has	  been	  some	  confusion	  over	  the	  terms	  Nepali	  or	  Nepalese	  (Sinha	  2009,	  15	  ff).	  Since	  people	  in	  
Darjeeling	  habitually	  call	  themselves	  “Nepali”,	  I	  have	  chosen	  here	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “Nepalis”	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  
living	  in	  India	  who	  speak	  the	  Nepali	  language,	  and	  “Nepalese”	  as	  an	  adjective	  when	  describing	  various	  cultural	  
aspects.	  	  




while	  marginalising	  other	  regional	  parties	  and	  rival	  voices	  by	  ignoring	  the	  principles	  of	  substantial	  
democracy.	  	  
Such	  observations	  seem	  to	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  common	  readings	  of	  statehood	  movements.	  
Many	  studies	  regard	  these	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  “spread	  of	  democracy”	  (Kohli	  2001)	  and	  as	  the	  result	  
of	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  rights	  among	  citizens	  at	  the	  grassroots	  (Kothari,	  1985).	  According	  to	  
this	  reading,	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  promote	  different	  forms	  of	  politics	  
which	  allow	  for	  greater	  popular	  participation	  in	  governance	  (Kothari	  1985;	  Kaviraj	  1989).	  As	  I	  will	  
show	  in	  detail	  below	  (Chapter	  1.2),	  these	  studies’	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  outcomes	  of	  movements	  in	  
terms	  of	  concessions	  of	  autonomy	  on	  paper	  (Chadda	  2002;	  Phadnis	  and	  Ganguly	  2001;	  Kohli	  1997a;	  
Shah	  2010;	  Adeney	  2002;	  Bhattacharyya	  2005)	  forecloses	  any	  focus	  on	  their	  effects	  on	  local	  and	  
regional	  political	  regimes,	  practices	  and	  participants’	  subjectivities.	  They	  therefore	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  
the	  case	  of	  Darjeeling,	  where,	  paradoxically,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  movement	  that	  draws	  on	  a	  language	  
of	  rights	  and	  democracy	  co-­‐exists	  with	  a	  regional	  authoritarian	  regime	  where	  such	  principles	  are	  
regularly	  violated	  by	  a	  dominant	  party.	  	  
These	  contradictions	  have	  created	  the	  major	  puzzle	  with	  which	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned.	  Assuming	  
that	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  are	  indeed	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  sachet	  jantā	  (persons	  
“aware”	  of	  their	  rights	  and	  aspiring	  for	  justice	  as	  embodied	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  statehood	  
demand)	  then	  why	  did	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  GNLF	  as	  a	  dominant	  party	  by	  the	  GJM,	  and	  the	  revival	  of	  
agitation	  for	  statehood	  in	  2007	  not	  inspire	  overall	  regime	  change	  towards	  more	  democracy?	  How	  
could	  a	  party	  which	  allegedly	  employs	  violent	  means	  continue	  to	  sustain	  support	  from	  persons	  with	  
aspirations	  for	  justice,	  freedom	  from	  exploitation,	  and	  recognition	  of	  their	  rights,	  as	  embodied	  in	  the	  
language	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand?	  Why	  is	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  so	  stable?	  	  
Critical	  evaluations	  of	  the	  1986-­‐88	  Gorkhaland	  movement,	  and	  the	  concession	  of	  autonomy	  in	  form	  
of	  the	  DGHC	  that	  resulted	  from	  it,	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  explaining	  such	  contradictions.	  They	  
associate	  the	  power	  of	  the	  dominant	  party	  in	  Darjeeling	  with	  state	  patronage	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
with	  the	  party	  elites’	  utilisation	  of	  an	  emotional	  ethno-­‐regional	  appeal	  on	  the	  other	  (see	  Chapter	  
1.2.2).	  They	  suggest	  a	  conflation	  of	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  with	  local	  elites’	  attempts	  to	  gain	  political	  
authority	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  point	  to	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  establishing	  a	  dominant	  party	  
through	  autonomous	  councils	  (Lacina	  2009;	  Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Sarkar	  2013;	  Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  
2000).	  Although	  I	  generally	  agree	  with	  such	  contentions,	  the	  primary	  concern	  of	  these	  studies	  with	  
the	  relations	  between	  the	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  state	  distracts	  attention	  from	  the	  relations	  between	  
the	  dominant	  party,	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  masses.	  They	  fail	  to	  explain	  why	  there	  is	  public	  
acceptance	  for	  the	  resulting	  political	  regime.	  Instead	  of	  exploring	  the	  reasons	  for	  people’s	  
acceptance	  of,	  compliance	  with,	  or	  resistance	  to	  a	  dominant	  party,	  individuals	  and	  their	  perceptions	  




of	  the	  political	  regime	  remain	  unknown.	  Such	  readings	  not	  only	  avoid	  examining	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  
dominant	  party	  as	  embedded	  in	  specific	  historical,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  contexts,	  but	  also	  
foreclose	  all	  possibility	  of	  resistance	  and	  political	  change,	  as	  they	  risk	  reducing	  those	  subject	  to	  rule	  
to	  unreflective	  objects	  who	  blindly	  follow	  the	  appeal	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism.	  In	  short,	  they	  pay	  no	  
attention	  to	  the	  ruled’s	  agency,	  perceptions	  and	  interpretations.	  	  
In	  this	  way	  they	  fail	  to	  address	  the	  inherent	  contradiction	  between	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  
political	  support,	  and	  a	  government-­‐supported	  political	  elite	  that	  rules	  through	  an	  autonomous	  
council:	  Why	  would	  most	  of	  the	  population	  support	  a	  party	  which	  officially	  draws	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐
regional	  agenda	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cooperating	  with	  the	  State	  government	  to	  rule	  an	  
autonomous	  council	  which	  –	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  many	  –	  is	  only	  a	  government-­‐designed	  means	  to	  divert	  
the	  ethno-­‐regional	  statehood	  agenda	  based	  on	  which	  this	  party	  originally	  gained	  mass	  support?	  Why	  
do	  people	  not	  instead	  follow	  another	  regional	  party	  that	  states	  a	  claim	  to	  Gorkhaland	  when	  the	  
ruling	  party	  diverts	  from	  its	  main	  agenda?	  	  
In	  his	  extensive	  study	  on	  the	  1986	  GNLF	  agitation,	  T.B.	  Subba	  (1992)	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  explore	  the	  
relationships	  between	  leaders	  and	  the	  masses	  more	  closely	  (ibid.	  192)	  and	  to	  see	  leaders	  as	  
dependent	  on	  their	  respective	  political	  parties.	  He	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  interrelations	  between	  social	  
class	  divisions,	  local	  political	  power	  struggles	  and	  the	  violent	  turn	  the	  movement	  took	  in	  the	  1980s.	  
Similarly,	  Samanta	  (2000)	  made	  an	  attempt	  to	  dismantle	  the	  “movement”	  of	  the	  1980s	  by	  digging	  
into	  the	  internal	  structure	  and	  contradictions	  of	  the	  GNLF.	  Both	  studies	  provide	  important	  impetus	  
for	  understanding	  the	  inherent	  contradictions	  of	  the	  statehood	  “movement”.	  I	  want	  to	  complement	  
these	  by	  further	  exploring	  the	  party/movement/mass	  relations	  from	  the	  view	  of	  the	  ruled.	  	  
Research	  aims	  and	  research	  questions	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  study	  of	  statehood	  movements	  and	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation	  I	  have	  outlined	  above,	  this	  study	  has	  two	  aims.	  First,	  it	  intends	  to	  address	  the	  gaps	  
identified	  by	  accounting	  for	  statehood	  movements’	  effects	  on	  regional	  political	  regimes,	  and	  for	  
what	  they	  mean	  to	  those	  involved.	  It	  seeks	  to	  dismantle	  the	  “movement”	  paradigm	  by	  accounting	  for	  
the	  movements’	  internal	  fractures,	  issues	  of	  representation,	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion,	  and	  their	  
conflation	  with	  party	  politics.	  Second	  –	  but	  related	  to	  the	  first	  aim	  –	  this	  study	  attempts	  to	  analyse	  
the	  dominance	  of	  an	  ethno-­‐regional	  party	  in	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  in	  Darjeeling.	  It	  seeks	  to	  
understand	  how	  the	  political	  authority	  of	  this	  party	  -­‐	  the	  GJM	  -­‐	  is	  constructed.	  To	  do	  so	  it	  explores	  
the	  ruling	  strategies	  employed	  by	  the	  party	  and	  its	  leaders,	  and	  contrasts	  these	  with	  their	  perception	  
and	  evaluation	  by	  those	  over	  whom	  they	  seek	  to	  rule.	  	  




The	  study	  pursues	  these	  aims	  by	  posing	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  
• What	  are	  the	  incumbent	  party’s	  strategies	  for	  ruling?	  What	  are	  the	  limitations	  to	  its	  rule?	  
• How	  are	  such	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  perceived	  and	  evaluated	  by	  the	  ruled?	  Why	  would	  
presumably	  “aware	  citizens”,	  who	  wish	  to	  secure	  their	  rights,	  lend	  support	  to	  or	  accept	  a	  
party	  whose	  ways	  of	  ruling	  through	  corruption	  and	  repression	  apparently	  contradict	  such	  
aspirations?	  	  
• What	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime?	  
Does	  the	  movement	  help	  to	  sustain	  the	  regime,	  and,	  if	  so,	  in	  what	  way?	  	  
The	  attempt	  to	  analyse	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement	  on	  regional	  political	  regimes	  makes	  it	  
necessary	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  national	  and	  State	  level	  concern	  of	  many	  studies	  on	  statehood	  
movements	  (Chadda	  2002;	  Phadnis	  and	  Ganguly	  2001;	  Kohli	  1997a;	  Shah	  2010;	  Adeney	  2002;	  
Bhattacharyya	  2005).	  Instead,	  following	  the	  suggestion	  of	  Heller	  (2009)	  who	  found	  that	  “the	  problem	  
of	  democratisation	  [in	  India]	  lies	  less	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  democracy	  or	  the	  party	  system	  [...]	  than	  in	  
the	  political	  practices	  and	  channels	  that	  link	  civil	  society	  to	  the	  State”	  (ibid.	  133,	  my	  emphasis),	  I	  
propose	  that	  one	  must	  focus	  on	  the	  practices	  of	  statehood	  movements	  if	  one	  wishes	  to	  understand	  
their	  effects.	  This	  includes	  a	  study	  of	  the	  “local”	  life	  of	  such	  movements	  as	  embodied	  and	  enacted	  in	  
quotidian	  social	  and	  political	  practice.	  This	  study	  therefore	  opted	  for	  an	  approach	  grounded	  in	  social	  
science,	  which	  attempts	  to	  understand	  political	  structures	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  social	  and	  political	  
practice	  (cf.	  Giddens	  1984).	  I	  propose	  that	  only	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  in	  
relation	  to	  their	  public	  perception	  and	  reproduction	  will	  help	  to	  solve	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  co-­‐existence	  
of	  sachet	  jantā	  and	  authoritarianism	  in	  Darjeeling.	  	  
The	  explicit	  focus	  on	  local	  perceptions	  and	  political	  practices	  not	  only	  complements	  existing	  critical	  
studies	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  and	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling,	  but	  as	  I	  will	  explain	  in	  
Chapter	  1.3,	  it	  also	  adds	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  qualitative	  relations	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  in	  
regimes	  dominated	  by	  one	  political	  party.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  is	  historically	  strongly	  associated	  with	  regional	  
parties	  that	  draw	  their	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  same	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda.	  To	  account	  for	  this	  close	  
conjuncture	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  with	  regional	  parties,	  and	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  the	  statehood	  
movement	  and	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  I	  attempt	  to	  contextualise	  the	  research	  into	  statehood	  
movements	  with	  a	  view	  of	  research	  into	  political	  authority	  and	  party	  political	  contestations.	  Thus,	  
instead	  of	  treating	  movements	  and	  parties	  separately	  –	  both	  empirically	  and	  conceptually	  –	  the	  
study	  compares	  and	  contrasts	  them	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  The	  study	  thus	  contributes	  to	  a	  better	  




understanding	  of	  the	  regional	  effects	  of	  statehood	  movements	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  to	  the	  
persistence	  of	  dominant	  party	  regimes	  under	  national	  democratic	  set-­‐ups	  on	  the	  other.	  	  
This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  main	  proposition	  of	  this	  study.	  I	  propose	  that	  in	  Darjeeling	  there	  is	  not	  only	  a	  
co-­‐existence	  of	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  statehood	  movement	  but	  also	  that	  the	  two	  are	  strongly	  
related	  and	  dependent.	  I	  assume	  that	  instead	  of	  leading	  to	  greater	  democratisation	  and	  grassroots	  
participation,	  agitations	  for	  new	  States	  can	  imply	  and	  foster	  the	  establishment	  of	  regional	  
“competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes”	  (cf.	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002)	  which	  are	  dominated	  by	  powerful	  
ethno-­‐regional	  parties.	  These	  parties’	  privileging	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  as	  a	  major	  means	  for	  
mobilisation	  and	  legitimation	  ultimately	  shuts	  down	  alternative	  ways	  for	  people	  to	  negotiate	  their	  
relations	  with	  the	  state.	  	  
To	  substantiate	  this	  thesis	  I	  draw	  on	  two	  bodies	  of	  work:	  studies	  on	  authoritarian	  regimes	  based	  in	  
comparative	  politics;	  and	  anthropological	  studies	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  South	  
Asia.	  As	  I	  will	  further	  elaborate	  in	  Chapter	  1.3,	  studies	  on	  dominant	  party	  regimes	  or	  competitive	  
authoritarianism	  (Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002;	  Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010)	  identify	  repression,	  co-­‐
optation/patronage	  and	  legitimacy	  as	  major	  strategies	  used	  by	  incumbents	  to	  maintain	  their	  power	  
before	  other	  rival	  parties	  (Gerschewski	  2014;	  Greene	  2010;	  Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013).	  
Anthropological	  approaches	  complement	  these	  largely	  national	  analyses.	  They	  not	  only	  help	  to	  
account	  for	  my	  understanding	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  deriving	  from	  a	  qualitative,	  contested	  and	  
dynamic	  two-­‐sided	  relationship	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled.	  They	  also	  enable	  me	  to	  approach	  the	  
qualitative	  relations	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  and	  the	  ruled’s	  reasons	  for	  lending	  
support	  to,	  or	  complying	  with,	  certain	  leaders.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  methodology,	  I	  chose	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  grounded	  in	  the	  constructivist	  paradigm	  
(Lincoln,	  Lynham,	  and	  Guba	  2011;	  Kubik	  2009;	  Schatz	  2009).	  This	  not	  only	  enables	  me	  to	  assess	  the	  
qualitative	  relationships	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled,	  and	  strategies	  for	  attaining	  political	  authority	  and	  
their	  perceptions,	  but	  also	  to	  account	  for	  the	  different	  meanings,	  interpretations	  and	  performances	  
of	  politics.	  I	  chose	  a	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnographic	  approach	  (Marcus	  1995)	  to	  account	  for	  the	  multiple	  
sites	  of	  these	  constructions	  and	  performances	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	  Aside	  from	  party	  offices	  and	  sites	  of	  
political	  performance	  such	  as	  public	  meetings,	  tea	  plantations	  were	  of	  particular	  importance	  as	  
contested	  sites	  for	  political	  support	  in	  regional	  politics	  (see	  Chapter	  1.4).	  The	  juxtaposition	  of	  these	  
views	  from	  different	  sites	  and	  sources	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  display	  the	  multiple	  and	  often	  
contradictory	  perspectives	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  statehood	  movement,	  and	  in	  the	  two-­‐sided	  
construction	  of	  political	  authority.	  Case	  studies	  illustrate	  these	  findings.	  The	  methods	  I	  apply	  include	  
participant	  and	  non-­‐participant	  observation,	  different	  forms	  of	  interviews,	  and	  document	  analysis.	  




In	  studying	  these	  questions	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  revived	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  since	  2007.	  Accordingly,	  this	  
study	  primarily	  covers	  the	  period	  from	  October	  2007	  –	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  GJM	  –	  to	  July	  2013.	  In	  a	  
few	  cases	  I	  also	  add	  observations	  from	  briefer	  stays	  in	  December	  2013	  and	  October	  2014.	  I	  embed	  
this	  analysis	  with	  a	  view	  on	  historical	  developments	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  the	  19th	  century,	  including	  
pre-­‐and	  post-­‐Independence	  politics,	  the	  first	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  (1986-­‐1988),	  and	  the	  reign	  of	  
the	  GNLF	  till	  2007/08.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  I	  have	  also	  added	  some	  information	  -­‐	  largely	  
based	  on	  newspaper	  reports	  –	  up	  to	  the	  March	  2014	  national	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections.	  
To	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  I	  introduced	  above,	  the	  subsequent	  chapters	  of	  this	  study	  are	  as	  
follows.	  Chapter	  1.2	  develops	  the	  aforementioned	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  statehood	  movements	  
and	  political	  authority,	  and	  provides	  more	  detailed	  background	  information	  about	  Darjeeling	  and	  the	  
statehood	  claim.	  I	  contextualise	  this	  within	  a	  broader	  review	  of	  literature	  about	  movements	  for	  new	  
States	  in	  India.	  I	  contrast	  positive	  accounts	  of	  such	  movements	  with	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  their	  
effects	  and	  outcomes.	  I	  then	  show	  why	  a	  different	  approach	  is	  required	  to	  understand	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  regional	  political	  regime.	  In	  Chapter	  1.3	  I	  introduce	  
approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  as	  valuable	  entrance	  points	  for	  understanding	  the	  
dominance	  of	  the	  GJM	  over	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  strategies	  
incumbents	  in	  such	  regimes	  employ	  to	  gain	  and	  maintain	  their	  political	  authority.	  After	  a	  critical	  
evaluation	  of	  these	  theories,	  largely	  based	  on	  comparative	  politics,	  I	  propose	  to	  employ	  
anthropological	  approaches	  to	  understand	  better	  how	  political	  authority	  emerges	  from	  the	  relations	  
between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled.	  Chapters	  4	  to	  7	  detail	  these	  theoretical	  approaches.	  As	  my	  study	  
attempts	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  side	  of	  the	  ruled	  by	  including	  their	  perceptions	  and	  evaluations	  of	  
rulers,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  appropriately	  situate	  their	  perspectives	  in	  their	  respective	  historical,	  socio-­‐
economic	  and	  cultural	  contexts.	  To	  do	  so,	  Chapter	  1.4	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  economy,	  
development	  indicators,	  demography	  and	  history.	  As	  a	  majority	  of	  rulers’	  and	  the	  ruled’s	  accounts	  
stems	  from	  people	  residing	  and	  working	  on	  Darjeeling	  tea	  plantations,	  this	  section	  also	  provides	  a	  
detailed	  background	  of	  these.	  
Chapter	  2	  substantiates	  my	  epistemological	  approach	  and	  describes	  the	  methodology	  employed	  in	  
this	  study.	  It	  also	  comments	  on	  my	  positionality	  and	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  study.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  situates	  the	  topic	  in	  a	  historical	  context	  by	  reviewing	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  
in	  Darjeeling	  in	  relation	  to	  political	  process	  and	  party	  politics	  since	  the	  colonial	  time.	  This	  chapter	  
combines	  insights	  from	  existing	  studies	  with	  archival	  data	  and	  interviews,	  and	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  
time-­‐span	  between	  the	  19th	  century	  and	  2007.	  	  




Chapters	  4	  to	  7	  then	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  present	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  2007,	  and	  
analyse	  the	  GJM’s	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  and	  their	  reception	  in	  detail.	  These	  chapters	  account	  more	  
explicitly	  for	  the	  perceptions	  of	  the	  ruled.	  Chapter	  4	  researches	  why	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  –	  
after	  2007	  –	  continues	  to	  appeal	  so	  strongly	  to	  people	  in	  Darjeeling.	  This	  chapter	  draws	  mainly	  on	  
the	  approach	  of	  Anthony	  Smith	  (Smith	  1996a;	  Smith	  1996b;	  Smith	  1996c)	  to	  understand	  the	  
construction	  of	  ethnic	  identities,	  and	  other	  studies	  on	  regionalisation	  and	  imaginative	  geographies	  
(Reuber	  1999;	  Radcliffe	  1998;	  Paasi	  2002a).	  A	  comparison	  of	  political	  leaders’	  rhetoric	  and	  public	  
aspirations	  reveals	  the	  fractures	  in	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imagination	  and	  raises	  serious	  questions	  about	  
party-­‐leaders’	  representation	  of	  the	  public.	  It	  also	  shows	  how	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda	  has	  been	  
employed	  by	  political	  leaders	  to	  marginalise	  rivals	  and	  alternative	  imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling.	  	  
Chapter	  5	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  and	  why	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  his	  new	  party,	  the	  GJM,	  gained	  
power	  in	  Darjeeling	  in	  2007,	  and	  reviews	  the	  processes	  leading	  to	  the	  GNLF’s	  ousting	  in	  2008.	  
Drawing	  on	  anthropological	  studies	  on	  leadership	  and	  reputation	  in	  South	  Asia	  (Bailey	  1988;	  Bailey	  
1971;	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010a;	  Alm	  2006),	  it	  proposes	  that	  it	  was	  in	  particular	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  
social	  worker	  and	  strongman	  that	  helped	  him	  to	  mesmerise	  the	  masses.	  An	  evaluation	  of	  popular	  
perceptions	  of	  Gurung,	  however,	  reveals	  that	  after	  gaining	  power	  he	  slowly	  lost	  public	  trust.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  the	  GJM	  maintains	  its	  rule	  through	  other	  means.	  These	  are	  subject	  to	  discussion	  in	  the	  
following	  two	  chapters,	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  time	  span	  between	  2008	  and	  2012.	  	  
Chapter	  6	  analyses	  the	  role	  of	  political	  patronage	  and	  so-­‐called	  “money	  power”.	  Drawing	  on	  
literature	  on	  clientelism,	  patronage,	  corruption,	  and	  “machine	  politics”	  (Greene	  2010;	  Piliavsky	  
2014a;	  Chandra	  2003;	  de	  Wit	  1996)	  I	  show	  how	  intra-­‐party	  patronage,	  distributed	  along	  hierarchical	  
chains	  of	  the	  organisation,	  helped	  the	  party	  president	  to	  bind	  activists	  to	  him	  through	  promises	  of	  
developmental	  contracts	  and	  other	  state	  benefits.	  In	  such	  a	  competitive	  system	  within	  the	  party,	  the	  
violent	  oppression	  of	  rivals	  emerges	  as	  a	  means	  for	  activists	  to	  make	  claims	  on	  the	  party	  leaders.	  
Simultaneously,	  the	  evolving	  exclusionary	  structures	  give	  rise	  to	  public	  criticism	  of	  leaders	  and	  
diminish	  their	  reputation	  as	  social	  workers.	  	  
Chapter	  7	  further	  looks	  into	  the	  role	  of	  hard	  repression	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  ruling.	  Drawing	  on	  Brass’	  
(1997)	  suggestion	  of	  a	  “functional	  utility”	  of	  violence	  and	  a	  call	  to	  show	  attentiveness	  to	  
interpretations	  and	  performances	  of	  violence	  (ibid.;	  Hansen	  2001;	  Gorringe	  2006a)	  it	  not	  only	  shows	  
how	  hard	  repression	  sustains	  fear	  amongst	  the	  population	  and	  oppresses	  dissent.	  It	  also	  displays	  
how	  leaders	  reinterpret	  such	  incidents	  to	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  a	  “democratic	  and	  non-­‐violent”	  party.	  	  




Chapter	  8	  then	  contrasts	  the	  GJM’s	  practices	  for	  ruling	  with	  attempts	  for	  resistance,	  which	  takes	  
different	  forms	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  these	  attempts	  began	  to	  emerge	  more	  clearly	  since	  
2010	  and	  have	  intensified	  especially	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  in	  2011	  and	  its	  establishment	  in	  2012.	  	  
Chapter	  9	  summarises	  the	  results	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions.	  	  
	  
1.2 Gorkhaland	  and	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  
A	  stroll	  through	  the	  green,	  hilly	  landscape	  of	  Darjeeling	  district,	  famous	  for	  its	  tea	  and	  as	  a	  domestic	  
and	  international	  tourist	  destination,	  reveals	  barely	  anything	  of	  the	  violent	  history	  of	  this	  former	  
British	  hill	  station.	  Tourists	  travelling	  up	  from	  the	  dusty	  business	  hub	  of	  Siliguri	  in	  the	  district’s	  plains	  
to	  the	  Darjeeling	  hills5,	  which	  comprise	  Kurseong,	  Kalimpong	  and	  Darjeeling	  sub-­‐divisions,	  are	  
welcomed	  by	  colourfully	  painted	  houses	  pitched	  against	  the	  steep	  slopes	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  miles	  of	  tea	  
plantations.	  If	  they	  are	  in	  luck,	  on	  a	  clear	  day	  they	  can	  spot	  the	  impressive	  massif	  of	  the	  
Kanchenjunga,	  the	  world’s	  third-­‐highest	  mountain,	  whose	  snow-­‐white	  peaks	  seem	  to	  float	  above	  
these	  dark-­‐green	  Himalayan	  foothills.	  The	  mountain	  lies	  between	  Nepal	  and	  Sikkim,	  the	  State	  to	  the	  
north.	  Darjeeling	  once	  belonged	  to	  this	  former	  kingdom	  before	  its	  king	  ceded	  it	  to	  the	  East	  India	  
Company	  in	  1835.	  West	  of	  the	  district	  lies	  Nepal,	  to	  the	  east	  is	  Bhutan,	  and	  to	  the	  south-­‐east	  it	  
borders	  Bangladesh	  (see	  Map,	  p.	  xxi).	  Old	  colonial	  remains	  are	  a	  reminder	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  times	  as	  a	  
British	  hill	  station	  and	  the	  summer	  capital	  of	  the	  Bengal	  presidency.	  	  
However,	  Darjeeling’s	  picturesque	  exterior	  is	  deceptive,	  as	  the	  region	  has	  witnessed	  a	  long	  history	  of	  
political	  uproar,	  largely	  connected	  with	  demands	  for	  territorial	  autonomy	  and	  an	  administrative	  
separation	  from	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State.	  As	  early	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  members	  of	  the	  
local	  elite	  demanded	  a	  separation	  of	  the	  region	  dominated	  by	  a	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  population,	  the	  so-­‐
called	  “Gorkhas”.	  Throughout	  the	  20th	  century,	  such	  demands	  were	  reiterated	  by	  different	  political	  
outfits,	  amongst	  them	  the	  All	  India	  Gorkha	  League	  (AIGL)	  which	  demanded	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  
State	  since	  1948.	  Administrative	  separation	  of	  the	  geographically	  and	  culturally	  distinct	  region,	  they	  
argued,	  would	  ensure	  adequate	  representation	  of	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  minority	  in	  state	  governance.	  
In	  1946	  and	  1947	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI)	  even	  proposed	  to	  create	  a	  new	  nation	  state	  of	  
“Gorkhasthan”	  comprising	  Nepal,	  Sikkim	  and	  Darjeeling.	  None	  of	  these	  demands	  was	  successful,	  and	  
Darjeeling	  remained	  part	  of	  West	  Bengal	  State.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘Darjeeling’	  or	  ‘Darjeeling	  hills’	  to	  refer	  to	  its	  three	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  
(Darjeeling,	  Kalimpong,	  Kurseong),	  ‘Darjeeling	  district’	  for	  the	  whole	  district	  including	  its	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division	  in	  
the	  plains,	  and	  ‘Darjeeling	  town’	  for	  the	  administrative	  headquarters	  of	  the	  district	  (see	  Map,	  p.	  xxi).	  
	  




The	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  itself	  was	  first	  raised	  in	  1980	  by	  the	  newly	  established	  Pranta	  Parishad,	  
and	  then	  –	  more	  forcefully	  –	  by	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  (GNLF)	  and	  its	  charismatic	  
leader	  Subash	  Ghisingh.	  He	  proposed	  to	  carve	  out	  the	  new	  State	  from	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  the	  
adjoining	  areas	  of	  the	  Dooars	  on	  the	  southern	  fringes	  of	  Bhutan,	  although	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  
population	  was	  not	  in	  a	  majority	  there.	  Only	  a	  separate	  State,	  according	  to	  Ghising,	  would	  guarantee	  
the	  Gorkhas	  a	  recognised	  Indian	  identity,	  and	  put	  an	  end	  to	  their	  perceived	  stigmatisation	  as	  citizens	  
from	  Nepal.	  Drawing	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  socio-­‐political	  anxiety	  and	  ethnic	  agenda,	  Ghisingh	  mobilised	  the	  
masses	  for	  a	  violent	  agitation	  for	  statehood	  which	  was	  mainly	  directed	  against	  the	  Communist	  Party	  
of	  India	  -­‐	  Marxist	  (CPI-­‐M)-­‐led	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government,	  which	  strictly	  opposed	  the	  creation	  of	  
Gorkhaland.	  Between	  1986	  and	  1988,	  the	  civil-­‐war-­‐like	  violent	  agitation,	  in	  which	  GNLF	  activists	  and	  
state-­‐backed	  CPI-­‐M	  activists	  fought	  each	  other,	  left	  an	  estimated	  1,200	  persons	  dead	  (Subba	  1992;	  
Samanta	  2000;	  Lama	  1994).	  Eventually,	  in	  1988,	  Ghising	  signed	  a	  tripartite	  agreement	  with	  the	  State	  
and	  central	  government	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  regional	  council	  -­‐	  the	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  
Council	  (DGHC).	  The	  council	  comprised	  the	  three	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  (Kalimpong,	  
Kurseong,	  Darjeeling)	  and	  a	  few	  adjoining	  areas	  of	  the	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division.	  It	  ceded	  certain	  
administrative	  powers	  to	  an	  elected	  hill	  government	  and	  received	  funding	  from	  the	  central	  and	  State	  
governments.	  	  
Importantly,	  administrative	  overlaps	  between	  the	  DGHC’s	  constituencies	  and	  the	  three-­‐tier	  
panchayat	  system6	  created	  an	  exceptional	  system	  of	  local	  governance	  in	  Darjeeling.	  In	  1992,	  the	  73rd	  
Constitution	  Amendment	  Act	  effectively	  dispossessed	  the	  three	  Darjeeling	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  of	  2	  tiers	  
of	  the	  3-­‐tier	  panchayat	  structure.	  It	  not	  only	  dissolved	  the	  district	  or	  zilla	  parishad	  (till	  then	  including	  
the	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division).	  Although	  the	  panchayat	  samitis	  at	  the	  intermediary	  block	  level	  were	  not	  
dissolved,	  they	  were	  never	  elected	  and	  did	  not	  actually	  function,	  so	  that	  only	  the	  local	  gram	  
panchayats	  remained	  as	  locally	  elected	  bodies,	  albeit	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  DGHC.	  Unlike	  in	  
the	  three	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions,	  the	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division	  has	  a	  full	  three-­‐tier	  panchayat	  structure.	  Here,	  in	  
1989	  a	  separate	  mahakuma	  parishad	  (sub-­‐divisional	  council)	  was	  established	  in	  place	  of	  the	  previous	  
district-­‐wide	  zilla	  parishad	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000).	  The	  latter	  only	  exercises	  authority	  over	  the	  
Siliguri	  sub-­‐division	  of	  Darjeeling	  district.	  This	  set-­‐up	  not	  only	  led	  to	  a	  partial	  separation	  of	  the	  Siliguri	  
sub-­‐division	  from	  the	  overall	  district	  administrative	  structure.	  For	  the	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions,	  it	  also	  led	  to	  a	  
higher	  concentration	  of	  powers	  in	  the	  DGHC,	  while	  crippling	  local	  participation	  in	  governance	  
(Chakrabarty	  2005).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  constitutional	  three-­‐tier	  panchayat	  system	  in	  India	  includes	  the	  gram	  panchayats,	  locally	  elected	  self-­‐
government	  institutions	  that	  implement	  state	  programmes	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  These	  send	  representatives	  to	  the	  
panchayat	  samiti	  at	  block	  level	  and	  to	  the	  zilla	  parishad	  at	  district	  level.	  The	  panchayats	  receive	  funding	  from	  
the	  State	  and	  central	  government,	  and	  are	  regarded	  powerful	  institutions	  at	  the	  grassroots.	  




The	  GNLF	  won	  all	  the	  five-­‐yearly	  DGHC	  elections,	  and	  GNLF	  president	  Ghisingh	  became	  the	  council’s	  
chairman,	  putting	  it	  entirely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  GNLF	  and	  its	  councillors	  for	  the	  coming	  19	  years.	  But	  
Ghisingh’s	  perceived	  hobnobbing	  with	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  the	  failure	  to	  deliver	  the	  
development	  he	  had	  promised,	  allegations	  of	  corruption	  and	  repression	  of	  rivals,	  and	  the	  perceived	  
rollback	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda	  added	  to	  the	  growing	  public	  apprehensions.	  Yet	  none	  of	  the	  
other	  existing	  regional	  parties	  which	  continued	  demanding	  Gorkhaland	  was	  able	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  
growing	  anti-­‐incumbency	  mood	  and,	  backed	  by	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  Ghisingh	  remained	  the	  
unchallenged	  ruler	  of	  Darjeeling.	  Until,	  that	  was,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  -­‐	  himself	  a	  GNLF	  leader	  -­‐	  entered	  the	  
stage	  on	  7th	  October	  2007.	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  capitalised	  on	  the	  growing	  dissent	  and	  established	  a	  new	  organisation,	  the	  Gorkha	  
Janmukti	  Morcha	  (GJM),	  which	  subsequently	  took	  over	  the	  rule	  from	  the	  GNLF,	  chased	  Ghisingh	  out	  
of	  the	  hills	  and	  revived	  demands	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  Like	  Ghisingh	  in	  1986,	  the	  GJM	  mobilised	  the	  
masses	  by	  promising	  them	  that	  Gorkhaland	  would	  guarantee	  their	  recognition	  as	  genuine	  Indian	  
citizens,	  and	  address	  their	  developmental	  grievances.	  Unlike	  in	  1986,	  however,	  the	  movement	  
against	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  was	  announced	  as	  “non-­‐violent”	  and	  drew	  largely	  on	  forms	  of	  
public	  disobedience.	  	  
After	  having	  announced	  a	  “new	  dawn”	  for	  Darjeeling	  in	  October	  2007	  at	  a	  massive	  public	  meeting	  in	  
Siliguri	  in	  May	  2008,	  Gurung	  further	  underlined	  his	  different	  approach	  to	  politics,	  which	  he	  promised	  
would	  revolutionise	  relations	  between	  leaders	  and	  followers:	  	  
It	  is	  time	  for	  leaders	  to	  do	  politics	  passively,	  and	  for	  people	  to	  do	  it	  actively.	  It	  is	  people’s	  
responsibility	  to	  watch:	  What	  does	  the	  leader	  eat?	  Where	  does	  he	  go?	  What	  vehicle	  does	  he	  
ride?	  In	  what	  kind	  of	  building	  does	  he	  reside?	  [...]	  We	  are	  here	  to	  make	  people	  ‘conscious’	  
[Engl.].	  (speech,	  7.5.2008)	  	  
Gurung	  also	  announced	  that	  the	  new	  agitation	  would	  not	  be	  led	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  political	  party,	  
instead	  declaring	  the	  GJM	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  of	  the	  jāti	  (race,	  group,	  kind),	  while	  asking	  
members	  of	  other	  Gorkha	  parties	  to	  leave	  their	  leadership	  behind	  and	  instead	  to	  unite	  under	  a	  
common	  flag	  until	  Gorkhaland	  was	  achieved:	  
So	  I	  am	  declaring	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  party	  flag	  but	  a	  jāti	  flag.	  So	  you	  all,	  leave	  your	  [party-­‐]	  flags	  
and	  come	  here!	  Come	  under	  this	  flag	  and	  we	  will	  get	  Gorkhaland.	  You	  can	  be	  whatever	  you	  
want	  to	  be:	  a	  leader,	  a	  chairman,	  or	  home	  minister.	  But	  first	  get	  Gorkhaland.	  (speech,	  
7.10.2007)	  
After	  ousting	  Ghising,	  the	  GJM’s	  dominance	  was	  bolstered	  by	  its	  recognition	  as	  the	  sole	  negotiation	  
partner	  of	  the	  then	  CPI-­‐M-­‐led	  State	  and	  Congress-­‐led	  central	  government.	  Such	  negotiations	  –	  
supported	  by	  various	  tactics	  of	  public	  disobedience	  such	  as	  general	  strikes	  or	  gheraus	  (encircling	  with	  




a	  human	  chain)	  of	  government	  offices	  in	  Darjeeling	  –	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  proposition	  of	  an	  “interim	  
council”	  (Indian	  Express,	  19.3.2010).	  But	  in	  July	  2011	  it	  was	  not	  the	  CPI-­‐M,	  but	  the	  newly	  elected	  
West	  Bengal	  Chief	  Minister	  (CM)	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  of	  the	  All	  India	  Trinamool	  Congress	  (TMC)	  who	  
succeeded	  in	  establishing	  this	  new	  council	  on	  paper	  (The	  Hindu,	  19.7.2011).	  	  
Thus,	  instead	  of	  succeeding	  with	  the	  statehood	  demand,	  after	  a	  four-­‐year	  agitation,	  the	  GJM	  signed	  a	  
tripartite	  agreement	  with	  the	  State	  and	  central	  government	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  council.	  This	  
“Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration”	  (GTA)	  was	  to	  replace	  the	  DGHC,	  and	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  
GJM	  as	  a	  stepping	  stone	  towards	  Gorkhaland	  (especially	  due	  to	  the	  word	  “Gorkhaland”	  in	  its	  name).	  
Importantly,	  instead	  of	  party	  president	  Gurung,	  it	  was	  General	  Secretary	  Roshan	  Giri	  who	  signed	  the	  
agreement	  so	  that	  Gurung	  could	  keep	  his	  hands	  clean	  (see	  Chapter	  8	  for	  more	  information	  about	  the	  
GTA).	  	  
One	  major	  setback	  for	  the	  GJM	  was,	  however,	  its	  failure	  to	  increase	  the	  area	  the	  council	  
commanded.	  The	  “Sen	  Committee”,	  which	  had	  been	  created	  to	  evaluate	  the	  Morcha’s	  claim	  to	  the	  
Dooars	  ceded	  only	  5	  mouzas7	  (of	  the	  398	  mouzas	  demanded)	  to	  the	  new	  council	  (TT,	  10.6.2012).	  
Despite	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  outrage	  on	  this	  recommendation	  and	  threats	  to	  start	  a	  new	  agitation	  for	  
Gorkhaland,	  the	  party	  leaders	  eventually	  agreed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  GTA	  elections,	  which	  were	  held	  
in	  July	  2012	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  State	  government.	  Most	  other	  regional	  parties	  boycotted	  the	  
elections,	  so	  the	  GJM	  won	  virtually	  uncontested,	  and	  since	  then	  formally	  controls	  the	  GTA	  and	  a	  bulk	  
of	  the	  development	  funds	  flowing	  into	  Darjeeling	  from	  the	  government.	  GJM	  president	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
became	  the	  elected	  chief	  of	  the	  GTA.	  Despite	  the	  GJM’s	  inability	  to	  achieve	  Gorkhaland	  and	  to	  add	  
areas	  of	  the	  Dooars	  to	  the	  GTA,	  the	  party-­‐supported	  candidates	  won	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha8	  elections	  
by	  a	  huge	  margin	  (see	  Table	  1).	  
1.2.1 The	  decentralisation	  thesis	  
Stories	  of	  demands	  for	  ethnically	  or	  linguistically	  based	  statehood,	  and	  the	  granting	  of	  autonomy	  
concessions	  by	  the	  government	  in	  form	  of	  regional	  councils	  are	  not	  unique	  to	  Darjeeling.	  After	  
independence,	  the	  Indian	  state	  witnessed	  a	  long	  period	  of	  such	  demands,	  and	  the	  constitutional	  
enshrinement	  of	  the	  possibility	  for	  States’	  territorial	  reorganisation	  testifies	  to	  the	  government’s	  
realisation	  that	  this	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  accommodate	  demands	  from	  groups	  expressing	  all	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Mouza	  is	  an	  administrative	  unit.	  One	  mouza	  comprises	  several	  gram	  panchayats.	  	  
8	  Lok	  Sabha	  refers	  to	  the	  lower	  house	  of	  the	  national	  Indian	  parliament;	  the	  Rajya	  Sabha	  (Council	  of	  States)	  is	  
the	  upper	  house.	  Members	  to	  the	  Lok	  Sabha	  (maximum	  552)	  are	  directly	  elected	  every	  five	  years.	  Most	  
members	  of	  the	  Rajya	  Sabha	  (maximum	  250)	  are	  elected	  by	  the	  respective	  State	  governments;	  twelve	  are	  
nominated	  by	  the	  Indian	  president.	  Both	  houses	  have	  equal	  participation	  in	  legislature,	  but	  owing	  to	  its	  larger	  
size	  the	  Lok	  Sabha	  is	  more	  powerful.	  




ethnic,	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  diversity	  of	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  setting	  (Kaviraj	  1989;	  Shastri	  and	  Wilson	  
2001;	  Chadda	  2002;	  Bhattacharyya	  2005)9.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Election	  results	  for	  Darjeeling	  hills	  (Darjeeling	  Kalimpong,	  Kurseong).	  Sources:	  ^Assorted	  Thougthz	  
(2009);	  ^^Indian	  Election	  Affairs	  (2011);	  ^^^personal	  communication	  Saman	  Pathak	  (CPI-­‐M)	  
2009	  –	  Lok	  Sabha*^	  	  
BJP/GJM	   CPI/CPI-­‐M	   INC	   Others	  
411,739	   11,421	   13,132	   4,362	  
2011	  –	  West	  Bengal	  State	  Assembly^^	  	  
GJM	   GNLF	   AIGL	   CPI/CPI-­‐M	   INC	   Others	  
343,931	   42,605	   17,513	   12,711	   10,134	   5,963	  
2014	  –	  Lok	  Sabha^^^	  
BJP/GJM	   TMC/GNLF	   M.P.	  Lama**	   CPI/CPI-­‐M	   INC	   Others	   NOTA***	  
289,017	   91,271	   52,563	   5,546	   6,487	   2,361	   8,309	  
*	  Not	  contested	  by	  GNLF;	  AIGL	  and	  CPRM	  supported	  BJP/GJM	  combine	  
**	  Independent	  candidate,	  supported	  by	  AIGL,	  CPRM,	  BGP	  
***	  None	  of	  the	  above,	  option	  introduced	  in	  2014	  
	  
Ceding	  to	  the	  pressure	  of	  public	  movements	  that	  started	  to	  emerge	  shortly	  after	  Indian	  
Independence,	  the	  Union	  government	  under	  Prime	  Minister	  Nehru	  established	  a	  States	  
Reorganisation	  Commission	  (SCR)	  as	  early	  as	  1953.	  Based	  on	  its	  recommendations,	  the	  existing	  
administrative	  units	  were	  reorganised	  in	  1956,	  resulting	  in	  14	  States	  organised	  along	  linguistic	  lines;	  
the	  number	  of	  States	  has	  since	  doubled.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  the	  ethnically	  diverse	  north-­‐
eastern	  parts	  witnessed	  the	  creation	  of	  five	  new	  States	  along	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  lines	  to	  appease	  
tribal	  insurgency,	  and	  in	  2000	  the	  then	  BJP	  Union	  government	  created	  Uttarkahand,	  Chhattisgarh	  
and	  Jharkhand,	  officially	  for	  administrative	  reasons	  (Bhattacharyya	  2005;	  Beck,	  Destradi,	  and	  Neff	  
2010).	  In	  2013	  the	  national	  Congress-­‐led	  government	  responded	  to	  the	  long-­‐standing	  demand	  for	  
Telangana	  to	  be	  carved	  out	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  which	  thus	  became	  India’s	  29th	  State	  in	  2014.	  But	  
despite	  this	  wide-­‐reaching	  reorganisation	  there	  are	  still	  more	  demands	  for	  autonomy	  pending.	  The	  
demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  is	  but	  one	  of	  about	  30	  statehood	  demands,	  amongst	  them	  the	  ones	  for	  
Bodoland	  (Assam),	  Vidharbha	  (Maharasthra),	  and	  Bundelkhand	  (Uttar	  Pradesh/Madhya	  Pradesh).	  
Nearly	  all	  of	  these	  demands	  are	  formulated	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  an	  Indian	  nation	  state,	  and	  are	  
therefore	  not	  secessionist	  but	  “sub-­‐national”	  (Baruah	  1997).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Various	  studies	  on	  statehood	  movements	  and	  reorganisation	  have	  discussed	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  
the	  Indian	  nation.	  Contrary	  to	  fears	  that	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  “Balkanisation”	  of	  India,	  most	  studies	  found	  that	  
reorganisation	  strengthens	  national	  unity	  and	  demonstrates	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Indian	  state	  to	  “accommodate”	  
demands	  for	  autonomy	  through	  diverting	  power	  to	  lower	  levels	  (Kohli	  1997a;	  Chadda	  2002;	  Ganguly	  2005;	  
Shah	  2010).	  




Many	  authors	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  groups	  demanding	  statehood	  as	  resulting	  from	  unfulfilled	  hopes	  
and	  expectations	  towards	  the	  state	  which	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  promises	  of	  delivering	  symbolic	  or	  
material	  goods	  such	  as	  recognition	  of	  (ethnic)	  identities	  and	  lifestyles,	  or	  the	  provision	  of	  
development	  and	  welfare	  (Kothari	  1985;	  Corbridge	  1987;	  Kumar	  2001;	  Shastri	  and	  Wilson	  2001;	  
Phukon	  2002;	  Mawdsley	  1997;	  Mawdsley	  2002;	  Nilsen	  2007;	  Karlsson	  2013)10.	  In	  this	  reading,	  
movements	  for	  autonomy	  are	  not	  against	  the	  state	  per	  se,	  or	  the	  state	  as	  system,	  but	  emerge	  
because	  of	  the	  state's	  lack	  of	  capacity	  to	  deliver	  what	  people	  regard	  as	  their	  rightful	  entitlements.	  	  
Samaddar	  (2005)	  sees	  such	  aspirations	  for	  autonomy	  related	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  political	  
subjectivities.	  Drawing	  on	  Chatterjee’s	  (2004)	  “politics	  of	  the	  governed”	  he	  understands	  autonomy	  as	  
resistance	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  For	  him,	  it	  is	  a	  “symbol	  for	  the	  emerging	  patterns	  of	  new	  spaces	  
in	  politics,	  spaces	  that	  speak	  of	  rights	  and	  justice”	  (ibid.	  9).	  Autonomy	  indicates	  collective	  actions,	  
political	  and	  autonomous	  practices	  which	  form	  the	  political	  subject	  “in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  
existence	  of	  governmental	  realities	  of	  this	  world”	  (Samaddar	  2005,	  10).	  This	  account	  resembles	  what	  
Hansen	  has	  called	  the	  emergence	  of	  “plebeian	  identities”	  (Hansen	  2001,	  9),	  referring	  to	  citizens	  who	  
draw	  on	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  entitlements,	  rights	  and	  political	  aspirations	  to	  place	  increasing	  demands	  on	  
the	  state.	  	  
Rajni	  Kothari	  (1985)	  positively	  evaluated	  statehood	  movements	  in	  India	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  an	  
increasingly	  assertive	  grassroots	  politics.	  They	  form	  part	  of	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “non-­‐party	  political	  
process”.	  Movements	  for	  regional	  autonomy,	  he	  writes,	  “represent	  strong	  expressions	  of	  the	  will	  of	  
the	  people	  and	  their	  rejection	  of	  the	  ruling	  establishment”	  (ibid.	  345).	  As	  a	  form	  of	  a	  new	  political	  
movement	  they	  are	  based	  on	  a	  “deep	  stirring	  of	  consciousness”	  (ibid.	  341)	  and	  a	  growing	  awareness	  
of	  rights	  aimed	  at	  the	  state.	  Such	  grassroots	  movements	  “are	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  attempts	  to	  open	  
alternative	  political	  spaces	  outside	  the	  usual	  arenas	  of	  party	  and	  government	  [...]”	  (ibid.).	  In	  contrast	  
to	  the	  established	  political	  parties,	  Kothari	  regards	  grassroots	  movements	  as	  more	  radical,	  as	  
“attempts	  at	  redefining	  politics”	  (ibid.),	  seeking	  new	  forms	  of	  organisation	  and	  new	  conceptions	  of	  
political	  roles	  (ibid.	  342)	  to	  “interven[e]	  in	  the	  historical	  process”	  (ibid.	  341).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Amongst	  the	  questions	  examined	  by	  studies	  on	  statehood	  movements	  are	  critical	  evaluations	  of	  
governmental	  approaches	  towards	  ethno-­‐regionalism,	  including	  discussions	  of	  Indian	  federalism	  and	  
mechanisms	  for	  power-­‐sharing	  (Manor	  1996;	  Kohli	  1997a;	  Adeney	  2002;	  Chadda	  2002;	  Samaddar	  2002;	  Wyatt,	  
Zavos,	  and	  Hewitt	  2002;	  Bhattacharyya	  2005;	  Benedikter	  2009b;	  Lacina	  2009;	  Majeed	  2010;	  Rudolph	  and	  
Rudoloph	  2010;	  van	  Schendel	  2012),	  studies	  of	  the	  changing	  bases	  of	  States’	  reorganisation	  (Bhattacharyya	  
2001;	  Majeed	  2003;	  Kumar	  2010;	  Tillin	  2011;	  Tillin	  2013),	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  ethno-­‐nationalism	  and	  
nationalism	  (Baruah	  1997;	  Mawdsley	  2002;	  Baruah	  2005;	  Das	  2005;	  Beck,	  Destradi,	  and	  Neff	  2010),	  and	  the	  
formation	  of	  ethnic	  identities	  and	  political	  subjectivities	  (Mawdsley	  1999;Samaddar	  2005;	  Shneiderman	  and	  
Tillin	  2015).	  	  




Some	  authors	  relate	  self-­‐determination	  movements	  to	  an	  increasing	  democratisation	  and	  
decentralisation	  of	  the	  Indian	  polity.	  Kohli	  (2001,	  2)	  and	  Kaviraj	  (1989)	  interpret	  the	  emergence	  of	  
social	  and	  people’s	  movements,	  including	  self-­‐determination	  movements,	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  
“spread	  of	  democracy”	  (Kohli	  2001,	  2;	  Sangvai	  2007;	  see	  also	  Nilsen	  2007),	  and	  Kothari	  views	  them	  as	  
“part	  of	  a	  larger	  democratic	  struggle	  [...]	  providing	  local	  responses	  to	  national	  crises”	  (Kothari	  1985,	  
345).	  This	  process	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  fostered	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  movements	  organised	  along	  caste	  
or	  ethnic	  lines	  who	  have	  demanded	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  state’s	  resources	  since	  the	  1970s	  (Kaviraj	  
1989;	  Sangvai	  2007).	  
Kaviraj	  (1989)	  framed	  regionalist	  movements	  at	  the	  grassroots	  as	  a	  counter-­‐tendency	  to	  the	  
centralising	  drives	  of	  the	  Indian	  central	  government	  in	  the	  1980s11.	  He	  argued	  that	  demands	  for	  
regional	  autonomy	  were	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  “democratic	  struggle	  for	  achieving	  a	  more	  participant	  
and	  decentralised	  polity	  and	  society”	  (Kaviraj	  1989,	  13).	  Self-­‐governance	  and	  decentralisation,	  so	  his	  
contention,	  would	  bring	  the	  state	  “closer”	  to	  the	  citizens	  and	  entail	  a	  diversion	  of	  power	  from	  the	  
centre	  to	  the	  grassroots	  resulting	  in	  a	  new	  power	  balance.	  	  
In	  these	  readings	  written	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  what	  I	  call	  the	  “decentralisation	  thesis”,	  demands	  for	  a	  
redistribution	  of	  power	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  democracy	  (Kohli	  2001,	  2)	  accompanied	  by	  
a	  rapidly	  politicised	  body	  politic	  (Kohli	  1997a,	  328;	  Kohli	  2001,	  9).	  	  
This	  “decentralisation	  thesis”	  appealed	  to	  many	  subsequent	  works	  on	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  
States.	  Wyatt	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  for	  instance	  interpret	  the	  granting	  of	  autonomy	  in	  form	  of	  new	  Union	  
States	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  “decentring”	  of	  the	  Indian	  state.	  Further,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  “spread	  of	  
democracy”	  proposal,	  many	  authors	  continued	  to	  approach	  statehood	  movements	  as	  expressions	  of	  
an	  increasingly	  conscious	  citizenry	  making	  justified	  demands	  on	  the	  state	  (Corbridge	  1987;	  Mawdsley	  
1997;	  Mawdsley	  1999;	  Rangan	  2004;	  Nilsen	  2007)12.	  Such	  readings	  inherently	  suggest	  that	  statehood	  
movements	  are	  a	  form	  of	  “social	  movement”,	  a	  point	  I	  critically	  discuss	  further	  below.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Kaviraj	  sees	  this	  centralisation	  in	  the	  concentration	  of	  political	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few	  individuals	  at	  the	  
centre	  who	  disempower	  State	  governments	  and	  undermine	  federalism.	  This	  led	  to	  an	  “authoritarian	  rule”	  of	  
Rajiv	  Gandhi	  at	  that	  time	  (Kaviraj	  1989,	  12).	  
12	  Such	  positive	  associations	  with	  statehood	  movements	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  attributes	  used	  to	  label	  them.	  
While	  some	  authors	  call	  them	  “self-­‐determination	  movements”	  (Kohli	  1997)	  or	  “autonomy	  movement”	  
(Bhattacharjee	  1996),	  thereby	  stressing	  their	  decentralisation	  agenda,	  others	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  
and	  mobilisation	  aspects,	  naming	  them	  “ethnic	  movements”	  (Kohli	  1997a;	  Barbora	  2005),	  “ethno-­‐regional	  
movement”	  (Wenner	  2013)	  or	  “regional	  movements”	  (Mawdsley	  1997).	  Some	  additionally	  qualify	  their	  non-­‐
secessionist	  character	  by	  labelling	  them	  either	  “sub-­‐nationalist	  movements”	  (Chima	  2009;	  Baruah	  1997)	  or	  
“non-­‐secessionist”	  (Mawdsley	  1997).	  	  




1.2.2 The	  darker	  side	  of	  statehood	  movements	  
Although	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  decentralisation	  thesis’s	  view	  of	  statehood	  movements	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  
more	  “aware	  citizenry”	  formulating	  their	  demands	  for	  rights	  towards	  the	  state,	  the	  example	  of	  
Gorkhaland	  and	  other	  experiences	  with	  autonomy	  concessions	  and	  statehood	  agitations	  seem	  to	  
contradict	  other	  positive	  associations.	  These	  concern	  the	  conviction	  that	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  
(i)	  are	  expressions	  of	  a	  more	  assertive	  and	  distinct	  non-­‐party	  political	  process;	  (ii)	  are	  actually	  
representing	  those	  in	  whose	  names	  autonomy	  concessions	  are	  demanded	  by	  movement	  leaders;	  and	  
(iii)	  that	  they	  are	  successful	  in	  establishing	  a	  greater	  access	  to	  the	  state	  through	  promoting	  
administrative	  and	  territorial	  reform.	  I	  propose	  that	  these	  assumptions	  foreclose	  the	  view	  on	  the	  
actual	  effects	  movements	  and	  agitations	  have	  on	  the	  respective	  regional	  political	  regimes,	  e.g.	  the	  
establishment	  of	  authoritarian	  structures	  characterised	  by	  repression	  and	  corruption	  as	  described	  in	  
the	  Darjeeling	  case	  above.	  
Indeed,	  contrary	  to	  the	  decentralisation	  thesis’s	  assumptions,	  various	  critical	  studies	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  
autonomy	  movements	  or	  autonomy	  concessions	  suggest	  a	  stark	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  
proclaimed	  ideological	  contents	  of	  movements	  in	  terms	  of	  decentralisation,	  self-­‐governance	  and	  
recognition,	  and	  their	  actual	  practices	  and	  effects.	  Defying	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  separation	  of	  movements	  and	  
party	  politics,	  Tillin’s	  (2013)	  extensive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  processes	  leading	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
Jharkhand,	  Chhattisgarh	  and	  Uttarakhand	  in	  2000	  suggests,	  for	  instance,	  that	  such	  movements	  
should	  not	  be	  treated	  separately	  from	  their	  specific	  regional	  and	  broader	  State	  and	  national	  party-­‐
political	  context.	  The	  boundaries	  between	  social	  movement	  and	  party	  politics	  are	  fuzzy.	  She	  argues	  
that	  statehood	  became	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  amongst	  different	  groups	  –	  including	  social	  
movements	  and	  regional	  and	  national	  political	  parties	  –	  who	  pursued	  different	  visions	  about	  the	  
States	  to	  be	  granted.	  This	  “compromise	  politics”	  (ibid.	  24)	  entailed	  the	  suppression	  of	  some	  
ideological	  content	  of	  social	  movements	  (ibid.	  108)13.	  This	  is	  stated	  by	  Kumar	  (2011)	  who	  notes	  that	  
activists	  of	  the	  Uttarakhand	  movement	  continued	  with	  their	  protests	  even	  after	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  
new	  State	  as	  they	  found	  their	  agendas	  not	  accommodated	  with	  the	  new	  State	  government.	  
Another	  critique	  addresses	  the	  assumption	  of	  autonomy	  movements	  as	  representatives	  of	  their	  
constituents.	  Shah’s	  (2012)	  ethnographic	  account	  on	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  Jharkhand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  heart	  of	  Tillin’s	  (2013)	  analysis	  concerns	  the	  factors	  that	  actually	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  States	  in	  
2000.	  She	  denies	  any	  causal	  relation	  between	  mass	  mobilisations	  and	  the	  centre’s	  decision	  to	  grant	  new	  States	  
or	  autonomy,	  and	  instead	  suggests	  that	  movements	  become	  part	  of	  the	  political	  struggle	  over	  power	  at	  the	  
State	  and	  central	  levels.	  Defying	  claims	  which	  see	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  States	  as	  an	  actual	  response	  of	  the	  
central	  government	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  movements,	  she	  contends	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  three	  States	  was	  
rather	  the	  outcome	  of	  short-­‐term	  electoral	  considerations	  of	  Chief	  Ministers	  of	  the	  respective	  mother-­‐States	  
which	  were	  preceded	  and	  conditioned	  by	  social	  and	  political	  changes	  which	  had	  created	  new	  patterns	  of	  
political	  competition	  since	  the	  1970s,	  i.e.	  the	  rise	  of	  caste-­‐based	  politics	  or	  the	  BJP’s	  support	  for	  regional	  
movements.	  




points	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  representation	  within	  movements.	  She	  shows	  that	  statehood	  had	  very	  different	  
meanings	  for	  different	  sections	  of	  society	  (see	  also	  Corbridge	  2002).	  While	  better-­‐off	  adivasis14	  and	  
higher	  castes	  anticipated	  benefits	  from	  autonomy,	  other	  adivasis	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  show	  much	  
interest	  in	  the	  change	  of	  governance.	  Instead	  of	  seeing	  their	  aspirations	  being	  fulfilled	  through	  
statehood,	  many	  of	  them	  turned	  to	  the	  Maoists	  (Corbridge	  2002,	  Shah	  2012).	  This	  points	  at	  stark	  
discrepancies	  between	  well-­‐articulated	  elite	  -­‐	  and	  less-­‐articulated	  non-­‐elite	  -­‐	  aspirations,	  and	  
underlines	  Mawdsley’s	  critical	  remark	  that	  “regional	  mobilisations,	  like	  other	  social	  movements,	  can	  
mask	  partial	  and	  elite	  interests	  and	  manipulation”	  (Mawdsley	  2002,	  44).	  Chima	  (2009)	  and	  Lacina	  
(2014;	  2009)	  emphasise	  this	  aspect	  by	  pointing	  at	  the	  internal	  fractures	  of	  movements	  and	  power-­‐
struggles.	  In	  the	  north-­‐east	  of	  India	  this	  has	  often	  led	  to	  local	  autocracies	  and	  exacerbated	  ethnic	  
conflict.	  	  
This	  latter	  point	  is	  stated	  by	  Baruah’s	  (2005)	  study	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  autonomy	  concessions	  in	  the	  
North	  East	  of	  India,	  which	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  mosaic	  of	  different	  ethno-­‐linguist	  groups.	  He	  shows	  
that	  autonomy	  concessions	  on	  paper	  do	  not	  guarantee	  a	  more	  effective	  participation	  of	  the	  
grassroots.	  Instead,	  concessions	  in	  form	  of	  autonomous	  councils	  contributed	  to	  an	  escalation	  of	  
ethnically	  based	  conflicts	  as	  these	  increase	  the	  access	  to	  resources	  for	  an	  ethnic	  majority	  group	  while	  
tending	  to	  exclude	  ethnic	  minorities	  who	  then	  demand	  autonomy	  for	  themselves,	  often	  violently	  
(Samaddar	  2002;	  Das	  2005;	  van	  Schendel	  2012)15.	  Samaddar	  (2005)	  pointedly	  described	  such	  
discrepancies	  between	  the	  legal-­‐constitutional	  promises	  and	  principles	  of	  “autonomy”,	  and	  the	  
shortcomings	  in	  their	  factual	  implementation	  by	  a	  centralised	  state	  as	  a	  “paradox	  of	  autonomy”	  (ibid.	  
17).	  	  
Also	  studies	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  1986	  movement	  and	  the	  DGHC	  in	  Darjeeling	  show	  that	  instead	  of	  
facilitating	  greater	  participation	  of	  the	  population	  in	  regional	  governance,	  the	  autonomy	  concessions	  
for	  Darjeeling	  have	  instead	  fostered	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dominant	  political	  elite	  (Sarkar	  and	  
Bhaumik	  2000;	  Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Benedikter	  2009a;	  Lacina	  2009;	  Sarkar	  2012).	  	  
Many	  hold	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  occasional	  claims	  to	  statehood,	  political	  clientelism,	  corruption,	  and	  
repression	  of	  rivals	  (including	  alleged	  murders	  of	  Ghisingh’s	  challengers)	  ensured	  party	  president	  
Ghisingh	  the	  uncontested	  position	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  presidential	  hierarchy	  (Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Lacina	  
2009;	  Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Rival	  parties	  (such	  as	  the	  AIGL	  and	  the	  CPRM)	  were	  
marginalised	  through	  exclusion	  from	  developmental	  benefits	  channelled	  through	  the	  GNLF-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Aborigines	  
15	  Baruah’s	  (2005)	  extensive	  study	  on	  Assam	  also	  underlines	  that	  despite	  of	  statehood	  the	  central	  government	  
influences	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  State	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  (e.g.	  in	  terms	  of	  developmental	  policies	  or	  the	  employment	  
of	  army	  and	  paramilitary	  forces	  to	  fight	  rebel	  groups).	  He	  calls	  this	  “cosmetic	  federalism”	  (Baruah	  2005,	  63	  pp).	  




controlled	  DGHC	  (see	  Chapter	  3),	  and	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  by	  the	  government,	  which	  
increased	  their	  inability	  to	  seriously	  challenge	  the	  GNLF.	  The	  GNLF’s	  dominance	  between	  1986	  and	  
2007	  is	  reflected	  in	  electoral	  victories	  of	  party-­‐supported	  candidates	  at	  district,	  State	  and	  national	  
levels.	  
In	  view	  of	  these	  developments,	  many	  authors	  interpret	  Gorkha	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  as	  a	  mere	  
instrument	  of	  elites	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  resources.	  Such	  an	  instrumentalist	  reading	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  
contends	  that	  ethnicity	  is	  a	  social	  and	  political	  construct	  of	  elites	  who	  struggle	  over	  access	  to	  state	  
resources	  and	  control	  of	  their	  communities	  (Brass	  1991).	  These	  competing	  elites	  use	  selected	  
cultural	  characteristics	  from	  the	  groups	  they	  claim	  to	  represent	  as	  political	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  
ensure	  and	  gain	  political	  and	  economic	  advantages	  (ibid.	  8,	  15).	  The	  construction	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  
thus	  serves	  both	  as	  a	  means	  for	  mobilisation,	  and	  as	  an	  instrument	  that	  elites	  use	  to	  formulate	  
demands	  towards	  the	  state.	  Accordingly,	  in	  this	  reading	  instrumental	  party	  politics	  is	  the	  main	  driving	  
force	  behind	  the	  regular	  claims	  and	  agitations	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  These	  become	  a	  means	  for	  power-­‐
hungry	  regional	  elites	  to	  get	  autonomy	  concessions	  from	  the	  government	  and	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  
(Lacina	  2009;	  Lacina	  2014;	  Subba	  1992;	  Kaushik	  2013;	  Sarkar	  2013;	  Chettri	  2014).	  	  
Lacina	  (2014)	  who	  analyses	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  in	  relation	  to	  historic	  political	  power	  struggles	  
in	  Darjeeling,	  contends:	  
Mobilisation	  for	  autonomy	  is	  primarily	  a	  tactic	  of	  local	  political	  competition.	  […]	  Autonomy	  demands	  
escalated	  owing	  to	  weakening	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  party	  […].	  When	  a	  weakened	  hegemon	  makes	  
political	  space	  available,	  challengers	  immediately	  demand	  greater	  autonomy	  for	  Darjeeling.	  The	  
reliable	  popular	  response	  to	  such	  appeals	  suggests	  the	  durability	  of	  both	  the	  Gorkha	  identity	  and	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  demand.	  (ibid.	  24)	  
This	  critique	  not	  only	  adds	  an	  instrumental	  dimension	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
movement	  by	  uncovering	  the	  roles	  of	  regional	  political	  elites,	  it	  also	  underlines	  that	  autonomy	  
concessions	  from	  the	  central	  or	  State	  governments	  are	  not	  (necessarily)	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  
government’s	  readiness	  to	  share	  power	  with	  the	  regions,	  but	  might	  be	  intended	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
“convert”	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  136)	  the	  ethnic	  movement	  into	  local	  power	  struggles.	  This	  helped	  the	  state	  
to	  repress	  autonomy	  demands	  (Lacina	  2009).	  Ultimately,	  such	  practices	  led	  to	  a	  shrinking	  of	  
democratic	  space	  in	  Darjeeling	  (Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Ganguly	  2005;	  Chima	  2009;	  Bagchi	  2012;	  Sarkar	  
2013;	  Lacina	  2014)	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  These	  critical	  accounts	  point	  at	  the	  conflation	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐
regional	  agenda,	  the	  autonomous	  council	  and	  regional	  power	  struggles.	  	  
Further,	  such	  critical	  evaluations	  suggest	  that	  the	  repeated	  attempts	  of	  regional	  parties	  to	  present	  
themselves	  as	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  towards	  the	  government	  indicate	  
their	  instrumentalisation	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  for	  negotiating	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  State	  and	  




national	  government.	  Leadership	  over	  the	  movement	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  regional	  political	  struggle	  
over	  resources.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  regional	  council	  (DGHC)	  institutionalised	  this	  relation	  
between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  regionally	  ruling	  party.	  	  
Such	  observations	  underline	  that	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  distinction	  between	  party-­‐politics,	  the	  movement,	  and	  
the	  state	  is	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  case.	  I	  will	  detail	  these	  claims	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3	  
through	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  historic	  evolution	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  in	  conflation	  with	  political	  parties.	  
I	  also	  draw	  on	  these	  critical	  evaluations	  to	  scrutinise	  the	  political	  regime	  after	  the	  GJM	  gained	  power	  
in	  Darjeeling.	  This	  includes	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  autonomous	  council	  as	  a	  means	  for	  GJM’s	  political	  
patronage	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  and	  the	  utilisation	  of	  repression	  as	  means	  for	  ruling	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  	  
1.2.3 Bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  parties	  and	  movements	  
I	  draw	  on	  these	  critical	  evaluations	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement.	  They	  underline	  
my	  proposal	  to	  approach	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  not	  as	  unified	  blocks,	  but	  to	  account	  for	  their	  
internal	  fractures	  and	  composition,	  and	  their	  interrelations	  with	  party	  politics	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  
the	  polity.	  They	  also	  express	  caution	  in	  understanding	  movement	  leaders’	  rhetoric	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  
those	  in	  whose	  names	  new	  States	  are	  being	  demanded,	  and	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  the	  winners	  and	  
losers	  of	  autonomy	  movements	  and	  concessions.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  decentralisation	  thesis	  is	  
insufficient	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  statehood	  agitations	  in	  Darjeeling	  (from	  1986-­‐88,	  and	  since	  2007)	  
were	  accompanied	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dominant	  party	  regime.	  
Drawing	  on	  this	  critique	  I	  make	  two	  major	  propositions	  for	  the	  study	  of	  statehood	  movements.	  First,	  
I	  suggest	  shifting	  attention	  from	  studying	  the	  effects	  of	  autonomy	  movements	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  
autonomy	  concessions	  towards	  analysing	  such	  movements’	  effects	  on	  political	  practice	  and	  regimes	  
in	  the	  concerned	  regions.	  	  
Second,	  I	  critically	  review	  the	  “movement”	  character	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  and	  raise	  the	  
question	  of	  what	  type	  of	  movement	  it	  actually	  is.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  I	  contend	  that	  common	  
approaches	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  as	  a	  “social”	  and/or	  “ethnic”	  movement	  (Subba	  1992;	  
Samanta	  2000;	  Bagchi	  2012;	  Kaushik	  2013)	  account	  only	  for	  the	  dimensions	  which	  are	  prominently	  
promoted	  by	  its	  leaders	  and	  advocates.	  Such	  labelling	  obscures	  not	  only	  the	  movement’s	  internal	  
politics	  and	  the	  role	  of	  elite	  interests	  but	  also	  the	  question	  of	  the	  movements’	  bases	  and	  
organisational	  structure,	  the	  relations	  between	  leaders	  and	  followers,	  and	  its	  entanglement	  with	  
regional,	  state	  and	  central	  politics.	  I	  propose	  that	  a	  study	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  movements	  needs	  to	  
better	  scrutinise	  such	  relations	  between	  movements	  and	  party-­‐politics.	  Drawing	  on	  approaches	  that	  
question	  such	  relations,	  I	  will	  now	  critically	  review	  the	  “movement”-­‐	  character	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation,	  and	  the	  “party”	  character	  of	  the	  GJM.	  




For	  this	  discussion	  I	  draw	  on	  existing	  studies	  on	  the	  movement	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Subba	  1992;	  
Samanta	  2000;	  Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Lacina	  2009;	  Sarkar	  2013)	  and	  on	  my	  own	  observations	  of	  the	  
movement	  since	  2007.	  These	  are	  based	  on	  newspaper	  articles,	  expert	  interviews	  and	  party	  leaders’	  
accounts	  (Chapter	  2	  will	  discuss	  the	  research	  methods	  in	  detail).	  
Social	  movements	  and	  parties	  
The	  decentralisation	  thesis	  tends	  to	  understand	  autonomy	  movements	  uncritically	  as	  non-­‐party	  
political	  phenomena	  which	  promote	  a	  radical	  break	  with	  the	  functioning	  of	  politics,	  as	  becomes	  clear	  
in	  Kothari’s	  (1985)	  interpretation	  of	  the	  grassroots	  level	  or	  non-­‐party-­‐political	  process.	  Very	  often,	  
however,	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  are	  led	  by	  regional	  political	  parties	  which	  initiate,	  or	  sometimes	  
emerge	  from	  popular	  agitations.	  Prominent	  examples	  are	  the	  Jharkhand	  Mukti	  Morcha	  (Jharkhand	  
Liberation	  Front)	  for	  Jharkhand,	  the	  Telugu	  Desam	  Party	  (Party	  of	  the	  Telugu	  land)	  for	  Telangana,	  or	  
the	  Dravida	  Munnetra	  Kazhagam	  (Drawidian	  Progress	  Federation)	  for	  Tamil	  Nadu.	  Tillin	  (2011)	  also	  
mentioned	  that	  “non-­‐party	  popular	  movements”	  (ibid.	  36)	  can	  be	  hijacked	  by	  politicians.	  But	  how	  do	  
political	  parties	  and	  social	  movements	  interrelate?	  
Bebbington	  (2009)	  broadly	  defined	  social	  movements	  as	  “processes	  of	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  
diffuse	  collective	  action	  that	  […]	  are	  sustained	  over	  time	  and	  framed	  within	  a	  shared	  identity	  and	  set	  
of	  programmatic	  commitments”	  (ibid.	  8).	  Oomen	  (2010)	  described	  them	  as	  “informed	  of	  an	  ideology	  
to	  promote	  change	  or	  stability,	  using	  any	  means	  –	  violent	  or	  non-­‐violent”	  (ibid.	  11).	  Actors	  in	  the	  
movements	  do	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  on	  the	  same	  vision	  but	  there	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  overlap	  between	  
their	  goals	  and	  concerns.	  Examples	  for	  such	  social	  movements	  are	  women’s	  rights	  movements,	  
environmental	  movements,	  caste-­‐	  or	  religion-­‐based	  movements,	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  organisations	  and	  issues	  involved,	  social	  movements	  are	  however	  not	  fixed	  
objects,	  but	  instead	  fluid	  and	  not	  easily	  categorised	  (Bebbington	  2009,	  3).	  To	  better	  account	  for	  this	  
vagueness	  some	  authors	  suggested	  to	  replace	  the	  term	  “social	  movement”	  with	  “contentious	  
politics”	  to	  describe	  collective	  political	  struggles	  directed	  towards,	  or	  involving	  the	  state	  (McAdam,	  
Tarrow,	  and	  Tilly	  2001;	  Leitner,	  Sheppard,	  and	  Sziarto	  2008).	  Leitner	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  define	  contentious	  
politics	  as:	  
concerted,	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  social	  and	  political	  action,	  in	  which	  differently	  positioned	  participants	  
come	  together	  to	  challenge	  dominant	  systems	  of	  authority,	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  and	  enact	  alternative	  
imaginaries.	  (Leitner	  2008,	  157)	  
Although	  the	  debate	  on	  social	  movements	  began	  to	  question	  their	  internal	  democratic	  character	  
(della	  Porta	  2013;	  della	  Porta	  and	  Rucht	  2013;	  Poletta	  2002),	  the	  above	  definitions	  fit	  to	  the	  




decentralisation	  thesis’	  conviction	  that	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  forward	  popular	  demands	  
towards	  the	  state	  using	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  rights,	  recognition,	  redistribution	  and	  democracy.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  social	  movements,	  political	  parties	  invest	  more	  into	  their	  organisational	  structure,	  
define	  membership	  roles,	  have	  a	  clear	  division	  of	  labour	  and	  function	  along	  chains	  of	  command	  
(Kitschelt	  2006).	  Schlesinger	  (1985)	  defined	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  parties	  as	  “to	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  
government	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  group	  by	  winning	  election	  to	  public	  office”	  (ibid.	  1985).	  Thus,	  to	  
advance	  collective	  interests	  parties	  use	  the	  institutional	  channels	  of	  the	  political	  system	  and	  involve	  
in	  electoral	  politics,	  while	  social	  movements	  concentrate	  their	  protest	  outside	  of	  such	  channels,	  e.g.	  
through	  “street	  politics”	  (Kitschelt	  2006).	  	  
Such	  differences	  in	  the	  definitions	  of	  movements	  and	  parties	  do	  however	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  two	  
exist	  in	  isolation	  from	  each	  other.	  The	  literature	  on	  social	  movements	  offers	  an	  accommodation	  of	  
political	  parties	  into	  its	  framework	  as	  “social	  movement	  organisations”	  (SMO).	  This	  proposal	  stems	  
from	  the	  realisation	  that	  networks	  solely	  based	  on	  shared	  grievances	  alone	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  
maintain	  movement	  action	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time	  (McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1977).	  Movements	  
require	  financial,	  human,	  social	  and	  other	  resources	  which	  can	  only	  be	  channelled	  by	  organisations,	  
such	  as	  NGOs,	  churches,	  or	  parties	  (Bebbington	  2009,	  4;	  Kriesi	  1996).	  These	  SMOs	  are	  “complex,	  or	  
formal,	  organisations	  which	  identif[y]	  [their]	  goals	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	  a	  social	  movement	  [...]	  
and	  attempt[s]	  to	  implement	  those	  goals”	  (McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1977,	  1218).	  Alliances	  between	  social	  
movements	  and	  parties	  yield	  benefits	  for	  both:	  they	  can	  increase	  a	  party’s	  ideological	  credibility,	  
while	  movements	  might	  benefit	  from	  the	  organisational	  strength	  of	  the	  party.	  Over	  time,	  social	  
movements	  might	  even	  become	  formalised	  as	  parties,	  or	  parties	  might	  initiate	  movements	  (Basu	  
2001).	  This	  underlines	  that	  the	  “dichotomy	  of	  the	  party	  and	  non-­‐party	  politics	  is	  somewhat	  outdated	  
or	  misleading”	  (Sangvai	  2007,	  117).	  Importantly,	  the	  SMO	  concept	  acknowledges	  that	  such	  
organisations	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  conflicts	  and	  fractures	  within	  a	  movement:	  different	  SMOs	  
representing	  a	  social	  movement	  may	  have	  distinct	  ideas	  about	  the	  movement	  discourse	  and	  can	  
compete	  for	  position	  within	  the	  movement,	  e.g.	  by	  capturing	  the	  resource	  flows	  (in	  terms	  of	  public	  
support,	  money	  etc.)	  to	  the	  movement	  (ibid.	  1219	  and	  1237;	  Bebbington	  2009,	  4).	  But	  although	  an	  
analysis	  of	  a	  movement’s	  structure	  along	  its	  SMOs	  is	  helpful	  for	  deciphering	  its	  organisational	  
structure	  and	  popular	  bases,	  the	  concept	  alone	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  
consequences	  of	  political	  parties’	  participation	  in	  (or	  initiation	  of)	  movements	  are.	  	  
Also	  Kothari	  (1985)	  regards	  regional	  parties	  which	  demand	  autonomy	  as	  an	  element	  of	  grassroots	  
movements	  and	  “part	  of	  a	  larger	  democratic	  struggle”	  (ibid.	  345).	  But	  despite	  of	  his	  overtly	  positive	  
reading	  of	  such	  movements,	  he	  also	  raises	  the	  critical	  question	  of	  whether	  involved	  parties	  pave	  the	  




way	  for	  greater	  participation	  or	  instead	  “rise	  on	  the	  crest	  of	  mass	  discontent	  and	  then	  ignore	  them”	  
(Kothari	  1985,	  346).	  In	  Darjeeling,	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Morcha	  not	  only	  raises	  questions	  of	  its	  
ability	  (and	  will)	  to	  represent	  other	  groups	  of	  the	  movement,	  and	  the	  relations	  of	  movement	  leaders	  
to	  participants.	  It	  also	  raises	  the	  more	  general	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  “movement”	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
movement	  actually	  is.	  Following	  Kothari’s	  warning,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  
a	  movement	  does	  indeed	  have	  serious	  consequences	  for	  the	  course	  the	  movement	  takes,	  and	  on	  its	  
effects	  on	  the	  regional	  political	  regime.	  I	  propose	  that	  one	  reason	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  revived	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  to	  initiate	  substantial	  change	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  political	  regime	  is	  the	  way	  it	  
was	  captured	  by	  regional	  political	  parties	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  
In	  literature	  on	  statehood	  movements	  however,	  the	  questions	  of	  the	  social	  or	  party-­‐political	  bases	  of	  
statehood	  movements,	  and	  the	  possibly	  problematic	  relations	  between	  social	  and	  party-­‐political	  
realms	  have	  been	  discussed	  explicitly	  by	  very	  few	  authors.	  I	  discuss	  these	  in	  the	  following.	  
“Jan	  andolan”	  and	  party-­‐political	  movements	  
Anup	  Kumar’s	  (2011)	  accounts	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  bases	  of	  the	  Uttarakhand	  movement	  are	  a	  
useful	  approach	  to	  this	  question.	  Kumar	  distinguishes	  between	  a	  non-­‐party-­‐political	  movement	  (jan	  
andolan)	  and	  a	  (party-­‐)	  political	  movement.	  Drawing	  on	  Kothari’s	  account	  of	  the	  “non-­‐party	  political	  
process”,	  for	  Kumar,	  the	  qualifier	  jan	  (“people”)	  describes	  those	  who	  express	  resistance	  (or	  
formulate	  demands)	  to	  the	  state	  while	  being	  opposed	  to	  the	  mainstream	  political	  parties.	  While	  the	  
jan	  andolan	  draws	  on	  ideology	  and	  programmatic	  appeals,	  a	  “political”	  movement	  is	  organised	  by	  
political	  parties	  and	  involves	  in	  electoral	  politics	  to	  make	  claims	  on	  the	  state.	  Kumar	  shows	  how	  
movement	  activists,	  who	  stemmed	  from	  different	  social	  movements	  (such	  as	  Chipko,	  anti-­‐liquor,	  or	  
anti-­‐dam)	  themselves	  enforced	  this	  distinction	  between	  social	  and	  party-­‐political	  realms	  by	  not	  
granting	  party	  politicians	  access	  to	  the	  public	  spaces	  of	  the	  movement	  such	  as	  the	  protest	  
committees	  and	  thereby	  avoid	  their	  demands	  being	  exploited	  by	  electoral	  politics.	  In	  other	  words,	  
activists	  did	  not	  recognise	  parties	  as	  SMOs.	  Also	  Baruah	  (1999,	  9)	  analyses	  the	  basis	  of	  Assamese	  sub-­‐
nationalism	  (i.e.	  the	  Assam	  movement	  from	  1979-­‐85)	  more	  explicitly.	  The	  organisations	  leading	  the	  
movement	  described	  themselves	  as	  “non-­‐political”	  and	  saw	  their	  concerns	  of	  a	  higher	  moral	  order	  
than	  the	  imperatives	  of	  electoral	  politics	  (Baruah	  1999,	  10).	  	  
In	  Darjeeling,	  however,	  the	  opposite	  is	  the	  case,	  as	  the	  broad	  public	  appeal	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  
is	  channelled	  exclusively	  through	  regional	  parties.	  Also,	  the	  GJM	  became	  a	  formal	  political	  party	  
recognised	  by	  the	  Indian	  Election	  Commission	  in	  April	  2008	  (Election	  Commission	  India	  2008)	  after	  it	  
had	  revived	  the	  agitation	  as	  a	  self-­‐proclaimed	  “organisation	  of	  the	  jāti”	  (see	  above)	  in	  2007.	  Besides	  
the	  GJM,	  the	  AIGL,	  the	  GNLF	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Revolutionary	  Marxists	  (CPRM)	  –	  a	  splinter	  




group	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  district	  committee	  established	  in	  1996	  –	  are	  also	  demanding	  Gorkhaland.	  The	  
CPRM	  combines	  the	  statehood	  with	  a	  class-­‐agenda.	  Further,	  the	  GNLF-­‐C,	  a	  small	  splinter	  party	  of	  the	  
GNLF16,	  and	  the	  Gorkha	  Rastriya	  Nirman	  Morcha	  (GRNM)	  demand	  statehood17.	  The	  only	  non-­‐party	  
political	  organisation	  which	  demands	  Gorkhaland	  is	  the	  Bharatiya	  Gorkha	  Parisangh	  (BGP)	  which	  
describes	  itself	  as	  a	  national-­‐level	  umbrella	  organisation	  of	  all	  Indian	  Gorkhas	  (BGP	  2011),	  including	  
Nepali-­‐speaking	  Indians	  living	  outside	  Darjeeling.	  Although	  the	  BGP	  does	  not	  have	  much	  influence	  in	  
Darjeeling,	  it	  sometimes	  organises	  indoor	  meetings	  and	  seminars,	  or	  participates	  in	  rallies	  called	  by	  
the	  AIGL	  or	  the	  CPRM.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  besides	  the	  regional	  parties	  there	  are	  no	  non-­‐party	  political	  organisations	  
(except	  for	  the	  BGP)	  involved	  as	  SMOs	  in	  the	  struggle,	  and	  that	  the	  movement	  has	  been	  dominated	  
by	  two	  parties:	  the	  GNLF	  (from	  1986-­‐2007),	  and	  its	  successor	  the	  GJM	  (since	  2007/08).	  The	  
respective	  dominant	  party	  claims	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  genuine	  promoter	  of	  Gorkhaland	  while	  alleging	  that	  
other	  parties	  were	  neither	  capable	  nor	  trustworthy	  advocates	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Thus,	  although	  all	  the	  
above	  named	  regional	  parties	  share	  the	  same	  objective	  –	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  –	  they	  do	  not	  
struggle	  in	  a	  united	  way.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  “movement”	  involves	  all	  regional	  parties	  as	  SMOs,	  
one	  of	  these	  has	  attained	  dominance	  over	  the	  others.	  This	  dominance	  is	  however	  contested	  by	  rival	  
parties	  who	  regularly	  criticised	  the	  Morcha	  for	  its	  “monopolisation”	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  claim.	  For	  
instance,	  late	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  demanded	  a	  “collective	  leadership”	  of	  the	  agitation	  by	  
all	  regional	  parties,	  while	  stressing	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  a	  “people’s”	  and	  not	  a	  party-­‐movement	  
(Tamang	  2010,	  YouTube;	  see	  Chapter	  8).	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  label	  “party-­‐political	  movement”	  
adequately	  describes	  its	  internal	  organisational	  structure.	  	  
Interestingly,	  most	  people	  I	  spoke	  to	  in	  Darjeeling	  hardly	  ever	  question	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  only	  political	  
parties	  (instead	  of	  non-­‐party	  groups)	  claiming	  leadership	  of	  the	  movement.	  Although	  in	  the	  
vernacular	  people	  distinguished	  between	  the	  “āndolaṇ”	  (movement,	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland)	  and	  
the	  “party”	  [Engl.]	  as	  an	  organisation,	  they	  saw	  only	  political	  parties	  responsible	  for	  initiating	  and	  
maintaining	  the	  āndolaṇ.	  This	  underlines	  the	  close	  association	  of	  “party”	  and	  movement	  in	  the	  public	  
imaginary,	  too.	  In	  fact,	  public	  “party”	  meetings	  do	  not	  usually	  have	  a	  programmatic	  content,	  except	  
for	  aspects	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  Thus	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  whether	  people	  join	  
processions	  because	  they	  follow	  the	  party,	  or	  because	  they	  want	  Gorkhaland,	  or	  both	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  After	  the	  murder	  of	  former	  GNLF	  rebel	  leader	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  in	  2002	  (allegedly	  sanctioned	  by	  Subash	  Ghisingh)	  
his	  wife	  launched	  the	  CNLF-­‐C.	  
17	  These	  parties	  are	  of	  no	  further	  concern	  to	  this	  study	  due	  to	  their	  small	  size	  and	  lack	  of	  political	  activities.	  




Dual	  identities	  and	  movement-­‐parties	  
To	  further	  scrutinise	  the	  relation	  between	  social	  and	  party-­‐political	  realms	  in	  the	  “movement”	  I	  now	  
turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  type	  of	  party	  the	  GJM	  is.	  	  
Basu’s	  (2001)	  account	  on	  the	  BJP’s	  “dual	  tactics”,	  and	  Kitschelt’s	  (2006)	  concept	  of	  the	  “movement	  
party”	  are	  helpful	  for	  conceptualising	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  party	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  movement.	  
In	  her	  study	  on	  the	  BJP,	  Basu	  contends	  that	  both	  social-­‐movement-­‐	  and	  party-­‐identities	  are	  
situational	  registers	  for	  electoral	  mobilisation.	  Similarly	  to	  Kumar	  (2011),	  she	  claims	  that	  while	  a	  
social	  movement	  tends	  to	  stress	  beliefs	  and	  ideology,	  and	  is	  rather	  uncompromising	  about	  its	  
objectives,	  a	  political	  party	  attempts	  to	  garner	  votes	  for	  electoral	  success	  making	  it	  more	  
compromising	  on	  its	  principles	  (Basu	  2001,	  164).	  Her	  analysis	  of	  the	  BJP’s	  dual	  tactics,	  however,	  
transcends	  clear-­‐cut	  distinctions	  between	  movements	  and	  parties,	  and	  instead	  shows	  that	  a	  political	  
party	  can	  itself	  combine	  these	  two	  identities:	  the	  one	  of	  a	  militant	  social	  movement,	  and	  the	  other	  of	  
a	  moderate	  political	  party.	  Basu	  finds	  that	  the	  BJP	  combines	  these	  identities	  in	  cyclical	  and	  
sometimes	  simultaneous	  ways.	  While	  the	  movement	  identity	  is	  directed	  at	  garnering	  broad	  public	  
support	  –	  which	  she	  sees	  exemplified	  in	  the	  march	  to	  Ayodya18	  –	  the	  party	  tactics	  attempted	  to	  
represent	  the	  BJP	  as	  a	  responsible	  political	  party	  once	  it	  was	  elected	  into	  government.	  Basu	  sees	  the	  
reason	  for	  these	  “dialectics”	  (ibid.	  163)	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  “by	  emphasising	  one	  identity	  the	  BJP	  has	  
encountered	  certain	  problems	  which	  it	  has	  sought	  to	  address	  by	  highlighting	  the	  other	  identity”	  
(ibid.).	  	  
Also	  the	  GJM	  espouses	  such	  “dialectics”.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  (and	  openly)	  involved	  in	  electoral	  politics;	  it	  
also	  draws	  strongly	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  programme	  as	  a	  source	  of	  legitimacy,	  which	  puts	  it	  into	  
direct	  opposition	  towards	  the	  State	  government.	  The	  GJM	  led	  a	  forceful	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland	  
between	  2007	  and	  2012	  which	  included	  mass-­‐demonstrations,	  regular	  general	  strikes	  (bandhs)	  in	  the	  
three	  hill-­‐subdivisions,	  hunger-­‐strikes,	  tax-­‐boycotts	  and	  gheraus	  of	  government	  offices.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  
in	  Chapter	  5,	  public	  turnout	  at	  these	  events	  was	  huge	  and	  included	  all	  sections	  of	  society	  (including	  
tea	  plantation	  labourers,	  state	  employees,	  and	  intellectuals.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  promoting	  a	  
radical	  programmatic	  agenda	  directed	  against	  the	  State,	  the	  GJM	  was	  also	  involved	  in	  negotiations	  
with	  the	  State	  and	  central	  government	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  agreement	  on	  the	  new	  autonomous	  
council,	  the	  GTA,	  in	  2011.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  GJM	  adopted	  a	  confrontational	  stance	  towards	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  In	  1992,	  the	  BJP	  and	  its	  affiliated	  Rashtriya	  Swayamsevak	  Sangh	  (a	  radical-­‐nationalist	  Hindu	  organisation)	  
had	  mobilised	  thousands	  of	  supporters	  to	  occupy	  the	  site	  of	  the	  16th	  century	  Babri	  Masjit	  in	  Ayodhya,	  Uttar	  
Pradesh,	  which	  they	  claimed	  stood	  on	  the	  historical	  birthplace	  of	  God	  Ram.	  Following	  a	  political	  rally,	  the	  
Masjit	  was	  completely	  destroyed,	  and	  several	  hundred	  people	  died	  in	  the	  subsequent	  clashes	  between	  Hindus	  
and	  Muslims.	  




government	  during	  the	  agitation,	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  signifies	  an	  accommodative	  and	  less	  radical	  
approach.	  	  
Whenever	  the	  situation	  demands	  it,	  however,	  the	  GJM	  is	  ready	  to	  mobilise	  its	  supporters	  for	  new	  
protest	  programmes,	  such	  as	  happened	  in	  August	  2013:	  In	  the	  end	  of	  July	  2013	  the	  central	  
government	  in	  Delhi	  had	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  Telangana	  State.	  In	  reaction,	  GJM	  
president	  Bimal	  Gurung	  resigned	  from	  his	  post	  as	  GTA	  chief	  and	  the	  Morcha	  mobilised	  thousands	  of	  
followers	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  month-­‐long	  bandh	  to	  press	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  (The	  Hindu,	  
29.7.2013;	  TT,	  31.7.2013).	  Confronted	  with	  paramilitary	  forces	  sent	  by	  the	  State	  government	  and	  
with	  the	  arrest	  of	  hundreds	  of	  its	  activists	  (including	  elected	  GTA	  councillors),	  however,	  the	  Morcha	  
decided	  to	  switch	  back	  into	  its	  accommodative	  party	  modus	  and	  continued	  to	  rule	  through	  the	  GTA	  
(The	  Hindu,	  27.12.2013)19.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  party	  oscillates	  between	  a	  radical	  movement	  and	  an	  
accommodative	  political	  party	  identity.	  	  
Kitschelt	  (2006)	  too	  transcends	  clear-­‐cut	  distinctions	  between	  movements	  and	  parties	  through	  his	  
concept	  of	  “movement	  parties”,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  “coalitions	  of	  political	  activists	  who	  emanate	  
from	  social	  movements	  and	  try	  to	  apply	  the	  organisational	  and	  strategic	  practices	  of	  social	  
movements	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  party	  competitions”	  (ibid.	  280).	  According	  to	  him,	  they	  differ	  from	  formal	  
political	  parties	  in	  that	  they	  invest	  little	  in	  the	  formal	  party	  structure,	  lack	  a	  formal	  definition	  of	  
membership	  and	  staff	  of	  paid	  professionals,	  do	  not	  invest	  into	  an	  institutionalised	  system	  of	  
aggregating	  interests,	  and	  combine	  their	  activities	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  formal	  politics	  with	  extra-­‐
institutional	  mobilisation	  (ibid.).	  	  
The	  GJM	  demonstrates	  similar	  characteristics.	  Like	  a	  political	  party,	  it	  is	  hierarchically	  organised	  and	  
its	  branches	  from	  the	  local	  and	  intermediary	  to	  the	  top	  levels	  are	  connected	  via	  chains	  of	  command	  
(see	  Chapter	  6).	  Like	  a	  movement	  however,	  the	  party	  lacks	  any	  formal	  membership	  (in	  fact	  a	  top-­‐
level	  party	  leader	  could	  not	  answer	  my	  question	  as	  to	  how	  many	  members	  the	  party	  had,	  as	  there	  
were	  no	  central	  registers).	  Many	  individuals	  affiliate	  themselves	  to	  the	  GJM	  through	  one	  of	  its	  frontal	  
organisations,	  which	  include	  the	  female	  (Nari	  Morcha)	  or	  the	  youth	  (Yuva	  Morcha)	  wings,	  or	  labour	  
unions	  among	  others20.	  Unlike	  more	  formally	  organised	  parties,	  the	  GJM	  does	  not	  call	  annual	  party	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  After	  the	  agitation	  failed	  and	  the	  GTA’s	  and	  GJM’s	  stability	  was	  crippled	  by	  the	  arrests	  of	  elected	  councillors	  
and	  higher-­‐ranking	  party-­‐leaders,	  Gurung	  made	  a	  u-­‐turn	  and	  again	  took	  oath	  as	  the	  GTA	  chairman	  in	  December	  
2013.	  
20	  These	  are	  the:	  Gorkha	  Primary	  Teachers	  Organisation,	  Janmukti	  Secondary	  Teachers	  Organisation,	  
Unemployed	  Primary	  Trained/Untrained	  Teachers	  Association,	  Voluntary	  Higher	  Teachers	  Association,	  
Janmukti	  Voluntary/Para	  Primary	  Teachers	  Organisation,	  Sishu	  Sikchha	  Kendra	  (MSK),	  Madhyamic	  Sikchha	  
Kendra	  (MMK),	  Janmukti	  Insecured	  Secondary	  Teachers	  Organisation,	  Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Vidhyarthi	  Morcha	  
(students),	  Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Yuva	  Morcha	  (youth),	  Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Nari	  Morcha	  (women),	  Darjeeling	  Terai	  
Dooars	  Plantation	  Labour	  Union,	  Janmukti	  Karmachari	  Sangathan	  (administrative	  employees),	  Janmukti	  




assemblies	  of	  elected	  representatives.	  Instead,	  the	  senior	  leadership	  (i.e.	  president	  and	  17-­‐strong	  
core	  committee)	  occasionally	  call	  meetings	  of	  the	  party’s	  central	  committee,	  which	  (in	  2012)	  
consisted	  of	  86	  members	  nominated	  by	  the	  president.	  The	  intermediary	  leaders	  are	  also	  largely	  
nominated	  by	  the	  president	  instead	  of	  being	  elected,	  a	  procedure	  which	  partly	  reflects	  the	  
spontaneous	  coming-­‐to-­‐power	  of	  the	  organisation	  (see	  Chapter	  5)	  but	  also	  ensures	  the	  inner-­‐party	  
authority	  of	  the	  president	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  Furthermore,	  the	  lack	  of	  formal	  opinion-­‐forming	  
mechanisms	  such	  as	  party	  assemblies	  and	  intra-­‐party	  elections,	  and	  the	  Morcha’s	  alleged	  exclusion	  
of	  other	  regional	  parties	  in	  their	  agitation	  raise	  questions	  about	  its	  representative	  function.	  
Both	  Kitschelt’s	  and	  Basus’	  elaborations	  suggest	  that	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  movement	  and	  
party	  is	  less	  helpful	  when	  studying	  political	  performances	  and	  certain	  forms	  of	  political	  power	  
struggles.	  Movement	  and	  party	  identities	  provide	  distinct	  registers	  of	  political	  mobilisation;	  the	  
boundaries	  between	  the	  two	  are	  blurred.	  Seeing	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  as	  a	  party-­‐political	  
movement,	  and	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  movement-­‐party	  suggests	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement	  
through	  the	  prism	  of	  party-­‐political	  contestations	  might	  reveal	  insights	  into	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  GJM’s	  
dominance	  and	  contributes	  to	  solving	  the	  puzzle	  of	  the	  acceptance	  of	  such	  a	  regime	  by	  those	  
involved	  in	  a	  movement	  for	  justice	  and	  rights.	  	  
	  
1.3 Competitive	  authoritarianism	  and	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  
So	  far,	  I	  have	  described	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  as	  dominated	  by	  a	  regional	  political	  party	  
(GJM),	  which	  claims	  leadership	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement	  while	  other	  regional	  parties	  (i.e.	  AIGL,	  
CPRM)	  which	  –	  albeit	  promoting	  the	  same	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  –	  have	  not	  succeeded	  in	  garnering	  
greater	  public	  support,	  or	  gaining	  recognition	  as	  a	  negotiation	  partner	  by	  the	  government.	  The	  GJM’s	  
authority	  is	  expressed	  not	  only	  in	  its	  huge	  electoral	  victories	  (see	  Table	  1)	  or	  its	  seeming	  
omnipresence	  through	  spatial	  markers	  such	  as	  flags	  or	  posters	  all	  over	  Darjeeling	  hills,	  but	  also	  
through	  its	  recognition	  by	  the	  government	  as	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  people.	  Beyond	  
that,	  I	  also	  outlined	  that	  many	  people	  blame	  the	  GJM	  for	  ruling	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  corruption,	  
clientelism,	  and	  repression	  of	  rivals.	  
In	  comparative	  politics	  such	  a	  political	  set-­‐up	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “dominant-­‐party”	  (Magaloni	  and	  
Kricheli	  2010)	  or	  a	  “competitive	  authoritarian”	  (Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002)	  regime.	  These	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ashayee	  Karmachari	  Sangathan	  (unregular	  employed),	  Janmukti	  Unorganised	  Sector	  Labour	  Union,	  Bharatiya	  
Gorkha	  Purba/Ardha	  Sainik	  Morcha	  (soldiers),	  Janmukti	  Hotel	  Owners	  Association,	  Minority	  Community,	  
Siliguri-­‐Terai	  Chalak	  Mahasangh	  (drivers),	  Joint	  Action	  Committee-­‐Transport	  (Source:	  document	  provided	  by	  
GJM	  in	  July	  2012)	  




characterised	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  such	  as	  elections,	  parliaments	  or	  the	  media.	  
But	  although	  these	  institutions	  are	  “widely	  viewed	  as	  the	  principal	  means	  of	  obtaining	  and	  exercising	  
political	  authority”	  (Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002,	  52),	  incumbents	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
systematically	  and	  regularly	  violate	  such	  rules	  and	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  dominant	  
position.	  Such	  disturbances	  can	  include	  the	  changing	  of	  electoral	  rules,	  buying	  of	  votes,	  intimidation	  
of	  opposition	  and	  media,	  or	  other	  disadvantaging	  techniques	  which	  make	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  
opposition	  forces	  to	  win	  (ibid.).	  In	  other	  words,	  incumbents	  regularly	  breach	  the	  principles	  of	  
substantial	  democracy	  (in	  contrast	  to	  procedural	  democracy)	  such	  as	  equality,	  participation	  and	  
freedom	  of	  expression	  (Rubongoya	  2007)	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  I	  begin	  the	  discussion	  with	  a	  
more	  general	  outline	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  then	  display	  how	  studies	  of	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  grounded	  in	  comparative	  politics	  approach	  the	  question	  of	  how	  rulers	  in	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  their	  authority.	  	  
1.3.1 Authority,	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  and	  critical	  junctures	  
Rulers	  can	  only	  rule	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  recognised	  and	  accepted	  by	  their	  respective	  subjects	  and	  
followers	  (Weber	  1972;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Political	  authority	  evolves	  from	  this	  two-­‐sided	  
relation	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled.	  Following	  Weber	  (1972),	  I	  understand	  “authority”	  as	  the	  claim	  to	  
obedience	  from	  the	  ruled,	  expressed	  through	  the	  unconstrained	  and	  unquestionable	  acceptance	  of	  
hierarchy	  (Straßenberger	  2013)	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  ruled.	  Whether	  attempts	  to	  gain	  authority	  are	  
successful	  depends	  on	  the	  obedience,	  acceptance,	  and/or	  compliance	  of	  the	  ruled.	  Thus	  any	  analysis	  
of	  authority	  must	  not	  only	  account	  for	  strategies	  for	  ruling,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  
attempts	  are	  experienced	  and	  perceived,	  adhered	  to	  or	  resisted.	  Such	  an	  understanding	  
acknowledges	  that	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  shape	  the	  relations	  between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled,	  including	  
both	  elites	  and	  other	  layers	  of	  society.	  Drawing	  on	  these	  insights,	  I	  understand	  authority	  here	  as	  a	  
relative	  and	  procedural	  outcome	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  rule,	  and	  those	  over	  
whom	  they	  seek	  to	  rule.	  Like	  legitimacy	  (see	  below),	  it	  is	  not	  a	  fixed	  property	  of	  rulers,	  but	  an	  
outcome	  of	  negotiations	  and	  contestations21.	  	  
Studies	  based	  in	  comparative	  politics	  have	  developed	  a	  range	  of	  explanations	  to	  study	  the	  creation	  
or	  maintenance	  of	  authority	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  At	  the	  centre	  of	  these	  studies	  stand	  concerns	  
about	  the	  regimes’	  rise,	  survival	  and	  demise,	  often	  centring	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  authoritarian	  
rulers	  manage	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  despite	  of	  regular	  violations	  of	  democratic	  standards	  and	  human	  
rights.	  This	  not	  only	  includes	  the	  question	  of	  why	  people	  vote	  for	  authoritarian	  rulers,	  but	  also	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  This	  study	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  political	  authority	  and	  not	  with	  other	  forms	  such	  as	  intellectual/scientific	  or	  
religious	  authority.	  




strategies	  these	  use	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  to	  meet	  challenges	  to	  their	  rule	  (Gandhi	  and	  Lust-­‐Okar	  
2009;	  Greene	  2010;	  Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013;	  Gerschewski	  2014).	  	  
Following	  the	  arguments	  from	  comparative	  politics,	  although	  democratic	  rules	  and	  procedures	  are	  
regularly	  disturbed	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  the	  general	  existence	  of	  democratic	  
institutions	  such	  as	  parliaments,	  judiciary,	  or	  media	  provide	  meeting	  platforms	  for	  the	  opposition	  
and	  thereby	  pose	  challenges	  to	  the	  incumbents.	  Such	  challenges	  are	  exacerbated	  by	  incumbents’	  
lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  real	  support	  of	  their	  regime	  (what	  Wintrobe	  (2009)	  has	  described	  as	  
“dictators’	  dilemma”),	  or	  –	  in	  more	  technical	  terms	  –	  the	  gap	  between	  public	  needs	  and	  
governmental	  programmes.	  Literature	  on	  authoritarian	  and	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  has	  
identified	  a	  range	  of	  strategies	  which	  rulers	  employ	  to	  meet	  such	  challenges	  and	  establish	  their	  
authority.	  Amongst	  these	  are	  the	  co-­‐optation	  of	  elites	  and/or	  rivals,	  and	  repression	  (Greene	  2007;	  
Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013;	  Gandhi	  and	  Lust-­‐Okar	  2009).	  Studies	  also	  mention	  the	  role	  of	  
economic	  performance	  or	  ideology	  as	  means	  to	  legitimise	  authoritarian	  rule	  (Schmidt	  2012;	  Croissant	  
and	  Wurster	  2013;	  Gerschewski	  2014).	  	  
Repression	  
One	  prominent	  strategy	  incumbents	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes	  can	  use	  to	  meet	  challenges	  to	  their	  
authority	  is	  repression.	  Repression	  refers	  to	  the	  threat	  or	  actual	  use	  of	  sanctions	  against	  individuals	  
or	  organisations	  (Davenport	  2007,	  2).	  It	  can	  take	  two	  forms:	  “hard	  repression”	  (Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  
and	  Merkel	  2013)	  or	  “high	  intensity	  coercion”	  (Way	  and	  Levitsky	  2006)	  refers	  to	  highly	  visible	  acts	  of	  
violence	  or	  abuse	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  the	  violent	  suppression	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  or	  targeted	  
assassinations	  of	  well-­‐known	  opposition	  leaders	  (ibid.);	  it	  usually	  involves	  physical	  violence	  
(Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012)	  and	  “poses	  an	  immediate	  existential	  threat	  to	  individual	  well-­‐being”	  
(Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013,	  119).	  “Soft	  repression”	  (Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013)	  
(or	  “low	  intensity	  coercion”,	  Way	  and	  Levitsky	  2006)22	  –	  which	  is	  more	  common	  –	  describes	  more	  
subtle	  forms	  which	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  joining	  the	  opposition.	  Although	  “soft	  repression”	  is	  less	  
visible,	  it	  is	  often	  highly	  systematic	  (ibid.).	  It	  includes	  manipulation,	  “legal”	  means	  to	  undermine	  
opposition	  activities	  (e.g.	  tax	  raids	  on	  rivals’	  offices),	  limitations	  of	  civil	  liberties	  or	  other	  techniques	  
that	  increase	  the	  cost	  of	  joining	  the	  opposition.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  the	  clientelist	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  
(e.g.	  government	  jobs	  or	  contracts)	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  reward	  and	  punishment	  (Greene	  
2010;	  Way	  and	  Levitsky	  2006,	  392).	  This	  technique	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  second	  strategy	  
incumbents	  use	  to	  maintain	  their	  power:	  co-­‐optation	  and	  political	  patronage.	  I	  discuss	  the	  use	  of	  soft	  
and	  hard	  repression	  through	  the	  GJM	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  In	  my	  opinion	  the	  term	  “low	  intensity”	  is	  misleading,	  as	  soft	  repression	  can	  also	  be	  very	  “intense”	  from	  the	  
standpoint	  of	  the	  victims	  (see	  Chapter	  6	  and	  7).	  




Co-­‐optation	  and	  patronage	  
Co-­‐optation	  refers	  to	  the	  rulers’	  sharing	  of	  privileges	  and	  power	  with	  a	  selected	  elite	  or	  opposition	  
members	  in	  return	  for	  their	  loyalty,	  support,	  or	  obedience.	  It	  is	  targeted	  at	  elites	  whose	  support	  is	  
regarded	  important	  for	  regime	  sustenance	  (such	  as	  military	  or	  business	  people)	  (Brownlee	  2002;	  
Gandhi	  and	  Przeworski	  2007;	  Wintrobe	  2009;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Schmidt	  2012).	  Guided	  by	  the	  
principle	  of	  benefit	  maximisation,	  this	  “winning	  coalition”	  (Burnell	  2006,	  553)	  pledges	  loyalty	  and	  
support	  to	  the	  ruler.	  Co-­‐optation	  is	  exercised	  through	  both	  formal	  (parties,	  parliaments,	  elections)	  
and	  informal	  institutions	  in	  form	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  clan-­‐based	  relations	  and	  patronage	  
(Gandhi	  and	  Przeworski	  2007;	  Collins	  2009;	  Lust	  2009;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  The	  latter	  refers	  to	  a	  
hierarchical	  and	  reciprocal	  exchange	  relationship	  in	  which	  a	  client	  provides	  services	  such	  as	  work,	  
loyalty	  or	  time	  in	  return	  for	  a	  patron’s	  protection	  or	  services	  (Piliavsky	  2014b,	  5).	  While	  most	  studies	  
regard	  patronage	  as	  a	  means	  of	  co-­‐opting	  elites,	  I	  will	  show	  in	  Chapter	  6	  that	  political	  patronage	  is	  in	  
itself	  an	  important	  means	  for	  tying	  the	  larger	  population	  to	  a	  ruler/party.	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  patronage	  or	  clientelism	  does	  not	  only	  function	  as	  a	  means	  of	  rewarding	  loyal	  
supporters,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  of	  punishing	  perceived	  rivals.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  the	  dominant	  party	  
regime	  in	  Mexico	  for	  instance,	  Greene	  (2007)	  showed	  how	  the	  ruling	  party	  via	  its	  control	  over	  public	  
resources	  excluded	  rivals	  from	  accessing	  these	  by	  distributing	  public	  sector	  jobs	  or	  state	  contracts	  
solely	  to	  supporters.	  The	  resulting	  resource	  asymmetries	  result	  in	  the	  victimisation	  of	  rivals,	  as	  it	  is	  
unlikely	  for	  people	  hoping	  for	  or	  depending	  on	  the	  incumbents’	  patronage	  to	  join	  opposition	  forces	  
(except	  for	  ideological	  reasons).	  In	  this	  way,	  co-­‐optation	  and	  patronage	  help	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  
maintain	  its	  “mobilising”	  and	  “bargaining”	  functions	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010),	  the	  latter	  referring	  
to	  its	  ability	  to	  strike	  deals	  with	  elites,	  and	  the	  former	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  distribute	  valued	  goods	  in	  
return	  for	  political	  support.	  I	  will	  utilise	  and	  detail	  the	  concept	  of	  patronage	  as	  reward	  and	  
punishment	  strategy	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  in	  which	  I	  show	  how	  it	  helps	  the	  GJM	  to	  silence	  dissent	  and	  to	  
undermine	  opposition	  activities	  while	  maintaining	  the	  loyalty	  of	  elites.	  	  
Greene	  (2007,	  46)	  contends	  that	  patronage	  is	  such	  a	  powerful	  advantage	  that	  it	  even	  allows	  
incumbents	  to	  edge	  away	  from	  their	  political	  programmes.	  This	  last	  insight	  suggests	  that	  patronage	  
can	  compensate	  for	  a	  ruler’s	  deviations	  from	  his	  ideology,	  or	  programmatic	  incoherence.	  But	  how	  
important	  are	  the	  ideological	  or	  programmatic	  appeals	  of	  dominant	  parties	  (such	  as	  the	  appeal	  to	  
Gorkhaland)	  in	  sustaining	  their	  authority	  beyond	  material	  and	  instrumental	  interests?	  
	  





Although	  many	  authors	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  co-­‐optation	  and	  repression,	  most	  of	  them	  
claim	  that	  these	  alone	  are	  not	  sufficient	  and	  too	  costly	  to	  sustain	  autocracies.	  Rather,	  rulers	  also	  
have	  to	  convince	  their	  populations	  of	  the	  rightfulness	  or	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  rule	  (Weber	  1972;	  Burnell	  
2006;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Croissant	  and	  Wurster	  2013;	  Kailitz	  2013).	  Instead	  of	  only	  targeting	  
the	  ruled	  with	  patronage/benefits,	  authoritarian	  rulers	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  “stocking”	  support	  
amongst	  the	  population	  (Schmidt	  2012).	  Greene	  (2007)	  also	  noted	  that	  even	  the	  elites	  are	  not	  
attracted	  to	  a	  party	  by	  instrumental	  benefits	  alone,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  their	  belief	  in	  the	  partisan	  cause	  
the	  party	  espouses	  (ibid.	  120).	  This	  “moral	  authority”	  is	  expressed	  in	  programmatic	  or	  ideological	  
beliefs,	  and	  can	  be	  attained,	  for	  example,	  through	  cumulative	  years	  of	  activism,	  commitment	  to	  a	  
cause,	  or	  maintaining	  links	  to	  the	  party’s	  core	  constituency	  (ibid.	  60).	  
However,	  legitimacy	  exceeds	  such	  programmatic	  appeals.	  The	  considerations	  of	  the	  historian	  
Karateke	  (2005)	  are	  a	  helpful	  complement	  to	  the	  description	  on	  legitimacy	  I	  outlined	  above,	  and	  to	  
understand	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  more	  general	  quality	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled.	  Karateke	  
distinguishes	  between	  a	  “demand”	  side,	  which	  describes	  the	  public’s	  expectations	  of	  a	  ruler,	  and	  a	  
“supply”	  side	  regarding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  rulers	  attempt	  to	  shape	  and	  live	  up	  to	  such	  public	  
expectations.	  A	  ruler’s	  legitimacy	  emerges	  from	  the	  level	  of	  coherence	  between	  the	  supply	  and	  
demand	  sides24.	  	  
Karateke	  further	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  different	  bases	  of	  legitimacy:	  factual	  and	  normative	  
legitimacy.	  Normative	  legitimacy	  (also	  “diffuse	  system	  support”,	  Easton	  1965)	  is	  based	  on	  external	  
sources	  such	  as	  political	  ideologies,	  legal,	  nationalistic	  or	  religious	  claims;	  shared	  historical	  events;	  
traditional	  norms	  and	  values;	  or	  a	  leader’s	  charisma	  (Karateke	  2005;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012;	  
Croissant	  and	  Wurster	  2013).	  Also,	  people’s	  commitment	  to	  an	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  can	  provide	  a	  
basis	  for	  such	  diffuse	  support	  for	  a	  system.	  While	  normative	  legitimacy	  involves	  the	  general	  and	  
longer-­‐term	  attitudes	  of	  the	  ruled	  towards	  the	  system,	  factual	  legitimacy	  (also	  “specific	  system	  
support”,	  Easton	  1965,	  “output-­‐legitimacy”,	  Schmidt	  2012,	  or	  “performance	  legitimacy”,	  Burnell	  
2006;	  Pepinsky	  2007;	  Croissant	  and	  Wurster	  2013)	  depends	  on	  the	  successful	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  
population’s	  short-­‐term	  expectations	  through	  the	  performance	  and	  output	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  
Schmidt	  (2012)	  defines	  it	  as	  a	  belief	  in	  legitimacy	  based	  on	  factual	  recognition	  of	  the	  political	  
products	  and	  results	  of	  a	  ruler.	  Such	  products	  can	  include	  public	  goods	  (Croissant	  and	  Wurster	  2013),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Parts	  of	  this	  section	  have	  already	  been	  published	  in	  a	  similar	  form	  in	  Wenner	  (2014).	  
24	  Although	  most	  authors	  concerned	  with	  legitimacy	  acknowledge	  Weber’s	  (1972)	  understanding	  of	  it	  as	  a	  form	  
of	  voluntary	  belief	  they	  transcend	  his	  classic	  three-­‐fold	  classification	  of	  legitimate	  bases	  of	  authority	  
(traditional,	  bureaucratic,	  charismatic)	  (Stillman	  1974;	  Beetham	  2001;	  Greene	  2007;	  Dogan	  2009;	  Croissant	  and	  
Wurster	  2013).	  	  




socio-­‐economic	  attainments	  (Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012),	  or	  the	  “fulfilment	  of	  societal	  needs	  and	  
desires	  such	  as	  material	  welfare	  and	  personal	  security”	  (Burnell	  2006,	  549).	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  
to	  achieve	  factual	  legitimacy.	  Besides	  increasing	  spending	  before	  elections	  (Pepinsky	  2007),	  or	  
effective	  social	  and	  economic	  policy	  to	  increase	  the	  supply	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  lower	  unemployment	  
rates	  (Burnell	  2006;	  Schmidt	  2012),	  the	  dispensation	  of	  patronage	  through	  patron-­‐client	  networks	  
can	  also	  increase/underline	  people’s	  belief	  in	  the	  rightfulness	  of	  an	  authority	  (Brownlee	  2002;	  
Burnell	  2006;	  Rubongoya	  2007;	  Wenner	  2014).	  Thus	  co-­‐optation	  and	  patronage	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  
legitimating	  strategy	  for	  incumbents.	  
Karateke’s	  approach	  to	  legitimacy	  as	  deriving	  from	  the	  relation	  between	  supply	  and	  demand	  sides	  is	  
helpful	  for	  this	  study,	  as	  it	  pays	  equal	  attention	  to	  public	  expectations	  of	  the	  rulers/regime	  and	  the	  
need	  for	  the	  rulers	  to	  live	  up	  to	  these	  expectations	  and	  to	  deliver.	  It	  helps	  to	  understand	  legitimacy	  
as	  a	  dynamic,	  contested	  and	  negotiated	  process	  rather	  than	  a	  stable	  property	  of	  rulers.	  The	  demand	  
side,	  or	  public	  expectations	  and	  evaluations	  of	  a	  rulers’	  normative	  bases	  and	  factual	  deliveries,	  is	  
framed	  by	  socially	  and	  culturally	  shaped	  moral	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  These	  are	  not	  uniform	  in	  a	  society	  
but	  “debated,	  agreed	  upon	  or	  rejected	  within	  processes	  of	  social	  competition	  and/or	  conflict”	  
(Alfonso,	  Kennedy,	  and	  Escalona	  2004,	  53:xii).	  In	  her	  study	  on	  the	  legitimating	  bases	  of	  “big	  men”	  in	  
Ghana,	  Lentz	  (1998)	  framed	  these	  differing	  expectations	  and	  evaluations	  as	  “moral	  communities”	  
(ibid.	  62)	  which	  evaluate	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  leader	  based	  on	  different	  parameters.	  Burnell	  (2006)	  and	  
Hardin	  (2009)	  call	  for	  attention	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  different	  perceptions	  and	  evaluations	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  
any	  one	  society.	  Karateke’s	  framework	  is	  also	  useful	  to	  analyse	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  context	  
where	  elections	  to	  district	  and	  local	  institutions	  have	  not	  been	  held	  since	  2001,	  and	  leaders	  must	  
base	  their	  legitimacy	  on	  other	  than	  the	  legal-­‐formal	  mechanism	  of	  elections.	  
Institutions,	  critical	  junctures	  and	  succession	  
The	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  set	  of	  strategies	  for	  autocratic	  rule	  provided	  some	  insights	  into	  how	  
incumbents	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  their	  authority.	  I	  now	  discuss	  the	  more	  general	  question	  of	  how	  
such	  strategies	  contribute	  to	  a	  stabilisation	  of	  the	  political	  regime.	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  
Gerschewski	  (2014)	  designed	  a	  three-­‐pillar	  model	  of	  authoritarian	  rule,	  which	  views	  the	  three	  sets	  of	  
strategies	  discussed	  so	  far	  (co-­‐optation,	  repression,	  legitimacy)	  in	  the	  round.	  The	  authors	  regard	  the	  
pillars	  as	  complementary	  and	  reciprocal.	  The	  latter	  means	  that	  they	  can	  reinforce	  each	  other	  through	  
functional	  interdependence	  and	  mutual	  strengthening.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  along	  the	  pillars	  of	  
legitimacy	  and	  co-­‐optation:	  Gerschewski	  (2014)	  argues	  that	  legitimation	  and	  ideology	  make	  it	  easier	  
for	  an	  incumbent	  to	  persuade	  the	  elite	  and	  thus	  help	  to	  reduce	  co-­‐optation	  costs;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	  co-­‐optation	  of	  elites	  decreases	  the	  risks	  of	  another	  leader	  coming	  up	  who	  promotes	  another	  
possibly	  appealing	  ideology.	  This	  strengthens	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  incumbent	  (ibid.	  28).	  The	  authors	  




suggest	  that	  short-­‐term	  declines	  in	  one	  of	  these	  three	  pillars	  can	  be	  compensated	  by	  investing	  in	  the	  
other	  two.	  For	  example,	  when	  an	  economic	  crisis	  diminishes	  incumbents’	  ability	  to	  distribute	  public	  
goods,	  they	  can	  instead	  invest	  in	  an	  ideological	  programme,	  e.g.	  ethno-­‐regional	  autonomy	  agenda,	  to	  
increase	  their	  normative	  legitimacy;	  or	  when	  rival	  parties	  detect	  a	  decline	  in	  rulers’	  commitment	  to	  
certain	  programmatic	  policies	  which	  affects	  their	  legitimacy,	  the	  rulers	  can	  use	  repression.	  
In	  explaining	  the	  long-­‐term	  stability	  and	  demise	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  and	  to	  conceptually	  link	  
agency-­‐based	  and	  structure-­‐focused	  approaches	  to	  explain	  regime	  stability,	  Gerschewksi	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  
draw	  on	  historical	  institutionalism	  as	  a	  variant	  of	  neo-­‐institutionalism	  (Hall	  and	  Taylor	  1996;	  
Immergut	  1998)25.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  regime-­‐sustaining	  pillars	  (co-­‐optation,	  legitimacy,	  repression)	  
are	  not	  givens,	  but	  merely	  develop	  and	  stabilise	  over	  time.	  They	  are	  underpinned	  by	  institutions	  
(understood	  as	  formal	  and	  informal	  rules	  and	  norms)	  that	  structure	  and	  regulate	  the	  interactions	  
between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled	  (ibid.	  8).	  A	  regime	  is	  regarded	  as	  being	  more	  stable	  when	  the	  
established	  rules	  and	  norms	  cater	  to	  the	  interests,	  preferences	  and	  motives	  of	  the	  ruled.	  This	  implies	  
that	  only	  when	  the	  ruled	  positively	  respond	  and	  adhere	  to	  rulers’	  strategies	  are	  these	  pillars	  
reinforced	  and	  stabilised	  (ibid.	  25).	  	  
The	  authors	  use	  the	  same	  institutional	  theory	  to	  explain	  regime	  change.	  If	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  
strategies	  embodied	  in	  the	  three	  pillars	  fail	  over	  the	  longer	  term,	  this	  can	  –	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  
social	  or	  political	  developments	  –	  lead	  to	  a	  “critical	  juncture”	  (ibid.	  3;	  see	  also:	  Capoccia	  and	  Kelemen	  
2011)	  entailing	  the	  possible	  fall	  or	  demise	  of	  a	  regime	  and/or	  its	  ruler(s).	  According	  to	  this	  model,	  the	  
GNLF	  was	  ultimately	  unable	  to	  sustain	  its	  rule,	  as	  it	  lost	  control	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  pillars.	  Bimal	  
Gurung’s	  establishment	  of	  the	  GJM	  and	  his	  successful	  overthrow	  of	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  GNLF	  can	  be	  
understood	  as	  one	  such	  critical	  juncture	  (this	  will	  be	  detailed	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  5).	  Such	  succession	  
does	  not,	  however,	  necessarily	  entail	  a	  change	  of	  the	  regime’s	  form	  per	  se	  (Brownlee	  2002;	  Levitsky	  
and	  Way	  2002).	  Although	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  GNLF	  did	  raise	  hopes	  for	  a	  general	  regime	  change	  in	  
Darjeeling,	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  dominant-­‐party	  politics	  suggest	  that	  only	  the	  regime’s	  master	  had	  
changed.	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Gerschewksi	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  I	  contend	  that	  my	  question	  about	  the	  acceptance	  of	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  and	  about	  political	  practice	  and	  perceptions	  is	  best	  approached	  through	  a	  
constructivist	  approach	  focussing	  on	  actors	  and	  their	  agencies.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  follow	  Giddens’	  (1984)	  
who	  argued	  that	  structures	  in	  form	  of	  institutions	  (rules,	  laws,	  socially	  agreed	  terms	  of	  behaviour)	  
stand	  in	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  to	  agency	  and	  practices.	  By	  acting	  according	  to	  certain	  rules,	  actors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Neo-­‐institutional	  approaches	  research	  the	  role	  that	  institutions	  play	  in	  determining	  social	  and	  political	  
outcomes	  (Hall	  and	  Taylor	  1996).	  Alongside	  historical	  institutionalism,	  rational	  choice	  and	  sociological	  
institutionalism	  are	  also	  considered	  branches	  of	  this	  diverse	  field	  (ibid.).	  




reproduce	  them.	  In	  turn,	  their	  actions	  are	  influenced	  and	  shaped	  by	  these	  structures.	  If	  a	  majority	  of	  
actors	  refuse	  to	  act	  according	  to	  such	  rules	  or	  lose	  their	  trust	  in	  the	  expected	  outcomes	  of	  certain	  
actions,	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  institutional	  -­‐	  and	  ultimately	  regime	  -­‐	  change.	  I	  provide	  further	  details	  of	  this	  
agency-­‐structure	  approach	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
The	  theories	  to	  understanding	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  and	  the	  three-­‐pillar	  model	  outlined	  
above	  provide	  a	  valuable	  element	  of	  the	  framework	  for	  studying	  the	  situation	  in	  Darjeeling.	  In	  the	  
language	  of	  competitive	  authoritarianism,	  this	  study	  is	  thus	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  why	  the	  
overthrow	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  party	  (GNLF)	  was	  not	  accompanied	  by	  a	  general	  regime	  change,	  
despite	  the	  broad	  public	  awareness	  about	  rights	  and	  aspirations	  for	  justice	  expressed	  in	  the	  idiom	  of	  
sachet	  jantā	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  statehood.	  	  
1.3.2 Shortcomings	  and	  anthropological	  approaches	  
The	  theoretical	  approaches	  I	  have	  reviewed,	  all	  revolving	  around	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  authoritarian	  
rule,	  are	  useful	  for	  gaining	  a	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  the	  strategies	  employed	  by	  incumbents	  in	  
competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  maintain	  their	  authority.	  The	  theories	  have	  certain	  
shortcomings,	  however,	  regarding	  their	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  rulers	  
and	  the	  ruled,	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  ruled’s	  compliance	  with	  a	  regime.	  
Most	  of	  the	  above	  reviewed	  studies	  draw	  on	  national	  level	  data	  and	  generate	  findings	  based	  on	  
large-­‐N	  quantitative	  surveys	  and	  mathematic	  models.	  This	  positivist	  methodological	  approach	  using	  
quantitative	  modelling	  distracts	  attention	  from	  the	  concrete	  interactions	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled	  at	  
smaller	  scales.	  Further,	  this	  nationwide	  focus	  ignores	  possible	  deviations	  from	  national	  democratic	  
regimes	  on	  the	  sub-­‐national	  level,	  and	  the	  ways	  such	  exceptional	  spaces	  co-­‐exist	  with	  national	  
democratic	  regimes.	  Another	  shortcoming	  is	  the	  assumption	  of	  benefit-­‐maximising	  populations	  as	  a	  
stable	  part	  of	  their	  models.	  Studies	  on	  voting	  behaviour	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  usually	  
identify	  voters’	  expectations	  of	  benefiting	  from	  political	  patronage	  as	  the	  main	  driving	  force	  behind	  
their	  electoral	  choice,	  and	  see	  ideologically	  driven	  voting	  behaviour	  as	  a	  secondary	  phenomenon	  
(Blaydes	  2006;	  Greene	  2007;	  Gandhi	  and	  Lust-­‐Okar	  2009;	  for	  India	  see:	  Chandra	  2003;	  Vaishnav	  
2012).	  Although	  such	  transactional	  considerations	  do	  certainly	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  voting	  
behaviour,	  I	  contend	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  reduce	  voters	  solely	  to	  benefit-­‐maximising	  subjects.	  	  
Gerschewksi	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  identify	  three	  motives	  for	  the	  ruled	  to	  accept	  or	  support	  an	  authoritarian	  
regime:	  they	  regard	  it	  as	  rightful;	  they	  benefit	  from	  co-­‐optation;	  or	  they	  fear	  sanctions.	  Each	  of	  the	  
three	  pillars	  corresponds	  to	  one	  of	  the	  motives:	  legitimacy	  is	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  regime’s	  
rightfulness,	  co-­‐optation	  draws	  on	  the	  benefit-­‐maximising	  actor,	  and	  repression	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fear	  
of	  sanctions	  (Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012,	  8).	  Although	  I	  generally	  agree	  with	  these	  motives	  of	  the	  ruled	  




to	  comply	  with	  or	  support	  a	  regime,	  they	  do	  not	  answer	  several	  important	  questions.	  When	  and	  
under	  what	  conditions	  do	  the	  ruled	  perceive	  a	  regime	  as	  rightful?	  What	  kind	  of	  benefits	  do	  they	  
regard	  as	  pleasing?	  What	  kind	  of	  sanctions	  do	  they	  fear,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions?	  I	  propose	  that	  
answers	  to	  these	  questions	  are	  not	  uniform	  for	  the	  group	  of	  the	  ruled,	  but	  differ	  according	  to	  factors	  
such	  as	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  background,	  their	  moral	  values	  or	  their	  differing	  expectations.	  These	  
are	  aspects	  which	  are	  covered	  in	  the	  “demand”	  side	  of	  Karateke’s	  legitimacy-­‐model	  (see	  above).	  
Answering	  these	  questions	  requires	  an	  approach	  which	  explores	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  
rulers	  and	  the	  ruled,	  and	  which	  accounts	  for	  differing	  perceptions	  and	  evaluations	  of	  the	  rulers	  by	  
the	  ruled.	  	  
Lust’s	  (2009)	  study	  on	  electoral	  behaviour	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  underlines	  the	  usefulness	  of	  local	  
studies	  for	  understanding	  electoral	  behaviour	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  beyond	  
simplifying	  transactional	  models.	  Using	  qualitative	  research	  methods,	  she	  shows	  that	  expectations	  
that	  candidates	  will	  distribute	  patronage	  are	  not	  only	  based	  on	  benefit-­‐maximising	  motives,	  but	  are	  
equally	  embedded	  in	  social	  norms	  related	  to	  membership	  of	  family,	  tribe,	  neighbourhood	  or	  villages.	  
This	  underlines	  the	  context-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  regime	  support.	  Also	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  demand	  
a	  stronger	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  population	  for	  the	  sustenance	  or	  decline	  of	  autocracies,	  and	  
Gerschewski	  (2014)	  himself	  acknowledges	  the	  need	  of	  qualitative	  studies	  to	  assess	  the	  three	  pillars	  
of	  legitimacy,	  repression	  and	  co-­‐optation.	  	  
An	  understanding	  of	  the	  acceptance	  of	  or	  compliance	  with	  a	  regime	  therefore	  requires	  an	  
epistemological	  and	  methodological	  approach	  that	  accounts	  for	  individuals’	  life-­‐worlds	  and	  
perceptions	  as	  framed	  by	  specific	  historical,	  cultural	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  structures.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  
above	  introduced	  conceptualisation	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  deriving	  from	  the	  relations	  between	  
rulers	  and	  the	  ruled,	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  rulers’	  attempts	  to	  stabilise	  their	  authority	  and	  gain	  
legitimacy	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  this	  relation.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  longevity	  of	  a	  regime	  can	  only	  be	  
explained	  by	  viewing	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  specific	  perceptions	  amongst	  those	  over	  
whom	  authority	  is	  sought.	  	  
An	  approach	  grounded	  in	  qualitative	  research	  and	  the	  constructivist	  paradigm	  helps	  to	  account	  for	  
these	  aspects.	  It	  helps	  to	  derive	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  localised	  everyday	  processes,	  in	  which	  
individuals	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  life-­‐worlds	  as	  embedded	  in	  historical,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  
structures	  and	  processes	  (Lincoln,	  Lynham,	  and	  Guba	  2011).	  This	  includes	  not	  only	  accounting	  for	  
emic	  views	  and	  calling	  generalisations	  (such	  as	  “movement”,	  “party”)	  into	  question.	  It	  also	  demands	  
attention	  to	  symbolic-­‐cultural	  and	  local	  expressions	  and	  configurations	  of	  “politics”	  (Kubik	  2009).	  I	  
will	  provide	  a	  detailed	  account	  on	  the	  methodological	  and	  epistemological	  approach	  of	  this	  study	  in	  
Chapter	  2.	  




Anthropological	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  politics	  in	  South	  Asia	  that	  look	  at	  public	  evaluations	  of	  
leaders	  and	  the	  bases	  for	  such	  evaluations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ruled’s	  specific	  contexts	  and	  their	  
subjectivities	  as	  social	  and	  political	  persons	  account	  for	  these	  aspects.	  Their	  local	  and	  qualitative	  
focus	  allows	  to	  put	  the	  existence	  of	  rights-­‐seeking	  and	  “aware”	  persons	  (or	  sachet	  jantā	  )	  into	  
relation	  to	  the	  dominant	  party-­‐regime	  and	  thereby	  to	  link	  the	  understanding	  of	  political	  structures	  to	  
the	  regularities	  of	  human	  behaviour	  (cf.	  Giddens	  and	  Sutton	  2009).	  The	  approaches	  I	  used	  here	  
account	  for	  the	  empirical	  data	  generated	  during	  this	  study.	  More	  explicitly,	  these	  concern:	  (i)	  the	  
construction	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  –	  in	  my	  case	  with	  particular	  relation	  to	  geographical	  space	  (Smith	  
1996a;	  Smith	  1996b;	  Reuber	  1999;	  Paasi	  2002a);	  (ii)	  the	  role	  of	  leadership,	  reputation,	  and	  
reputation	  management	  (Bailey	  1971;	  Mines	  and	  Gourishankar	  1990;	  Alm	  2006;	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  
2010a);	  (iii)	  patronage	  and	  clientelism	  (Bardhan	  and	  Mookherjee	  2003;	  Chandra	  2003;	  Véron	  et	  al.	  
2003;	  Piliavsky	  2014a);	  and	  (iv)	  hard	  repression,	  i.e.	  the	  “functional	  utility”	  and	  performance	  of	  
violence	  (Brass	  1997;	  Hansen	  2001;	  Gorringe	  2006a;).	  I	  will	  detail	  each	  of	  these	  approaches	  in	  the	  
consecutive	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
I	  will	  show	  how	  these	  strategies,	  together	  with	  their	  respective	  response	  amongst	  the	  ruled,	  
contribute	  to	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  repression,	  co-­‐optation	  and	  legitimacy.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  
combination	  of	  comparative	  politics	  with	  anthropological	  approaches	  will	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  durability	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  The	  latter	  supplements	  the	  formers’	  largely	  
quantitative	  approach	  with	  insights	  from	  local	  field	  studies,	  which	  help	  understanding	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  relations	  between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	  are	  not	  that	  clear-­‐cut,	  and	  in	  
practice	  they	  overlap	  in	  their	  functions	  and	  effects	  (cf.	  Gerschewski	  2014).	  I	  already	  suggested	  that	  
patronage	  can	  be	  a	  means	  of	  co-­‐optation	  and	  repression	  (see	  Chapter	  6),	  and	  –	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  
Chapter	  7	  –	  even	  hard	  repression	  can	  serve	  to	  legitimise	  an	  incumbent.	  In	  Darjeeling,	  I	  argue,	  the	  
parties’	  reference	  to	  the	  imaginative	  geography	  of	  Gorkhaland	  (Chapter	  4),	  a	  leaders’	  reputation	  
(Chapter	  5),	  patronage/clientelism	  (Chapter	  6)	  and	  hard	  repression	  (Chapter	  7)	  are	  all	  distinct	  
strategies	  through	  which	  incumbents	  attempt	  to	  attain	  legitimacy	  and	  maintain	  authority	  expressed	  
in	  their	  leadership	  over	  the	  statehood	  movement.	  
1.3.3 Activists,	  followers	  and	  rivals	  
I	  will	  attempt	  to	  analyse	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  evolving	  from	  the	  relations	  
between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled.	  Before	  approaching	  this	  relation	  however	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  clarify	  who	  
the	  “rulers”	  and	  the	  “ruled”	  are	  in	  Darjeeling,	  and	  how	  I	  use	  these	  terms	  in	  this	  study.	  While	  it	  is	  
relatively	  easy	  to	  identify	  the	  “rulers”	  as	  the	  leaders	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  persons	  commonly	  




referred	  to	  as	  netā	  in	  the	  vernacular	  (see	  Chapter	  5),	  the	  question	  of	  the	  “ruled”	  requires	  greater	  
differentiation.	  Based	  on	  the	  empirical	  data	  generated	  during	  this	  study	  I	  propose	  following	  
distinction	  to	  account	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  the	  ruled:	  (i)	  activists,	  (ii)	  followers/constituents,	  and	  
(iii)	  rivals.	  Importantly,	  various	  interviews	  with	  the	  “ruled”	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  “one	  has	  to	  have	  
a	  party”.	  Thus	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  “neutral”	  persons	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
I	  use	  the	  term	  “activist”	  to	  describe	  all	  those	  who	  are	  called	  kāryakartā	  in	  the	  vernacular,	  i.e.	  party	  
activists	  or	  party-­‐workers	  who	  are	  actively	  involved	  with	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  invest	  time	  and	  
money	  into	  the	  political	  work.	  Such	  work	  comprises	  organising	  local	  level	  meetings,	  mobilising	  
support	  for	  party	  events,	  or	  mediating	  between	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  population	  (Banerjee	  
2011).	  I	  distinguish	  between	  activists	  as	  active	  party	  supporters	  and	  passive	  “followers”	  (or	  
constituents).	  The	  term	  follower	  might	  be	  misleading	  and	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  active	  
support.	  Rather,	  my	  study	  characterises	  followers	  as	  those	  not	  actively	  resisting	  the	  ruling	  party.	  As	  
“non-­‐activists”	  they	  only	  sometimes	  or	  never	  take	  part	  in	  party	  activities.	  Although	  the	  party	  might	  
regard	  them	  as	  members	  (usually	  because	  they	  placed	  a	  party-­‐flag	  on	  their	  house,	  or	  occasionally	  
participate	  in	  rallies)	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  willingly	  support	  a	  certain	  party.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  this	  
study,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  power	  over	  resources	  or	  through	  intimidation	  the	  ruling	  party	  often	  “traps”	  
them	  into	  support	  (cf.	  Magaloni	  2006)	  which	  becomes	  visible	  in	  their	  electoral	  support	  as	  
constituents.	  Followers’	  membership	  is	  vague,	  underlining	  the	  movement-­‐character	  of	  the	  GJM	  (cf.	  
Kitschelt	  2006).	  While	  many	  studies	  on	  comparative	  authoritarianism	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  elites	  in	  
sustaining	  an	  incumbents’	  rule	  (see	  critique	  in	  Gerschewksi	  et	  al.	  2012),	  here	  I	  contend	  that	  this	  
group	  of	  “followers”	  plays	  at	  least	  an	  equally	  important	  role	  in	  stabilising	  a	  regime,	  as	  they	  provide	  a	  
potent	  base	  for	  party-­‐political	  mobilisation.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  call	  both	  activists	  and	  followers	  
“supporters”	  of	  a	  party	  when	  they	  do	  not	  actively	  resist	  its	  orders.	  Like	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  I	  
assume	  that	  activists’	  and	  followers’	  motivations	  to	  support	  a	  party/leader	  can	  be	  based	  on	  both,	  
transactional	  (when	  expecting	  some	  material	  benefits)	  or	  moral	  grounds	  (following	  a	  leader	  because	  
he	  claims	  to	  promote	  a	  programmatic	  cause)	  (see	  also	  Bailey	  1969)	  but	  it	  can	  also	  stem	  from	  fear	  and	  
obligation.	  I	  call	  those,	  who	  openly	  oppose	  the	  ruling	  party	  (e.g.	  by	  joining	  an	  opposition	  group)	  
“rivals”	  or	  opposition-­‐members.	  	  
1.4 Living	  in	  Darjeeling	  
Before	  utilising	  the	  analytical	  concepts	  outlined	  above	  to	  study	  political	  authority	  in	  Darjeeling	  in	  the	  
subsequent	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  provide	  more	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  specific	  socio-­‐
economic	  context	  of	  the	  “ruled”	  and	  “rulers”.	  This	  serves	  as	  a	  background	  for	  understanding	  their	  
accounts	  on	  the	  movement,	  political	  leaders/supporters/rivals	  and	  parties	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
chapters.	  After	  giving	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  demography,	  economy	  and	  development,	  I	  will	  




turn	  to	  the	  tea	  plantations.	  Although	  this	  study	  has	  a	  multi-­‐sited	  methodological	  focus	  (see	  Chapter	  
2)	  including	  various	  places	  of	  political	  performance	  (such	  as	  public	  meetings,	  party-­‐offices,	  urban	  
areas)	  tea	  plantations	  were	  a	  major	  field	  site	  for	  this	  study.	  Plantation	  residents	  provide	  a	  major	  
constituent	  group	  for	  political	  parties	  and	  were	  therefore	  chosen	  as	  important	  group	  representing	  
the	  “ruled”	  for	  this	  study.	  Due	  to	  time	  constraints	  I	  did	  not	  include	  agricultural	  (or	  bastī)	  areas	  in	  this	  
study.	  
1.4.1 Economy	  and	  development	  
The	  three	  Darjeeling	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  have	  a	  total	  population	  of	  872,839	  (including	  the	  four	  
municipalities	  of	  Darjeeling,	  Kurseong,	  Kalimpong	  and	  Mirik),	  of	  which	  643,976	  are	  classified	  as	  rural	  
(data	  provided	  by	  Darjeeling	  District	  Magistrate	  (DM)	  based	  on	  the	  2011	  Census).	  As	  mentioned	  
above,	  Darjeeling’s	  economic	  mainstay	  is	  tea,	  which	  is	  a	  major	  employer	  of	  the	  population	  in	  
Darjeeling	  and	  Kurseong	  sub-­‐divisions.	  In	  2013,	  there	  were	  87	  tea	  plantations	  in	  Darjeeling,	  
employing	  about	  57,000	  persons	  permanently	  and	  13,000	  seasonally	  (Business	  Standard,	  1.9.2013).	  
Both	  the	  number	  of	  estates	  and	  of	  employees	  used	  to	  be	  higher,	  but	  since	  the	  1970s	  changes	  in	  
national	  business	  policy	  and	  world	  market	  conditions	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  closure	  of	  many	  estates	  
(Besky	  2013,	  14)	  and	  forced	  people	  to	  search	  for	  alternative	  employment.	  While	  the	  tea	  economy	  is	  
concentrated	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  Kurseong	  subdivisions,	  agriculture	  plays	  a	  bigger	  role	  in	  Kalimpong	  
sub-­‐division.	  	  
Other	  rural	  income	  sources	  are	  timber	  or	  cinchona	  cultivation,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  is	  also	  done	  on	  
plantations.	  Besides	  tea,	  tourism	  is	  the	  other	  major	  economic	  pillar.	  It	  is	  largely	  confined	  to	  a	  few	  
spots	  (Subba	  1992)	  including	  the	  municipal	  areas	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  Mirik.	  In	  urban	  areas,	  business	  
(such	  as	  retail,	  tourism,	  construction	  or	  public	  contract	  works)	  and	  education	  are	  important	  sources	  
of	  income.	  Educational	  institutions,	  many	  of	  which	  have	  survived	  from	  the	  colonial	  era,	  entice	  pupils	  
from	  all	  over	  India	  and	  neighbouring	  countries	  to	  come	  to	  Darjeeling.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  many	  young	  
persons	  in	  Darjeeling	  hold	  a	  degree	  but	  leave	  the	  district	  in	  search	  for	  adequate	  employment	  in	  the	  	  
cities	  in	  the	  plains,	  underlining	  the	  problem	  of	  “educated	  unemployment”	  (Chettri	  2014,	  134).	  Many	  
retired	  servicemen	  live	  with	  their	  families	  in	  the	  town	  areas.	  	  
Town-­‐dwellers’	  reliance	  on	  business	  and	  tourism	  makes	  them	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  prolonged	  
strikes	  such	  as	  those	  regularly	  called	  as	  part	  of	  the	  statehood	  agitation	  since	  late	  2007.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  number	  of	  tourists	  declined	  from	  495,000	  in	  2008/09	  to	  145,000	  in	  2010/11,	  and	  only	  increased	  
to	  757,000	  in	  2013	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  promised	  more	  peace	  in	  the	  region	  (Business	  Standard,	  
1.9.2013).	  Various	  accounts	  hold	  that	  especially	  socio-­‐economically	  weaker	  sections	  such	  as	  daily	  
wage	  labourers	  were	  forced	  to	  pawn	  or	  sell	  their	  assets	  such	  as	  gold	  in	  order	  to	  afford	  the	  stocking	  of	  




food	  for	  phases	  of	  prolonged	  strikes.	  Besides	  regular	  power-­‐cuts,	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  water	  supply	  
is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  of	  concern	  in	  the	  towns,	  particularly	  in	  Kalimpong	  and	  Darjeeling	  (Joshi	  
2014)26.	  In	  conversations,	  Darjeeling	  town-­‐dwellers	  also	  often	  criticised	  the	  congestion	  and	  the	  dirt	  in	  
the	  town,	  along	  with	  the	  perceived	  illegal	  acquisitions	  of	  public	  land	  for	  private	  enterprises.	  
Although	  leaders	  of	  the	  regional	  parties	  criticise	  a	  lack	  of	  development	  in	  the	  hill	  region,	  
developmental	  indicators	  suggest	  that	  Darjeeling	  is	  relatively	  well-­‐off	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  West	  
Bengal	  and	  the	  wider	  country.	  The	  West	  Bengal	  Human	  Development	  Report	  in	  2004	  (Government	  of	  
West	  Bengal	  2004)27	  ranked	  Darjeeling	  district	  fourth	  in	  West	  Bengal	  after	  Kolkata	  and	  its	  urban	  
surrounding	  areas	  (Haora,	  North	  24	  Paragans)	  with	  a	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (HDI)	  of	  0.65	  (the	  
West	  Bengal	  average	  was	  0.61).	  This	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  national	  HDI	  of	  0.461	  at	  that	  time	  (UNDP	  
2011).	  In	  terms	  of	  gender	  equality,	  Darjeeling	  ranks	  as	  high	  as	  second	  behind	  Kolkata	  (Government	  of	  
West	  Bengal	  2004).	  Although	  there	  are	  certainly	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  plains	  which	  benefit	  
from	  the	  Siliguri	  business	  hub	  and	  the	  rural	  dominated	  hills	  (Chettri	  2014),	  Darjeeling	  district	  is	  
better-­‐off	  than	  other	  economically	  deprived	  districts	  in	  West	  Bengal.	  
1.4.2 Demography:	  Gorkhas,	  Nepalis	  and	  others	  
Today,	  most	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  three	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  is	  Nepali-­‐speaking,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
West	  Bengal	  plains	  where	  Bangla	  is	  the	  dominant	  language.	  This	  distinct	  demography	  of	  the	  region	  is	  
largely	  an	  outcome	  of	  its	  historically	  contested	  boundaries	  and	  of	  the	  British	  colonial	  era,	  which	  
included	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Hill	  Station	  in	  Darjeeling	  in	  1835	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  After	  the	  East	  India	  
Company	  had	  acquired	  the	  sparsely	  inhabited	  region,	  their	  attempts	  to	  build	  infrastructure,	  the	  
introduction	  of	  tea	  cultivation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  opening	  of	  an	  army	  recruitment	  centre	  enticed	  
thousands	  of	  persons	  from	  East	  Nepal	  who	  soon	  outnumbered	  the	  indigenous	  Lepcha-­‐population	  
(Subba	  1992;	  Samanta	  2000).	  Those	  who	  joined	  the	  British	  army	  were	  called	  “Gurkhas”	  by	  the	  
British,	  an	  anglicised	  reference	  to	  their	  origin	  in	  the	  expanding	  Kingdom	  of	  Nepal	  led	  by	  emperors	  
from	  the	  previous	  Gorkha	  Kingdom28.	  Although	  these	  migrants	  stemmed	  from	  different	  ethnic	  
groups	  such	  as	  Gurung,	  Tamang,	  Mangar,	  Rai	  or	  Limbu,	  with	  different	  languages,	  they	  began	  to	  adopt	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Various	  promised	  water-­‐supply	  projects	  either	  failed	  or	  have	  been	  delayed	  for	  years.	  While	  poorer	  people	  
have	  to	  queue	  to	  fill	  their	  buckets	  with	  water	  from	  public	  taps	  –	  as	  they	  cannot	  pay	  the	  high	  bribes	  to	  plumbers	  
and	  municipal	  officers	  –	  	  the	  pipes	  of	  the	  municipal	  supply	  systems	  are	  often	  leaky.	  Joshi’s	  (2014)	  insightful	  
study	  discusses	  the	  water	  crisis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  local	  politics	  with	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  women.	  
27	  The	  report	  is	  based	  on	  the	  2001	  Census.	  
28	  Gorkha	  is	  also	  the	  name	  of	  the	  district	  in	  Nepal	  from	  where	  in	  the	  18th-­‐century	  Gorkha	  King	  Prithvi	  Narayan	  
Shah	  started	  to	  conquer	  the	  territories	  that	  constitute	  present-­‐day	  Nepal.	  There	  are	  different	  theories	  about	  
the	  origin	  of	  the	  word	  Gorkha.	  Tucci	  claimed	  that	  the	  Nepalese	  Gorkhas	  placed	  themselves	  under	  the	  
protection	  of	  the	  ascetic	  Goraksa	  who	  lived	  in	  a	  mountain	  cave	  and	  worked	  miracles	  (cited	  in:	  Subba	  1992,	  54).	  
Probably	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Gorakhnath	  sect	  which	  was	  spreading	  across	  northern	  India	  in	  the	  14th	  and	  15th	  
centuries	  had	  settled	  there	  (ibid.),	  and	  his	  idol	  was	  installed	  in	  Gorkha	  (Samanta	  2000,	  8).	  




Nepali	  –	  which	  was	  at	  that	  time	  made	  the	  official	  language	  of	  Nepal	  –	  as	  a	  lingua	  franca.	  Around	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  coupled	  with	  this	  process	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  Nepalese	  literature,	  a	  
shared	  identity	  as	  “Gorkha”	  began	  to	  evolve.	  This	  process	  also	  contributed	  to	  an	  decoupling	  of	  
traditional	  caste	  relations	  (Subba	  1992).	  This	  history	  of	  migration	  and	  appropriation	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  
hills	  is	  much	  contested	  and	  a	  highly	  political	  issue	  (Middleton	  2013c).	  In	  Chapter	  4	  I	  show	  that	  many	  
Gorkha	  politicians	  in	  Darjeeling	  stress	  a	  primordial	  relation	  of	  the	  Nepalis	  to	  the	  land	  and	  deny	  their	  
migration	  during	  the	  British	  time.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  historical	  roots	  to	  Nepal	  
contribute	  to	  what	  they	  call	  an	  “identity	  crisis”,	  perceived	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  as	  Indian	  citizens	  
by	  the	  Indian	  state	  and	  other	  Indians.	  Following	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  initial	  proposition,	  many	  people	  
and	  politicians	  still	  believe	  that	  only	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  can	  solve	  this	  “identity”	  crisis	  (see	  
Chapter	  4).	  	  
Such	  apprehensions	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  confusion	  about	  the	  terms	  “Nepali”	  or	  “Gorkha”	  to	  describe	  
the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  citizens	  of	  India.	  Not	  only	  in	  Darjeeling	  itself	  (Subba	  1992,	  67)	  but	  even	  in	  studies	  
on	  the	  region	  there	  is	  often	  confusion	  about	  what	  to	  call	  them	  (see	  contributions	  in:	  Subba	  et	  al.	  
2009;	  Sinha	  and	  Subba	  2003).	  While	  politicians	  and	  some	  intellectuals	  from	  Darjeeling	  prefer	  the	  
term	  “Gorkha”,	  social	  scientists	  proposed	  terms	  such	  as	  “Indians	  of	  Nepalese	  Origin”	  (Sinha	  2009),	  
“Indian	  Nepalis”	  (Subba	  2003),	  or	  “Nepali-­‐speaking	  Indians”	  (Chettri	  2013).	  Subba	  (1992,	  71)	  found	  
that	  some	  politicians’	  insistence	  on	  using	  the	  term	  “Gorkha”	  since	  the	  1980s	  underlines	  its	  fairly	  
political	  connotations29.	  The	  2001	  Census	  termed	  their	  language	  “Nepali”	  and	  not	  “Gorkhali”	  (Census	  
of	  India	  2001a),	  although	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  Constitution	  also	  mentions	  “Gorkhali”	  or	  
“Gorkha	  bhasa”	  as	  alternatives	  (Government	  of	  India	  1992).	  Interestingly,	  most	  people	  I	  spoke	  to	  in	  
Darjeeling	  (except	  for	  politicians)	  defied	  such	  discussions	  and	  used	  the	  terms	  “Gorkha”	  and	  “Nepali”	  
interchangeably	  suggesting	  that	  the	  terminology	  actually	  did	  not	  make	  much	  difference	  to	  them	  (cf.	  
Besky	  2013,	  18).	  Accordingly,	  I	  use	  the	  terms	  Gorkha	  and	  Nepali	  as	  synonyms	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  
Nepali-­‐speaking	  Indians30.	  	  
In	  2001,	  Nepali-­‐speakers	  predominate	  in	  the	  three	  hill-­‐subdivisions	  of	  Darjeeling.	  The	  Lepcha	  make	  
up	  around	  2%,	  and	  the	  Bhutia	  (Tibetan	  community)	  3%	  of	  the	  district	  population	  (Census	  of	  India	  
2001).	  Other	  non-­‐Nepali	  groups	  are	  Bengalis,	  Marwaris	  and	  Biharis31.	  While	  according	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  All	  political	  parties	  use	  the	  term	  “Gorkha”	  for	  their	  names,	  e.g.	  the	  “All	  India	  Gorkha	  League”	  or	  “Gorkha	  
National	  Liberation	  Front”.	  Only	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Revolutionary	  Marxists	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  ethnic	  
group’s	  identity	  in	  its	  name,	  underlining	  its	  class	  approach.	  
30	  The	  interchangeability	  of	  these	  terms	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  government	  documents	  do	  not	  use	  
them	  uniformly.	  For	  instance,	  the	  1988	  notification	  of	  citizenship	  reads	  Gorkha,	  while	  the	  West	  Bengal	  official	  
language	  Act	  1961	  recognises	  Nepali	  as	  official	  language	  in	  the	  three	  Nepali-­‐speakers	  dominated	  sub-­‐divisions	  
of	  Darjeeling	  district	  (Subba	  1992,	  70).	  
31	  According	  to	  the	  2001	  census,	  there	  are	  31,210	  Lepcha	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  45,014	  Bhutia	  (Census	  of	  
India	  2001b).	  




language	  census	  there	  are	  about	  2.8	  million	  “Nepali”-­‐speakers	  all	  over	  India	  (Census	  of	  India	  2001a),	  
they	  have	  their	  highest	  concentration	  in	  the	  three	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  of	  Darjeeling.	  Importantly,	  and	  
contrary	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  many	  Gorkha	  politicians	  that	  all	  residents	  of	  Darjeeling	  hills	  belonged	  to	  the	  
“Gorkhas”	  (see	  Chapter	  4),	  some	  groups	  defy	  such	  claims.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Lepcha	  have	  more	  
recently	  invested	  in	  emphasising	  their	  distinct	  language	  and	  culture	  (see	  Chapters	  4	  and	  7),	  and	  it	  is	  
doubtful	  whether	  the	  Bhutia	  or	  other	  resident	  groups	  such	  as	  Biharis	  or	  Marwadis	  –	  who	  mostly	  
belong	  to	  the	  business	  community	  –	  regard	  themselves	  as	  “Gorkhas”.	  Religion-­‐wise,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  
hill-­‐population	  are	  Hindus	  (69%).	  Buddhists	  are	  the	  second	  largest	  group	  (22%).	  In	  2001,	  about	  11	  %	  
of	  the	  population	  belonged	  to	  Scheduled	  Tribes,	  and	  6.2	  %	  to	  Scheduled	  Castes	  (data	  provided	  by	  
DM	  Darjeeling)	  (see	  Table	  2).	  
Table	  2:	  Population	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  (Darjeeling,	  Kurseong,	  Kalimpong)	  and	  Siliguri	  as	  per	  
census,	  2001.	  Source:	  Darjeeling	  DM/Census	  2001	  
	   3	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	   Siliguri	  sub-­‐division	   Total	  
Total	  population	   790,501	   818,581	   1,609,172	  
Scheduled	  Castes	   49,089	   209,792	   258,881	  
Scheduled	  Tribes	   85,047	   119,120	   204,167	  
Hindu	   545,796	   691,918	   1,237,714	  
Buddhist	   171,434	   5,893	   177,327	  
Christian	   56,696	   42,596	   99,232	  
Muslim	   11,952	   73,426	   85,378	  
	  
1.4.3 Tea	  plantations:	  Class,	  hierarchies,	  dependencies	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  tea	  plantations	  as	  a	  major	  field	  site	  of	  this	  study.	  Tea	  
estates	  not	  only	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  district’s	  economy,	  Sandeep	  Mukherjee,	  spokesperson	  of	  the	  
Darjeeling	  Tea	  Association	  (DTA),	  estimates	  that	  70%	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  population	  are	  directly	  or	  
indirectly	  dependent	  on	  the	  tea	  economy	  (interview,	  15.06.2012).	  Accordingly,	  residents	  of	  the	  
plantations	  also	  provide	  an	  important	  mass	  base	  for	  political	  parties,	  something	  that	  historically	  
made	  them	  prone	  to	  political	  contestations	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  3)	  (Sarkar	  and	  Lama	  1986).	  As	  Sandeep	  
Mukherjee	  put	  it:	  “[Tea]	  gardens	  are	  the	  turf	  for	  political	  parties’	  fight”	  (interview,	  15.06.2012).	  
The	  following	  presentation	  is	  partly	  based	  on	  secondary	  literature,	  and	  partly	  on	  the	  data	  largely	  
generated	  through	  participant	  observation	  and	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  during	  my	  stays	  in	  the	  tea	  
plantations	  (see	  Chapter	  2).	  




The	  land	  of	  the	  tea	  plantations	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State	  which	  leases	  it	  out	  to	  private	  
companies	  for	  long	  time-­‐spans	  (around	  30	  years).	  While	  these	  companies	  or	  individual	  proprietors	  
(māliks)	  usually	  stay	  away	  from	  Darjeeling,	  managers	  supported	  by	  a	  team	  of	  assistant	  managers	  
oversee	  the	  operations.	  Most	  workers	  on	  the	  plantation	  are	  employed	  for	  their	  whole	  life.	  When	  
they	  reach	  retirement	  age	  they	  usually	  pass	  on	  their	  employment	  to	  another	  younger	  family	  
member,	  or	  sell	  it	  to	  somebody	  else.	  In	  the	  high	  season	  the	  companies	  additionally	  employ	  non-­‐
permanent	  workers	  from	  the	  same	  or	  surrounding	  villages.	  The	  permanent	  workers	  usually	  spend	  
most	  of	  their	  life	  on	  the	  plantations.	  The	  six-­‐day	  working	  week	  gives	  them	  hardly	  any	  time	  to	  travel,	  
and	  often	  the	  transportation	  fares	  to	  the	  nearby	  bazaar	  places	  or	  bigger	  towns	  exceed	  their	  daily	  
earnings.	  Most	  plantations	  permanently	  employ	  several	  hundred	  workers	  who	  receive	  their	  salaries	  
fortnightly	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  days	  they	  worked,	  and	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  fulfilled	  the	  
“task”	  of	  plucking	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  leaves	  a	  day.	  Since	  2011,	  workers	  were	  paid	  a	  salary	  of	  90	  INR	  
(about	  1.33	  euros)	  a	  day.	  Permanent	  employees,	  however,	  receive	  a	  large	  part	  of	  their	  salaries	  in	  
kind.	  According	  to	  law	  (Indian	  Plantation	  Labour	  Act	  1951),	  companies	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  
covering	  medical	  expenses,	  foot	  rations,	  money	  for	  firewood,	  for	  dependents’	  children’s	  primary	  
education,	  and	  the	  expenses	  of	  working	  tools	  (such	  as	  baskets,	  sickles,	  gumboots).	  Some	  companies	  
provide	  financial	  support	  to	  workers	  to	  construct	  their	  houses.	  A	  part	  of	  the	  salary	  goes	  into	  a	  
provident	  fund,	  which	  serves	  as	  a	  pension	  for	  retired	  workers.	  Once	  a	  year	  workers	  also	  receive	  a	  
“bonus”	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  their	  work32.	  Despite	  all	  these	  in-­‐kind	  facilities,	  many	  workers	  complained	  
that	  their	  wages	  were	  too	  low	  to	  sustain	  their	  families	  (compare	  the	  minimum	  wage	  of	  135	  INR	  (2	  
euros)	  a	  day	  in	  West	  Bengal).	  To	  prop	  up	  the	  low	  income	  from	  plantation	  work,	  households	  engage	  in	  
farming	  on	  the	  scarce	  plots	  and	  animal	  husbandry,	  or	  take	  other	  odd	  jobs.	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  
National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  (NREGS)	  or	  other	  governmental	  welfare	  schemes	  
provide	  an	  important	  and	  helpful	  source	  of	  income.	  Yet,	  the	  access	  to	  these	  schemes	  is	  confined	  (see	  
Chapter	  6).	  	  
Most	  workers	  had	  quite	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  their	  entitlements	  and	  rights	  towards	  the	  
management.	  To	  enforce	  their	  claims,	  they	  felt	  reliant	  on	  the	  labour	  unions	  which	  function	  as	  frontal	  
organisations	  of	  political	  parties.	  The	  oft-­‐expressed	  feeling	  that	  “one	  has	  to	  have	  a	  ‘party’	  [Engl.]	  
[read:	  union]”	  is	  related	  to	  this	  perceived	  dependency.	  Once	  a	  year	  individual	  labourers	  buy	  a	  ticket	  
of	  their	  respective	  union	  at	  a	  contribution	  of	  around	  100	  INR	  which	  in	  a	  way	  shows	  their	  party-­‐
affiliation.	  In	  2012	  and	  2013,	  in	  most	  tea	  plantations,	  only	  the	  GJM-­‐affiliated	  union	  was	  active,	  while	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  The	  bonus	  is	  paid	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  money	  a	  worker	  has	  earned	  during	  the	  year	  (recently	  20%).	  




the	  CPRM-­‐affiliated	  union	  was	  active	  in	  a	  few	  gardens,	  only.	  Other	  unions	  were	  not	  active	  at	  the	  
studied	  sites33.	  	  
As	  the	  land	  of	  the	  plantation	  and	  villages	  is	  State	  owned,	  there	  is	  next	  to	  no	  private	  land-­‐ownership.	  
Residents’	  occupation	  of	  the	  few	  available	  plots	  for	  agriculture,	  gardening	  and	  firewood	  collection	  is	  
usually	  accepted	  by	  the	  management,	  but	  the	  plots	  can	  be	  cleared	  at	  any	  time	  as	  they	  are	  on	  
government	  land	  to	  which	  the	  company	  holds	  the	  legal	  entitlement.	  According	  to	  the	  Indian	  
Plantation	  Labour	  Act	  1951,	  only	  those	  working	  on	  the	  plantation	  and	  their	  dependants	  are	  allowed	  
to	  live	  on	  the	  plantations,	  and	  earlier	  workers	  and	  their	  families	  could	  be	  evicted	  if	  the	  management	  
cancelled	  their	  work	  contracts.	  After	  the	  rise	  of	  labour	  unions	  in	  the	  1950s,	  this	  practice	  ceased	  to	  be	  
enforced	  so	  that	  today	  also	  families	  without	  labour	  relations	  to	  the	  plantation	  reside	  on	  the	  
plantation	  land.	  Importantly,	  the	  colonial	  introduction	  of	  the	  tea	  economy	  and	  the	  resulting	  
migration	  of	  workers	  from	  Nepal	  had	  effects	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  land-­‐ownership,	  land	  tenure,	  
caste	  and	  class.	  Due	  to	  residents’	  lack	  of	  legal	  land-­‐ownership	  certificates	  and	  limited	  access	  to	  land	  
for	  cultivation,	  land-­‐ownership,	  class	  and	  caste	  do	  not	  have	  a	  positive	  correlation	  in	  the	  tea	  
plantation	  areas	  of	  Darjeeling,	  unlike	  in	  the	  plains.	  Instead,	  Subba	  (1989,	  91)	  found	  that	  higher	  
economic	  status	  was	  more	  related	  to	  the	  length	  of	  settlement	  and	  the	  adaptive	  capacity	  of	  individual	  
migrants	  including	  their	  investment	  into	  education	  (see	  also:	  Chatterji	  2007,	  49).	  	  
As	  I	  will	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  many	  respondents	  voiced	  their	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  harsh	  and	  
hierarchical	  working	  conditions,	  the	  low	  salaries,	  and	  the	  limited	  perspectives	  for	  promotions,	  
underlining	  feelings	  of	  insecurity,	  exploitation,	  and	  minor	  positions	  in	  the	  strict	  plantation	  hierarchy.	  
The	  majority	  works	  in	  tea	  plucking	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  bushes	  (including	  weeding,	  cutting	  the	  
bushes,	  supplying	  fertiliser,	  etc.).	  Separate	  groups	  of	  men	  and	  women	  (so-­‐called	  deks)	  are	  overseen	  
by	  kāmdārīs	  and	  chaprāsīs	  who	  notice	  work	  attendance,	  supervise	  the	  tasks	  and	  report	  to	  the	  upper	  
management	  levels	  (see	  Picture	  1).	  They	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  orders	  from	  the	  
management,	  which	  sometimes	  causes	  conflict	  between	  them	  and	  dissatisfied	  workers.	  Workers	  
frequently	  criticised	  the	  fact	  that	  managers	  and	  assistant	  managers	  were	  not	  chosen	  from	  among	  the	  
local	  labours	  but	  came	  from	  “outside”	  (bāhira),	  which	  in	  their	  views	  blocked	  opportunities	  for	  
qualified	  locals	  to	  attain	  higher	  positions.	  Many	  also	  expressed	  the	  fear	  that	  their	  plantation	  might	  be	  
shut	  down	  (or	  “logged	  out”),	  as	  sometimes	  happens	  when	  companies	  feel	  that	  the	  profits	  are	  too	  
low.	  Such	  a	  closure	  even	  led	  to	  a	  suicide	  of	  one	  man	  at	  Chongtong	  tea	  estate	  in	  2006.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Very	  often,	  minority	  parties’	  unions	  were	  only	  represented	  by	  a	  few	  leaders,	  but	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
get	  involved	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  management.	  Different	  unions	  hardly	  ever	  cooperate,	  thus	  underlining	  
their	  party-­‐political	  orientation.	  




Protesting	  against	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  workers	  in	  the	  logged-­‐out	  plantation,	  62-­‐year-­‐old	  Baburam	  
Dewan	  hanged	  himself	  at	  one	  of	  the	  tea-­‐weighing	  stations.	  In	  a	  handwritten	  “Suicide	  Note”	  attached	  
to	  his	  body,	  he	  blamed	  the	  proprietor	  of	  the	  tea	  plantation	  for	  his	  suicide	  and	  asked	  the	  
administration	  to	  punish	  him	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  His	  note	  ends	  with	  “What	  kind	  of	  oppression	  is	  it	  
that	  one	  person	  can	  keep	  6,500	  individuals	  hungry?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  to	  the	  administration.”	  
Although	  an	  extreme	  case,	  this	  incidence	  symbolises	  the	  depression	  and	  perceived	  powerlessness	  of	  
many	  employed	  on	  the	  plantations.	  	  
Village	  samāj,	  unemployment	  and	  Gorkhaland	  
Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  dependency	  and	  insecurity	  about	  employment	  and	  finances,	  residents	  of	  the	  
tea	  plantation	  villages	  formed	  socially	  inclusive,	  informal	  institutions,	  known	  as	  samāj	  (Nepali	  for	  
society)34.	  These	  are	  comprised	  of	  all	  male	  and	  female	  members	  from	  all	  the	  village	  households.	  The	  
members	  make	  a	  little	  financial	  contribution	  (10-­‐20	  INR)	  to	  it,	  generally	  on	  a	  fortnightly	  basis.	  The	  
samājs	  are	  run	  by	  village-­‐chosen	  representatives	  who	  take	  care	  of	  finances	  and	  call	  meetings	  when	  
necessary.	  All	  respondents	  considered	  the	  samāj	  to	  be	  very	  important	  because	  it	  provides	  some	  
degree	  of	  social	  security.	  It	  mostly	  helps	  members	  to	  organise	  social	  events	  (e.g.	  through	  providing	  
crockery	  and	  chairs	  for	  weddings/funerals)	  and	  its	  community-­‐chosen	  representatives	  engage	  in	  
conflict	  resolution.	  In	  all	  villages,	  people	  regarded	  the	  samāj	  as	  non-­‐political	  and	  drew	  a	  clear	  line	  
between	  the	  social	  and	  political	  realms.	  Importantly,	  not	  all	  people	  living	  on	  tea	  plantations	  are	  
employed	  in	  them.	  Rather,	  unemployment	  and	  labour	  migration	  of	  family	  members	  to	  the	  plains	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Such	  samāj	  are	  in	  fact	  also	  active	  in	  agricultural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  
	  
Picture	  1:	  Women	  pluck	  tea	  on	  a	  steep	  slope	  while	  being	  supervised	  by	  chaprāsīs.	  Picture	  by	  the	  author.	  




very	  common.	  As	  I	  will	  show,	  many	  of	  these	  unemployed	  persons	  (largely	  men)	  are	  actively	  engaged	  
with	  the	  political	  parties	  (cf.	  Besky	  2014,	  158).	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  draw	  on	  accounts	  by	  both	  tea	  
plantation	  workers	  and	  residents,	  i.e.	  those	  not	  employed	  in	  the	  plantations	  but	  living	  there.	  	  
Importantly,	  I	  do	  not	  treat	  the	  village	  community	  as	  a	  united	  block,	  but,	  according	  to	  the	  
aforementioned	  distinction	  between	  “rulers”	  and	  the	  “ruled”	  and	  based	  on	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  
this	  study,	  as	  fractured	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  political	  leaders,	  party	  activists,	  followers	  and	  rivals.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  4	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  how	  this	  specific	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  relates	  to	  tea	  plantation	  
residents’	  visions	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  aspirations	  for	  a	  redistribution	  of	  resources	  
and	  recognition	  of	  their	  identities	  as	  formulated	  towards	  the	  state	  reflect	  what	  I	  had	  earlier	  called	  an	  
“aware	  citizenry”.	  	  
	  
	  




2 Studying	  politics:	  Approaches,	  methods,	  and	  political	  
implications	  
	  
2.1 Secrecy	  and	  warnings	  
During	  an	  interview	  on	  Darjeeling	  politics	  Niraj	  Lama,	  an	  acclaimed	  journalist	  from	  the	  region,	  
pointed	  out:	  “It	  was	  always	  a	  ‘cloak	  and	  dagger’-­‐politics	  in	  the	  hills.	  [...]	  There	  is	  so	  much	  secrecy	  
involved	  [...].	  Even	  those	  involved	  are	  very	  much	  unaware	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  a	  larger	  arena”	  
(interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Indeed,	  my	  endeavour	  to	  uncover	  power	  struggles	  hidden	  behind	  the	  visible	  
and	  publicly-­‐articulated	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  met	  various	  challenges,	  amongst	  which	  the	  mentioned	  
“secrecy”	  was	  only	  one.	  While	  many	  politicians	  I	  spoke	  to	  readily	  welcomed	  my	  interview	  requests	  as	  
a	  chance	  to	  portray	  themselves	  and	  their	  “cause”	  to	  an	  “international	  audience”,	  many	  of	  those	  not	  
actively	  engaged	  with	  any	  of	  the	  parties	  often	  expressed	  a	  general	  refrain	  to	  talk	  about	  “politics”	  and	  
“party”,	  claiming	  that	  they	  did	  not	  “know”	  about	  it,	  and	  that	  they	  did	  “not	  like	  it”.	  	  
Further,	  prior	  to	  generating	  data	  in	  Darjeeling	  I	  had	  been	  warned	  by	  one	  of	  my	  supervisors	  of	  the	  
possibly	  violent	  context,	  which	  I	  was	  planning	  to	  explore.	  Also,	  at	  my	  first	  stay	  in	  Darjeeling	  town,	  
Binita*35,	  a	  friend	  running	  a	  small	  restaurant	  warned	  me	  after	  I	  told	  her	  about	  my	  plans	  to	  study	  
“Gorkhaland”.	  With	  a	  low	  voice	  she	  urged	  me:	  “Miriam,	  people	  here	  are	  not	  good.	  You	  must	  be	  
careful,	  don’t	  ask	  your	  questions	  to	  everyone”.	  This	  common	  association	  of	  politics	  with	  violence	  and	  
fear	  underlined	  that	  it	  was	  a	  highly	  sensitive	  subject.	  Also	  later,	  many	  respondents	  expressed	  their	  
fear	  of	  oppression	  if	  criticising	  those	  regarded	  as	  powerful.	  Stories	  of	  violent	  oppression	  and	  even	  
murders	  of	  political	  rivals	  allegedly	  ordered	  by	  the	  ruling	  party	  also	  raised	  ethical	  concerns	  about	  the	  
security	  of	  respondents,	  and	  about	  how	  I	  would	  deal	  with	  persons	  (for	  example	  in	  interviews),	  who	  
held	  reputations	  of	  using	  violence	  against	  their	  rivals.	  Such	  a	  context	  clearly	  posed	  challenges	  to	  the	  
research	  process,	  generation	  and	  evaluation	  of	  data,	  and	  called	  for	  an	  adequate	  framework	  and	  
reflection	  about	  my	  own	  positionality.	  How	  could	  I	  explore	  my	  primary	  research	  subject,	  the	  
construction	  of	  political	  authority,	  in	  a	  context	  characterised	  by	  presumed	  political	  “secrecy”	  and	  
fear	  from	  political	  oppression?	  Who	  could	  I	  trust?	  What	  kind	  of	  relationships	  between	  me	  and	  
respondents	  would	  be	  possible	  in	  such	  a	  context?	  Was	  it	  possible	  to	  seek	  scientific	  “objectivity”	  
when	  confronted	  with	  cases,	  which	  strongly	  challenged	  my	  “European”-­‐shaped	  moral	  values?	  Could	  I	  
stay	  “out	  of	  politics”	  when	  researching	  politics?	  	  
This	  chapter	  addresses	  these	  questions	  by	  reviewing	  the	  research	  process	  and	  decisions	  taken	  
regarding	  the	  choice	  of	  research	  paradigm,	  approach,	  and	  methods.	  After	  justifying	  the	  grounding	  of	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  In	  the	  following	  the	  *	  behind	  person-­‐	  or	  place-­‐names	  indicates	  their	  anonymisation.	  




the	  study	  in	  the	  constructivist	  paradigm	  and	  discussing	  the	  implications	  for	  data	  generation,	  
documentation,	  and	  interpretation,	  I	  introduce	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  as	  my	  main	  approach	  for	  
data	  generation.	  A	  critique	  of	  the	  approaches	  and	  methods	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  description	  of	  
documentation	  and	  analysis	  methods.	  
	  
2.2 Understanding	  the	  meanings	  of	  politics	  
The	  study	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  constructivist	  paradigm,	  which	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  pristine	  reality	  
separate	  from	  the	  researcher.	  Constructivism	  assumes	  that	  “the	  meaning	  of	  experiences	  and	  events	  
are	  constructed	  by	  individuals	  and,	  therefore,	  people	  construct	  the	  realities	  in	  which	  they	  
participate”	  (Lauckner,	  Paterson,	  and	  Krupa	  2012,	  6).	  The	  aim	  of	  research	  is	  to	  “elicit	  and	  understand	  
how	  research	  respondents	  construct	  their	  individual	  and	  shared	  meanings	  around	  the	  phenomen[a]	  
of	  interest”	  (ibid.;	  Lincoln,	  Lynham,	  and	  Guba	  2011).	  A	  research	  subject	  is	  nothing	  to	  be	  “discovered”	  
and	  completely	  understood	  but	  rather	  a	  complex	  and	  context-­‐specific	  phenomenon,	  which	  holds	  
different	  meanings	  for	  those	  involved	  or	  affected.	  Thus,	  the	  aim	  of	  research	  in	  the	  constructivist	  
paradigm	  is	  not	  to	  produce	  generalisable	  “truths”.	  Instead,	  it	  acknowledges	  a	  variety	  of	  differing	  
voices	  and	  does	  not	  judge	  their	  accurateness.	  It	  interprets	  voices	  “for	  what	  perspectives,	  practices,	  
and	  assumptions	  [they]	  reveal[s]”	  and	  “seeks	  to	  link	  these	  testimonies	  to	  prevailing	  social	  discourses”	  
(Schatz	  2009,	  13).	  Epistemologically,	  constructivism	  evaluates	  every	  knowledge	  as	  “situated”	  (Rose	  
1997)	  and	  co-­‐produced.	  The	  principle	  of	  situatedness	  acknowledges	  the	  partiality	  of	  knowledge	  as	  
being	  produced	  in	  specific	  circumstances,	  which	  shape	  it	  in	  some	  way	  (Rose	  1997,	  305).	  It	  denies	  
viewing	  knowledge	  as	  independent	  object	  and	  instead	  treats	  it	  as	  evolving	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  
the	  researcher	  and	  the	  researched/respondents,	  acknowledging	  their	  influences	  on	  the	  generated	  
data	  (Collins	  1998).	  	  
I	  found	  this	  constructivist	  perspective	  best	  suited	  to	  account	  for	  the	  variety	  of	  differing	  and	  often	  
contradictory	  opinions	  and	  accounts	  on	  Gorkhaland,	  its	  politics,	  and	  parties	  in	  Darjeeling	  that	  I	  came	  
across	  during	  my	  research.	  It	  helped	  me	  to	  frame	  the	  question	  of	  the	  two-­‐sided	  construction	  of	  
political	  authority	  in	  relation	  to	  quotidian	  lifeworlds	  by	  accounting	  for	  the	  ways	  individuals	  (try	  to)	  
make	  sense	  of	  their	  world,	  i.e.	  how	  they	  interpret	  events,	  their	  positions	  in	  social	  systems	  of	  power	  
and	  their	  relations	  with	  each	  other,	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  nation.	  Insights	  from	  the	  constructivist	  
paradigm	  also	  required	  me	  to	  continuously	  reflect	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  my	  own	  positionality	  as	  a	  female	  
European	  researcher	  in	  a	  foreign	  context.	  
	  




2.2.1 Subjectivity,	  positionality	  and	  reflexivity	  
Understanding	  knowledge	  as	  co-­‐produced	  and	  situated	  calls	  for	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  researcher	  on	  how	  
her	  positionality	  (in	  terms	  of	  race,	  nationality,	  age,	  gender,	  social	  and	  economic	  status,	  sexuality,	  and	  
scientific	  training)	  may	  influence	  the	  data	  generated	  (Katz	  1994;	  Rose	  1997;	  Collins	  1998).	  
Acknowledging	  their	  subjectivist	  stance	  requires	  researchers	  to	  articulate	  their	  assumptions	  and	  to	  
provide	  transparency	  about	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  research	  was	  done,	  and	  how	  their	  cultural,	  
theoretical,	  and	  political	  context	  affected	  interactions	  with	  the	  subject	  (Lauckner,	  Paterson,	  and	  
Krupa	  2012).	  Reflexivity	  also	  requires	  to	  display	  detours,	  dilemmas,	  and	  uncertainties,	  and	  to	  make	  
visible	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  leading	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  approaches,	  methods,	  field-­‐sites	  etc.	  
(Rose	  1997;	  Collins	  1998;	  Charmaz	  2004;Lauckner,	  Paterson,	  and	  Krupa	  2012).	  
Understanding	  knowledge	  as	  co-­‐constructed	  (Mills,	  Bonner,	  and	  Francis	  2006)	  demands	  due	  
attention	  to	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  researcher	  and	  respondents	  during	  the	  research	  process.	  
Transparent	  reflexivity	  requires	  the	  researcher	  to	  make	  her	  position	  known	  in	  terms	  of	  complex	  
power	  relations	  between	  herself	  and	  the	  researched	  (Katz	  1994;	  Rose	  1997).	  Following	  a	  critical	  
paradigm	  ,	  a	  researcher	  should	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  reciprocity	  between	  research-­‐respondents	  and	  
herself	  (Mills,	  Bonner,	  and	  Francis	  2006).	  Practically,	  this	  includes	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  non-­‐judgmental	  
stance	  towards	  the	  respondents	  and	  their	  accounts	  and	  the	  investment	  of	  one’s	  own	  personality	  in	  
the	  research	  process	  to	  establish	  a	  more	  non-­‐hierarchical	  relationship	  (ibid.).	  A	  technique	  to	  situate	  
knowledge	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  researcher	  as	  author	  of	  the	  text	  (Denzin	  2000;	  
Mills,	  Bonner,	  and	  Francis	  2006).	  Making	  the	  researcher	  (and	  her	  positionality)	  visible	  in	  the	  
authorship	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  “silent	  authorship”	  (Charmaz	  and	  Mitchell	  1996)	  –	  helps	  the	  reader	  to	  
comprehend	  the	  analytical	  lenses	  through	  which	  the	  researcher	  generated	  and	  looked	  at	  the	  data	  
(Mills,	  Bonner,	  and	  Francis	  2006).	  	  
Acknowledging	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  requirements,	  Rose	  (1997)	  takes	  a	  more	  critical	  stance	  on	  
the	  possibility	  of	  such	  transparent	  reflexivity,	  which	  attempts	  to	  make	  both	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  
researcher	  (inward-­‐reflexivity)	  and	  her	  relation	  to	  her	  research	  and	  the	  wider	  world	  (outward	  
reflexivity)	  visible	  (ibid.).	  According	  to	  Rose,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  explicate	  and	  know	  the	  landscape	  of	  
power	  one	  enters	  (and	  produces)	  during	  research,	  and	  one’s	  own	  positions	  in	  it.	  Claiming	  otherwise	  
would	  place	  researchers	  in	  position	  of	  Gods,	  “who	  claim	  to	  know	  how	  power	  works,	  but	  who	  are	  
themselves	  powerful,	  able	  to	  see	  and	  know	  both	  themselves	  and	  the	  world	  in	  which	  they	  work”	  (ibid.	  
310).	  Ways	  out	  of	  this	  dilemma	  are	  to	  ask	  about	  how	  difference	  is	  constituted,	  to	  pay	  due	  attention	  
to	  language	  and	  translations	  as	  ways	  to	  challenge	  researcher’s	  assumptions,	  and	  to	  write	  
uncertainties	  and	  tensions	  into	  the	  text.	  Rose	  proposes	  to	  view	  research	  as	  a	  process	  of	  constitutive	  
negotiation	  in	  which	  social	  identities	  (of	  both	  researcher	  and	  researched)	  are	  mutually	  made	  and	  




remade.	  In	  this	  reading	  position	  is	  relational,	  and	  reflexivity	  becomes	  self-­‐construction	  (ibid.	  313,	  
314).	  Practically,	  Rose’s	  contentions	  call	  for	  vigilance	  in	  the	  research	  process,	  and	  for	  acknowledging	  
gaps	  in	  meaning	  and	  absences	  (ibid.	  319).	  	  
These	  elaborations	  not	  only	  demand	  displaying	  the	  research	  process	  including	  its	  detours	  and	  
dilemmas	  but	  also	  an	  elaboration	  on	  my	  own	  positionality	  (as	  far	  as	  I	  understand	  it),	  my	  relation	  to	  
the	  research	  subject	  and	  to	  research	  respondents.	  	  
Pre-­‐assumptions	  and	  detours	  
Initially	  –	  influenced	  by	  interviews	  with	  movement	  leader	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  which	  I	  had	  read	  in	  the	  
internet	  –	  I	  had	  planned	  to	  study	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  as	  an	  example	  for	  increasing	  
democratisation	  in	  India,	  while	  accounting	  for	  the	  influences	  the	  “democratic”	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  
movement	  leaders	  had	  on	  public	  perceptions	  of	  democracy.	  Initial	  readings	  on	  Darjeeling	  also	  
provided	  me	  with	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  political	  actors	  (mainly	  the	  regional	  parties),	  the	  special	  
autonomy	  set-­‐up	  for	  the	  region	  in	  form	  of	  a	  district	  council,	  and	  the	  political	  history	  of	  the	  district	  
since	  the	  18th	  century.	  Particularly	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  formerly	  ruling	  GNLF	  in	  2007,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  
a	  new	  party,	  the	  GJM	  proclaiming	  a	  “democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  Gandhian”	  agitation	  struck	  me	  as	  
interesting	  entry-­‐points	  for	  my	  research.	  	  
My	  first	  explorative	  field	  visit	  to	  Darjeeling,	  however,	  strongly	  contradicted	  my	  optimist	  assumptions	  
about	  the	  democratic	  nature	  of	  the	  statehood	  agitation.	  Talking	  to	  different	  persons	  in	  Darjeeling	  
including	  intellectuals	  (mostly	  journalists	  and	  lawyers)	  I	  realised	  how	  fractured	  the	  so-­‐called	  
“movement”	  was.	  Perceptions	  on	  the	  meanings	  of	  Gorkhaland	  seemed	  to	  be	  inconsistent.	  While	  
some	  persons	  I	  initially	  spoke	  to	  held	  a	  largely	  optimist	  opinion	  about	  the	  ruling	  GJM	  party,	  others	  
strongly	  criticised	  it	  for	  its	  alleged	  “authoritarian,	  violent,	  and	  corrupt”	  rule	  and	  for	  oppressing	  other	  
regional	  parties	  or	  non-­‐party	  voices.	  It	  seemed	  that	  serious	  issues	  concerning	  political	  authority,	  
public	  representation,	  and	  leadership	  were	  hidden	  behind	  the	  proclaimed	  “democratic	  and	  non-­‐
violent”	  labels.	  	  
Such	  contradictions	  forced	  me	  to	  adapt	  my	  stand	  on	  politics	  in	  India	  and	  engage	  with	  anthropological	  
literature	  on	  the	  constitution	  of	  political	  authority	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  comparative	  politics’	  
approaches	  to	  authoritarianism	  on	  the	  other.	  Both	  helped	  me	  to	  reframe	  my	  research	  by	  shifting	  the	  
focus	  towards	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  party	  politics	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  
statehood	  movement.	  	  
During	  these	  explorations	  into	  Darjeeling	  politics	  I	  often	  felt	  my	  own	  European	  assumptions	  about	  
how	  politics	  functions	  contradicted.	  Being	  confronted	  with	  the	  ways	  parties	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  




statehood	  movement	  attempted	  to	  attain	  and	  maintain	  leadership,	  did	  not	  only	  call	  my	  assumptions	  
but	  also	  my	  values	  and	  ideas	  about	  “how	  politics	  should	  function”	  strongly	  into	  question.	  Although	  
such	  challenges	  to	  my	  pre-­‐understandings	  and	  the	  entailed	  “surprises”	  facilitated	  the	  process	  of	  
understanding	  and	  reconstruction	  of	  socially	  held	  beliefs	  and	  perspectives	  –	  as	  they	  forced	  me	  to	  
review	  and	  question	  my	  assumptions	  in	  close	  interaction	  with	  research	  respondents	  –	  the	  
confrontation	  with	  political	  violence	  and	  the	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  Darjeeling	  underlined	  the	  difficulties	  in	  
understanding	  respondents’	  perspectives	  and	  world-­‐views.	  	  
I	  remember	  an	  instance	  when	  a	  mob	  of	  GJM	  activists	  had	  forcefully	  stopped	  a	  pick-­‐up	  truck	  with	  
GNLF	  supporters	  from	  proceeding	  to	  attend	  a	  public	  meeting	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  I	  stood	  close-­‐by	  when	  
the	  men	  began	  shaking	  and	  hitting	  the	  truck.	  I	  was	  pretty	  shocked	  and	  disturbed	  by	  what	  I	  had	  seen.	  
When	  I	  spoke	  about	  the	  event	  later	  to	  a	  friend	  from	  the	  same	  village	  (and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  GJM)	  he	  
smiled	  and	  said:	  “Miriam,	  that	  was	  nothing.	  Nobody	  got	  injured.”	  Was	  he	  just	  trying	  to	  play-­‐down	  the	  
incident,	  or	  was	  it	  really	  “nothing”?	  Was	  I	  overestimating	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  incident?	  Indeed,	  other	  
clashes	  sometimes	  included	  stone-­‐pelting	  and	  the	  use	  of	  sharp	  weapons	  (see	  Chapter	  7).	  Shaking	  a	  
pick-­‐up	  was	  nothing	  compared	  to	  that	  –	  or	  was	  it?	  Hardly	  a	  month	  later	  there	  was	  the	  chance	  of	  a	  
clash	  between	  GJM	  and	  CPRM	  supporters	  at	  a	  planned	  CPRM-­‐meeting	  in	  Darjeeling	  which	  I	  wanted	  
to	  observe	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  A	  journalist	  friend	  had	  warned	  me	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  clash	  but	  –	  
unlike	  a	  month	  earlier	  –	  I	  realised	  that	  I	  was	  much	  more	  relaxed.	  Did	  I	  myself	  get	  used	  to	  political	  
violence?	  Was	  I	  accepting	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  political	  game	  in	  Darjeeling	  (and	  India)?	  Was	  this	  what	  it	  
was	  like	  for	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  –	  a	  common,	  non-­‐surprising,	  and	  acceptable	  incidence,	  a	  non-­‐
welcomed	  but	  every-­‐day	  occurrence	  one	  has	  to	  live	  with?	  	  
Relationships	  to	  research	  respondents	  
A	  second	  aspect	  of	  situating	  knowledge	  entails	  a	  critical	  attention	  and	  reflection	  on	  the	  researcher’s	  
relationships	  to	  research	  respondents36.	  How	  did	  they	  react	  to	  my	  requests	  for	  interviews	  and/or	  to	  
my	  presence	  in	  their	  lives?	  Did	  they	  trust	  me	  and	  did	  I	  trust	  them?	  What	  type	  of	  power-­‐relations	  
evolved	  during	  the	  interactions?	  Generally,	  most	  persons	  I	  spoke	  to	  were	  very	  welcoming,	  warm,	  and	  
helpful.	  Leaders	  of	  political	  parties	  happily	  granted	  me	  time	  for	  interviews	  and	  often	  shared	  how	  
pleased	  they	  were	  that	  an	  international	  researcher	  was	  showing	  interest	  in	  their	  agitation,	  providing	  
an	  “international	  audience”	  to	  their	  claims.	  Most	  leaders	  also	  agreed	  to	  audio-­‐recording	  of	  
interviews.	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  leaders’	  homes	  or	  party-­‐offices	  during	  the	  day-­‐time	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  I	  prefer	  the	  term	  “respondent”	  instead	  of	  “participant”	  as	  the	  latter	  would	  suggest	  that	  I	  discussed	  the	  
research	  results	  with	  them,	  which	  I	  only	  did	  in	  some	  cases.	  Although	  the	  term	  “respondent”	  suggests	  a	  solely	  
functional	  relationship,	  actually	  some	  of	  them	  became	  friends	  during	  the	  research	  process.	  I	  do	  not	  use	  the	  
term	  “informant”	  here	  to	  avoid	  possible	  misunderstandings,	  which	  would	  reduce	  these	  persons	  to	  the	  purpose	  
of	  “data-­‐extraction”	  or	  could	  even	  suggest	  that	  they	  were	  acting	  as	  “spies”.	  




depending	  on	  their	  preferences.	  These	  interviews	  mostly	  stayed	  focussed	  on	  my	  questions,	  and	  
respondents	  only	  seldom	  asked	  any	  personal	  questions	  about	  me	  beyond	  my	  institutional	  affiliation	  
and	  origin.	  Interviews	  with	  intellectuals	  or	  those	  not	  directly	  involved	  with	  the	  parties	  were	  similar,	  
although	  in	  general	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conversation	  was	  a	  bit	  more	  informal,	  and	  sometimes	  led	  to	  
more	  personal	  interactions	  going	  beyond	  the	  research	  topic.	  	  
Also	  in	  tea	  plantation	  villages	  I	  felt	  welcomed.	  I	  am	  very	  grateful	  to	  my	  host	  families,	  who	  invested	  
lots	  of	  attention	  and	  time	  in	  making	  my	  stays	  comfortable	  besides	  guiding	  me	  through	  the	  villages	  
and	  facilitating	  meetings	  with	  other	  people,	  including	  local	  leaders,	  unionists,	  administrators,	  and	  
other	  workers.	  Many	  workers	  shared	  that	  they	  had	  always	  wanted	  to	  talk	  to	  a	  “white”	  person,	  whom	  
they	  sometimes	  saw	  when	  visiting	  Darjeeling	  town,	  or	  who	  at	  times	  visit	  the	  managers	  of	  the	  
plantations,	  when	  sent	  by	  foreign	  tea-­‐companies	  –	  rendering	  them	  inaccessible.	  Once	  the	  initial	  
shyness	  was	  overcome,	  especially	  women	  expressed	  their	  happiness	  to	  be	  able	  to	  communicate	  with	  
me	  in	  Nepali	  and	  asked	  all	  kinds	  of	  questions,	  i.e.	  on	  the	  food	  we	  ate	  in	  Germany,	  my	  family	  
situation,	  my	  work	  (and	  income),	  living	  situation	  etc.	  I	  got	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  joined	  
both	  men	  and	  women	  during	  the	  work	  and	  lunch-­‐time	  limited	  initial	  hierarchies	  (although	  not	  
completely)	  and	  provided	  the	  chance	  to	  interact	  more	  frequently	  and	  in	  an	  informal	  context.	  Some	  
women	  also	  invited	  me	  to	  their	  houses	  to	  have	  tea	  or	  eat	  together.	  Staying	  with	  host	  families	  and	  
spending	  lots	  of	  time	  with	  workers	  helped	  me	  to	  situate	  and	  understand	  their	  views	  on	  Gorkhaland	  
and	  politics	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  specific	  living	  contexts,	  joys	  and	  sorrows,	  moral	  values,	  and	  
interpretations	  of	  their	  lifeworlds.	  
	  
2.3 Following	  the	  subject:	  multiple	  sites	  and	  perspectives	  
My	  aim	  to	  understand	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  agitation	  from	  different	  sites	  and	  perspectives	  demanded	  data	  generation	  at	  more	  than	  
one	  field-­‐site	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  an	  inclusion	  of	  views	  from	  persons	  of	  differential	  social,	  economic	  and	  
political	  positions.	  The	  approach	  of	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  was	  helpful	  for	  this	  endeavour	  because	  
it	  departs	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  field	  as	  a	  geographically	  defined	  locality	  –	  typically	  a	  village	  or	  
town	  –	  and	  understands	  a	  topic	  as	  interconnected	  with	  different	  processes	  happening	  at	  different	  
sites	  (Wittel	  2000).	  This	  calls	  for	  “multiple	  sites	  of	  observation	  and	  participation”	  (Marcus	  1995,	  95).	  
After	  introducing	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  multi-­‐sited	  approach	  I	  explain	  its	  application	  and	  implications	  
for	  my	  research.	  
	  




2.3.1 Multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  
Inspired	  by	  developments	  in	  cultural	  studies	  (Gupta	  and	  Ferguson	  1992)	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  
space	  as	  socially	  produced	  (Lefebvre	  1991	  [1974];	  Falzon	  2009),	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  evolved	  
from	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  phenomena	  as	  spatially	  bounded	  and	  the	  
related	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  “field”	  as	  a	  “container	  of	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  social	  relations	  which	  
could	  be	  studied	  and	  possibly	  compared	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  other	  containers	  elsewhere”	  (Falzon	  
2009,	  1).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  approach	  understand	  its	  research	  objects	  as	  inherently	  fragmented	  and	  
multiply	  situated	  (Falzon	  2009,	  2;	  Nadai	  and	  Maeder	  2005).	  It	  proposes	  to	  understand	  cultural	  logics	  
and	  difference	  as	  produced	  through	  the	  intersection	  and	  interrelations	  of	  multiple	  fields	  (Marcus	  
1995;	  Gupta	  and	  Ferguson	  1992)	  which	  “cross-­‐cut	  dichotomies	  such	  as	  the	  ‘local’	  and	  the	  ‘global’,	  
the	  ‘lifeworld’	  and	  the	  ‘system’”.	  (Marcus	  1995,	  95)	  
Practically	  this	  means	  that	  social	  phenomena	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  focusing	  on	  a	  single	  site	  
only	  (Falzon	  2009).	  This	  multi-­‐sitedness	  does,	  however,	  not	  only	  concern	  the	  plurality	  of	  geographical	  
locations	  of	  an	  object.	  It	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  dispersion	  of	  sites	  in	  terms	  of	  cultural	  difference	  that	  
allows	  a	  juxtaposition	  of	  data.	  This	  distinguishes	  the	  approach	  from	  multiperspectivism	  (ibid.).	  
This	  conceptualisation	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  research	  methodology.	  Instead	  of	  researching	  social	  
and	  cultural	  phenomena	  in	  depth	  through	  extended	  and	  intense	  field-­‐stays	  in	  a	  geographically	  
circumscribed	  field,	  the	  research	  is	  now	  designed	  around	  “chains,	  paths,	  threads,	  conjunctions,	  or	  
juxtapositions	  of	  locations”	  (Marcus	  1995,	  105).	  The	  essence	  of	  multi-­‐sited	  research	  is	  to	  follow	  
people,	  connections,	  associations,	  and	  relationships	  across	  space	  (Falzon	  2009,	  1,	  2).	  This	  also	  
includes	  following	  a	  conflict	  (e.g.	  conflict	  parties,	  as	  in	  my	  study)	  (Marcus	  1995).	  To	  meet	  the	  
requirement	  of	  different	  field	  sites,	  the	  multi-­‐sited	  approach	  suggests	  a	  contextualisation	  and	  
diversification	  of	  methods	  (see	  Chapter	  2.3.2).	  
Wittel	  (2000),	  Hannerz	  (2003),	  and	  Nadai	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  respond	  to	  the	  recurrent	  criticism	  that	  multi-­‐
sitedness	  happens	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  ethnographic	  depth	  by	  stressing	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  research	  in	  
multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  is	  less	  to	  search	  for	  deep	  dimensions	  within	  a	  culture	  or	  hidden	  layers	  of	  
meaning	  but	  more	  to	  study	  selected	  issues	  which	  are	  understood	  as	  “created	  in	  between”	  sites	  
(Wittel	  2000,	  5).	  Shallowness,	  so	  Falzon	  (2009),	  can	  be	  part	  of	  the	  studied	  phenomenon	  itself.	  
Production	  of	  the	  field	  
Multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  adopts	  an	  understanding	  of	  social	  phenomena	  as	  produced	  at	  and	  between	  
multiple	  sites.	  Inspired	  by	  ideas	  of	  the	  social	  production	  of	  space,	  contenders	  of	  the	  approach	  stress	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  pre-­‐existing	  research-­‐field	  with	  clear	  boundaries	  to	  explore	  (Falzon	  2009;	  Marcus	  




1995).	  As	  contours	  and	  relationships	  of	  the	  object	  of	  study	  are	  not	  known	  beforehand	  (Marcus	  1995),	  
the	  field	  is	  “fuzzy”	  (Nadai	  and	  Maeder	  2005,	  4).	  It	  only	  evolves	  “as	  it	  is	  eventually	  written	  up”	  
(Marcus	  1995,	  102):	  in	  interaction	  with	  research	  respondents,	  researchers	  consciously	  choose	  field	  
sites	  and	  construct	  and	  display	  connections	  amongst	  these	  (Falzon	  2009;	  Marcus	  1995).	  Marcus	  
(1995)	  noted	  that	  the	  drawing	  of	  boundaries	  (around	  the	  field)	  and	  selection	  of	  sites	  for	  data	  
generation	  does	  not	  only	  pre-­‐structure	  findings	  but	  also	  spatialises	  difference.	  This	  makes	  the	  
framing	  of	  the	  field	  a	  political	  practice	  (Marcus	  1995;	  Wittel	  2000)	  and	  underlines	  that	  multi-­‐
sitedness	  does	  not	  draw	  a	  holistic	  picture	  of	  an	  object	  of	  study	  as	  some	  criticise	  (Hage	  2005).	  This	  
awareness	  demands	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  field	  (Falzon	  2009).	  
Political	  implications	  
Although	  a	  strength	  of	  the	  multi-­‐sited	  approach	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  display	  connections	  between	  and	  
juxtapose	  positions,	  the	  agenda	  entails	  certain	  risks	  for	  the	  researcher	  as	  it	  can	  have	  serious	  political	  
implications	  for	  her	  positionality	  and	  identity.	  Marcus	  describes	  the	  researcher	  as	  a	  “circumstantial	  
activist”	  (Marcus	  1995,	  113),	  who	  moves	  across	  sites	  and	  levels	  of	  society.	  In	  conflict	  contexts	  this	  
can	  entail	  a	  confrontation	  with	  contradictory	  personal	  commitments,	  which	  requires	  a	  renegotiation	  
of	  one’s	  identities	  at	  different	  sites	  (ibid.).	  Criticising	  Marcus’	  stand	  as	  “politically	  naïve”,	  Gille	  (2001)	  
importantly	  notes	  the	  risks	  of	  moving	  across	  sites	  in	  politically	  charged	  settings,	  where,	  for	  instance,	  
associations	  with	  one	  party	  of	  the	  conflict	  might	  lead	  opposing	  parties	  to	  consider	  that	  the	  
ethnographer	  is	  a	  spy	  of	  the	  other	  site.	  “As	  soon	  as	  the	  social	  relations	  among	  sites	  manifest	  
themselves	  in	  actual	  political	  battles,	  the	  assumption	  of	  an	  activist	  role	  in	  any	  of	  the	  sites	  is	  suicidal”	  
(ibid.	  328,	  329).	  
Gille’s	  account	  importantly	  reminds	  us	  not	  only	  of	  the	  difficult	  manoeuvres	  which	  multi-­‐sited	  
ethnography	  requires	  in	  conflict	  situations	  but	  also	  of	  her	  ethical	  position	  in	  situations	  when	  insights	  
gained	  from	  engagement	  at	  different	  (conflicting)	  sites	  results	  in	  challenges	  to	  personally	  held	  moral	  
values	  and	  beliefs.	  
2.3.2 Applying	  multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  in	  Darjeeling	  
In	  my	  study	  the	  “sites”	  refer	  to	  different	  sites	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority,	  sites	  of	  the	  
production	  of	  “Gorkhaland”	  as	  a	  geographical	  imagination	  and	  the	  sites	  of	  the	  “movement”	  and	  
agitation.	  Paying	  attention	  to	  different	  sites	  and	  exploring	  their	  relations	  also	  permitted	  an	  
exploration	  of	  the	  fractures	  within	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement.	  These	  sites	  were,	  however,	  less	  
dispersed	  in	  terms	  of	  geographic	  location	  –	  as	  nearly	  all	  of	  them	  were	  in	  or	  near	  Darjeeling	  district	  
(and	  one	  in	  Kathmandu/Nepal,	  another	  in	  Dehra	  Dun).	  I	  understood	  them	  more	  as	  differing	  in	  terms	  
of	  “cultural	  difference”	  (cf.	  Falzon	  2009)	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  were	  produced	  in	  interaction	  with	  




respondents	  sharply	  distinguished	  by	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  positions	  and	  the	  roles	  they	  played	  in	  
both	  the	  statehood	  agitation	  and	  politics.	  	  
Choice	  of	  field	  sites	  
The	  initial	  choice	  of	  the	  field-­‐sites	  was	  influenced	  by	  explorative	  questions	  on	  the	  organisation,	  
programme,	  and	  participants	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation.	  As	  the	  research	  progressed,	  these	  initial	  
concerns	  were	  complemented	  by	  questions	  on	  the	  actual	  practices	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  
construction	  of	  political	  authority.	  The	  choice	  of	  field-­‐sites	  was	  further	  determined	  by	  my	  pre-­‐
understanding	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  (as	  happening	  at	  various	  possibly	  interconnected	  places	  
and	  being	  constituted	  by	  various	  actors)	  and	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  a	  
two-­‐sited	  process	  between	  rulers	  and	  ruled.	  The	  latter	  demanded	  an	  inclusion	  of	  political	  actors	  at	  
different	  levels	  of	  decision	  making	  and	  of	  those	  over	  whom	  they	  sought	  authority.	  To	  analyse	  
processes	  of	  political	  authority	  formation	  and	  resistance	  I	  especially	  wanted	  to	  study	  how	  different	  
parties	  struggle	  over	  it	  in	  their	  respective	  localities.	  
Accordingly,	  I	  had	  already	  roughly	  defined	  part	  of	  the	  field	  sites	  I	  wanted	  to	  use	  as	  entry	  point	  
applying	  a	  purposive	  sampling	  (Patton	  2002;	  Flick	  2007)	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  account	  for	  variations	  of	  
perceptions,	  sites,	  and	  actors.	  The	  initial	  choice	  of	  persons	  to	  meet	  was	  partly	  based	  on	  
recommendations	  of	  a	  journalist	  and	  another	  social	  scientist	  with	  expertise	  in	  the	  area	  and	  partly	  on	  
my	  own	  pre-­‐understanding	  and	  initial	  overview	  of	  political	  leaders	  and	  actors	  gained	  mainly	  from	  
newspaper	  reviews.	  The	  first	  two	  shorter	  phases	  of	  my	  field	  work	  (four	  and	  two	  weeks	  respectively)	  
were	  largely	  explorative.	  They	  mainly	  focussed	  on	  the	  higher-­‐level	  leadership	  of	  different	  political	  
parties,	  combined	  with	  interviews	  with	  intellectuals,	  who	  often	  provided	  a	  very	  important	  and	  critical	  
counter-­‐position	  to	  the	  formers’	  accounts.	  Most	  of	  these	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Darjeeling	  
town	  (such	  as	  party	  offices,	  or	  leaders’	  private	  residencies),	  and	  some	  in	  Kalimpong	  town.	  
Explorations	  of	  the	  national	  and	  international	  dimensions	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  also	  led	  me	  to	  
Dehradun	  and	  to	  Kathmandu/Nepal,	  where	  I	  met	  with	  a	  group	  demanding	  Darjeeling	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
“Greater	  Nepal”.	  	  
Later	  I	  increasingly	  followed	  and	  explored	  relations	  between	  field	  sites	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  
research	  process.	  During	  my	  third	  extended	  field	  phase	  lasting	  five	  months	  I	  complemented	  the	  
above	  sites	  with	  stays	  in	  three	  different	  tea	  plantations	  (two	  months	  in	  the	  first	  plantation	  and	  a	  
week	  each	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  plantations)37.	  During	  my	  last	  field	  stay	  I	  added	  another	  four	  
weeks	  in	  the	  third	  plantation	  and	  revisited	  the	  first	  for	  one	  week	  but	  had	  to	  exclude	  the	  second	  site	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The	  short	  duration	  in	  the	  second	  plantation	  owes	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  my	  stay	  there	  was	  somewhat	  
orchestrated	  by	  local	  GJM	  members.	  




due	  to	  time-­‐constraints.	  The	  choice	  of	  the	  three	  tea-­‐plantations	  was	  guided	  by	  practical	  and	  
conceptual	  consideration.	  Practically	  (i.e.	  in	  terms	  of	  accessibility)	  I	  relied	  on	  friends’	  help	  to	  establish	  
contacts	  to	  host-­‐families.	  Conceptionally,	  I	  ensured	  that	  different	  parties	  were	  present	  at	  the	  
respective	  sites.	  Thus,	  I	  first	  spent	  time	  in	  a	  tea	  plantation,	  where	  the	  GJM	  dominated	  but	  CPRM	  had	  
a	  certain	  hold	  (as	  communicated	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  CPRM	  president	  R.B.	  Rai).	  The	  choice	  of	  the	  
second	  field	  site	  was	  influenced	  by	  a	  recommendation	  of	  a	  GJM-­‐youth	  leader,	  who	  facilitated	  my	  
stay	  in	  a	  plantation	  dominated	  by	  GJM	  and	  lacking	  open	  presence	  of	  opposition	  parties.	  The	  choice	  
of	  the	  third	  tea-­‐plantation	  field	  site	  was	  spontaneous	  as	  I	  followed	  the	  trail	  of	  GJM	  president	  Bimal	  
Gurung,	  who	  had	  engaged	  himself	  in	  a	  welfare	  campaign	  in	  a	  cluster	  of	  tea	  estates	  known	  for	  their	  
strong	  CPRM-­‐presence.	  Here,	  I	  wanted	  to	  study	  the	  local	  reactions	  to	  this	  campaign.	  	  
To	  study	  politicians’	  performance	  I	  also	  added	  “event	  spaces”:	  I	  did	  not	  only	  observe	  various	  
(attempted)	  public	  meetings	  and	  demonstrations	  –	  most	  of	  them	  in	  Darjeeling	  town,	  some	  in	  tea	  
plantations,	  and	  one	  at	  the	  office	  of	  a	  Block	  Development	  Officer	  –	  but	  also	  shadowed	  one	  GTA	  
councillor	  by	  accompanying	  him	  from	  early	  morning	  till	  late	  night	  during	  his	  political	  work	  in	  his	  
constituency	  (see	  below).	  Another	  distinct	  site	  was	  constituted	  in	  meetings	  with	  journalists	  and	  
intellectuals,	  most	  of	  them	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  Kalimpong	  towns.	  Thus,	  my	  field	  was	  spread	  between	  
tea	  plantation	  villages	  as	  an	  important	  mass	  base	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  central	  party-­‐offices	  as	  sites	  
where	  I	  met	  and	  interacted	  with	  higher	  and	  top-­‐level	  party	  leaders.	  The	  simultaneousness	  of	  these	  
activities	  allowed	  me	  to	  see	  different	  perspectives	  and	  observations	  in	  relation,	  and	  to	  assess	  
similarities,	  further	  contradictions,	  and	  puzzles.	  
My	  attempt	  at	  multi-­‐sitedness,	  however,	  also	  met	  with	  some	  “political”	  difficulties.	  Like	  Gille	  (2001),	  I	  
increasingly	  found	  myself	  confronted	  with	  the	  need	  to	  navigate	  my	  position	  through	  the	  different	  
sites	  without	  evoking	  suspicions	  or	  perceptions	  of	  bias.	  Initially,	  this	  manoeuvring	  between	  different	  
sites	  –	  especially	  the	  different	  party	  offices	  of	  conflicting	  parties	  –	  was	  facilitated	  by	  my	  identity	  as	  a	  
European	  researcher,	  who	  despite	  asking	  about	  politics	  was	  herself	  (initially)	  not	  perceived	  as	  
involved	  in	  politics.	  	  
To	  facilitate	  this	  image	  as	  non-­‐biased	  and	  to	  account	  for	  differing	  views	  I	  made	  sure	  that	  I	  spent	  time	  
with	  both	  GJM	  and	  CPRM	  activists	  in	  the	  tea	  plantations	  and	  to	  meet	  representatives	  of	  other	  parties	  
(GNLF,	  AIGL,	  BGP,	  CPI-­‐M,	  TMC,	  DDCC).	  While	  I	  stayed	  with	  a	  CPRM-­‐affiliated	  family	  in	  the	  first	  tea	  
plantation,	  I	  lived	  in	  the	  house	  of	  a	  GJM	  youth	  activist	  in	  the	  second,	  and	  a	  politically	  less	  involved	  
family	  in	  the	  third	  plantation.	  Also	  while	  staying	  at	  different	  sites	  I	  recorded	  perspectives	  from	  
different	  party-­‐affiliated	  sides.	  Yet,	  a	  few	  times	  respondents	  were	  suspicious	  about	  my	  role	  and	  one	  
GNLF	  leader	  even	  thought	  I	  was	  a	  spy	  sent	  by	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  GJM	  president	  Bimal	  Gurung	  himself	  did	  
let	  me	  know	  that	  he	  had	  monitored	  my	  visits	  to	  a	  CPRM	  strong-­‐hold	  village	  as	  he	  knew	  whom	  I	  had	  




met	  and	  spoken	  to.	  I	  got	  the	  strong	  feeling	  that	  he	  disapproved	  of	  my	  stay	  in	  that	  village	  and	  I	  was	  
relieved	  to	  leave	  Darjeeling	  after	  the	  rather	  heated	  interview	  with	  him.	  	  
In	  another	  instance	  I	  got	  the	  strong	  feeling	  that	  the	  GTA	  councillor	  I	  was	  shadowing	  tried	  to	  utilise	  
me	  to	  generate	  additional	  legitimacy	  for	  himself.	  He	  did	  not	  only	  refer	  to	  me	  in	  public	  speeches	  but	  
also	  made	  me	  sit	  close	  to	  him	  on	  the	  stage	  during	  public	  meetings.	  I	  had	  to	  decline	  his	  request	  of	  
giving	  a	  speech	  at	  one	  of	  these	  events,	  although	  I	  was	  afraid	  that	  my	  clear	  refusal	  might	  impede	  the	  
friendship	  which	  developed	  between	  us.	  Such	  navigations	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  confrontation	  with	  
different	  and	  conflicting	  perspectives	  which	  increasingly	  put	  into	  question	  my	  positionality.	  The	  more	  
I	  heard	  about	  practices	  of	  GJM-­‐rule	  the	  more	  I	  also	  found	  my	  own	  moral	  values	  challenged.	  I	  
increasingly	  found	  myself	  confronted	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whose	  site	  I	  was	  taking.	  
Hearing	  stories	  of	  persons,	  who	  were	  denied	  payment	  in	  governmental	  schemes	  by	  local	  GJM-­‐
leaders,	  who	  instead	  chose	  to	  take	  such	  money	  for	  themselves	  (see	  Chapter	  6)	  made	  me	  angry	  and	  
sad.	  The	  longer	  I	  spend	  time	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  the	  more	  such	  stories	  of	  corruption	  and	  violent	  
oppression	  I	  heard	  the	  more	  I	  felt	  an	  urge	  to	  act,	  to	  change	  things.	  This	  strongly	  called	  into	  question	  
my	  attempts	  to	  be	  non-­‐biased	  and	  as	  objective	  as	  possible	  and	  not	  be	  judgemental	  to	  respondents.	  I	  
have	  to	  admit	  that	  such	  attempts	  became	  futile	  in	  some	  instances.	  Making	  use	  of	  my	  position	  as	  a	  
European	  female	  researcher,	  which	  owed	  me	  some	  respect	  I	  began	  to	  challenge	  certain	  persons	  in	  
interviews,	  including	  party-­‐leader	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  also	  to	  see	  how	  they	  would	  react	  to	  critical	  
allegations.	  Ultimately,	  after	  the	  official	  end	  of	  data	  generation,	  I	  supported	  a	  friend	  to	  collect	  
evidence	  against	  a	  group	  of	  corrupt	  local	  leaders.	  In	  a	  village	  meeting	  attended	  by	  the	  gram	  
panchayat	  secretary,	  members	  of	  a	  recently	  established	  GNLF	  unit,	  and	  the	  accused	  (including	  a	  GJM	  
central	  committee	  member)	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  withdraw	  their	  positions	  as	  supervisors	  in	  the	  
governmental	  100-­‐days-­‐employment	  guarantee	  scheme	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  the	  blatant	  corruption.	  
Upon	  returning	  to	  the	  village	  some	  months	  later	  I	  witnessed	  how	  my	  friend	  was	  physically	  attacked	  
one	  evening	  by	  a	  member	  of	  the	  same	  group,	  an	  incidence	  that	  led	  to	  filing	  a	  police	  case	  and	  left	  me	  
unsure	  whether	  and	  when	  I	  could	  ever	  return	  to	  that	  village,	  where	  my	  presence	  was	  apparently	  not	  
welcomed	  by	  some	  powerful	  local	  actors.	  	  
This	  incidence	  underlines	  that	  doing	  research	  in	  a	  politically	  charged	  context	  in	  Darjeeling	  is	  
necessarily	  “political”.	  Even	  asking	  respondents	  to	  reflect	  on	  their	  own	  positions	  in	  systems	  of	  power	  
might	  raise	  suspicions	  on	  the	  sides	  of	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  maintain	  their	  authority	  
by	  any	  means.	  The	  ideal	  of	  “non-­‐bias”	  I	  found	  was	  simply	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  context	  I	  was	  
researching	  and	  of	  which	  I	  became	  increasingly	  a	  part	  myself.	  I	  was	  caught	  between	  the	  sid/tes.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	  instead	  of	  claiming	  “objectivity”	  of	  my	  position,	  I	  tried	  to	  account	  for	  the	  multitude	  of	  
voices	  and	  opinions	  on	  certain	  issues.	  





I	  chose	  different	  methods	  for	  data-­‐generation,	  which	  were	  adapted	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  
respective	  field-­‐sites.	  In	  the	  tea	  plantations	  I	  involved	  in	  a	  selective	  and	  focussed	  form	  of	  participant	  
observation	  (Kawulich	  2005),	  which	  I	  combined	  with	  directed	  conversations	  and	  –	  if	  applicable	  –	  with	  
semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	  The	  aim	  was	  not	  to	  understand	  various	  aspects	  of	  people’s	  lives	  in	  detail	  
but	  instead	  to	  systematically	  look	  out	  for	  incidences	  and	  opinions	  related	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  
and	  political	  contestations.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  thematic	  focusing	  I	  relied	  very	  much	  on	  the	  help	  of	  local	  
key-­‐persons	  –	  mostly	  members	  of	  my	  host	  families	  –	  whom	  I	  roughly	  explained	  my	  research	  purpose	  
during	  the	  initial	  days	  of	  my	  stay	  and	  who	  helped	  me	  a	  lot	  in	  facilitating	  meetings	  with	  persons	  I	  was	  
interested	  in	  (e.g.	  local	  leaders,	  unionists,	  and	  other	  tea	  plantation	  workers).	  Usually,	  in	  the	  mornings	  
I	  joined	  the	  plantation	  workers	  during	  their	  work.	  Being	  aware	  of	  the	  politically	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  
my	  research	  initially	  our	  conversations	  centred	  on	  their	  working	  conditions,	  before	  I	  began	  asking	  
about	  Gorkhaland.	  I	  soon	  realised	  that	  asking	  about	  party	  politics	  was	  difficult,	  particularly	  because	  
other	  persons	  could	  possibly	  overhear	  such	  conversations.	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  my	  presence	  or	  
politically	  sensitive	  questions	  did	  not	  harm	  respondents	  I	  sought	  interview	  situations,	  where	  I	  could	  
be	  alone	  with	  them.	  I	  ensured	  them	  to	  treat	  their	  names	  and	  those	  of	  the	  field	  sites	  confidentially.	  
None	  of	  these	  interviews	  or	  conversations	  were	  recorded.	  Accounts	  of	  other	  tea	  plantation	  residents	  
as	  well	  as	  discussions	  with	  friends	  from	  a	  road-­‐side	  village	  complemented	  the	  data.	  	  
As	  many	  of	  the	  conversations	  were	  conducted	  in	  groups	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  an	  exact	  number	  of	  persons	  
and	  workers	  I	  spoke	  to.	  While	  during	  my	  shorter	  stay	  on	  the	  second	  plantation	  I	  spoke	  to	  around	  20-­‐
30	  persons	  only,	  the	  number	  was	  much	  higher	  on	  the	  first	  and	  third	  plantation.	  Amongst	  those	  
persons	  interviewed	  were	  30	  local	  political	  leaders	  from	  different	  parties.	  Besides	  workers,	  I	  also	  
interviewed	  other	  residents,	  including	  drivers,	  old	  persons,	  shop-­‐keepers,	  and	  teachers	  (all	  together	  
about	  20	  persons).	  	  
Another	  major	  means	  of	  data	  generation	  were	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  (Flick	  2007).	  These	  were	  
especially	  helpful	  when	  interacting	  with	  politicians,	  intellectuals,	  and	  journalists.	  Most	  of	  them	  
allowed	  me	  to	  record	  these	  interviews,	  which	  I	  later	  transcribed.	  All	  together	  I	  utilised	  48	  semi-­‐
structured	  interviews	  with	  43	  persons	  for	  this	  study.	  32	  of	  them	  were	  audio-­‐recorded	  and	  28	  
transcribed	  in	  detail	  (see	  Appendix	  B).	  	  
Another	  important	  source	  of	  insights	  into	  how	  political	  work	  functions	  was	  the	  shadowing	  
(McDonald	  2005)	  of	  a	  GTA	  councillor	  during	  5	  days	  of	  his	  work	  in	  his	  constituency	  in	  2012.	  
Shadowing	  designates	  a	  method	  where	  the	  researcher	  literally	  stays	  with	  and	  closely	  follows	  a	  
person	  during	  his/her	  day,	  including	  participation	  in	  meetings	  or	  travels.	  Throughout	  the	  shadowing	  




period	  the	  researcher	  can	  ask	  questions	  or	  seek	  explanations	  of	  incidences	  that	  happened	  or	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  respondent(s)	  (ibid.).	  The	  shadowing	  of	  the	  GTA	  councillor	  did	  not	  only	  allow	  me	  to	  
gain	  a	  first-­‐hand	  impression	  of	  the	  way	  he	  engages	  with	  supporters	  (and	  the	  supporters	  with	  him,	  
e.g.	  during	  the	  morning	  receptions)	  but	  also	  to	  observe	  (and	  ask)	  how	  he	  practically	  conducted	  
political	  work	  while	  meeting	  challenges	  to	  maintain	  his	  support	  base.	  These	  observations	  were	  highly	  
useful	  to	  complement	  the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  ruled.	  The	  shadowing	  also	  allowed	  me	  to	  cross-­‐check	  
and	  discuss	  interpretations	  from	  earlier	  field	  stays.	  
My	  attention	  to	  performances	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  situational	  generation	  of	  political	  authority	  at	  the	  
above	  field	  sites	  also	  led	  to	  case	  studies.	  These	  mainly	  evolved	  around	  incidents	  of	  inter-­‐party	  
violence,	  concrete	  performances	  of	  political	  work,	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  political	  meetings.	  
Drawing	  on	  a	  constructivist	  case-­‐study	  approach	  (Stake	  2006;	  Lauckner,	  Paterson,	  and	  Krupa	  2012),	  
the	  case	  studies	  served	  as	  entrance	  points	  to	  explore	  different	  perspectives	  on	  such	  events	  as	  
promoted	  by	  political	  activists/leaders,	  the	  media,	  supporters,	  and	  rivals,	  and	  helped	  me	  to	  explore	  
underlying	  structures	  of	  political	  contestations	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Such	  case-­‐studies	  are	  presented	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  Chapters	  6,	  7,	  and	  8.	  I	  complemented	  the	  so-­‐generated	  ethnographic	  data	  with	  reviews	  of	  
articles	  in	  local,	  State,	  and	  national	  newspapers;	  analyses	  of	  official	  party	  pamphlets	  and	  documents;	  
as	  well	  as	  audio	  and	  video	  recordings	  of	  political	  meetings	  between	  2005	  and	  2013.	  
Table	  3	  provides	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  research	  questions,	  data	  sources,	  and	  study	  sites.	  (Appendix	  
B	  includes	  a	  list	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  cited	  or	  used	  for	  this	  study.)	  
Limitations	  and	  access	  to	  the	  field	  
My	  choice	  of	  field-­‐sites	  aimed	  at	  highlighting	  and	  juxtaposing	  certain	  perspectives	  but	  I	  acknowledge	  
that	  this	  choice	  possibly	  ignored	  others	  rendering	  it	  somewhat	  “political”.	  Although	  I	  tried	  to	  
immerse	  myself	  in	  the	  field	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  the	  necessary	  split-­‐up	  of	  field	  time	  between	  
different	  locations	  forced	  me	  to	  focus	  on	  my	  research	  questions	  and	  push	  the	  focus	  of	  interviews	  and	  
conversations	  towards	  the	  question	  of	  Gorkhaland	  and	  politics	  instead	  of	  gaining	  more	  ethnographic	  
depth.	  	  
The	  attempt	  to	  multi-­‐sitedness,	  however,	  was	  compromised	  by	  the	  limited	  access	  to	  certain	  fields.	  
For	  instance,	  due	  to	  the	  politically	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  my	  topic	  I	  decided	  not	  to	  approach	  
representatives	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  or	  the	  Indian	  central	  government	  to	  learn	  more	  
about	  their	  position	  on	  Darjeeling.	  Accounts	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  government	  are	  thus	  largely	  
based	  on	  newspaper	  reports	  or	  interpretations	  of	  intellectuals	  I	  spoke	  to.	  The	  only	  exception	  is	  an	  




interview	  conducted	  with	  the	  previous	  minister-­‐in-­‐charge	  for	  Hill	  Affairs38	  and	  (later)	  Urban	  
Development	  minister	  (CPI-­‐M)	  Ashok	  Bhattacharya,	  who	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  major	  antagonist	  of	  
Subash	  Ghisingh.	  I	  met	  him	  in	  2012,	  after	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  had	  lost	  power	  in	  West	  Bengal.	  I	  also	  did	  not	  
have	  a	  chance	  to	  interact	  with	  district	  or	  block-­‐level	  administrators	  in	  Darjeeling,	  which	  would	  have	  
added	  an	  important	  perspective	  on	  the	  way	  governance	  worked	  during	  the	  agitation.	  My	  clear	  focus	  
on	  party-­‐political	  actors	  also	  foreclosed	  more	  attention	  to	  other	  actors	  including	  ethnic	  associations	  
which	  during	  the	  research	  period	  assumed	  increasing	  importance	  as	  political	  actors	  negotiating	  their	  
positions	  towards	  the	  state	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  Although	  I	  sought	  information	  about	  civil	  society	  
associations	  (without	  party-­‐political	  affiliation),	  most	  experts	  simply	  noted	  their	  “non-­‐existence”.	  My	  
priorisation	  of	  tea	  plantations	  as	  sites	  for	  political	  contestations	  and	  time-­‐constraints	  also	  entailed	  an	  
exclusion	  of	  agricultural	  settlement	  (bastī)	  areas.	  	  
	  
2.4 Documentation	  and	  analysis	  
The	  quality	  of	  qualitative	  research	  is	  evaluated	  along	  the	  criteria	  of	  precision,	  credibility,	  
conformability,	  consistency,	  authenticity,	  and	  transferability	  (Seale	  1999;	  Golafshani	  2003;	  Lincoln,	  
Lynham,	  and	  Guba	  2011).	  Lincon	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  propose	  that	  a	  major	  criterion	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
“validity”	  of	  research	  is	  authenticity,	  referring	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  one	  may	  trust	  oneself	  to	  
act	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  one’s	  research	  (ibid.	  120).	  Another	  criterion,	  particularly	  important	  in	  
politically	  charged	  contexts	  is	  “fairness”,	  which	  seeks	  to	  present	  all	  (or	  as	  many	  as	  possible)	  
stakeholder	  views,	  perspectives,	  claims,	  and	  concerns	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  marginalisation	  of	  voices	  
(ibid.).	  Such	  concerns	  do	  not	  only	  relate	  to	  the	  final	  presentation	  of	  data	  but	  also	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	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Table	  3:	  Overview	  of	  research	  aims,	  questions,	  data	  sources	  and	  methods	  during	  the	  different	  phases	  of	  data	  
generation	  




Phase	  1	  –	  explorative	  (January/February	  2011)	  
Gain	  first	  overview	  of	  field,	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  agitation,	  its	  main	  
political	  actors;	  find	  puzzles;	  
design	  research	  questions;	  test	  
and	  revise	  pre-­‐assumptions	  
	  
Focus	  on	  political	  
representatives	  and	  regional	  
experts	  
What	  is	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
movement	  about?	  Who	  are	  the	  
main	  actors	  promoting	  the	  
demand?	  How	  do	  they	  justify	  
their	  demand?	  What	  is	  the	  
political	  situation	  in	  Darjeeling	  
like?	  Who	  are	  the	  major	  
stakeholders,	  and	  what	  is	  their	  
relation	  to	  each	  other?	  How	  does	  
the	  ruling	  party	  respond	  to	  
allegations	  of	  their	  rule	  through	  
violence?	  
Leaders	  of	  Darjeeling	  























Phase	  2	  –	  specification	  of	  research	  questions/data-­‐generation	  (June/July	  2011)	  
Compare	  accounts	  of	  different	  
regional	  political	  parties;	  ways	  




Further	  explore	  factions	  and	  








dimension	  of	  the	  statehood	  
demand	  
	  
What	  are	  the	  differences	  in	  
regional	  parties’	  accounts	  on	  
Gorkhaland?	  What	  does	  
Gorkhaland	  mean	  to	  them?	  	  
	  
How	  do	  party-­‐leaders	  describe	  
their	  relation	  to	  other	  parties?	  
How	  do	  they	  characterise	  the	  
political	  situation	  in	  Darjeeling	  
and	  their	  opportunities	  to	  voice	  
critique?	  	  
Where	  are	  the	  strongholds	  of	  
different	  parties?	  
	  
In	  how	  far	  does	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
issue	  relate	  to	  developments	  in	  
Nepal	  and	  demands	  for	  a	  
“Greater	  Nepal”?	  


































Phase	  3	  –	  Data	  generation/exploration	  of	  perceptions	  on	  the	  ground	  (March-­‐July	  2012)	  
Explore	  followers’	  perspectives	  
on	  Gorkhaland	  and	  politics	  in	  
Darjeeling	  (focus	  on	  tea	  
plantation	  residents);	  compare	  
politicians’	  and	  non-­‐politicians’	  
perspectives	  	  
	  
Understand	  the	  supremacy	  of	  
What	  does	  Gorkhaland	  mean	  to	  
those	  not	  actively	  engaged	  in	  
political	  associations?	  What	  
hopes	  and	  aspirations	  does	  the	  
demand	  hold	  for	  those	  in	  whose	  
name	  the	  new	  State	  is	  being	  
demanded?	  
How	  does	  the	  struggle	  for	  
Tea	  plantation	  
workers/	  dwellers	  	  
	  



















Upon	  returning	  from	  my	  field-­‐stays	  I	  had	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  data.	  If	  possible,	  I	  had	  audio-­‐recorded	  
accounts	  and	  interviews	  but	  the	  politically	  charged	  nature	  of	  my	  research	  subject	  forced	  me	  to	  
collect	  the	  majority	  of	  statements	  in	  a	  field-­‐diary,	  which	  also	  contained	  a	  compilation	  of	  memos	  
based	  on	  my	  observations.	  It	  served	  as	  a	  reflective	  tool	  not	  only	  to	  access	  my	  research	  questions	  but	  
also	  my	  own	  thoughts	  and	  interpretations	  (see	  Mills,	  Bonner,	  and	  Francis	  2006;	  Lauckner,	  Paterson,	  
and	  Krupa	  2012).	  This	  was	  important	  to	  keep	  watch	  on	  how	  my	  own	  interpretations	  shaped	  the	  
research	  process	  and	  co-­‐construction	  of	  meaning.	  Thus,	  besides	  transcribed	  and	  translated	  semi-­‐
the	  GJM	  and	  the	  construction	  
of	  political	  authority;	  
reconstruct	  its	  appeal	  to	  
people	  and	  attaining	  power	  in	  
2007/08	  
	  
Analyse	  the	  strategies	  for	  rule	  
of	  the	  GJM,	  their	  perception	  by	  
the	  ruled,	  and	  possible	  
resistance	  	  
	  
Explore	  how	  local	  governance	  
works	  amidst	  the	  lack	  of	  
elected	  institutions	  at	  the	  
district	  and	  local	  levels	  
	  
Expand	  the	  historical	  
perspective	  to	  pre-­‐1980	  
	  
Cross-­‐check	  with	  experts;	  	  
add	  case-­‐studies	  	  
authority	  register	  in	  localities?	  
How	  is	  it	  experienced	  and	  
interpreted?	  How	  do	  the	  ruled	  
adapt	  to	  such	  power	  struggles?	  
Which	  factors	  influence	  their	  
choice	  of	  political	  party?	  What	  
meaning	  and	  importance	  does	  
“politics”	  have	  in	  people’s	  lives?	  
How	  do	  individuals	  explain	  the	  
supremacy	  of	  the	  GJM	  and	  what	  
do	  they	  think	  about	  the	  party	  and	  
its	  leaders?	  How	  do	  they	  evaluate	  
their	  performance	  against	  










































Phase	  4	  –	  Review	  and	  testing	  (June/July	  2013)	  
Test	  preliminary	  findings	  and	  
categories	  from	  analyses	  for	  
accuracy,	  e.g.	  by	  discussing	  
interpretations	  with	  
respondents	  and	  re-­‐visiting	  
field	  sites	  	  
	  
Further	  explore	  
“contradictions”/things	  I	  am	  
not	  sure	  about	  
	  
Track	  the	  processes	  after	  the	  
GTA	  elections	  (July	  2012)	  	  
What	  has	  happened	  after	  the	  
GTA	  elections?	  Whether	  people’s	  
perceptions	  of	  politics	  and	  
political	  leaders	  have	  changed?	  If	  
so	  how?	  How	  has	  the	  political	  
environment	  in	  Darjeeling	  
changed?	  What	  are	  the	  chances	  





























structured	  interviews,	  I	  mainly	  had	  notes	  on	  semi-­‐structured	  and	  informal	  interviews,	  memos	  
displaying	  accounts	  of	  respondents	  (mostly	  from	  tea	  plantations)	  and	  my	  own	  reflections,	  in	  addition	  
to	  a	  bulk	  of	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  party-­‐pamphlets.	  Further,	  a	  friend	  had	  shared	  video-­‐records	  of	  
some	  political	  speeches	  of	  the	  GNLF	  and	  GJM39.	  I	  analysed	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  material	  with	  qualitative	  
content	  analysis	  (Mayring	  2000)	  where	  I	  first	  searched	  for	  thematic	  categories	  and	  then	  extracted	  
accounts	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  research	  questions.	  	  
2.4.2 Analysis	  
I	  used	  triangulation	  (in	  a	  constructivist	  paradigm,	  cf.	  Seale,	  1999;	  Golafshani,	  2003)	  to	  compare	  
findings	  from	  different	  data	  sources	  and	  sites.	  It	  served	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  acquire	  information	  on	  multiple	  
and	  diverse	  realities	  (Golafshani	  2003,	  604)	  and	  to	  search	  “for	  convergence	  [or	  difference]	  amongst	  
multiple	  and	  different	  sources	  of	  information	  to	  form	  themes	  or	  categories	  in	  a	  study”	  (Creswell	  and	  
Miller	  2000,	  126).	  Thereby,	  I	  was	  not	  only	  looking	  for	  convergence	  amongst	  data-­‐sets	  (e.g.	  
statements	  of	  residents	  from	  different	  tea	  plantations)	  but	  combined	  the	  information	  attained	  from	  
different	  sources	  to	  generate	  a	  fuller	  and	  more	  complex	  picture	  of	  the	  topic	  (Nightingale	  2009).	  For	  
instance,	  I	  compared	  and	  juxtaposed	  accounts	  of	  residents	  from	  different	  tea	  plantations,	  of	  party-­‐
workers	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  party-­‐hierarchy,	  and	  intellectuals	  and	  journalists.	  Another	  
important	  source	  for	  such	  triangulation	  was	  my	  own	  observations,	  as	  well	  as	  newspaper	  articles.	  
Thus,	  my	  sampling	  along	  multiple	  sites	  facilitated	  the	  triangulation	  of	  information	  between	  different	  
sites	  representing	  multiple	  perspectives	  and	  voices.	  	  
Another	  way	  to	  increase	  the	  authenticity	  of	  data	  was	  to	  regularly	  discuss	  my	  findings	  or	  
understandings	  with	  knowledgeable	  persons	  from	  different	  places,	  including	  intellectuals,	  and	  other	  
persons	  I	  perceived	  as	  critical	  and	  reflective.	  I	  also	  confronted	  certain	  politicians	  with	  accusations	  I	  
had	  heard	  to	  test	  their	  reactions.	  Very	  important	  for	  testing	  the	  authenticity	  of	  my	  understanding	  
was	  also	  the	  last	  field	  stay	  which	  gave	  me	  the	  chance	  to	  review	  open	  questions	  and	  to	  apply	  my	  
understanding.	  During	  the	  writing	  process	  and	  the	  generation	  of	  case-­‐studies	  I	  regularly	  reviewed	  the	  
original	  material	  to	  test	  its	  coherence	  with	  my	  interpretations.	  	  
For	  translations	  of	  the	  material	  from	  Nepali	  to	  English	  I	  mostly	  relied	  on	  my	  own	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
language.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  conduct	  all	  interviews	  without	  the	  help	  of	  an	  interpreter.	  I	  transcribed	  and	  
translated	  the	  recorded	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  largely	  myself	  and	  with	  occasional	  support	  from	  
Nepalese	  friends.	  Owing	  to	  time	  constraints,	  however,	  I	  relied	  on	  an	  interpreter	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  
longer	  newspaper	  articles	  or	  audio-­‐records	  of	  political	  speeches.	  I	  reviewed	  these	  transcripts	  and	  –	  if	  
necessary	  –	  again	  edited	  them	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  friend	  from	  Darjeeling.	  My	  understanding	  of	  Nepali	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helped	  me	  to	  account	  for	  cultural	  specifics	  in	  expression	  and	  strongly	  facilitated	  my	  understanding	  of	  
people’s	  lifeworlds.	  	  
	  
2.5 Insightful	  gaps	  and	  incomplete	  stories	  
The	  above	  elaborations	  underline	  that	  my	  research	  on	  politics	  in	  Darjeeling	  met	  with	  certain	  limits,	  
mainly	  posed	  by	  the	  secrecy	  and	  sensitivity	  of	  my	  research	  subject	  and	  the	  comparably	  brief	  period	  
of	  field	  research	  particularly	  on	  the	  tea	  plantations	  and	  by	  the	  partly	  circumscribed	  access	  to	  the	  
field.	  
The	  juxtaposition	  of	  different	  perspectives	  as	  part	  of	  the	  triangulation	  sometimes	  led	  to	  
contradictions	  and	  incompleteness	  in	  data	  resulting	  in	  a	  “gap”.	  I	  do,	  however,	  not	  regard	  these	  as	  
limitations	  of	  the	  study	  but	  rather	  assume	  that	  this	  “gap”	  of	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  –	  which	  
was	  often	  reflected	  in	  accounts	  of	  respondents	  –	  is	  part	  of	  the	  way	  politics	  and	  systems	  of	  power	  in	  
Darjeeling	  work	  (see	  also	  Nightingale	  2009)40.	  It	  underlines	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  reinstates	  
the	  initially	  cited	  account	  of	  journalist	  Niraj	  Lama	  who	  states	  that	  “even	  those	  involved	  [in	  hill	  
politics]	  are	  very	  much	  unaware	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on”.	  	  
I	  have	  already	  discussed	  the	  influence	  of	  my	  own	  political	  standpoint	  and	  moral	  concerns	  that	  
evolved	  during	  my	  research.	  This	  has	  influenced	  the	  way	  I	  present	  data	  and	  opinions	  in	  this	  work.	  
Therefore,	  I	  try	  to	  establish	  transparency	  when	  my	  own	  opinions	  are	  involved.	  In	  sum,	  this	  study	  
attempts	  to	  draw	  a	  story,	  which	  accounts	  for	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  often	  conflicting	  perspectives.	  Thus,	  
this	  study	  does	  not	  write	  a	  definite	  story	  about	  Darjeeling	  but	  rather	  weave	  a	  variety	  of	  individuals’	  
accounts	  and	  author’s	  observations,	  analyses,	  and	  interpretations	  together	  as	  one	  possible	  story,	  
which	  is	  necessarily	  incomplete.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  I	  owe	  this	  view	  to	  a	  conversation	  with	  Jonathan	  Spencer.	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3 Historical	  legacies	  of	  authoritarian	  rule:	  Politics	  of	  pre	  and	  
post-­‐Independence	  
	  
3.1 Introduction:	  Political	  time	  
During	  interviews	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  on	  oral	  history,	  anthropologist	  Jonathan	  Spencer	  noticed	  how	  
respondents’	  long-­‐term	  time-­‐reckoning	  was	  inflected	  politically.	  Spencer	  called	  the	  way	  people	  
segmented	  the	  past	  in	  political	  terms	  as	  “political	  time”	  (Spencer	  2007,	  125).	  In	  Darjeeling	  such	  
segmentations	  are	  common:	  people	  referred	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Independence	  time	  as	  Britishko	  pālo	  (British	  
time);	  they	  said	  chhyāsī	  (’86)	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  GNLF’s	  violent	  movement	  for	  statehood;	  and	  
Ghisinghko	  pālo	  (Ghisingh’s	  time)	  for	  the	  phase	  of	  GNLF	  rule	  and	  the	  DGHC	  (1988-­‐2008).	  Each	  of	  
these	  time-­‐phases	  expresses	  certain	  feelings	  and	  memories	  and	  corresponds	  to	  changes	  in	  regimes	  
and	  how	  politics	  was	  conducted	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Significantly,	  politics	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  had	  not	  
always	  been	  characterised	  by	  a	  dominant	  party-­‐regime,	  which	  is	  reflected	  in	  pre-­‐1980	  election	  
results	  (see	  Table	  4).	  Taking	  these	  “political	  times”	  as	  a	  reference	  frame,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  
reconstruct	  the	  factors	  which	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  dominant-­‐party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  from	  
1980.	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  GNLF	  as	  the	  dominant	  party	  was	  preceded	  and	  paralleled	  by	  a	  
rise	  and	  spread	  of	  ethnic	  consciousness	  as	  the	  defining	  trait	  of	  political	  subjectivities.	  In	  researching	  
this	  evolution	  of	  ethnic	  consciousness	  I	  place	  special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  
organisations,	  and	  the	  ways	  they	  voiced,	  promoted,	  and	  framed	  the	  ethnic	  agenda	  since	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Comparing	  the	  forms	  of	  party-­‐political	  competition	  and	  public	  bases	  
for	  support	  before	  and	  after	  1980,	  I	  show	  that	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  GNLF	  and	  its	  demand	  for	  
Gorkhaland	  demarcates	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  Darjeeling’s	  political	  regime	  —	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  
statehood	  discourse	  and	  ethnic	  consciousness	  for	  defining	  political	  subjectivities	  and	  the	  cementing	  
of	  a	  state-­‐supported	  dominant	  party-­‐regime,	  which	  exists	  in	  Darjeeling	  till	  today.	  
The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  Chapter	  3.2	  reviews	  different	  explanations	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  
“Gorkha”	  identity	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  the	  colonial	  time.	  This	  includes	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  historical	  
formation	  of	  today’s	  Darjeeling	  district,	  and	  the	  demographic	  shifts	  initiated	  through	  the	  British	  
establishment	  of	  a	  “hill	  station”	  since	  1835.	  I	  then	  review	  approaches	  which	  show	  how	  special	  
administrative-­‐territorial	  arrangements	  for	  Darjeeling	  fostered	  ethnic	  exclusivism	  before	  and	  after	  
Independence,	  and	  planted	  the	  roots	  for	  what	  today	  is	  called	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  of	  Indian	  Gorkhas.	  
The	  third	  part	  (3.3)	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  organisations	  in	  framing	  and	  spreading	  
ethnic	  consciousness	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  It	  critically	  reviews	  in	  how	  far	  articulations	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  
in	  terms	  of	  demands	  for	  administrative	  autonomy	  were	  appealing	  to	  the	  masses,	  or	  whether	  there	  
were	  other	  bases	  of	  political	  support.	  In	  redrawing	  the	  evolution	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  Darjeeling,	  I	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show	  how	  –	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  state	  policy	  towards	  Darjeeling	  –	  ethnic	  consciousness	  spread	  from	  
the	  upper	  to	  the	  middle	  and	  lower	  classes	  of	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  derive	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
political	  regime	  pre-­‐1980,	  this	  chapter	  also	  asks	  about	  the	  forms	  of	  political	  contestation	  between	  
political	  parties,	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐party-­‐political	  formations	  and	  of	  non-­‐ethnicity	  based	  issues	  in	  
negotiating	  people’s	  relations	  with	  the	  state.	  Chapter	  3.4	  traces	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  party	  that	  would	  
dominate	  Darjeeling	  for	  20	  years,	  the	  GNLF	  and	  its	  leader	  Subash	  Ghisingh.	  It	  analyses	  how	  the	  
discourse	  of	  “Gorkhaland”	  not	  only	  became	  a	  major	  defining	  trait	  of	  people’s	  subjectivity	  but	  was	  
also	  coupled	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dominant	  party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Chapter	  3.5	  focuses	  on	  
Ghisinghko	  pālo	  since	  1988.	  It	  displays	  how	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime	  was	  institutionalised	  through	  
the	  establishment	  of	  the	  state-­‐sponsored	  autonomous	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  (DGHC).	  The	  
DGHC	  agreement	  transformed	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  state	  and	  dominant	  party	  by	  
institutionalising	  their	  mutual	  dependency	  while	  simultaneously	  shrinking	  the	  spaces	  for	  public	  
participation	  and	  democratic	  process	  in	  Darjeeling.	  The	  final	  part	  concludes	  that	  in	  this	  process	  the	  
imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  was	  transformed	  from	  an	  emotional	  vision	  to	  an	  instrument	  in	  regional	  
political	  competition.	  
The	  discussion	  is	  largely	  based	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  earlier	  studies	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  
(Subba	  1992;	  Samanta	  2000;	  Middleton	  2013c)	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  
Council	  (Chakrabarty	  2005;	  Ganguly	  2005;	  Sarkar	  2013).	  Unfortunately,	  regarding	  the	  time	  before	  
1980,	  most	  of	  these	  studies	  remain	  focused	  on	  the	  party	  and	  government	  and	  exclude	  the	  voices	  in	  
whose	  names	  demands	  were	  staged.	  I	  try	  to	  fill	  some	  of	  these	  gaps	  by	  adding	  evidence	  from	  primary	  
sources	  including	  the	  articles	  from	  the	  Times	  of	  India	  (hereafter	  ToI)	  and	  interviews	  I	  conducted	  with	  
elderly	  residents	  of	  tea	  plantations.	  
	  
3.2 The	  evolution	  of	  ethnic	  consciousness	  
3.2.1 Shifting	  boundaries	  –	  changing	  people	  
The	  rule	  over	  Darjeeling	  district	  has	  for	  long	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  contention.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  
understand	  today’s	  situation	  without	  accounting	  for	  Darjeeling’s	  historical	  cross-­‐border	  relations	  and	  
their	  effects	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  in	  Darjeeling	  (cf.	  Shneiderman	  2010).	  Before	  
Darjeeling	  district	  with	  its	  present	  four	  sub-­‐divisions	  (see	  Map,	  p.	  xxi)	  was	  formed	  and	  became	  part	  
of	  the	  Bengal	  Presidency	  of	  British	  India	  it	  had	  belonged	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Sikkim,	  to	  the	  Gorkha	  
Kingdom,	  and	  –	  the	  parts	  east	  of	  the	  river	  Teesta	  (today’s	  Kalimpong	  sub-­‐division)	  –	  to	  Bhutan.	  In	  
1780	  the	  expanding	  Gorkha	  Kingdom	  conquered	  Sikkim	  and	  what	  today	  are	  Darjeeling	  and	  Kurseong	  
sub-­‐divisions	  including	  areas	  of	  the	  Terai	  region	  (in	  today’s	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division).	  The	  East	  India	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Company	  (EIC)	  defeated	  the	  Gorkhas	  in	  the	  “Gorkha”-­‐war	  from	  1814-­‐1816.	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Sugauli	  
(1816)	  established	  today’s	  national	  boundaries	  between	  Nepal	  and	  India41	  and	  the	  conquered	  parts	  
of	  Darjeeling	  were	  returned	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Sikkim	  in	  1817	  following	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Titaliya	  (Subba	  
1992).	  	  
The	  actual	  creation	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  began	  in	  1835,	  when	  the	  King	  of	  Sikkim	  ceded	  the	  tract	  of	  
Darjeeling	  as	  a	  “deed	  of	  grant”	  to	  the	  EIC.	  In	  1861,	  the	  EIC	  annexed	  and	  added	  the	  Sikkim	  Terai	  to	  the	  
emerging	  district	  (today’s	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division),	  and	  in	  addition	  made	  Sikkim	  a	  de	  facto	  protectorate	  
of	  the	  British	  government	  (Treaty	  of	  Tunlong)	  (Samanta	  2000,	  34,	  35)42.	  Darjeeling	  district	  took	  its	  
final	  shape	  only	  in	  1866:	  the	  Anglo-­‐Bhutan	  war	  ended	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Sinchula	  in	  1865	  and	  today’s	  
Kalimpong	  sub-­‐division	  (which	  had	  been	  under	  Bhutanese	  control	  from	  1706	  to	  1864)	  was	  added	  to	  
the	  district	  (Subba	  1992;	  Samanta	  2000).	  The	  British	  annexation	  of	  Bhutanese	  areas	  also	  included	  the	  
Dooars,	  the	  area	  of	  dense	  jungle	  stretching	  at	  the	  southern	  border	  of	  Bhutan43.	  Darjeeling	  remained	  
part	  of	  the	  Bengal	  Presidency	  (since	  1905	  the	  Province	  of	  Bengal)	  till	  the	  Indian	  Independence.	  
Anecdotes	  tell	  that	  before	  it	  was	  about	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State	  one	  month	  after	  
Independence,	  the	  Pakistani	  flag	  was	  hoisted	  at	  the	  Darjeeling	  Town	  Hall	  for	  four	  days	  (Sarkar	  and	  
Bhaumik	  2000,	  23).	  	  
The	  British	  annexation	  entailed	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  Darjeeling	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  economy,	  
infrastructure,	  and	  demography,	  all	  reflecting	  its	  functions	  as	  a	  “hill	  station”	  catering	  to	  the	  interests	  
of	  the	  European	  settlers.	  Initially	  intended	  as	  a	  sanatorium	  for	  the	  Europeans	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  hot	  
plains,	  Darjeeling	  also	  carried	  political,	  military,	  educational,	  and	  economic	  functions	  (Chatterji	  
2007).	  Its	  geo-­‐political	  position	  between	  Nepal,	  Sikkim,	  and	  Bhutan	  and	  the	  proximity	  to	  China	  
underlined	  its	  strategic	  importance.	  Together	  with	  other	  hill	  stations	  at	  the	  northern	  frontier	  of	  the	  
British	  Empire	  it	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  “chain	  of	  fortresses”	  to	  protect	  the	  British	  Indian	  Empire	  from	  
feared	  intrusions	  by	  Russia	  and	  China	  during	  the	  “Great	  Game”	  (ibid.	  86).	  Darjeeling	  was	  also	  one	  of	  
the	  major	  points	  in	  the	  trade	  route	  to	  Tibet,	  and	  was	  even	  considered	  as	  the	  gateway	  through	  which	  
the	  commerce	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  West	  could	  reach	  Central	  Asia	  (Samanta	  2000,	  46;Chatterji	  2007,	  
101).	  The	  free	  trade	  encouraged	  merchants	  from	  the	  Indian	  plains	  to	  settle	  there	  and	  weekly	  
markets	  became	  the	  centres	  of	  trade	  activities	  (ibid.).	  Roads	  were	  constructed	  and	  in	  1881	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  In	  1860,	  the	  EIC	  returned	  parts	  of	  the	  Terai	  to	  Nepal	  as	  gratitude	  for	  the	  Rana	  rulers’	  help	  in	  suppressing	  the	  
Sepoy	  Mutini	  of	  1857.	  
42	  Initially	  the	  annual	  allowance	  was	  6,000	  rupees.	  In	  1861	  the	  annual	  allowance	  to	  Sikkim	  for	  the	  ceded	  areas	  
was	  increased	  from	  9,000	  rupees	  in	  1868	  to	  12,000	  rupees	  in	  1873.	  	  
43	  Duar	  in	  Bengali	  means	  door,	  and	  the	  belt	  belonging	  to	  the	  Cooch	  Behar	  Kingdom	  –	  a	  British	  protectorate	  -­‐	  
was	  considered	  essential	  for	  the	  security	  of	  the	  plains	  and	  for	  trade	  and	  commerce	  at	  that	  time.	  Continuous	  
raids	  of	  Bhutanese	  local	  chiefs	  provoked	  the	  war	  which	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  the	  ceding	  of	  the	  territories	  to	  
British	  India	  and	  made	  Bhutan	  a	  de	  facto	  British	  protectorate	  (Samanta	  2000).	  
Historical	  legacies	  of	  authoritarian	  rule:	  Politics	  of	  pre	  and	  post-­‐Independence	  
66	  
	  
famous	  Himalayan	  Railway	  reached	  Darjeeling.	  The	  establishment	  of	  high-­‐quality	  educational	  
institutions,	  in	  addition	  to	  leisure	  facilities	  gave	  Darjeeling	  an	  increasingly	  “European”	  touch.	  The	  
upper	  parts	  of	  Darjeeling	  town	  were	  reserved	  for	  the	  European	  elite;	  the	  lower	  elevations	  housed	  
the	  “natives”.	  This	  ethnic	  and	  social	  separation	  was	  (and	  partly	  still	  is)	  reflected	  in	  socio-­‐spatial	  
segregation	  (Chatterji	  2007,	  81).	  From	  the	  1880s	  on	  Darjeeling	  became	  the	  summer-­‐capital	  of	  the	  
Bengal	  Presidency	  (Kenny	  1995;	  Chatterji	  2007).	  	  
The	  most	  significant	  changes,	  however,	  were	  caused	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  tea	  economy	  and	  
the	  opening	  of	  a	  recruitment	  centre	  for	  the	  British	  Indian	  army	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  
which	  heavily	  reworked	  the	  demography	  of	  the	  district.	  The	  commercial	  planting	  of	  tea	  began	  in	  
185244.	  In	  1866	  the	  number	  of	  tea	  plantations	  had	  increased	  from	  3	  to	  39,	  and	  by	  1891	  there	  were	  
177	  tea	  plantations	  on	  an	  area	  of	  45,000	  acres	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  (Subba	  1992,	  45).	  The	  sparsely	  
inhabited	  district	  however	  lacked	  sufficient	  man-­‐power.	  British	  sources	  mention	  that	  the	  region	  was	  
only	  habituated	  by	  a	  few	  hundred	  Lepcha	  (or	  Rang),	  who	  were	  regarded	  as	  the	  aboriginal	  population	  
(O’Malley	  1907;	  Subba	  1992;	  Chatterji	  2007).	  At	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  since	  1846,	  the	  Rana	  family	  
had	  established	  its	  firm	  dominance	  in	  Nepal,	  while	  rendering	  the	  Shah	  Kings	  mere	  marionettes.	  The	  
Ranas	  did	  not	  only	  impose	  a	  rigid	  caste	  system	  in	  Nepal	  but	  their	  policy	  also	  resulted	  in	  land	  
dispossessions.	  These	  also	  affected	  the	  eastern	  parts	  of	  Nepal,	  bordering	  Darjeeling.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  
British	  promised	  those	  oppressed	  by	  the	  Ranas	  a	  better	  life	  and	  paid	  work,	  and	  thereby	  enticed	  
thousands	  of	  people	  from	  East	  Nepal45.	  
A	  second	  factor	  encouraging	  migration	  was	  the	  British	  Army	  recruitment	  of	  Nepalis	  or	  “Gurkhas”	  
who	  were	  believed	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  “martial	  race”	  of	  “warlike”,	  “hardy”,	  fierce,	  and	  brave	  soldiers46,	  
loyal	  to	  the	  British	  crown	  (Caplan	  1995;	  Samanta	  2000,	  25)47.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  British	  
encouraged	  the	  settlement	  of	  ex-­‐servicemen	  in	  Darjeeling	  also	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  segment	  of	  “loyal	  
citizens”	  as	  a	  “counter-­‐balance”	  to	  the	  as	  hostile	  regarded	  Lepcha	  and	  Bhutia.	  The	  latter	  refer	  to	  
Tibetan	  stemming	  groups	  such	  as	  Sherpa	  or	  Yolmo	  (Samanta	  2000,	  40	  ff.).	  Samanta	  regards	  such	  
differentiations	  as	  influential	  factors	  contributing	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  ethnic	  exclusiveness	  amongst	  the	  
Gorkhas	  (ibid.	  75).	  In	  no	  time,	  the	  Nepalese	  outnumbered	  other	  groups	  of	  the	  district,	  mainly	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Initially	  three	  plantations	  in	  proximity	  to	  Darjeeling	  town	  were	  opened:	  Tukvar,	  Steinthal,	  and	  Aloobari.	  
45	  Native	  sardārs	  recruited	  workers	  from	  Nepal.	  Today,	  many	  settlements	  that	  were	  created	  this	  way	  still	  carry	  
the	  name	  of	  the	  respective	  sardārs.	  
46	  The	  martial	  race	  theory	  was	  established	  by	  Lord	  Roberts,	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  the	  Indian	  Army	  from	  1885-­‐
1893.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  Gorkhas’	  recruitment	  was	  to	  “substitute	  man	  of	  more	  warlike	  and	  hardy	  races	  for	  the	  
Hindusthani	  sepoys	  of	  Bengal,	  the	  Tamils	  and	  Telugus”	  (cited	  in:	  Samanta	  2000,	  25).	  
47	  After	  the	  Rana	  regime	  in	  Nepal	  had	  given	  formal	  clearance	  for	  recruitment	  of	  Gorkhas	  in	  British	  army,	  from	  
1846	  on	  recruitment	  centres	  were	  established	  (Subba	  1992,	  58).	  Between	  1886	  and	  1904	  about	  28,000	  Gorkha	  
soldiers	  were	  recruited	  by	  the	  Darjeeling	  recruitment	  centre	  (Chatterji	  2007,	  96).	  By	  1908	  about	  55,000	  soldiers	  
were	  enlisted	  in	  10	  Gorkha	  regiments	  (Subba	  1992,	  58).	  
Historical	  legacies	  of	  authoritarian	  rule:	  Politics	  of	  pre	  and	  post-­‐Independence	  
67	  
	  
Lepcha	  and	  the	  Bhutia.	  However,	  the	  question	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  demographic	  composition	  before	  the	  
British	  advent	  is	  highly	  contested	  in	  political	  circles	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  	  
3.2.2 Culture,	  language	  and	  literature	  
When	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  people	  from	  today’s	  Nepal	  migrated	  to	  Darjeeling,	  they	  did	  
not	  yet	  feel	  as	  a	  united	  “ethnic”	  group.	  Rather,	  they	  felt	  affiliated	  to	  their	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  
such	  as	  Rai,	  Limbu,	  Tamang,	  Mangar,	  or	  Gurung	  each	  having	  their	  distinct	  languages	  and	  culture	  
(Subba	  1992,	  38)48.	  But	  since	  1850	  the	  growth	  of	  multi-­‐group	  villages	  required	  a	  common	  language.	  
Various	  authors	  stress	  that	  the	  development	  of	  Nepali	  as	  the	  lingua	  franca	  was	  amongst	  the	  most	  
important	  factors	  in	  an	  ethno-­‐genesis	  which	  forged	  a	  bond	  of	  unity	  between	  these	  different	  groups	  
(Subba	  1992;	  Samanta	  2000;	  Kaushik	  2013).	  This	  process	  was	  fostered	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  Nepali	  
literature,	  journals,	  and	  public	  theatre	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  making	  Nepali	  a	  
symbol	  of	  Nepali	  nationalism	  (Chalmers	  2009).	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  new	  settlement	  structures	  also	  fostered	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “common	  culture	  
[...]	  where	  each	  caste	  or	  tribe	  contributed	  its	  share	  and	  built	  what	  we	  now	  know	  as	  the	  Nepali	  society	  
and	  culture”	  (Subba	  1992,	  65).	  This	  process	  entailed	  a	  slow	  erosion	  of	  caste-­‐prejudices,	  and	  indeed	  
today	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  claim	  that	  –	  unlike	  in	  Nepal	  –	  caste	  did	  not	  play	  a	  big	  role	  for	  them49.	  
Besides	  language,	  Subba	  emphasises	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Gorkhas’	  military	  history	  on	  their	  identity	  
construction	  (Subba	  1992,	  56).	  Together,	  these	  processes	  forged	  a	  collective	  consciousness	  among	  
the	  Gorkhas,	  expressed	  through	  an	  increasingly	  shared	  culture,	  language,	  and	  history,	  which	  
contributed	  to	  their	  identity	  in	  positive	  terms.	  This	  ethno-­‐genesis	  was,	  however,	  also	  paralleled	  by	  
some	  exclusionary	  processes,	  which	  many	  authors	  hold	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  the	  historical	  
roots	  of	  the	  Nepalis’	  confusion	  about	  their	  position	  in	  the	  Indian	  state	  (Chakrabarty	  1988;	  Samanta	  
2000;	  Middleton	  2010;	  Sarkar	  2013;).	  I	  turn	  to	  these	  “negative”	  definitions	  of	  Gorkha	  consciousness	  
now.	  	  
3.2.3 Exclusions	  and	  exceptions:	  British	  governance	  and	  after	  
Under	  colonial	  governance,	  Darjeeling	  got	  the	  status	  of	  “non-­‐regulated	  area”.	  In	  1874	  it	  became	  a	  
“scheduled	  district”.	  After	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  Act	  1919,	  it	  was	  designated	  as	  a	  “backward	  
tract”.	  The	  Government	  of	  India	  Act	  in	  1935	  made	  it	  a	  “partially	  excluded	  area”.	  All	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Subba	  distinguishes	  between	  Bahuns,	  Thakuris,	  Chhetris,	  Kamis,	  Sarkis,	  and	  Damais,	  who	  had	  already	  
identified	  themselves	  with	  the	  term	  “Nepali”,	  and	  the	  other	  groups	  (Rai,	  Limbu,	  Mangar,	  Tamang)	  that	  started	  
to	  identify	  themselves	  with	  the	  term	  “Nepali”	  only	  after	  the	  1920s	  (Subba,	  1992,	  38).	  
49	  Indeed,	  today	  weddings	  across	  caste	  and	  ethnic	  group	  are	  common,	  although	  some	  people	  I	  spoke	  to	  
admitted	  that	  marrying	  a	  Dalit	  (member	  of	  the	  lower	  caste)	  would	  be	  “difficult”	  and	  it	  would	  take	  some	  time	  
for	  the	  parents	  and	  community	  to	  give	  their	  blessings.	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denominations	  meant	  that	  laws	  regarding	  land	  and	  land-­‐revenue,	  especially	  after	  1874	  all	  general	  
laws,	  were	  only	  applied	  after	  the	  explicit	  permission	  of	  the	  governor	  of	  the	  Bengal	  Presidency	  (Subba	  
1992;	  Samanta	  2000;	  Kaushik	  2013).	  While	  the	  1919	  Act	  allowed	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  Indians	  as	  
elected	  representatives	  in	  governance,	  Darjeeling’s	  special	  status	  entailed	  that	  no	  representative	  
from	  the	  area	  could	  be	  send	  to	  the	  Provincial	  Legislative	  Council	  (Bagchi	  2012,	  86).	  Only	  after	  1937	  
Darjeeling	  was	  allowed	  to	  send	  representatives	  to	  the	  Bengal	  Legislative	  Assembly	  (Rhodes	  and	  
Rhodes	  2006,	  70).	  Thus,	  although	  Darjeeling	  was	  politically	  part	  of	  the	  Bengal	  Presidency/Province	  of	  
Bengal	  since	  1866,	  it	  was	  administratively	  not	  fully	  integrated	  into	  it	  up	  to	  1947	  (Subba	  1992,	  36,	  37).	  
The	  British	  government’s	  motivation	  for	  the	  exclusionary	  governance	  of	  Darjeeling	  was	  probably	  not	  
only	  the	  intention	  to	  safeguard	  the	  population	  that	  was	  considered	  as	  “tribal”	  from	  outsiders’	  
exploitation	  or	  to	  secure	  the	  huge	  capital	  invested	  by	  the	  European	  tea	  planters	  (Samanta	  2000,	  74)	  
by	  restricting	  outsiders	  from	  buying	  land	  (Bagchi	  2012,	  85).	  Samanta	  (2000,	  74)	  interprets	  the	  
attempt	  to	  foster	  an	  ethnic	  Nepali	  exclusiveness	  as	  a	  means	  to	  oppress	  the	  feared	  Tibetan	  influence	  
(from	  the	  North)	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  insulate	  the	  population	  from	  the	  rising	  freedom	  struggle	  in	  
Bengal	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  
In	  discussing	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  exceptional	  rules,	  Sarkar	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  colonial	  
governmentality	  gave	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  hills	  “an	  early	  experience	  of	  the	  art	  of	  being	  governed	  
differently”	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  42).	  This	  implanted	  the	  urge	  for	  “attaining	  recognition	  through	  privileges,	  
rewards,	  and	  protection”	  which	  translated	  into	  an	  “aporia	  of	  self-­‐rule”	  (ibid.	  44).	  Similarly,	  Dyutis	  
Chakrabarty	  claims	  that	  the	  exceptional	  rules	  supported	  a	  belief	  among	  the	  Nepalis	  that	  their	  future	  
“would	  remain	  safe	  only	  under	  a	  system	  of	  protection	  and	  special	  status”	  (Chakrabarty	  1988,	  51).	  	  
Ultimately,	  the	  British	  policy	  of	  protection	  through	  exclusion	  did	  not	  only	  support	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  common	  identity	  as	  the	  Gorkhas.	  Some	  authors	  claim	  that	  it	  also	  planted	  the	  roots	  for	  the	  
confused	  relationship	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  with	  the	  emerging	  Indian	  nation.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  
exclusionary	  policy	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  participation	  in	  governance	  hindered	  the	  independence	  
movement	  from	  spreading	  to	  Darjeeling	  and	  left	  the	  Gorkhas	  by	  and	  large	  outside	  of	  the	  national	  
mainstream	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000;	  Kaushik	  2013,	  40).	  	  
This	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  role	  the	  Gorkhas	  as	  soldiers	  in	  the	  British	  Army	  played	  for	  fighting	  the	  
freedom	  struggle.	  Although	  some	  participated	  in	  the	  independence	  struggle	  and	  became	  martyrs50,	  
the	  fact	  that	  Gorkha	  soldiers	  were	  employed	  to	  subdue	  the	  Sepoy	  Mutini	  in	  1857	  and	  were	  involved	  
in	  the	  massacre	  at	  Jalianawalabagh	  in	  Amritsar	  in	  1919,	  where	  they	  gunned	  down	  hundreds	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Famous	  martyrs	  are	  Major	  Durga	  Malla	  and	  Dal	  Bahadur	  Thapa.	  Dal	  Bahadur	  Giri	  from	  Kalimpong	  became	  a	  
close	  aide	  of	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  (Bagchi	  2012).	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unarmed	  independence	  fighters	  has	  left	  a	  strong	  stigma	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  being	  “stooges”	  of	  the	  British	  
government	  (Kaushik	  2013,	  41).	  Subba	  (1992)	  argues	  that	  this	  raised	  doubts	  amongst	  other	  Indians	  
about	  the	  Gorkhas’	  loyalty	  to	  the	  emerging	  Indian	  nation	  and	  caused	  their	  discrimination,	  e.g.	  when	  
travelling	  within	  the	  country.	  Subba	  concludes	  that	  these	  experiences	  have	  left	  a	  “deep	  sense	  of	  
insecurity”	  on	  the	  Gorkhas	  which	  increased	  their	  ethnic	  consciousness,	  and	  their	  reliance	  on	  ethnic	  
solidarity	  for	  security	  (Subba	  1992,	  61).	  This	  ambivalent	  relation	  to	  the	  Indian	  nation,	  and	  the	  feeling	  
of	  being	  not	  completely	  recognised	  as	  part	  of	  it,	  translated	  into	  what	  Middleton	  (2013c,	  609)	  termed	  
“anxieties	  of	  belonging”.	  These	  anxieties	  are	  instrumental	  in	  understanding	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  in	  1980,	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  3.4.1	  below.	  	  
Although	  Darjeeling’s	  excluded	  status	  ended	  after	  Independence	  with	  its	  inclusion	  into	  the	  new	  
Union	  State	  of	  West	  Bengal,	  the	  special	  treatment	  of	  the	  district	  continued.	  This	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  Hill	  Development	  Council	  in	  1976	  (a	  government	  nominated	  body),	  the	  establishment	  
of	  the	  autonomous	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  (DGHC)	  in	  1988,	  and	  –	  more	  recently	  –	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA)	  in	  2012.	  All	  these	  continue	  the	  logic	  of	  administrative-­‐
territorial	  exceptions	  (cf.	  Middleton	  2013a).	  In	  this	  context,	  Sarkar	  (2013)	  and	  Sonntag	  (1999)	  claim	  
that	  instead	  of	  addressing	  these	  doubts	  about	  their	  recognised	  Indian	  identity,	  the	  government’s	  
post-­‐Independence	  policy	  of	  establishing	  autonomous	  councils	  in	  Darjeeling	  has	  rather	  added	  to	  the	  
Gorkhas’	  perceived	  exclusion.	  Autonomous	  councils,	  they	  claim,	  continue	  the	  colonial	  exclusionist	  
policy	  instead	  of	  fostering	  a	  “we-­‐ness”	  of	  Indians	  (Sonntag	  1999,	  429).	  
Also	  in	  developmental	  terms,	  most	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  today	  perceive	  the	  government	  policy	  
towards	  their	  region	  as	  discriminative	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Many	  people	  interpret	  this	  alleged	  “internal	  
colonialism”	  (Bomjan	  2008)	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  ethnic	  discrimination,	  where	  a	  “Bengali”	  government	  
allocates	  developmental	  rewards	  along	  ethnic	  lines	  and	  excludes	  the	  ethnic	  minority	  of	  the	  Gorkhas.	  
Subba	  (1992)	  sees	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  this	  perception	  and	  an	  instrumentalisation	  of	  ethnic	  
identity.	  Ethnic	  identity,	  he	  argues,	  becomes	  “the	  only	  straw	  that	  people	  can	  hold	  on	  to”	  in	  order	  to	  
pressurise	  the	  state	  for	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  developmental	  allocations	  (ibid.	  21	  ff.).	  
This	  discussion	  underlines	  that	  the	  Gorkhas’	  ethnic	  consciousness	  is	  not	  only	  defined	  in	  positive	  ways	  
through	  distinctive	  characteristics	  in	  language,	  culture,	  or	  history,	  but	  also	  negatively,	  experienced	  as	  
a	  lack	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  Indian	  nation,	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  recognised	  Indian	  identity,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  
development.	  The	  feeling	  of	  ethnic	  exclusiveness	  is	  thus	  strongly	  related	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  ethnically	  
based	  discrimination.	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3.3 Ethnic	  consciousness,	  the	  class-­‐question,	  and	  political	  parties	  in	  20th	  century	  
Darjeeling	  
The	  foregoing	  discussion	  displayed	  accounts,	  which	  see	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethnic	  consciousness	  in	  
Darjeeling	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  migratory	  processes	  and	  pre	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  state	  
policy	  towards	  the	  region.	  Although	  these	  approaches	  are	  helpful	  to	  describe	  early	  roots	  of	  ethnic	  
consciousness	  and	  feelings	  of	  discrimination	  and	  exclusion,	  they	  do	  not	  yet	  explain	  how	  ethnic	  
consciousness	  eventually	  became	  a	  defining	  trait	  of	  people’s	  subjectivities.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  explore	  
the	  role	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  organisations	  in	  shaping,	  framing,	  and	  spreading	  ethnic	  consciousness	  
amongst	  the	  masses	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  I	  show	  that	  not	  only	  regular	  demands	  
for	  administrative	  separation	  from	  (West)	  Bengal	  but	  also	  demands	  for	  recognition	  of	  Nepali	  as	  
official	  language	  were	  instrumental	  in	  strengthening	  this	  ethnic	  consciousness.	  Together,	  they	  
formed	  part	  of	  the	  base	  drawing	  on	  which	  Ghisingh	  eventually	  framed	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  in	  
1980.	  In	  reviewing	  this	  history,	  I	  also	  elaborate	  on	  the	  forms	  of	  political	  competition	  and	  popular	  
bases	  for	  party-­‐political	  support.	  The	  discussion	  underlines	  the	  comparative	  diversity	  of	  active	  
political	  parties	  and	  the	  more	  competitive	  party-­‐system	  of	  pre-­‐1980	  and	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  
discourse	  around	  ethnic	  identity	  was	  only	  one	  amongst	  other	  issues,	  which	  mobilised	  the	  masses.	  
3.3.1 Parties	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  ethnic	  consciousness	  
Significantly,	  at	  one	  time	  or	  the	  other,	  all	  political	  parties	  in	  Darjeeling	  (except	  for	  the	  All	  India	  
Trinamool	  Congress)51	  have	  at	  least	  once	  raised	  the	  demand	  for	  separation	  from	  West	  Bengal,	  
regardless	  of	  what	  they	  claim	  today.	  While	  most	  of	  these	  demands	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  actual	  or	  
envisaged	  political	  changes	  at	  the	  national	  level52	  and	  unanimously	  stress	  cultural,	  linguistic,	  and	  
geographical	  differences	  as	  bases	  for	  justification,	  they	  differ	  considerably	  regarding	  the	  extent	  and	  
territory	  of	  the	  demanded	  autonomous	  administration,	  and	  regarding	  the	  representative	  function	  of	  
those	  who	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  public	  voice	  (see	  time-­‐line,	  Appendix	  A).	  	  
The	  earliest	  demands	  for	  administrative	  separation	  of	  Darjeeling	  were	  made	  in	  1907	  by	  the	  Hillmen’s	  
Association,	  which	  was	  composed	  of	  members	  of	  the	  local	  elite,	  who	  claimed	  to	  represent	  
Darjeeling’s	  Nepalis,	  Bhutia,	  and	  Lepcha	  (Memorandum	  1917,	  cited	  in:	  Moktan	  2004,	  90).	  Its	  
president	  S.W.	  Laden	  La,	  a	  respected	  police	  officer	  and	  political	  “middleman”	  with	  intimate	  contacts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  The	  TMC	  only	  started	  activities	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  after	  winning	  the	  2011	  elections	  to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  
Assembly.	  	  
52	  The	  national	  impetus	  include	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  Acts	  of	  1919	  and	  1935;	  the	  report	  of	  the	  States	  
Reorganisation	  Commission	  in	  1955;	  the	  Pataskar	  Commission	  for	  hills	  of	  Assam	  in	  1965	  (which	  suggested	  the	  
formation	  of	  Hill	  Areas	  Councils	  with	  separate	  power	  and	  budget);	  Nehru’s	  Plan	  emphasising	  full	  autonomy	  of	  
hill	  people	  and	  greater	  participation	  in	  decision	  making,	  planning,	  and	  administration,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  
Meghalaya	  in	  1972	  raising	  hopes	  for	  an	  autonomous	  State	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000,	  28).	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to	  the	  British	  administration	  (Rhodes	  and	  Rhodes	  2006),	  stood	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  an	  exclusionist	  
school	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Supported	  by	  the	  European	  Planters	  and	  the	  European	  
Association,	  the	  Hillmen’s	  Association	  expressed	  the	  need	  for	  “special	  safeguards”	  for	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  
perceived	  geographically,	  socially,	  historically,	  religiously,	  and	  linguistically	  different	  area.	  In	  face	  of	  
the	  Government	  of	  India	  Acts	  of	  1919	  and	  1935	  –	  the	  latter	  granting	  large	  measures	  of	  autonomy	  to	  
the	  provinces	  and	  introducing	  direct	  elections	  –	  they	  petitioned	  the	  government	  for	  full	  
administrative	  separation	  of	  the	  district	  from	  the	  Province	  of	  Bengal.	  In	  1917,	  1920,	  and	  1929	  they	  
proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  North-­‐East	  Frontier	  Province,	  comprising	  today’s	  Darjeeling	  district,	  the	  
Dooars,	  Assam	  and	  today’s	  Arunachal	  Pradesh.	  Significantly,	  these	  demands	  were	  opposed	  by	  groups	  
(i.e.	  the	  Gurkha	  Memorialists,	  the	  Darjeeling	  People’s	  Association,	  and	  the	  Kalimpong	  Samiti)	  who	  
feared	  that	  Darjeeling	  would	  remain	  backward	  if	  further	  excluded	  from	  participation	  in	  governance	  
(Kaushik	  2013;	  Middleton	  2013a).	  Instead,	  they	  argued	  that	  only	  an	  inclusion	  in	  the	  regular	  ambit	  of	  
administration	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  benefit	  from	  constitutional	  reforms	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000,	  
18),	  underlining	  their	  apprehensions	  to	  remain	  further	  separated	  from	  the	  Indian	  mainstream	  
developments.	  The	  British	  government	  chose	  a	  middle	  path:	  although	  it	  continued	  with	  the	  special	  
status	  of	  Darjeeling	  they	  never	  agreed	  to	  a	  complete	  separation	  of	  Darjeeling	  from	  the	  Bengal	  
Presidency.	  Middleton	  (2013a)	  concludes	  that	  such	  internal	  voices	  of	  dissent	  –	  which	  usually	  lack	  
from	  popular	  histories	  –	  not	  only	  point	  at	  the	  entanglement	  of	  articulations	  of	  Nepali-­‐Indian	  identity	  
with	  state	  formation.	  They	  also	  show	  that	  “this	  conglomerate	  identity	  did	  not	  yet	  have	  the	  social	  or	  
political	  cohesion	  it	  would	  accrue	  in	  later	  generations”	  (ibid.	  17).	  Gorkha	  nationalism	  –	  and	  the	  
discussion	  about	  it	  –	  was	  confined	  to	  the	  elite	  classes	  only.	  	  
This	  changed	  in	  the	  1940s,	  when	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  class	  of	  small	  shopkeepers,	  
businessmen,	  contractors,	  clerks,	  teachers,	  and	  intellectuals,	  who	  were	  more	  conscious	  about	  their	  
language,	  sought	  a	  forum	  for	  interest	  promotion	  (Datta	  1991,	  227).	  This	  foresaw	  the	  foundation	  of	  
an	  ethnic	  party	  in	  Darjeeling,	  the	  All	  India	  Gorkha	  League	  (AIGL)	  in	  194453.	  Its	  president	  D.S.	  Gurung,	  
a	  lawyer	  from	  Kalimpong,	  stemmed	  from	  a	  mandal54	  family	  of	  land-­‐revenue	  collectors	  (Sarkar	  2010,	  
96).	  From	  the	  beginning	  the	  AIGL	  had	  a	  clear	  ethnic	  focus	  on	  the	  Gorkhas	  only,	  thereby	  excluding	  the	  
Lepcha	  and	  Bhutia	  and	  signalling	  the	  end	  to	  the	  joined	  struggle	  of	  the	  groups	  as	  promoted	  by	  S.W.	  
Laden	  La.	  The	  death	  of	  Laden	  La	  in	  December	  1936	  and	  the	  subsequent	  victory	  of	  D.S.	  Gurung	  in	  the	  
Provincial	  elections	  in	  1937	  signalled	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  Hillmen’s	  Association,	  which,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The	  party	  had	  first	  been	  established	  in	  1923	  in	  Dehradun	  (Subba	  1992,	  84).	  
54	  The	  British	  had	  rented	  out	  agricultural	  lands	  to	  local	  mandals	  or	  revenue-­‐collectors	  who	  attained	  powerful	  
positions	  in	  the	  local	  community,	  as	  they	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  distribute	  land	  to	  new	  settlers	  and	  to	  realise	  the	  
land-­‐rent	  (Sarkar	  2010,	  94	  ff.).	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retained	  its	  base	  in	  Darjeeling	  till	  the	  European	  Planters	  left	  Darjeeling	  (Lacina	  2014,	  9).	  The	  Lepcha	  
and	  Bhutia	  subsequently	  opened	  their	  own	  associations	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  interests.	  
The	  aims	  of	  the	  AIGL	  were	  “to	  fight	  against	  the	  pathetic	  condition	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  spread	  over	  India,	  
uncertainty	  of	  their	  political	  status	  and	  their	  perilous	  future”	  (cited	  in:	  Subba	  1992,	  84).	  This	  was	  
voiced	  in	  demands	  for	  recognition	  as	  a	  community,	  representation	  in	  the	  provincial	  legislatures	  and	  
the	  interim	  government,	  and	  the	  official	  recognition	  of	  the	  Nepali	  language55.	  Expressing	  fear	  of	  
Bengali	  oppression,	  in	  1948	  (briefly	  after	  Indian	  Independence	  and	  the	  partition	  of	  East	  (Pakistan)	  
from	  West	  Bengal)	  the	  AIGL	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  autonomous	  council	  to	  secure	  the	  
proportional	  representation	  in	  State	  governance	  of	  the	  minority	  Nepalis,	  or	  alternatively	  the	  
administrative	  separation	  from	  Bengal,	  and	  a	  merger	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  Dooars	  with	  Assam	  to	  form	  a	  
new	  province.	  
D.S.	  Gurung’s	  speech	  at	  a	  large	  public	  meeting	  in	  Kalimpong	  on	  May	  17,	  1947,	  vividly	  expressed	  the	  
apprehensions	  against	  being	  part	  of	  a	  Bengali	  dominated	  State:	  
The	  Britishers	  (sic)	  have	  treated	  us	  like	  animals	  but	  the	  Bengalis	  are	  worse	  than	  Britishers.	  The	  Bengalis	  
will	  be	  our	  administrators	  and	  will	  try	  to	  keep	  us	  down	  all	  the	  time.	  Look	  how	  all	  Government	  posts	  
have	  been	  occupied	  by	  these	  Bengalis	  although	  we	  have	  got	  now	  so	  many	  graduates,	  who	  can	  easily	  
replace	  them.	  […]	  [A]ll	  of	  you	  must	  prepare	  to	  face	  anything	  and	  prepare	  to	  lay	  down	  even	  your	  life.	  I	  
am	  ready	  to	  die	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  our	  people	  but	  I	  will	  kill	  ten	  enemies	  before	  I	  die.	  (D.S.	  Gurung,	  cited	  
in:	  Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  79)	  
While	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  was	  drawing	  a	  Constitution	  for	  the	  now	  independent	  India,	  in	  1949	  
at	  another	  large	  public	  meeting	  in	  Darjeeling,	  the	  AIGL	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  “Uttarakhand”	  
State	  comprising	  Darjeeling,	  Sikkim,	  Cooch	  Behar,	  and	  Jalpaiguri56.	  The	  demand	  was	  jointly	  
formulated	  by	  representatives	  from	  the	  Hillmen’s	  Association	  and	  the	  Cooch	  Behar	  Praja	  Congress,	  
along	  with	  people	  from	  Jalpaiguri	  district	  of	  West	  Bengal	  and	  Sikkim.	  This	  demand	  expressed	  the	  fear	  
of	  losing	  political	  representation	  in	  Bengal,	  and	  stressed	  on	  the	  similar	  “nature	  and	  habit”,	  racial	  
characteristics,	  geographical	  affinity,	  and	  shared	  history	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  envisioned	  
“Uttarakhand”	  State	  (Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  87).	  The	  Constituent	  Assembly,	  however,	  turned	  down	  
the	  demand	  as	  they	  thought	  such	  “mischievous	  moves”57	  could	  jeopardise	  national	  integrity.	  
Discussions	  on	  how	  far	  this	  demand	  reached	  the	  common	  public	  are	  controversial.	  While	  Subba	  
notes	  that	  the	  Uttarakhand	  idea	  received	  a	  response	  beyond	  the	  educated	  people	  (Subba	  1992,	  89),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Memorandum	  to	  Viceroy	  Wavell,	  1	  February	  1944	  (cited	  in:	  Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987).	  
56	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  Cooch	  Behar	  Praja	  Party	  demanded	  separation	  from	  West	  Bengal	  for	  the	  former	  Cooch	  
Behar	  Kingdom.	  Till	  date	  groups	  in	  the	  region	  demand	  a	  separate	  State	  of	  Kamtapur	  to	  be	  carved	  out	  of	  north	  
Bengal,	  including	  the	  areas	  of	  Darjeeling	  district.	  
57	  From	  Constituent	  Assembly	  of	  India,	  reply	  to	  starred	  question	  No.	  658,	  answered	  on	  15.12.1949	  (cited	  in:	  
Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  94).	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Samanta	  (2000)	  claims	  that	  it	  “did	  not	  find	  much	  favour	  with	  the	  people”	  (ibid.	  84)58.	  In	  1952,	  the	  
AIGL	  sent	  another	  memorandum	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Nehru	  proposing	  three	  alternative	  ways	  of	  
separating	  Darjeeling	  from	  West	  Bengal59,	  yet	  again	  without	  any	  success.	  
Initially	  –	  presumably	  as	  a	  move	  to	  increase	  its	  public	  base	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  where	  the	  Hillmen’s	  
Association	  was	  still	  strong	  –	  the	  AIGL	  had	  established	  ties	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Darjeeling60.	  
Although	  the	  AIGL	  had	  initially	  stressed	  its	  loyalty	  to	  the	  British	  government,	  from	  1946	  onwards	  it	  
openly	  lent	  support	  to	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  (INC)	  and	  the	  Quit	  India	  resolution	  (Singh	  and	  Singh	  
1987,	  61;	  Subba	  1992,	  86).	  Already	  in	  November	  1945,	  the	  AIGL	  had	  openly	  criticised	  the	  deployment	  
of	  Gurkha	  troops	  to	  beat	  down	  the	  freedom	  movement	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Indo-­‐China,	  blaming	  the	  
“imperialists”	  for	  befouling	  their	  reputation	  (Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  45,	  47)61.	  Such	  statements	  
express	  the	  fear	  of	  losing	  touch	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  India,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  discrimination	  due	  to	  
the	  Gorkhas’	  disputed	  role	  in	  the	  freedom	  movement.	  	  
In	  1946,	  D.S.	  Gurung	  was	  elected	  Member	  of	  the	  (Bengal)	  Legislative	  Assembly	  (MLA)	  on	  a	  Congress	  
ticket	  and	  subsequently	  became	  member	  of	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  (ToI,	  27.06.1946)62.	  After	  his	  
death	  in	  1948,	  the	  AIGL’s	  new	  president	  Deo	  Prakash	  Rai	  won	  the	  MLA	  seat	  from	  Darjeeling	  sub-­‐
division	  seven	  times	  in	  a	  row	  between	  1957	  and	  1977,	  supported	  by	  the	  electoral	  alliances	  of	  the	  
party	  with	  the	  Congress	  at	  the	  State	  level	  (Sarkar	  2013).	  	  
Although	  the	  party	  had	  begun	  with	  a	  clear	  agenda	  for	  territorial	  autonomy	  and	  separation	  from	  
(West)	  Bengal,	  after	  1956	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  D.P.	  Rai	  its	  focus	  shifted	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  
Nepali	  as	  a	  recognised	  language	  (Chakrabarty	  2005;	  ToI,	  10.11.1972).	  There	  are	  accusations	  against	  
D.	  P.	  Rai	  that	  he	  had	  made	  a	  secret	  pact	  with	  the	  government	  in	  Calcutta	  for	  downplaying	  the	  
political	  aspirations	  of	  autonomy	  (Bomjan	  2008,	  92).	  Indeed,	  the	  close	  ties	  between	  the	  Congress	  and	  
the	  AIGL	  were	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  MLAs	  from	  AIGL	  got	  seats	  as	  Deputy	  or	  Cabinet	  ministers	  in	  
Congress	  governments.	  Further,	  many	  erstwhile	  Darjeeling	  Congress	  leaders	  were	  either	  dismissed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Also	  the	  Times	  of	  India	  mentions	  that	  the	  “campaign	  was	  never	  taken	  to	  a	  crisis	  point”	  (ToI,	  10.11.1972).	  
59	  These	  were:	  either	  a	  separate	  administrative	  unit	  directly	  under	  the	  centre;	  or	  a	  separate	  province	  with	  
Jalpaiguri,	  Cooch	  Behar,	  and	  Sikkim;	  or	  the	  merger	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  Jalpaiguri	  with	  Assam.	  
60	  Ratanlal	  Brahmin,	  leader	  of	  the	  CPI,	  was	  vice-­‐president	  at	  the	  general	  body	  meeting	  of	  the	  AIGL	  in	  March	  
1944.	  A	  note	  from	  the	  Bengal	  Intelligence	  Bureau	  dated	  January	  18,	  1944	  suspects	  a	  strategic	  move	  behind	  this	  
association	  to	  establish	  a	  stronger	  base	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  (cited	  in:	  Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  31).	  
61	  The	  memorandum	  even	  threatens	  the	  British	  Government:	  “And	  the	  day	  is	  coming	  soon	  when	  the	  Brave	  
Gurkhas	  shall	  wreak	  vengeance	  upon	  the	  Imperialist	  oppressors	  for	  the	  part	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  play	  in	  
the	  black	  deed	  of	  robbing	  other	  people’s	  freedom”	  (November	  1945,	  joint	  statement	  of	  Gorkha	  Organisations;	  
cited	  in	  Singh	  and	  Singh	  1987,	  47).	  
62	  The	  Legislative	  Assembly	  refers	  to	  the	  State-­‐level	  parliament.	  Members	  are	  elected	  every	  five	  years	  on	  the	  
sub-­‐divisional	  level.	  Thus,	  currently	  Darjeeling	  district	  has	  four	  MLAs:	  for	  Siliguri,	  Kurseong,	  Darjeeling,	  and	  
Kalimpong	  sub-­‐divisions.	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AIGL	  members	  or	  shared	  family	  ties	  with	  it	  (Sarkar	  2013)63.	  The	  AIGL	  only	  raised	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  
separate	  state	  again	  in	  1981,	  after	  D.P.	  Rai’s	  death.	  	  
The	  AIGL	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  party	  which	  forged	  the	  autonomy	  agenda	  after	  Independence,	  but	  
initially	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI)	  also	  joined	  the	  choir	  of	  demands	  for	  separation.	  Defying	  
the	  Hillmen’s	  Association’s	  proposal	  of	  a	  merger	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  Assam,	  in	  1946	  the	  party	  proposed	  
the	  creation	  of	  “Gorkhasthan”,	  an	  independent	  nation	  comprising	  today’s	  Nepal,	  Darjeeling	  district,	  
and	  Sikkim.	  Supported	  by	  the	  State-­‐level	  leadership,	  in	  1947	  the	  Darjeeling	  District	  Unit	  of	  the	  CPI	  
formulated	  the	  demand	  in	  a	  memorandum	  to	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru	  (at	  that	  time	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  
interim	  government)	  and	  Liaquat	  Ali	  Khan	  (leader	  of	  the	  Muslim	  League)	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  people	  
of	  the	  envisaged	  country	  constituted	  one	  nation	  (by	  sharing	  geographical,	  cultural,	  and	  linguistic	  
characteristics)	  and,	  therefore,	  had	  the	  right	  to	  national	  self-­‐determination.	  Alternatively,	  as	  a	  
remedy	  for	  the	  “backwardness”	  of	  people,	  they	  suggested	  a	  “committee	  of	  representatives”	  with	  the	  
right	  to	  introduce	  bills	  be	  constituted	  from	  locals	  in	  Darjeeling64.	  The	  opinions	  about	  the	  CPI’s	  
motivations	  behind	  the	  Gorkhasthan	  demand	  are	  divided.	  While	  Chakrabarty	  (2005,	  91)	  sees	  the	  
ideas	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐doctrine	  of	  the	  right	  to	  national	  self-­‐determination,	  Subba	  (1992)	  
and	  Samanta	  (2000)	  denote	  it	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  broaden	  the	  public	  support	  base	  of	  the	  party	  beyond	  
the	  tea-­‐belt	  against	  the	  demand’s	  obvious	  infeasibility.	  The	  communist	  leaders	  “knew	  what	  would	  
sell	  in	  Darjeeling	  then:	  not	  Marxism	  or	  Leninism	  but	  ‘Gorkhalism’”	  (Subba	  1992,	  90;	  see	  also	  Samanta	  
2000,	  93).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Besky	  (2013,	  78)	  claims	  that	  Darjeeling	  CPI	  leader	  Ratanlal	  Brahmin	  did	  
not	  win	  the	  elections	  to	  the	  Provincial	  Council	  in	  1946	  based	  on	  an	  ethnic	  platform	  but	  on	  a	  platform	  
that	  promised	  the	  improvement	  of	  labour	  rights.	  
Yet,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  State	  Reorganisation	  Commission	  (SRC)	  committee’s	  visit	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	  June	  
1955	  (ToI,	  12.6.55),	  the	  CPI	  revised	  its	  stand	  on	  Darjeeling	  and	  instead	  advocated	  “regional	  
autonomy”	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  regional	  government	  for	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  part	  of	  West	  Bengal	  
(Subba	  1992,	  91;	  Samanta	  2000,	  93),	  reflecting	  programmatic	  changes	  in	  the	  CPI	  (Brass	  1985).	  
Although	  the	  SRC	  did	  not	  recommend	  statehood	  for	  Darjeeling,	  encouraged	  by	  its	  report	  which	  
stated	  that	  new	  States	  could	  be	  granted	  based	  on	  linguist	  principle,	  the	  AIGL	  revived	  the	  demand	  for	  
a	  separate	  State	  but	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  refused	  even	  granting	  regional	  autonomy	  fearing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  For	  example,	  N.B.	  Gurung,	  the	  younger	  brother	  of	  D.S.	  Gurung,	  had	  resigned	  from	  the	  AIGL	  in	  1962	  and	  
thereafter	  served	  as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  District	  Congress	  till	  1967,	  before	  becoming	  member	  of	  the	  
All	  India	  Congress	  Committee	  in	  1972.	  Under	  CM	  B.C.	  Roy	  (Congress)	  he	  had	  served	  as	  the	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	  
Labour	  twice.	  After	  N.B.	  Gurung	  changed	  parties,	  Deo	  Prakash	  Rai	  shifted	  the	  base	  of	  the	  AIGL	  from	  Kalimpong	  
to	  Darjeeling	  town	  (Sarkar	  2013).	  	  
64	  Memorial	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  District	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India,	  6.4.1947	  (in	  Samanta	  2000,	  
255).	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rumours	  of	  a	  merger	  with	  Nepal	  (Samanta	  2000,	  85)	  65.	  At	  around	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  May	  1955,	  the	  
Darjeeling	  District	  Congress	  Committee	  (DDCC)	  also	  joined	  the	  demands	  for	  autonomy.	  In	  1956	  the	  
reorganisation	  of	  States	  in	  India	  took	  place	  without	  reflecting	  these	  demands.	  When	  Nehru	  visited	  
Darjeeling	  in	  1957,	  the	  DDCC,	  CPI,	  and	  AIGL	  jointly	  placed	  a	  demand	  for	  “regional	  autonomy”	  (and	  
not	  statehood)	  before	  him	  (Subba	  1992,	  91).	  	  
Despite	  the	  recurrent	  demands,	  only	  in	  1967	  did	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  pass	  a	  resolution	  for	  
Darjeeling’s	  regional	  autonomy.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  government	  was	  led	  by	  the	  leftist	  United	  Front,	  
which	  included	  the	  CPI	  and	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  among	  other	  parties	  and	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  AIGL.	  Although	  
this	  development	  suggests	  some	  responsiveness	  from	  the	  government,	  critiques	  stress	  that	  the	  
resolution	  did	  not	  specify	  the	  exact	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  regional	  autonomy	  (Samanta	  2000,	  94;	  
Subba	  1992,	  91).	  Samanta	  interprets	  it	  as	  an	  intent	  to	  satisfy	  the	  AIGL	  as	  supporter	  of	  the	  United	  
Front	  (Samanta	  2000,	  85).	  In	  1976,	  resulting	  from	  the	  DDCC	  initiative,	  a	  Hill	  Development	  Council	  was	  
created	  by	  the	  Darjeeling	  Hill	  Areas	  Development	  Council	  Act	  1976	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  formulate	  and	  
implement	  development	  plans	  for	  Darjeeling	  (Chakrabarty	  2005,	  183).	  But	  contradicting	  people’s	  
demand	  for	  a	  democratic	  representation	  (it	  was	  headed	  by	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  and	  all	  its	  members	  
were	  government	  nominated)	  it	  soon	  ceded	  to	  disfunctionality	  (Kaushik	  2013;	  Samanta	  2000).	  After	  
the	  Left	  Front	  was	  voted	  into	  power	  in	  West	  Bengal	  in	  1977,	  it	  passed	  resolutions	  demanding	  
regional	  autonomy	  concerning	  the	  three	  Darjeeling	  hill	  subdivisions	  only	  and	  inclusion	  of	  Nepali	  in	  
the	  8th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  Constitution	  to	  the	  Indian	  government	  in	  1978	  and	  September	  1981,	  
yet,	  without	  any	  positive	  response	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  	  
3.3.2 Beyond	  party-­‐politics:	  The	  language	  movement	  
While	  between	  1960	  and	  1980	  the	  discussion	  in	  political	  circles	  concerning	  Darjeeling’s	  status	  
transformed	  from	  demands	  of	  a	  full	  separation	  from	  West	  Bengal	  in	  form	  of	  statehood	  to	  claims	  for	  
“regional	  autonomy”	  under	  West	  Bengal,	  another	  long-­‐standing	  demand	  came	  to	  the	  fore:	  the	  
demand	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  Nepali	  as	  official	  language	  in	  Darjeeling	  district,	  and	  its	  inclusion	  in	  the	  
8th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Constitution66.	  The	  language	  movement	  differed	  from	  the	  autonomy-­‐demands	  in	  
so	  far	  as	  it	  had	  from	  its	  beginning	  a	  broad	  cross-­‐party	  and	  non-­‐party	  political	  base,	  including	  various	  
intellectuals	  and	  writers	  (Roy	  2012)	  which	  underlines	  its	  social	  (in	  contrast	  to	  party-­‐political)	  
character.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Disunity	  within	  the	  AIGL	  about	  the	  separation	  demand	  resulted	  in	  a	  rift	  and	  the	  expulsion	  of	  3	  MLAs	  from	  the	  
party	  as	  they	  refused	  to	  end	  the	  alliance	  with	  the	  Congress	  in	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  (ToI,	  8.9.55).	  
66	  Inclusion	  of	  a	  language	  in	  the	  list	  of	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  entitles	  it	  to	  official	  representation	  in	  the	  Official	  
Languages	  Commission,	  and	  obliges	  the	  government	  to	  take	  measures	  for	  its	  promotion.	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This	  language	  movement67	  attained	  mass-­‐appeal	  in	  the	  late-­‐1950s,	  after	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  
turned	  down	  the	  demand	  of	  N.B.	  Gurung	  (AIGL)	  and	  B.B.	  Hamal	  (CPI)	  to	  recognise	  Nepali	  as	  the	  
official	  language	  in	  Darjeeling.	  The	  government	  justified	  its	  rejection	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Census	  
data	  of	  1951	  which	  showed	  only	  26%	  Nepali-­‐speakers	  in	  Darjeeling	  district,	  and	  not	  the	  70%	  for	  
recognition	  as	  recommended	  by	  the	  States	  Reorganisation	  Commission	  (Subba	  1992,	  94).	  Claiming	  
that	  the	  data	  were	  inadequate	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Nepali	  was	  –	  if	  not	  everybody’s	  mother	  tongue	  –
the	  lingua	  franca	  spoken	  in	  the	  district,	  all	  political	  parties	  organised	  large-­‐scale	  protests	  in	  form	  of	  
demonstrations,	  strikes,	  and	  public	  meetings,	  and	  formed	  the	  Bhasa	  Manyata	  Samiti	  or	  Darjeeling	  
District	  Hill	  Peoples’	  Language	  Implementation	  Committee	  in	  1961	  (Subba	  1992,	  94	  ff.).	  The	  agitation	  
convinced	  the	  population	  to	  name	  “Nepali”	  and	  not	  their	  sub-­‐ethnic	  vernaculars	  as	  their	  mother	  
tongue	  when	  asked	  for	  the	  Census.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  movement	  is	  underlined	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
next	  Census,	  where	  the	  share	  of	  Nepali	  speakers	  suddenly	  rose	  to	  60	  %	  in	  the	  district	  (ibid.).	  
Subsequently	  Nepali	  was	  included	  in	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Official	  Languages	  Act	  1961	  as	  additional	  
language	  in	  the	  Nepali	  dominated	  three	  hill-­‐subdivisions	  of	  Darjeeling	  district.	  The	  Act	  was,	  however,	  
only	  implemented	  after	  12	  years.	  	  
The	  language	  movement	  then	  focussed	  on	  its	  second	  aim,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Nepali	  in	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  
of	  the	  Constitution.	  In	  1969,	  jointly	  supported	  by	  the	  AIGL	  and	  CPI/CPI-­‐M,	  the	  Nepali	  Bhasa	  Samiti	  (in	  
1972	  renamed	  All	  India	  Nepali	  Bhasa	  Samiti)	  was	  established	  to	  “promote	  and	  safeguard	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  Nepali	  speaking	  people”	  (ToI,	  10.11.1972).	  The	  Darjeeling	  Congress	  joined	  the	  Samiti	  
ahead	  of	  Indira	  Gandhi’s	  visit	  to	  the	  hills	  in	  November	  1972.	  Importantly,	  the	  Bhasa	  Samiti	  expressed	  
a	  conscious	  effort	  to	  keep	  the	  agitation	  for	  the	  constitutional	  recognition	  of	  Nepali	  separate	  from	  
other	  political	  issues	  like	  demands	  for	  autonomy	  or	  a	  separate	  state	  (Samanta	  2000,	  81).	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  senior	  Darjeeling	  Congress	  leader	  Lorez	  P.T.	  Lama	  described	  in	  retrospect	  the	  
language	  movement	  as	  “social”	  and	  not	  a	  “political”	  one.	  For	  him	  “social”	  meant	  where	  “all	  parties	  
went	  together”,	  in	  contrast	  to	  “political”	  party-­‐competitions	  (interview,	  14.6.2013).	  Thereby	  he	  
reflected	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  joint	  cross-­‐party	  movement	  and	  contentious	  party-­‐politics.	  This	  
broader	  language	  movement	  as	  an	  alliance	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  intellectuals	  had	  probably	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  The	  earliest	  phase	  of	  the	  language	  movement	  was	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Fostered	  by	  the	  
emergence	  of	  Nepali	  literature	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Nepali	  Sahitya	  Sammelan	  in	  Darjeeling	  in	  1924,	  
initially	  intellectuals	  amongst	  the	  Nepali-­‐speakers	  demanded	  the	  introduction	  of	  Nepali	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  
instruction	  at	  schools	  and	  colleges	  in	  Darjeeling,	  which	  at	  that	  time	  was	  opposed	  by	  the	  Tibetan	  speaking	  
Bhutia	  and	  Lepcha.	  Already	  in	  1918	  Nepali	  had	  been	  recognised	  as	  a	  vernacular	  language	  for	  examinations	  by	  
Calcutta	  University.	  In	  1921	  Nepali	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  vernacular	  subject	  in	  Darjeeling	  Governmental	  schools.	  
In	  1949	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Government	  also	  recognised	  Nepali	  as	  the	  medium	  of	  instruction	  in	  primary,	  middle,	  
and	  high	  schools	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  (Samanta	  2000).	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greater	  impact	  on	  forging	  ethnic	  consciousness	  compared	  to	  the	  autonomy	  demands	  (cf.	  Chakrabarty	  
2005).	  The	  need	  to	  convince	  a	  majority	  of	  people	  of	  naming	  “Nepali”	  instead	  of	  their	  sub-­‐ethnic	  
vernacular	  languages	  as	  their	  mother	  tongue	  in	  the	  1961	  Census	  contributed	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  
identities.	  	  
Only	  in	  1992,	  Nepali	  received	  constitutional	  recognition.	  The	  delayed	  government	  responses	  further	  
forged	  this	  ethnic	  consciousness.	  Derogatory	  comments	  of	  Nepali	  being	  a	  “foreign”	  language	  by	  B.G.	  
Kher,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Language	  Commission	  in	  1956,	  and	  again	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Morarji	  Desai	  
in	  1979	  (Samanta	  2000,	  81)	  reminded	  the	  Nepalis	  of	  their	  fuzzy	  status	  in	  India,	  their	  belonging	  to	  an	  
Indian	  nation	  questioned	  due	  to	  their	  historic	  and	  cultural	  associations	  to	  Nepal.	  All	  this	  forged	  a	  
sense	  of	  alienation	  and	  distrust	  towards	  the	  seemingly	  unresponsive	  and	  insensitive	  state	  (cf.	  
Samanta	  2000).	  Neither	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Hill	  Development	  Council	  in	  1976	  with	  its	  solely	  
nominated	  body,	  nor	  the	  resolutions	  passed	  by	  the	  Left	  Front	  dominated	  West	  Bengal	  State	  
Assembly	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Nepali	  in	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  adopted	  in	  1977	  and	  1981	  could	  stop	  this.	  
Instead,	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  became	  more	  aware	  of	  their	  ethnicity	  and	  the	  possibilities	  to	  use	  it	  
politically.	  This	  paved	  the	  way	  towards	  broader	  political	  questions	  including	  self-­‐determination,	  
ethnic	  consciousness,	  and	  separate	  statehood	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  56).	  
Although	  the	  language	  movement	  drew	  massive	  support,	  political	  mobilisation	  did	  not	  solely	  happen	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  language	  or	  ethnicity.	  This	  becomes	  visible	  in	  the	  class-­‐based	  mobilisation	  of	  tea	  
plantation	  workers	  to	  which	  I	  turn	  now.	  
3.3.3 Plantations	  and	  class	  consciousness	  
Although	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI)	  joined	  the	  choir	  of	  demands	  for	  separation	  from	  West	  
Bengal,	  the	  party	  focussed	  more	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  class-­‐consciousness	  than	  on	  the	  ethnic	  question.	  
While	  the	  AIGL	  drew	  on	  ethnically	  based	  aspirations	  for	  more	  representation	  in	  governance	  and	  
drew	  most	  of	  its	  support	  from	  the	  urban	  educated	  middle-­‐classes	  and	  ex-­‐servicemen,	  the	  CPI	  
established	  its	  bases	  amongst	  plantation	  workers	  in	  the	  tea	  and	  cinchona	  economy.	  Five	  years	  after	  
its	  establishment	  in	  Darjeeling,	  in	  September	  1945,	  the	  CPI	  opened	  the	  first	  labour	  union	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  The	  party	  forcefully	  promoted	  the	  rights	  of	  tea	  labourers,	  who	  till	  then	  had	  been	  
completely	  unorganised.	  Workers	  in	  the	  hierarchical	  plantation	  system	  were	  still	  totally	  dependent	  
on	  the	  plantation	  owners	  for	  housing,	  food,	  and	  medical	  care.	  Workers	  defying	  the	  orders	  could	  be	  
evicted	  from	  the	  company	  leased	  plantation	  premises.	  Agitations	  including	  strikes	  or	  slow-­‐down	  in	  
tea	  plantations	  were	  initially	  oppressed	  through	  the	  police	  and	  eviction	  orders	  to	  the	  ringleaders	  by	  
the	  management	  (Sarkar	  and	  Lama	  1986,	  13).	  In	  a	  1967	  published	  study,	  historian	  Percival	  Griffith	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mentions	  murder	  plots	  of	  labourers	  against	  managers	  and	  use	  of	  force	  against	  those,	  who	  refused	  to	  
join	  the	  Union	  and	  pay	  subscription	  fees	  (cited	  in:	  Sarkar	  and	  Lama	  1985,	  14).	  	  
Such	  agitation	  was	  led	  by	  the	  famous	  Darjeeling	  communist	  leader	  Ratanlal	  Brahmin	  (known	  as	  Māilā	  
Bhāje)	  who	  stemmed	  from	  an	  economically	  weak	  background.	  After	  having	  worked	  for	  the	  
Himalayan	  Railway	  and	  taken	  up	  jobs	  at	  tea	  plantations	  he	  became	  active	  in	  social	  issues	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  He	  is	  described	  as	  a	  man	  of	  action	  who	  knew	  “how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  tea	  garden	  workers	  or	  
bully	  the	  managers”	  (Subba	  1992,	  90).	  He	  is	  also	  famous	  for	  distributing	  food	  from	  looted	  godowns	  
(warehouses)	  to	  the	  starving	  population	  during	  the	  Bengal	  famine	  in	  1943	  (Bomjan	  2008,	  94).	  Subba	  
(1992,	  90)	  states	  that	  together	  with	  the	  intellectual	  Ganeshlal	  Subba	  he	  established	  communism	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  	  
After	  Independence,	  impressed	  by	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  the	  tea	  gardens,	  in	  the	  early	  
1950s	  the	  AIGL	  also	  established	  a	  tea	  plantation	  union	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Deo	  Prakash	  Rai	  and	  
in	  the	  early	  1960s	  the	  Congress	  party	  followed	  suit.	  At	  that	  time,	  tea	  garden	  workers	  constituted	  
about	  60%	  of	  the	  total	  labour	  force	  in	  the	  hill	  areas	  (Sarkar	  and	  Lama	  1986,	  16).	  Initially,	  regardless	  of	  
inter-­‐party	  rivalry,	  the	  unions	  cooperated	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  more	  rights	  of	  plantation	  workers.	  
Strikes	  and	  charters	  of	  demands	  were	  organised	  jointly	  (ibid.).	  For	  instance,	  the	  agitation	  for	  more	  
labour	  rights,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  shooting	  of	  six	  young	  workers	  by	  the	  police	  at	  Margret’s	  Hope	  tea	  
estate	  in	  1955,	  had	  been	  jointly	  organised	  by	  AIGL	  and	  CPI-­‐M-­‐unions	  (Bomjan	  2008,	  107).	  Also	  the	  
Maoist	  uprising	  in	  1967,	  which	  began	  in	  Naxalbari,	  a	  village	  in	  the	  Siliguri	  sub-­‐division	  of	  Darjeeling,	  
had	  some	  effects	  on	  the	  hills	  and	  some	  Naxalite	  units	  were	  installed	  in	  the	  tea	  plantations	  although	  
they	  never	  gained	  a	  considerable	  base	  68.	  	  
By	  1969	  the	  communists	  controlled	  about	  half	  of	  the	  tea	  gardens	  in	  Darjeeling	  (ToI,	  18.8.1969),	  
leaving	  the	  rest	  to	  the	  Congress	  and	  AIGL	  unions.	  Such	  activities	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  labour	  
movement	  in	  the	  tea	  plantations	  after	  Independence.	  During	  the	  Indian	  emergency	  between	  1975	  
and	  1977	  the	  communists,	  meanwhile	  divided	  into	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  CPI,	  continued	  its	  activities	  
underground69.	  	  
Many	  elders	  still	  remember	  CPI-­‐M	  leader	  and	  later	  Chief	  Minister	  Jyoti	  Basu	  hiding	  in	  their	  tea	  
plantations	  during	  that	  time.	  Yet,	  while	  the	  trade	  unions	  initially	  jointly	  fought	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  
workers,	  in	  view	  of	  Sarkar	  and	  Lama	  (1986,	  34)	  violent	  inter-­‐party	  conflicts	  including	  murders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Accounts	  of	  Kanu	  Sanyal,	  the	  main	  initiator	  of	  the	  Naxalite	  movement,	  suggest	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
interest	  and	  commitment	  from	  the	  communist	  hill-­‐leaders	  who	  preferred	  a	  peaceful	  agitation	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
policy	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  (Paul	  2014).	  
69	  After	  the	  CPI	  split	  into	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  CPI	  in	  1964,	  both	  parties	  continued	  to	  exist	  in	  Darjeeling	  district.	  While	  the	  
CPI-­‐M	  was	  comparably	  stronger	  in	  Kurseong	  and	  Darjeeling	  sub-­‐divisions,	  the	  CPI	  was	  represented	  by	  a	  
prominent	  leader	  in	  Kalimpong	  (personal	  communication,	  R.B.	  Rai).	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underline	  that	  these	  unions	  degraded	  to	  mere	  political	  tools	  for	  the	  contending	  parties,	  which	  
exploited	  the	  labour	  issues	  for	  political	  advancement	  instead	  of	  promoting	  the	  genuine	  interests	  of	  
the	  labourers.	  	  
3.3.4 Public	  support	  between	  autonomy,	  class,	  and	  language	  
This	  review	  of	  socio-­‐political	  processes	  in	  Darjeeling	  underlines	  that	  the	  ethnic	  agenda	  expressed	  in	  
demands	  for	  “regional	  autonomy”	  was	  a	  prominent	  (but	  not	  the	  only)	  programmatic	  base	  of	  political	  
parties	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Since	  the	  Hillmen’s	  Association,	  all	  proposals	  stressed	  on	  the	  cultural,	  
geographical,	  historic,	  linguistic,	  and	  religious	  differences	  of	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  with	  the	  people	  
living	  in	  the	  plains	  of	  West	  Bengal,	  and	  claimed	  that	  only	  regional	  autonomy	  or	  a	  separation	  from	  the	  
West	  Bengal	  State	  would	  secure	  their	  representation	  in	  government.	  Thereby,	  they	  unequivocally	  
expressed	  the	  fear	  of	  oppression	  by	  the	  Bengali	  majority	  community	  in	  terms	  of	  governance,	  
business,	  and	  state	  employment.	  The	  discussion	  also	  suggested	  that	  regional	  claims	  for	  autonomy	  
were	  either	  influenced	  through	  electoral	  alliances	  between	  the	  regional	  majority	  party	  and	  the	  ruling	  
party	  in	  West	  Bengal	  (e.g.	  AIGL-­‐Congress),	  or	  changed	  in	  relation	  to	  national	  party	  programs	  (CPI/CPI-­‐
M,	  INC).	  It	  is	  yet	  not	  clear	  in	  how	  far	  the	  continued	  reference	  to	  the	  ethnic	  agenda	  framed	  and	  
fostered	  ethnic	  consciousness	  amongst	  the	  masses,	  and	  in	  how	  far	  they	  served	  as	  explanation	  for	  
early	  feelings	  of	  discrimination70.	  However,	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  ethnic	  programme	  in	  mobilising	  the	  
masses	  is	  underlined	  through	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  AIGL	  which	  emerged	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  party	  
between	  1950	  and	  1980	  (as	  the	  election	  results	  in	  Table	  4	  underline).	  	  
Yet,	  the	  ethnic	  agenda	  was	  not	  the	  only	  programmatic	  base	  for	  parties.	  Before	  1980	  there	  was	  
neither	  a	  single-­‐party	  hegemony	  nor	  a	  single-­‐issue	  (i.e.	  ethnic)	  politics	  in	  Darjeeling	  but	  a	  more	  
competitive	  party	  system	  was	  forwarding	  multiple	  claims.	  Despite	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  AIGL,	  the	  
communists	  and	  the	  DDCC	  stood	  their	  ground,	  rendering	  especially	  the	  tea	  plantations	  highly	  
contested	  areas	  as	  becomes	  visible	  in	  the	  often	  violent	  contestations	  amongst	  the	  parties’	  labour	  
unions.	  Unfortunately,	  existing	  studies	  remain	  largely	  silent	  on	  the	  question	  to	  what	  extend	  demands	  
for	  regional	  autonomy	  were	  indeed	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  those	  living	  and	  working	  outside	  of	  the	  
urban	  areas.	  Accounts	  of	  older	  tea	  plantation	  residents	  suggest	  that	  plantation	  labourers	  were	  at	  
least	  equally	  concerned	  with	  improvement	  of	  their	  working	  and	  living	  conditions	  instead	  of	  engaging	  
for	  abstract	  things	  such	  as	  autonomy.	  Such	  allegiance	  to	  class-­‐struggle	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  labour	  
movement	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  Naxalite	  activities	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Such	  accounts	  also	  
suggest	  that	  the	  party-­‐affiliated	  labour	  unions	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  gaining	  political	  support.	  One	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  A	  report	  in	  the	  Times	  of	  India	  titled:	  “Darjeeling	  –	  Cindarella	  of	  Bengal”	  (ToI,	  12.6.1955)	  underlines	  that	  the	  
mood	  in	  Darjeeling	  at	  that	  time	  was	  already	  characterised	  by	  a	  feeling	  of	  governmental	  neglect	  and	  
discrimination.	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elder	  respondent	  stressed	  that	  local	  union	  leaders	  –	  regardless	  of	  party	  affiliation	  –	  would	  garner	  
respect	  and	  majority	  support	  if	  they	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  argue	  for	  improvement	  of	  working	  
conditions	  or	  workers’	  promotion	  to	  higher	  positions	  in	  the	  hierarchy.	  Another	  remembered	  that	  
while	  the	  AIGL	  preferred	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  “Gorkhas”,	  the	  communists	  stressed	  on	  rights	  
of	  “labours”.	  This	  points	  at	  the	  availability	  of	  both,	  ethnic	  and	  class-­‐consciousnesses.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  
argue	  that	  the	  continuous	  experience	  of	  oppression	  and	  exploitation	  at	  the	  plantations	  which	  were	  
run	  by	  non-­‐Nepalis,	  paired	  with	  the	  labour	  unions’	  promotion	  of	  new	  understandings	  about	  justice	  
and	  rights,	  increased	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐rule.	  This	  made	  it	  easy	  for	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  to	  
merge	  class	  consciousness	  with	  ethnic	  consciousness	  and	  frame	  the	  problem	  of	  economic	  inequality	  
in	  terms	  of	  ethnic	  discrimination,	  making	  it	  a	  powerful	  device	  to	  mobilise	  the	  masses.	  In	  the	  next	  
chapter	  I	  will	  show	  how	  his	  forceful	  promotion	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regionalist	  agenda	  since	  the	  1980s	  did	  
not	  only	  sideline	  this	  labour	  movement	  but	  also	  made	  the	  communist	  party	  nearly	  extinct	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  	  
Table	  4:	  Competitiveness	  of	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  elections	  from	  the	  Darjeeling	  hill	  constituencies.	  Source:	  
Lacina	  2014,	  based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  Election	  Commission	  
	   Darjeeling	   Kalimpong	   Kurseong/	  Jore	  Bungalow	  
Year	   Winner	   Margin	  (%)	   Winner	   Margin	  (%)	   Winner	   Margin	  (%)	  
1951	   AIGL/INC	   22	   CPI	   20	   AIGL/INC	   44	  
1957	   AIGL	   1.1	   Independent	   16	   CPI	   6.0	  
1962	   AIGL	   24	   AIGL	   20	   CPI	   0.60	  
1967	   AIGL	   19	   INC	   10	   AIGL	   17	  
1969	   AIGL	   15	   AIGL	   15	   AIGL	   0.86	  
1971	   AIGL	   18	   AIGL	   12	   CPI-­‐M	   1.5	  
1972	   AIGL	   17	   INC	   5.1	   AIGL	   3.6	  
1977	   AIGL	   11	   AIGL	   15	   INC	   0.47	  
1982*	   CPI-­‐M	   0.53	   AIGL	   32	   CPI-­‐M	   55	  
1987*	   CPI-­‐M	   84	   CPI	   84	   CPI-­‐M	   15	  
1991	   GNLF	   14	   GNLF	   39	   GNLF	   17	  
1996	   GNLF	   25	   GNLF	   37	   GNLF	   30	  
2001	   GNLF	   43	   GNLF	   28	   GNLF	   28	  
2006	   GNLF	   20	   GNLF	   25	   GNLF	   60	  
*Boycotted	  by	  GNLF	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3.4 Gorkhaland,	  chhyāsī,	  and	  the	  new	  political	  regime	  
Since	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  regional	  parties	  had	  scaled	  down	  demands	  for	  a	  total	  administrative	  
separation	  of	  Darjeeling	  from	  West	  Bengal	  to	  demands	  for	  “regional	  autonomy”	  under	  the	  State	  
which	  should	  ensure	  more	  representative	  regional	  governance.	  Electoral	  alliances	  between	  the	  AIGL	  
and	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  the	  State	  ensured	  the	  party	  posts	  in	  the	  government.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
1980s,	  the	  AIGL	  and	  the	  INC	  had	  strong	  bases	  in	  the	  urban	  areas,	  while	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  had	  built	  a	  solid	  
base	  in	  the	  tea	  plantations	  through	  their	  labour	  wing	  (Samanta	  2000,	  117).	  Political	  support	  bases	  
were,	  however,	  shifting.	  The	  death	  of	  the	  AIGL’s	  popular	  president	  D.P.	  Rai	  in	  1980,	  opened	  the	  
space	  for	  other	  parties	  to	  gain	  ground.	  Initially,	  the	  communists	  managed	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  and	  won	  the	  
national	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  in	  1980	  and	  1984,	  and	  even	  the	  MLA	  seat	  for	  the	  State	  Assembly	  from	  
Darjeeling	  in	  1982.	  This	  communist	  rise,	  however,	  was	  only	  for	  a	  short	  while,	  as	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
new	  organisations	  demanding	  territorial	  autonomy	  emerged.	  	  
The	  Pranta	  Parisad	  was	  the	  first	  organisation	  to	  take	  an	  uncompromising	  stand	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
separate	  State	  of	  “Gorkhaland”,	  and,	  thereby,	  attracted	  the	  more	  radical	  youth-­‐wing	  members	  of	  the	  
AIGL	  (Samanta	  2000).	  It	  was	  established	  in	  April	  1980	  (Subba	  1992,	  87)	  as	  a	  more	  militant	  
organisation	  compared	  to	  the	  AIGL.	  The	  famous	  writer	  Indra	  Bahadur	  Rai	  became	  the	  first	  president	  
and	  amongst	  its	  members	  were	  leaders	  from	  different	  parties	  (including	  the	  AIGL,	  DDCC),	  members	  
of	  the	  language	  movement,	  and	  intellectuals	  (Roy	  2012,	  364).	  In	  the	  1981	  memorandum	  to	  the	  Prime	  
Minister	  the	  Parishad	  demanded	  a	  separate	  State	  “comprising	  of	  the	  Nepali	  speaking	  region	  of	  North	  
Bengal”	  (memorandum,	  cited	  in:	  Moktan	  2004,	  143).	  The	  organisation	  however	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  
garner	  support	  outside	  the	  urban	  youth	  and	  students	  (Samanta	  2000,	  86)	  and	  its	  call	  for	  a	  vote	  
boycott	  in	  1982	  did	  not	  have	  much	  impact71.	  In	  the	  1984	  parliament	  elections,	  the	  Parishad	  
supported	  the	  INC	  expecting	  in	  return	  its	  support	  for	  the	  statehood	  demand.	  The	  Parishad’s	  early	  
decline	  in	  the	  mid-­‐80s	  is	  attributed	  to	  its	  heterogeneous	  membership.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  brought	  the	  
statehood	  issue	  back	  on	  Darjeeling’s	  political	  agenda.	  	  
In	  1986	  many	  active	  members	  joined	  the	  party	  that	  would	  lead	  Darjeeling	  to	  a	  violent	  struggle	  for	  
Gorkhaland,	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  (GNLF)	  (Samanta	  2000,	  86).	  The	  GNLF	  was	  founded	  
at	  around	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Pranta	  Parishad	  but	  it	  remained	  almost	  unknown	  in	  Darjeeling	  till	  the	  
mid-­‐1980s	  (Subba	  1992,	  187).	  Its	  founder	  Subash	  Ghisingh,	  who	  till	  today	  is	  perceived	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  controversial	  political	  leaders	  in	  Darjeeling,	  was	  born	  in	  1936	  near	  Mirik	  to	  tea	  workers.	  In	  1954	  
he	  joined	  the	  Indian	  Army,	  where	  he	  got	  involved	  in	  fighting	  the	  Naga	  upsurge	  in	  the	  Northeast	  of	  
the	  country.	  He	  claims	  that	  there	  he	  realised	  the	  importance	  of	  “fighting	  for	  a	  cause”	  (ToI,	  1.2.1987,	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  Except	  for	  Kalimpong	  where	  only	  32%	  voted.	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cited	  in:	  Lama	  1994,	  114).	  Upon	  returning	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	  1960,	  besides	  writing	  and	  publishing	  
novels,	  he	  got	  involved	  in	  politics.	  In	  1964,	  he	  became	  member	  of	  the	  AIGL	  youth	  wing	  (Tarun	  
Gorkha),	  and	  later	  organised	  the	  Congress-­‐I	  affiliated	  tea	  workers’	  union.	  With	  his	  1968	  established	  
Nilo	  Jhanda	  Party	  (the	  “blue-­‐flag”	  party),	  he	  forcefully	  occupied	  properties	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  (The	  
Week,	  June	  15-­‐21,	  1986,	  cited	  in:	  Lama	  1994,	  38	  ff.).	  In	  1977,	  he	  unsuccessfully	  contested	  elections	  
from	  Darjeeling	  constituency.	  Although	  Ghisingh,	  too,	  was	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  Pranta	  
Parishad	  he	  left	  the	  organisation	  due	  to	  differences	  with	  the	  other	  leaders	  and	  started	  the	  GNLF.	  
Initially	  Ghisingh	  sent	  letters	  and	  memoranda	  demanding	  Gorkhaland	  to	  the	  head	  of	  states	  of	  India,	  
Nepal,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations,	  giving	  his	  demand	  an	  international	  dimension	  from	  the	  
beginning.	  Initial	  calls	  to	  boycott	  the	  municipal	  and	  parliamentary	  elections	  between	  1980	  and	  1984	  
did	  not	  receive	  much	  response,	  and	  only	  since	  1985	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  led	  government	  paid	  more	  attention	  
to	  him	  (Samanta	  2000,	  116).	  	  
I	  now	  display	  the	  factors	  which	  helped	  Ghisingh	  to	  ascend	  to	  a	  powerful,	  loved,	  and	  equally	  feared	  
leader	  for	  the	  next	  decades.	  
3.4.1 Gaining	  majority	  
Ghisingh	  is	  certainly	  a	  grown	  politician.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  more	  or	  less	  started	  the	  GNLF	  from	  scratch	  
and	  to	  make	  it	  a	  majority	  party	  against	  the	  established	  Congress,	  AIGL,	  and	  CPI/CPI-­‐M	  in	  Darjeeling	  
underlines	  his	  impressive	  capability	  to	  mobilise	  people.	  A	  review	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  ’86	  agitation	  
uncovers	  four	  factors	  that	  help	  explaining	  the	  public	  appeal	  of	  the	  GNLF:	  (i)	  the	  argumentative	  
framing	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand,	  (ii)	  Ghisingh’s	  vocal	  strength	  and	  style	  of	  leadership,	  (iii)	  the	  
organisational	  strength	  of	  the	  GNLF	  including	  its	  ability	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  grassroots,	  and	  (iv)	  the	  
violent	  intimidation	  of	  rivals	  and	  dissenting	  voices.	  I	  argue	  that	  together,	  these	  factors	  did	  not	  only	  
make	  the	  GNLF	  to	  a	  dominant	  party	  but	  also	  made	  Gorkha	  ethnicity	  a	  defining	  trait	  of	  people’s	  
subjectivities.	  In	  reviewing	  the	  GNLF’s	  rise	  to	  and	  maintenance	  of	  its	  power,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  initially	  
introduced	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  (i.e.	  legitimacy,	  co-­‐optation,	  
repression)	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  
Framing	  Gorkhaland	  and	  vocal	  strength	  	  
The	  Pranta	  Parishad	  and	  the	  GNLF	  were	  both	  established	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  economic	  decline	  in	  the	  
tea	  plantations	  including	  the	  closure	  of	  gardens72,	  labour	  unrest	  and	  unemployment	  (Datta	  1991)	  
added	  to	  people’s	  grievances.	  These	  were	  exaggerated	  by	  comparisons	  to	  the	  northern	  State	  of	  
Sikkim	  (what	  Subba	  (1989,	  114)	  termed	  “transferred	  jealousy”).	  In	  1975,	  the	  former	  Kingdom	  of	  
Sikkim	  had	  become	  part	  of	  the	  Indian	  Union	  and	  –	  supported	  by	  generous	  financial	  support	  of	  the	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  Twelve	  of	  the	  84	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  had	  remained	  closed	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central	  government	  –	  observed	  a	  rapid	  development.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Darjeeling	  the	  perceived	  
nepotism	  in	  government	  hiring	  practices	  privileging	  Bengalis	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  employment	  
opportunities	  forced	  educated	  Gorkha	  youth	  to	  migrate	  to	  the	  plains	  in	  search	  of	  work.	  
Unemployment	  also	  entailed	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  abuse.	  All	  this	  added	  to	  
environmental	  degradation.	  The	  West	  Bengal	  government	  appeared	  to	  be	  “remote,	  opaque	  and	  
unaccountable	  to	  the	  local	  people	  in	  Darjeeling”	  (Ganguly	  2005).	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  economic	  crisis,	  in	  1979–80,	  news	  of	  the	  expulsion	  of	  ethnic	  Nepalis	  from	  Assam	  
and	  Manipur	  reached	  Darjeeling.	  This	  and	  the	  inaction	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  in	  this	  issue	  
sparked	  fears	  of	  possible	  evictions	  from	  Darjeeling,	  too.	  It	  reminded	  the	  Gorkhas	  of	  their	  insecure	  
position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Indian	  state	  expressed	  in	  doubts	  over	  their	  recognised	  national	  belonging	  and	  
citizenship	  (Datta	  1991;	  Dasgupta	  1999;	  Ganguly	  2005).	  Despite	  being	  Indian	  citizens,	  they	  were	  
afraid	  that	  due	  to	  their	  relations	  to	  Nepal	  they,	  too,	  could	  be	  evicted.	  Ghisingh	  emerged	  as	  a	  leader	  
during	  this	  perceived	  crisis,	  which	  created	  insecurity	  in	  both,	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  terms.	  
Ghisingh’s	  argumentative	  clue	  lay	  in	  the	  way	  he	  combined	  the	  statehood	  demand	  with	  the	  
citizenship	  and	  identity	  issue	  that	  it	  played	  upon	  such	  fear	  and	  uncertainty	  of	  the	  Nepalis	  (Samanta	  
2000,	  113).	  He	  suggested	  that	  the	  Gorkhas’	  interests	  were	  no	  longer	  safe	  with	  the	  West	  Bengal	  
government	  (Datta	  1991,	  228).	  Thus,	  while	  the	  Pranta	  Parishad	  still	  formulated	  the	  demand	  for	  
statehood	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  representation,	  Ghisingh	  addressed	  people’s	  fears	  of	  being	  branded	  as	  
“foreigners”	  and	  of	  disownment	  (Subba	  1992,	  101;	  Samanta	  2000,	  117).	  He	  gave	  the	  Nepali’s	  feeling	  
of	  insecurity	  and	  doubts	  of	  national	  belonging,	  which	  had	  lingered	  upon	  them	  since	  the	  colonial	  time,	  
a	  new	  frame	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  “identity	  crisis”,	  and	  blended	  it	  with	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda.	  He	  
established	  the	  myth	  that	  only	  a	  separate	  State	  could	  give	  the	  Gorkhas	  their	  “Indian	  identity”.	  	  
Generally,	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  describes	  the	  Gorkhas’	  perceived	  stigmatisation	  as	  citizens	  of	  Nepal	  
and	  lack	  of	  recognition	  as	  genuine	  Indian	  citizens.	  This	  perception	  translates	  into	  fears	  of	  possible	  
eviction	  from	  their	  home.	  Middleton	  (2013b)	  describes	  such	  “anxieties	  of	  belonging”	  as	  expressions	  
of	  “people	  seeking,	  yet	  perennially	  denied,	  their	  place	  in	  the	  nation	  state”,	  and	  as	  “collective	  
embodiments”	  of	  crisis	  and	  uncertainty	  (ibid.	  609).	  
Ghisingh	  identified	  the	  1950	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  and	  Friendship	  between	  Nepal	  and	  India	  as	  the	  core	  
reason	  for	  the	  confusion	  about	  national	  belonging.	  This	  bilateral	  treaty	  allows	  citizens	  of	  India	  and	  
Nepal	  both	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  other’s	  country	  and	  conduct	  business	  without	  needing	  a	  visa.	  Ghisingh	  
(and	  also	  today’s	  advocates	  of	  Gorkhaland)	  argued	  that	  this	  unrestricted	  movement	  and	  settlement	  
of	  the	  linguistically	  and	  ethnically	  similar	  Nepalese	  citizens	  in	  India	  (and	  Darjeeling)	  created	  confusion	  
about	  the	  Indian	  Gorkhas’	  nationality,	  and	  gave	  the	  impression	  that	  they,	  too,	  were	  from	  Nepal.	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Accordingly,	  he	  advocated	  for	  an	  abrogation	  of	  the	  treaty.	  Contrary	  to	  attempts	  of	  the	  Indian	  
government	  and	  the	  media	  to	  couch	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  in	  terms	  of	  developmental	  grievances,	  
Ghisingh	  prioritised	  these	  identity-­‐issues	  and	  clearly	  denied	  any	  “economic	  content”.	  In	  the	  August	  
1986	  issue	  of	  the	  popular	  Indian	  journal	  Frontline,	  he	  clarified:	  
We	  don’t	  want	  any	  ‘hill	  development’.	  We	  don’t	  want	  our	  roads	  to	  be	  paved	  with	  gold.	  [...]	  We	  are	  
prepared	  to	  go	  hungry	  but	  we	  are	  determined	  to	  have	  Gorkhaland.	  […]	  Our	  voice	  is	  not	  against	  any	  
economic	  mismanagement	  of	  allocated	  funds	  or	  for	  more	  money	  or	  for	  creation	  of	  more	  jobs.	  We	  demand	  
Gorkhaland	  to	  ensure	  and	  protect	  our	  Indian	  identity.	  (Subash	  Ghisingh	  in	  Frontline	  1986,	  August,	  cited	  in:	  
Lama	  1994,	  52)	  
The	  utilisation	  of	  humorous	  local	  idioms	  in	  speeches,	  the	  blending	  of	  “somewhat	  superstitious	  beliefs	  
with	  clever	  distortions	  of	  history”	  (Samanta	  2000,	  114),	  and	  his	  “mystic	  touch”	  helped	  Ghisingh	  to	  
spread	  his	  message	  and	  gain	  respect	  amongst	  the	  masses	  (ibid.).	  More	  worldly	  promises	  also	  had	  an	  
appeal	  to	  the	  populace,	  including	  the	  assurance	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  unemployment	  would	  be	  
resolved	  if	  Gorkhaland	  became	  a	  reality.	  This,	  especially,	  appealed	  to	  the	  unemployed	  youth	  who	  
believed	  that	  the	  dominance	  of	  “outsiders”	  in	  governmental	  positions	  and	  other	  higher	  positions	  was	  
a	  hurdle	  for	  getting	  jobs	  (Timsina	  1992,	  54,	  60).	  Thus,	  the	  GNLF	  built	  a	  strong	  base	  amongst	  the	  
emerging	  non-­‐urban	  educated	  middle-­‐classes	  of	  the	  district	  (Subba	  1989,	  138).73	  	  
Organisational	  strength	  and	  intimidation	  
To	  spread	  his	  message	  Ghisingh	  engaged	  in	  intense	  work	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  The	  establishment	  
of	  local	  units	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  recordings	  of	  his	  speech	  held	  on	  2.6.1985	  in	  Kurseong	  town	  in	  
forms	  of	  cassettes	  allowed	  Ghisingh	  to	  reach	  each	  and	  every	  settlement	  in	  the	  hills	  and	  had	  a	  
remarkable	  effect	  on	  mobilisation	  (Samanta	  2000,	  117;	  Kidan	  Lepcha,	  interview,	  21.4.2012).	  After	  
1985,	  frontal	  organisations	  including	  labour	  unions	  and	  women’s	  wings	  united	  different	  categories	  of	  
followers	  under	  the	  single	  thread,	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  69)74.	  One	  of	  them,	  the	  
Gorkha	  Volunteers’	  Cell	  (GVC)	  led	  by	  Chattrey	  Subba,	  who	  later	  became	  one	  of	  Ghisingh’s	  rivals,	  
became	  the	  underground	  militant	  force	  of	  the	  party75.	  Financially,	  the	  party	  was	  supported	  by	  
donations	  from	  rich	  Nepalese	  merchants	  and	  “donations”	  (taxes)	  from	  households	  (Kaushik	  2013,	  63)	  
as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  tea	  planters	  who	  hoped	  to	  break	  the	  communists’	  unions	  (Besky	  2013,	  145).	  Some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  This	  rhetoric	  was	  expressed	  in	  Ghisingh’s	  public	  speeches	  as	  well	  as	  on	  posters	  saying:	  “We	  are	  stateless.	  We	  
are	  constitutionally	  tortured	  all	  over	  India.	  We	  want	  our	  administration,	  return	  our	  land	  from	  Bengal.	  Our	  
future	  is	  in	  great	  danger.	  It	  is	  better	  to	  die	  than	  to	  live	  as	  a	  slave.	  All	  are,	  therefore,	  required	  to	  fight	  for	  
Gorkhaland”	  (cited	  in:	  Datta	  1991,	  228).	  
74	  These	  were	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Women’s	  organization	  (GNWO),	  Gorkha	  National	  Youth	  Front	  (GNYF),	  
Gorkha	  National	  Students’	  Front	  (GNSF),	  Gorkha	  Volunteers’	  Cell	  (GVC),	  Gorkha	  Liberation	  Welfare	  
Organisation	  (GWOP),	  and	  Gorkha	  National	  Ex-­‐Servicemen’s	  Organisation	  (GNEO)	  (S.	  Sarkar	  2013,	  69).	  
75	  Rumours	  have	  it	  that	  its	  activists	  undertook	  training	  with	  militant	  groups	  of	  the	  North	  East	  such	  as	  the	  
United	  Liberation	  Front	  of	  Assam,	  National	  Socialist	  Council	  of	  Nagaland,	  and	  People’s	  Liberation	  army	  of	  
Mizoram	  (Datta	  1991,	  230).	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claim	  that	  Ghisingh	  received	  considerable	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  Nepalese	  government	  that	  
allegedly	  used	  the	  uproar	  to	  ignore	  Indian	  government’s	  pressure	  regarding	  the	  Madheshi	  settlers	  in	  
the	  Nepalese	  Terai	  (Dasgupta	  1999;	  Kaushik	  2013;	  Bagchi	  2012)76.	  Others	  believe	  that	  the	  GNLF	  was	  
sponsored	  by	  the	  INC	  in	  order	  to	  create	  unrest	  in	  the	  Left	  Front-­‐led	  West	  Bengal	  State	  (Kohli	  1997b)	  
thus	  using	  the	  movement	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  electoral	  majorities	  (Subba	  1992;	  
Ganguly	  2005).	  	  
The	  GNLF’s	  black-­‐flag	  demonstration	  on	  5.4.1986	  that	  drew	  an	  immense	  following	  marked	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  violent	  agitation	  (or	  chhyāsī	  in	  people’s	  political	  time).	  The	  display	  of	  khukurīs	  (long	  
Gorkha	  knifes)	  functioned	  as	  a	  symbol	  for	  violent	  retaliation	  (Dasgupta	  1999,	  Samanta	  2000,	  118)	  
and	  reminded	  of	  the	  colonial	  ascriptions	  of	  the	  vīr	  (brave)	  Gorkha.	  In	  addition,	  bandhs	  (general	  
strikes),	  election,	  and	  tax	  boycotts	  were	  clearly	  directed	  against	  the	  State	  government	  (Samanta	  
2000,	  119)77.	  The	  GNLF’s	  anger	  was	  mainly	  directed	  against	  the	  members	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  in	  Darjeeling	  
who	  opposed	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  This	  rendered	  the	  tea	  plantations,	  where	  the	  communists	  
had	  a	  considerable	  hold,	  battle	  zones	  between	  pro	  and	  anti-­‐Gorkhaland	  forces.	  Those,	  who	  did	  not	  
surrender,	  saw	  their	  houses	  burned	  and	  many	  had	  to	  flee	  the	  hills	  (Subba	  1992).	  Even	  doubts	  about	  
one’s	  political	  affiliation	  could	  become	  a	  question	  of	  life	  and	  death.	  The	  GNLF	  also	  called	  for	  “social	  
boycotts”	  of	  rivals,	  a	  practice	  of	  complete	  social	  isolation	  from	  the	  community	  which	  strangles	  
livelihoods	  in	  the	  close-­‐knit	  interdependent	  society	  (Kaushik	  2013,	  62)78.	  Importantly,	  Subba	  
describes	  how	  ideological	  as	  well	  as	  personal	  grievances	  and	  distrust	  between	  the	  former	  
AIGL/Congress	  and	  communist	  members	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  violence	  (Subba	  1992,	  149).	  
Once,	  the	  AIGL’s	  influence	  began	  to	  wane	  in	  Darjeeling,	  CPI-­‐M	  cadres,	  who	  had	  been	  looked	  down	  
upon	  as	  “illiterates”	  and	  “idiots”,	  began	  to	  treat	  the	  Congress	  and	  AIGL	  supporters	  in	  similar	  terms	  
(Subba	  1992,	  126).	  Subba	  also	  points	  at	  social	  stratifications	  across	  the	  hill	  society,	  including	  divisions	  
between	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas,	  between	  the	  sub-­‐divisions,	  and	  between	  villages,	  expressing	  notions	  
of	  superiority	  and	  inferiority	  (ibid.	  150),	  which	  underlines	  that	  the	  Gorkhas	  –	  even	  in	  1986	  –	  were	  far	  
from	  being	  a	  united	  community.	  	  
The	  GNLF	  increasingly	  established	  its	  authority	  and	  even	  created	  its	  own	  “Gorkha	  Police	  Force”,	  
which	  acted	  as	  the	  law	  enforcing	  authority	  of	  Ghisingh’s	  unofficial	  government	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhoumik	  
2000,	  33).	  GNLF	  orders	  became	  binding	  on	  government	  employees	  and	  transport	  operators	  (ibid.).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Madhesi	  refers	  to	  ethnically	  Indian	  Nepalese	  citizens	  residing	  in	  the	  lower	  lands	  of	  Nepal.	  They	  are	  often	  
accussed	  to	  be	  Indian	  and	  not	  Nepalese	  citizens	  by	  other	  Nepalis.	  	  
77	  The	  72-­‐hours	  bandh	  called	  by	  the	  GNLF	  in	  May	  1986	  observed	  an	  outburst	  of	  violence	  between	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  
GNLF	  supporters	  (Ganguly	  2005).	  The	  police	  firing	  at	  GNLF	  demonstration	  in	  Kalimpong	  on	  27.7.1986,	  where	  
the	  1950	  Indo-­‐Nepal	  treaty	  was	  burned,	  added	  fuel	  to	  the	  circle	  of	  attacks	  and	  counter-­‐attacks	  (Subba	  1992).	  
78	  Socially	  boycotted	  persons	  were	  refused	  transport,	  support	  during	  social	  events	  such	  as	  weddings	  or	  
funerals,	  and	  shops	  would	  not	  sell	  goods	  to	  them.	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Elected	  representatives	  to	  local	  and	  district	  level	  governmental	  bodies	  resigned	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhoumik	  
2000,	  34).	  The	  GNLF	  did	  not	  only	  levy	  taxes	  on	  Darjeeling’s	  residents	  but	  from	  May	  1988	  also	  urged	  
each	  family	  to	  give	  at	  least	  one	  male	  member	  for	  their	  do-­‐or-­‐die	  struggle	  (Samanta	  2000;	  Kaushik	  
2013,	  63).	  	  
3.4.2 State	  response	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  CPI-­‐M-­‐led	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government	  became	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  increasing	  
mobilisation	  in	  the	  hills.	  In	  1985,	  Darjeeling’s	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  (MP)	  Ananda	  Pathak	  introduced	  
a	  private	  member	  bill	  in	  the	  Parliament	  demanding	  regional	  autonomy	  for	  Darjeeling.	  But	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  bill	  was	  from	  the	  beginning	  determined	  to	  fail	  due	  to	  the	  majority	  relations	  in	  the	  Parliament	  
only	  increased	  the	  perception	  amongst	  the	  Nepalis	  that	  the	  government	  was	  not	  treating	  them	  
honestly	  (Subba	  1992).	  Faced	  with	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  increasing	  GNLF	  influence,	  the	  State	  
government	  called	  paramilitary	  forces	  (i.e.	  the	  Central	  Reserve	  Police	  Force	  (CRPF),	  Border	  Security	  
Force,	  and	  the	  State	  Armed	  Police).	  The	  period	  from	  November	  1986	  until	  April	  1987	  was	  
characterised	  by	  a	  countermovement	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  state-­‐backed	  CPI-­‐M	  activists	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  
73).	  To	  counter	  the	  GNLF,	  they	  established	  camps	  with	  the	  support	  of	  nearby	  police	  posts	  in	  strategic	  
locations,	  including	  Sonada,	  Chongtong	  in	  Pulbazaar,	  Margret’s	  Hope,	  and	  Ringtang	  tea	  estates	  
(Samanta	  2000,	  128),	  places	  that	  till	  today	  have	  a	  considerable	  communist	  following.	  It	  is	  this	  period	  
which	  people	  commonly	  associate	  with	  chhyāsī,	  full	  of	  horrible	  memories	  of	  rape,	  murders,	  
beheaded	  bodies,	  nightly	  police	  raids,	  and	  hardship	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  mobility	  and	  lack	  of	  food	  
supplies.	  	  
Only	  after	  June	  1987	  (Sarkar	  2013)	  both	  the	  State	  and	  the	  central	  governments	  took	  a	  more	  
accommodating	  approach	  towards	  the	  movement.	  Ghisingh	  was	  called	  for	  talks	  to	  Delhi	  in	  January	  
1987,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  solution	  of	  the	  conflict	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  autonomous	  council	  
was	  first	  introduced	  in	  September	  of	  that	  year.	  It	  would,	  however,	  take	  one	  more	  year	  of	  violent	  
agitation	  topped	  by	  a	  40-­‐day-­‐long	  bandh	  until	  an	  agreement	  was	  signed	  in	  August	  1988,	  paving	  the	  
way	  for	  the	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  (DGHC).	  This	  was	  protested	  by	  the	  militant	  factions	  within	  
the	  GNLF,	  also	  because	  none	  of	  the	  demanded	  areas	  in	  the	  Dooars	  was	  included	  under	  the	  council.	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  Gorkhas’	  Indian	  citizenship	  was,	  however,	  not	  completely	  forgotten,	  as	  Ghisingh	  
pursued	  PM	  Rajiv	  Gandhi	  to	  notify	  the	  citizenship	  of	  all	  Indian	  Gorkhas,	  who	  had	  come	  to	  India	  prior	  
January	  26,	  195079.	  Many	  authors	  accuse	  both	  the	  centre	  and	  the	  State	  governments	  for	  their	  late	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  The	  Gazette	  notification	  (23.8.1988)	  reads:	  “every	  Gorkha	  who	  was	  domiciled	  in	  the	  territories	  that	  on	  26	  
January	  1950	  […]	  became	  the	  territory	  of	  India	  […]	  and	  who	  was	  either	  born	  in	  that	  territory	  or	  had	  been	  
ordinarily	  resident	  in	  that	  territory	  for	  not	  less	  than	  five	  years	  before	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  Indian	  
Constitution	  shall	  be	  a	  citizen	  of	  India”	  (cited	  in:	  Ganguly	  2005,	  489,	  499).	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response	  to	  the	  movement,	  alleging	  them	  of	  utilising	  it	  for	  their	  political	  manoeuvres	  (Datta	  1991;	  
Subba	  1992;	  Samanta	  2000;	  Ganguly	  2005).	  
3.4.3 Dissent	  and	  fractures	  
During	  the	  agitation	  the	  communists	  were	  the	  only	  group	  that	  openly	  opposed	  Ghisingh.	  Other	  
groups,	  including	  the	  Pranta	  Parishad,	  the	  AIGL	  and	  the	  DDCC,	  soon	  lend	  their	  support	  to	  Ghisingh,	  
although	  the	  DDCC	  suggested	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Union	  Territory	  instead	  of	  a	  separate	  State	  in	  May	  
1988	  (Subba	  1992,	  176).	  The	  GNLF	  activists	  mainly	  consisted	  of	  unemployed	  youth	  and	  ex-­‐
servicemen,	  underlining	  the	  militant	  direction	  while	  intellectuals	  were	  ousted	  after	  they	  started	  
raising	  soft	  critique	  against	  Ghisingh’s	  line	  of	  action	  (Samanta	  2000,	  120;	  Subba	  1992,	  34).	  Ghisingh	  
held	  unlimited	  power	  to	  make	  or	  unmake	  any	  committees	  (including	  district	  and	  local	  village	  
committees)	  (Samanta	  2000;	  119)	  and	  regularly	  reshuffled	  the	  party	  ranks	  (ibid.	  130).	  His	  agreement	  
on	  the	  DGHC,	  however,	  did	  not	  go	  unchallenged	  within	  the	  party,	  and	  splits	  emerged	  between	  the	  
more	  militant	  and	  modest	  factions80.	  	  
Chattrey	  Subba	  whose	  GVC	  had	  become	  an	  own	  organisation	  in	  the	  GNLF,	  and	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  –	  both	  
from	  Kalimpong	  –	  openly	  challenged	  Ghisingh	  in	  the	  DGHC	  elections.	  Also	  the	  masses	  did	  not	  seem	  
to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  Ghisingh.	  At	  a	  meeting	  in	  Kalimpong	  in	  November	  1989,	  he	  was	  openly	  criticised	  
when	  he	  –	  meanwhile	  elected	  DGHC	  chairman	  and	  entitled	  to	  State	  security	  –	  appeared	  
accompanied	  by	  the	  hated	  CRPF	  forces.	  Subba	  (1992,	  192)	  concluded:	  “He	  was	  not	  really	  the	  leader	  
the	  people	  had	  in	  mind.	  The	  masses	  supported	  the	  demand,	  not	  Ghisingh,	  and	  the	  issue	  but	  not	  
him”.	  
3.4.4 Chhyāsī	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  silence	  	  
In	  retrospect,	  the	  GNLF	  movement	  did	  not	  only	  bring	  the	  demand	  of	  statehood	  to	  the	  national	  
agenda	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  an	  autonomous	  council	  for	  the	  three	  hill-­‐subdivisions.	  It	  also	  
established	  the	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  bases	  for	  the	  single-­‐party	  hegemony	  which	  continues	  till	  
today:	  First,	  the	  movement	  succeeded	  in	  installing	  a	  firm	  belief	  that	  only	  a	  separate	  State	  could	  
address	  the	  perceived	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  crises,	  expressed	  in	  anxieties	  about	  recognised	  
national	  belonging/citizenship,	  and	  developmental	  grievances.	  The	  main	  aspect	  of	  this	  was	  the	  
formulation	  of	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  which	  till	  1980s	  was	  merely	  an	  undercurrent	  but	  not	  yet	  
outspoken	  and	  was	  brought	  into	  a	  direct	  relationship	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  separate	  State	  and	  the	  
citizenship	  question.	  Ghisingh	  connected	  these	  issues	  through	  a	  new	  frame	  of	  Gorkhaland	  which	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Some	  of	  the	  militant	  leaders	  had	  sizable	  armed	  underground	  followings	  (Samanta	  2000,	  120)	  and	  their	  
conflicts	  were	  mirrored	  in	  turf-­‐wars	  over	  towns.	  Kalimpong	  for	  instance	  was	  divided	  into	  GNLF	  and	  GVC	  camps	  
in	  the	  East	  and	  the	  West	  of	  the	  town	  (Subba	  1992,	  144).	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so	  appealing	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  problems	  and	  as	  a	  solution	  that	  people	  accepted	  the	  tyranny	  of	  
bandhs,	  violence,	  and	  the	  silencing	  of	  their	  voices.	  Ghisingh	  designed	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  powerful	  
normative	  frame	  which	  helped	  him	  legitimise	  his	  authority.	  	  
Second,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  ethnic	  identity	  gained	  a	  prime	  position	  as	  the	  defining	  
trait	  of	  people’s	  subjectivities.	  This	  ethnic	  consciousness	  combined	  both,	  positive	  formulations	  (in	  
terms	  of	  distinct	  culture,	  language,	  braveness)	  and	  negative	  formulations	  (as	  lack	  of	  governmental	  
recognition,	  developmental	  backwardness).	  Reference	  to	  the	  image	  of	  the	  vīr	  (brave)	  Gorkha	  helped	  
Ghisingh	  to	  mobilise	  the	  masses	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  perceived	  ethnic-­‐based	  government	  
discrimination.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  ethnic	  identity,	  coupled	  with	  a	  fight	  against	  the	  statehood-­‐opposing	  
members	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  eventually	  subsumed	  class-­‐consciousness	  in	  the	  tea	  plantations	  and	  tied	  
demands	  for	  labour	  justice	  and	  rights	  to	  the	  overshadowing	  idea	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  (cf.	  Chettri	  
2013).	  Thereby	  the	  Gorkhaland	  dream	  sidelined	  any	  alternative	  solutions	  for	  people’s	  grievances,	  
and	  ways	  to	  negotiate	  demands	  with	  the	  state.	  Against	  this	  background	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  
tea-­‐labour	  question	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  unemployment	  or	  other	  developmental	  
grievances)	  never	  figured	  in	  any	  GNLF	  programmes	  or	  the	  DGHC	  agreement	  (cf.	  Besky	  2014,	  170).	  
Instead,	  the	  GNLF-­‐agitation	  established	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  mood	  which	  prevails	  in	  Darjeeling	  till	  
today.	  
The	  sidelining	  of	  the	  labour	  or	  other	  alternative	  discourses	  was	  supported	  through	  the	  violent	  
silencing	  of	  dissenting	  voices.	  Social	  boycotts,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  violence,	  rape,	  and	  murder	  
committed	  by	  both	  sides	  in	  the	  conflict,	  instilled	  what	  some	  in	  Darjeeling	  call	  a	  “fear	  psychosis”.	  This	  
nurtured	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  belonging	  to	  the	  majority	  would	  ensure	  peace	  and	  personal	  security.	  
People’s	  apprehensions	  towards	  multi-­‐party	  villages,	  which	  I	  often	  discovered	  during	  my	  field	  work,	  
clearly	  express	  the	  (experienced)	  equation	  of	  multi-­‐party	  system	  and	  violence.	  Subba	  describes	  this	  
silencing	  with	  the	  term	  “chorused	  thinking”:	  if	  one	  party	  “says	  something	  the	  followers	  seldom	  
dispute	  among	  themselves	  and	  seldom	  allow	  others	  to	  dispute	  the	  sacred	  truth”	  (Subba	  1992,	  15).	  
Although	  Ghisingh	  had	  announced	  that	  once	  Gorkhaland	  was	  attained,	  all	  parties	  could	  openly	  
practise	  their	  ideologies	  (Subba	  1992,	  127),	  the	  GNLF	  objected	  the	  participation	  of	  other	  political	  
parties	  in	  the	  DGHC	  polls	  (Kaushik	  2013,	  139).	  This	  underlines	  its	  approach	  of	  leaving	  no	  space	  for	  
any	  opposition	  (ibid.	  178)	  (see	  Chapter	  3.5).	  Samanta	  notes	  that	  the	  movement	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  
means	  to	  “terrorise	  people	  into	  submission	  and	  for	  liquidating	  the	  opponents”	  (Samanta	  2000,	  135).	  
The	  term	  chhyāsī	  in	  political	  time	  expresses	  these	  memories	  of	  violence	  and	  hardship	  endured	  during	  
the	  agitation,	  which	  remain	  part	  of	  the	  collective	  memory	  in	  Darjeeling	  till	  today.	  	  
Thus,	  it	  is	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  ethnic	  Gorkhaland	  discourse	  in	  people’s	  subjectivities	  combined	  with	  
violent	  oppression	  through	  the	  dominant	  party,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	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firm	  dominant-­‐party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  after	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  DGHC	  in	  1988	  this	  regime	  would	  be	  sustained	  through	  the	  active	  support	  of	  the	  
West	  Bengal	  government.	  	  	  
	  
3.5 Ghisinghko	  pālo	  and	  institutionalised	  authoritarianism	  	  
The	  tripartite	  agreement	  between	  the	  GNLF,	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State,	  and	  the	  central	  government	  on	  
the	  DGHC	  was	  signed	  in	  August	  1988.	  The	  first	  elections	  to	  the	  autonomous	  council	  covering	  
Darjeeling	  hill	  sub-­‐divisions	  were	  held	  in	  December.	  Despite	  the	  internal	  critiques	  and	  the	  public	  
disappointment,	  the	  GNLF	  won	  26	  of	  the	  28	  seats	  of	  the	  council.	  The	  remaining	  seats	  were	  taken	  by	  
the	  CPI-­‐M81.	  The	  council	  was	  given	  authority	  over	  various	  areas	  including	  agriculture,	  public	  health,	  
sanitation,	  hospitals,	  tourism,	  public	  works,	  roads,	  transport,	  water,	  and	  education	  (Kaushik	  2009).	  
The	  remaining	  areas,	  including	  the	  economically	  important	  tea	  and	  timber	  remained	  under	  the	  
control	  of	  the	  State	  government	  and	  continued	  to	  be	  implemented	  by	  the	  District	  Magistrate.	  Yet,	  
the	  total	  financial	  dependence	  on	  the	  State	  and	  central	  governments,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  legislative	  
power,	  entailed	  questions	  of	  the	  council’s	  de	  facto	  autonomy.	  A	  third	  of	  the	  members	  was	  
nominated	  (Chakrabarty	  2005).	  In	  view	  of	  these	  shortcomings,	  some	  claim	  that	  the	  DGHC	  had	  barely	  
more	  powers	  than	  a	  district-­‐level	  zilla	  parishad	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  (Subba	  1992,	  189;	  Ganguly	  2005,	  
497).	  Politically,	  though,	  the	  DGHC	  entailed	  drastic	  changes	  concerning	  the	  bases	  of	  political	  
authority,	  structures	  of	  governance,	  and	  the	  GNLF	  leaders’	  relation	  to	  the	  State	  government.	  	  
Ghisingh	  had	  to	  transform	  from	  a	  leader	  of	  an	  armed	  agitation	  to	  an	  elected	  representative.	  Instead	  
of	  violently	  fighting	  the	  state,	  the	  council	  agreement	  forced	  him	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  previous	  
enemy.	  And	  instead	  of	  deriving	  his	  legitimacy	  from	  promoting	  a	  radical	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda,	  he	  
now	  had	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  developmental	  front.	  How	  did	  Ghisingh	  manage	  to	  rule	  for	  the	  coming	  20	  
years?	  Drawing	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  DGHC	  with	  accounts	  of	  interviews,	  I	  show	  that	  
different	  forms	  of	  repression	  and	  political	  patronage	  were	  as	  crucial	  as	  the	  support	  of	  the	  State	  
government.	  	  
3.5.1 Soft	  and	  hard	  repression	  
The	  establishment	  of	  the	  council	  forced	  the	  GNLF	  leaders	  to	  derive	  their	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  
successful	  distribution	  of	  welfare	  and	  employment	  instead	  of	  drawing	  on	  the	  normative	  Gorkhaland	  
demand.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  had	  to	  compensate	  their	  loss	  of	  normative	  legitimacy	  (based	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  The	  two	  CPI-­‐M	  constituencies	  were	  Bijanbari	  and	  Rishiheat,	  places	  that	  till	  today	  are	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
“red	  belt”	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
Historical	  legacies	  of	  authoritarian	  rule:	  Politics	  of	  pre	  and	  post-­‐Independence	  
90	  
	  
Gorkhaland	  demand)	  by	  investing	  in	  factual	  measures	  (cf.	  Karateke	  2005).	  This	  was	  difficult,	  as	  since	  
the	  GNLF	  foundation	  Ghisingh	  had	  based	  his	  rhetoric	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Gorkhas’	  Indian	  citizenship	  
and	  identity	  only,	  and	  defied	  attempts	  of	  the	  national	  government	  and	  media	  to	  couch	  it	  in	  
developmental	  terms.	  But	  instead	  of	  providing	  promised	  “swimming	  pools	  on	  the	  roofs”	  and	  “streets	  
of	  gold”,	  as	  people	  recall,	  the	  DGHC’s	  reign	  was	  characterised	  by	  corruption	  scams,	  the	  failure	  of	  
envisaged	  projects,	  and	  the	  incapability	  of	  the	  council	  to	  address	  pressing	  problems	  such	  as	  water	  
supply	  and	  unemployment	  (Ganguly	  2005).	  	  
Thus,	  instead	  of	  garnering	  factual	  legitimacy	  (cf.	  Karateke	  2005),	  various	  studies	  and	  accounts	  
underline	  how	  Ghisingh	  began	  to	  utilise	  the	  council	  as	  a	  means	  for	  soft	  repression.	  The	  DGHC	  
facilitated	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  so-­‐called	  “money	  power”	  and	  political	  patronage82.	  Ghisingh	  
used	  the	  council	  to	  issue	  developmental	  contracts	  to	  hand-­‐selected	  party	  activists	  and	  contractors	  
who	  formed	  the	  new	  elite.	  He	  also	  stabilised	  his	  presidential	  position	  through	  selecting	  candidates	  to	  
contest	  the	  elections	  for	  councillor-­‐positions	  in	  the	  DGHC.	  Ghisingh	  himself	  held	  a	  firm	  position	  at	  
the	  top-­‐end	  of	  this	  clientelist	  hierarchy	  and	  was	  regularly	  criticised	  for	  his	  “one-­‐man	  decisions”	  (Niraj	  
Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Various	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  rivals	  or	  those	  who	  did	  not	  obey	  orders	  
were	  excluded	  from	  the	  benefits,	  rendering	  development	  a	  disciplinary	  tool	  for	  controlling	  space	  and	  
people,	  a	  practice	  I	  explore	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  GJM	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  
Ghisingh’s	  orders	  even	  concerned	  the	  religious	  and	  cultural	  realms.	  In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  new	  
millennium,	  Ghisingh	  developed	  the	  idea	  of	  “upgrading”	  the	  DGHC	  by	  bringing	  its	  area	  under	  the	  6th	  
Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution.	  This	  guarantees	  constitutional	  safeguards	  for	  autonomy	  for	  areas	  
with	  a	  predominantly	  “tribal”	  population	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  At	  that	  time,	  Darjeeling,	  however,	  only	  had	  
a	  recognised	  tribal	  population	  of	  32	  per	  cent	  (Middleton	  2010,	  35).	  As	  part	  of	  his	  campaign	  to	  make	  
Darjeeling	  appear	  “tribal”,	  supported	  by	  the	  culture	  department	  of	  the	  DGHC,	  Ghisingh	  began	  to	  
promote	  non-­‐Hindu	  forms	  of	  worship.	  For	  instance,	  he	  ordered	  the	  worshipping	  of	  Godess	  Mahakali	  
instead	  of	  others	  (speech	  17.12.2006,	  at	  Norbong	  tea	  estate),	  or	  the	  worship	  of	  a	  shīlā	  (a	  stone)	  
instead	  of	  an	  idol	  of	  Godess	  Durga	  during	  Dashain	  or	  Durga	  Puja.	  Usually,	  Hindus	  worship	  an	  idol	  of	  
the	  Godess	  during	  this	  major	  festival	  (see	  Middleton	  2010,	  171	  for	  a	  detailled	  discussion).	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	  the	  bases	  of	  public	  support	  and	  tolerance	  of	  the	  GNLF’s	  political	  authority	  changed.	  
While	  veterans	  of	  the	  ‘86	  movement	  stress	  that	  they	  had	  initially	  followed	  Ghisingh	  because	  of	  their	  
emotional	  attachment	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  demand,	  people	  now	  obeyed	  his	  orders	  out	  of	  obligation:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  R.B.	  Rai,	  president	  of	  CPRM,	  claims	  that	  the	  DGHC	  marks	  a	  change	  in	  hill	  politics	  because	  it	  instrumentalised	  
the	  use	  of	  “money	  power”	  –	  which	  had	  played	  a	  less	  important	  role	  in	  Darjeeling’s	  politics	  previously.	  He	  claims	  
that	  prior	  to	  that	  people	  supported	  political	  parties	  rather	  based	  on	  their	  ideologies	  and	  beliefs,	  and	  less	  due	  to	  
intimidation	  and	  financial	  spoils	  (interview,	  11.6.2013).	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“Being	  with	  the	  party	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  make	  a	  life	  in	  the	  hills”	  (Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013).	  
Some	  expected	  personal	  benefits;	  others	  feared	  political	  victimisation	  such	  as	  losing	  their	  jobs,	  
exclusion	  from	  state	  benefits,	  or	  “social	  boycott”.	  This	  suggests	  that	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  council	  
Ghisingh	  established	  a	  “punishment	  regime”	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010,	  128),	  which	  helped	  him	  to	  
sustain	  the	  party	  organisation	  while	  sustaining	  his	  top-­‐position.	  
Studies	  show	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  common	  people	  in	  the	  political	  decision	  making	  processes	  was	  
further	  impeded	  by	  the	  73rd	  Constitutional	  Amendment	  in	  1992.	  This	  dissolved	  the	  three-­‐tier	  
panchayati	  raj	  system	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  only	  left	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  as	  elected	  bodies	  (albeit	  
equally	  controlled	  by	  the	  GNLF)	  (Ganguly	  2005,	  495)	  (see	  Chapter	  1.2).	  Further,	  conflicts	  of	  
jurisdiction	  between	  the	  DGHC	  and	  the	  panchayati	  raj	  sphere	  led	  to	  a	  complex	  working	  agreement	  
with	  the	  district	  administration.	  Chakrabarty	  (2005)	  comments	  that	  the	  resulting	  top-­‐down	  
approaches	  made	  people	  “passive	  recipients	  of	  development	  aid”	  (ibid.	  187).	  Unsurprisingly,	  people	  
in	  Darjeeling	  have	  a	  very	  tense	  relation	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  “development”.	  	  
Such	  means	  of	  soft	  repression	  were	  combined	  with	  the	  hard	  repression	  of	  rivals.	  To	  oversee	  the	  
GNLF	  constituencies,	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  any	  form	  of	  opposition	  was	  oppressed,	  Ghisingh	  invested	  
loyal	  strongmen	  with	  power:	  “Whoever	  could	  flex	  most	  muscle	  either	  by	  giving	  money	  or	  through	  
intimidation”	  (Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013)	  was	  nominated	  as	  DGHC	  councillor.	  Also	  political	  
murders	  such	  as	  that	  of	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  in	  2002	  –	  allegedly	  carried	  out	  on	  Ghisingh’s	  order	  –	  were	  never	  
solved.	  Former	  GVC	  chief	  Chattrey	  Subba	  got	  arrested	  in	  2001,	  after	  his	  alleged	  involvement	  in	  a	  
murder	  attempt	  on	  Ghisingh	  and	  was	  only	  released	  from	  jail	  in	  2011,	  after	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  (TMC)	  
had	  become	  the	  new	  Chief	  Minister83.	  
The	  fear	  of	  victimisation	  paired	  with	  the	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  GNLF	  strongmen	  and	  councillors	  for	  
gaining	  access	  to	  state	  benefits,	  jobs,	  and	  contracts	  accentuated	  the	  “politics	  of	  silence”	  (Chakrabarty	  
2005,	  193)	  which	  had	  started	  during	  the	  1986	  agitation	  and	  remains	  part	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  political	  
culture	  till	  today.	  As	  I	  show	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  all	  this	  could	  not	  work	  without	  the	  silent	  consent	  of	  
the	  CPI-­‐M	  led	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  which	  channelled	  the	  DGHC	  funds.	  
3.5.2 The	  state	  and	  the	  leader	  
Initially,	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  led	  State	  government	  and	  Ghisingh	  had	  been	  icy.	  Ghisingh	  
criticised	  the	  slow	  transfer	  of	  departments	  to	  the	  DGHC	  and	  the	  delay	  of	  funds.	  To	  put	  pressure	  on	  
the	  government	  he	  even	  designed	  some	  conspiracy	  theories,	  for	  example	  he	  claimed	  that	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Rumours	  claim	  that	  Chhatrey	  Subba	  was	  a	  secret	  West	  Bengal	  “crack	  force”	  leader,	  used	  by	  CPI-­‐M	  in	  
opposition	  to	  GNLF	  (Subba	  1992,	  146).	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“forces”	  in	  Darjeeling	  were	  attempting	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “Greater	  Nepal”,	  or	  declared	  Darjeeling	  a	  
“no-­‐man’s	  land”	  (Sarkar	  2013).	  This	  latter	  theory	  claims	  that	  Darjeeling	  lacks	  a	  constitutional	  
inclusion	  into	  the	  Indian	  nation	  state,	  and	  proclaims	  the	  Gorkhas	  as	  the	  only	  rightful	  rulers	  of	  the	  
district.	  Drawing	  on	  this	  claim	  Ghisingh	  justified	  a	  boycott	  of	  the	  1994	  panchayat	  samiti	  elections	  
(Sarkar	  2013,	  86).	  At	  other	  times	  he	  revived	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  (e.g.	  prior	  the	  gram	  
panchayat	  elections	  in	  2000)	  and	  kept	  hopes	  for	  an	  upgrade	  of	  the	  council	  to	  full	  statehood	  alive	  
(Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Such	  campaigns	  resulted	  in	  the	  three-­‐times	  amendment	  of	  the	  
DGHC	  Act	  or	  even	  the	  withholding	  of	  panchayat	  elections	  (Sarkar	  2013;	  Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000).	  In	  
1998	  another	  call	  to	  boycott	  the	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  to	  win	  the	  seat	  
from	  Darjeeling	  constituency	  (Sarkar	  and	  Bhaumik	  2000,	  130).	  A	  journalist	  recalled	  that	  after	  some	  
time	  the	  State	  government	  and	  Ghisingh	  seemed	  to	  have	  found	  a	  working	  balance	  and	  eventually,	  
the	  government	  allowed	  Ghisingh	  to	  rule	  Darjeeling	  as	  to	  his	  whims	  and	  hardly	  interfered	  anymore	  in	  
the	  council’s	  businesses.	  	  
Various	  critical	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  “money”	  and	  “muscle	  power”	  became	  the	  state	  approved	  
means	  allowing	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  GNLF	  to	  rule.	  Despite	  poll-­‐irregularities,	  intimidation	  of	  rival	  
candidates,	  political	  murders	  and	  signs	  of	  wide-­‐spread	  corruption,	  only	  once	  (in	  1992)	  an	  
independent	  audit	  of	  the	  DGHC	  was	  conducted	  (Lacina	  2014).	  Niraj	  Lama	  recalled	  that	  the	  
government	  gave	  the	  impression	  that	  Ghisingh	  alone	  was	  the	  recognised	  representative	  of	  
Darjeeling:	  “Nobody	  dared	  to	  speak	  against	  somebody	  so	  well	  endorsed	  by	  Delhi	  and	  Kolkata”	  
(interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Secrecy	  rather	  than	  transparency	  became	  a	  means	  to	  rule	  (ibid.).	  Lacina	  
(2014)	  contends	  that	  the	  government	  used	  the	  autocracy	  to	  create	  stability	  and	  oppress	  any	  
demands	  for	  autonomy.	  Chakrabarty	  (2005)	  concludes	  that	  it	  turned	  a	  “deaf	  ear”	  and	  shut	  “its	  eyes”	  
(ibid.	  193)	  to	  “buy[s]	  peace	  by	  abdicating	  its	  constitutional	  obligations”	  (ibid.	  189).	  Ghisingh	  and	  his	  
henchmen	  became	  brokers	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  which	  was	  not	  able	  to	  rule	  without	  
them.	  The	  DGHC	  institutionalised	  the	  relatively	  loose	  working	  relationship	  that	  had	  existed	  between	  
the	  State	  government	  and	  the	  ruling	  regional	  party	  in	  Darjeeling	  in	  form	  of	  electoral	  pacts	  prior	  to	  
the	  1980s.	  	  
This	  conclusion	  is	  supported	  by	  an	  account	  of	  CPI-­‐M	  leader,	  and	  former	  minister-­‐in-­‐charge	  of	  Hill	  
Affairs	  (later	  Urban	  Development	  minister)	  Ashok	  Bhattacharya,	  previously	  a	  major	  antagonist	  of	  
Ghisingh.	  In	  an	  interview	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  Ghisingh’s	  style	  of	  functioning	  was	  “completely	  
authoritarian”.	  But	  he	  added	  that	  “if	  we	  don’t	  give	  him	  support	  then	  this	  DGHC	  would	  be	  broken.	  
Then	  again	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  separate	  State	  of	  Gorkhaland	  might	  have	  started”	  while	  pointing	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  after	  all	  Ghisingh	  was	  “elected”	  (interview,	  9.7.2012).	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Yet,	  faced	  with	  decreasing	  public	  support	  –	  becoming	  visible	  in	  worsening	  election	  results	  to	  the	  
DGHC	  in	  1994	  and	  199984	  and	  the	  murder	  attempt	  –	  Ghisingh	  managed	  to	  withhold	  the	  scheduled	  
elections	  to	  the	  DGHC	  in	  2004.	  Instead,	  in	  2005	  the	  State	  government	  appointed	  him	  as	  “caretaker”	  
while	  leaving	  the	  next	  date	  for	  elections	  unknown85.	  This	  apparently	  “unholy	  alliance”	  between	  
Subash	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  State	  government	  alienated	  those	  who	  had	  fought	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  
chhyāsī	  even	  more.	  All	  this	  deepened	  the	  feeling	  of	  betrayal	  amongst	  Darjeeling’s	  population,	  giving	  
rise	  to	  the	  anti-­‐incumbency	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  downfall.	  	  
3.5.3 Resistance	  
Despite	  the	  authoritarianism	  of	  GNLF	  and	  its	  seeming	  total	  control,	  two	  forms	  of	  a	  new	  opposition	  
emerged.	  The	  first	  concerns	  other	  regional	  political	  parties	  that	  formed	  an	  anti-­‐Ghisingh	  alliance.	  At	  
its	  forefront	  stood	  Madan	  Tamang	  who	  openly	  challenged	  Ghisingh	  by	  denouncing	  him	  as	  a	  betrayer	  
of	  people’s	  aspirations	  and	  by	  accusing	  him	  of	  corruption.	  In	  1992,	  he	  established	  the	  Gorkha	  
Democratic	  Front	  (GDF)	  which	  later	  merged	  with	  the	  AIGL	  making	  Tamang	  its	  new	  president.	  	  
In	  another	  remarkable	  development,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Indian	  Prime	  Minister’s	  (PM)	  announcement	  
to	  give	  in	  to	  the	  demand	  of	  Uttarakhand	  State	  from	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  in	  1996	  district	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐
M	  de-­‐linked	  from	  their	  party.	  Demanding	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  they	  established	  the	  
Communist	  Party	  of	  Revolutionary	  Marxists	  (CPRM)	  (Bomjan	  2013,	  22).	  The	  communists	  still	  had	  a	  
considerable	  (albeit	  silent)	  following	  in	  Darjeeling,	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  my	  field	  work	  the	  CPRM	  was	  
regarded	  the	  second	  strongest	  party	  in	  the	  hills	  (TT,	  3.5.2012).	  While	  this	  break-­‐away	  CPI-­‐M	  was	  
campaigning	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  Darjeeling,	  Ghisingh	  prohibited	  newspapers	  from	  covering	  these	  
events,	  and	  reiterated	  the	  claim	  that	  Darjeeling	  was	  a	  historical	  “no-­‐man’s	  land”	  (Bhomjan	  2013,	  50	  
ff.).	  Together	  with	  the	  AIGL,	  the	  GDF,	  and	  the	  DDCC,	  the	  CPRM	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
People’s	  Front	  (GPF)	  which	  campaigned	  for	  a	  broad-­‐based	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland,	  a	  claim	  
rejected	  by	  Ghisingh	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  87).	  Despite	  the	  increasing	  antipathy	  towards	  Ghisingh	  none	  of	  
the	  regional	  opposition	  parties	  managed	  to	  mobilise	  sufficient	  support	  to	  de-­‐thrown	  him.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  either	  the	  public	  uproar	  was	  still	  too	  weak	  or	  people	  were	  simply	  too	  scared.	  	  
The	  second	  form	  of	  opposition	  challenged	  Ghisingh	  rather	  indirectly.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
1990s	  on,	  various	  ethnic	  sub-­‐groups	  began	  to	  stress	  and	  rediscover	  their	  distinct	  origin,	  language,	  
and	  culture	  as	  a	  means	  to	  demand	  recognition	  as	  Scheduled	  Tribes.	  Such	  recognition	  is	  part	  of	  an	  
Indian	  affirmative	  action	  policy	  which	  guarantees	  members	  of	  the	  group	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  In	  1999	  the	  GNLF	  won	  23	  out	  of	  the	  28	  DGHC	  constituencies.	  
85	  Ashok	  Bhattacharya	  claims	  that	  elections	  in	  2005	  were	  withheld	  as	  negotiations	  for	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  were	  
going	  on	  at	  that	  time	  (interview,	  9.7.2012).	  An	  amendment	  of	  the	  DGHC	  Act	  in	  1994	  allowed	  the	  State	  
government	  to	  legally	  establish	  a	  non-­‐elected	  caretaker	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  83).	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the	  allotment	  of	  government	  jobs	  or	  access	  to	  higher	  education	  besides	  special	  welfare	  schemes.	  
They	  sidelined	  their	  Gorkha	  identity	  which	  was	  instrumental	  for	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  
(Middleton	  and	  Shneiderman	  2008;	  Middleton	  2010)	  and	  organised	  themselves	  in	  (sub-­‐)ethnic	  
organisations.	  This	  process	  of	  ethno-­‐reversal	  intensified	  after	  2005,	  when	  Ghisingh	  had	  –	  probably	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  stop	  the	  public	  uproar–	  secretly	  signed	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  central	  and	  State	  governments	  
to	  bring	  Darjeeling	  under	  the	  6th	  Schedule.	  Although	  this	  grant	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  autonomy	  
under	  the	  State	  government	  for	  tribal-­‐dominated	  areas,	  the	  proposed	  bill	  initiated	  fears	  amongst	  
non-­‐tribal	  groups	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  benefits	  (Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  2007;	  Middleton	  
2010).	  Though	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  sustain	  his	  rule,	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  proposal	  eventually	  signalled	  the	  
end	  of	  Ghisingh’s	  reign.	  	  
In	  October	  2007	  a	  new	  party	  emerged,	  which	  did	  not	  only	  succeed	  in	  stopping	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  
but	  also	  in	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  and	  the	  GNLF’s	  rule.	  Proclaiming	  a	  “democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  
and	  Gandhian”	  agitation,	  Ghisingh’s	  former	  DGHC	  councillor	  and	  aide	  Bimal	  Gurung	  revived	  the	  
demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  and	  announced	  a	  new	  form	  of	  politics	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills,	  giving	  expression	  to	  
the	  long-­‐standing	  public	  grievances	  (more	  on	  this	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  
	  
3.6 Conclusion	  
The	  reviewed	  phases	  of	  “political	  time”	  in	  Darjeeling	  reflect	  respondents’	  political	  inflection	  of	  long-­‐
term	  time-­‐reckoning.	  The	  discussion	  of	  these	  phases	  indicated	  changes	  in	  governance	  as	  well	  as	  
changes	  in	  style	  of	  leadership	  and	  forms	  of	  ruling.	  For	  instance,	  senior	  Darjeeling	  Congress	  leader	  
Lorez	  P.T.	  Lama	  contrasted	  the	  “sincere”	  leaders	  before	  the	  1980s,	  who	  would	  involve	  in	  social	  work	  
for	  the	  people	  while	  maintaining	  their	  guṇ	  (quality,	  virtue,	  merit)	  with	  leaders	  after	  the	  agitation,	  
who	  were	  “selfish”	  and	  were	  involved	  in	  corruption	  and	  did	  not	  work	  for	  their	  communities	  
(interview,	  14.6.2013).	  	  
Indeed,	  before	  1980s,	  Darjeeling’s	  political	  regime	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  relatively	  competitive	  
multi-­‐party	  system.	  Despite	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  ethnic	  AIGL,	  also	  the	  communists,	  who	  
were	  drawing	  on	  class-­‐consciousness,	  and	  the	  INC	  stood	  their	  ground.	  This	  and	  the	  regular	  agitation	  
for	  labour	  rights	  underline	  that	  the	  ethnic	  agenda	  was	  not	  the	  only	  programme,	  which	  mobilised	  the	  
masses.	  Rather,	  discussions	  about	  ethnicity	  seemed	  to	  be	  initially	  confined	  to	  some	  elite	  circles,	  
before	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  AIGL	  signalled	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  agenda	  to	  the	  middle-­‐classes.	  Yet,	  
only	  the	  cross-­‐party	  and	  non-­‐party-­‐based	  language	  movement	  spread	  the	  awareness	  about	  the	  
ethnic	  belonging	  to	  the	  “Gorkhas”	  to	  the	  general	  masses	  and	  disclosed	  the	  potential	  of	  ethnically	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based	  mobilisation	  for	  achieving	  political	  aims.	  This	  awareness	  was	  strengthened	  by	  the	  rather	  
unresponsive	  state	  policy	  towards	  Darjeeling.	  	  
This	  awareness,	  coupled	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  crises,	  provided	  the	  pre-­‐
dispositions	  based	  on	  which	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  framed	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  since	  1980.	  His	  
skilled	  interconnection	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  with	  issues	  of	  citizenship	  and	  existential	  security-­‐
concerns	  made	  Gorkhaland	  a	  powerful	  vision	  presented	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  all	  problems.	  It	  also	  made	  
ethnic	  consciousness	  the	  defining	  trait	  of	  people’s	  subjectivities	  while	  subsuming	  the	  class-­‐
consciousness	  and	  the	  labour	  question.	  Gorkhaland	  became	  the	  only	  demand	  towards	  the	  state,	  and	  
the	  GNLF	  its	  sole	  voice.	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  derived	  his	  normative	  legitimacy	  from	  being	  the	  single	  
embodiment	  of	  this	  vision.	  In	  this	  process,	  also	  other	  Gorkha	  parties	  including	  the	  AIGL	  were	  largely	  
sidelined.	  The	  GNLF	  initiated	  the	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland	  and	  then	  monopolised	  it.	  
Importantly,	  this	  marginalisation	  of	  rival	  voices	  was	  supported	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  This	  had	  
serious	  implications	  for	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling,	  which	  was	  institutionalised	  through	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  DGHC.	  A	  dominant-­‐party	  regime	  was	  established.	  The	  use	  of	  repression	  and	  
political	  patronage	  became	  regular	  means	  of	  control	  to	  make	  up	  for	  Ghisingh’s	  loss	  of	  normative	  
legitimacy	  after	  his	  perceived	  rollback	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda.	  The	  politics	  of	  identity	  was	  
replaced	  by	  the	  “politics	  of	  intimidation”	  (Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Together,	  this	  lead	  to	  
what	  many	  call	  a	  “fear	  psychosis”	  expressed	  in	  commonly	  shared	  apprehensions	  towards	  multi-­‐party	  
competition	  (see	  Chapter	  7).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  peace,	  people	  kept	  silent	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  126)	  and	  
consigned	  democracy	  to	  the	  background	  (Bagchi	  2012,	  372).	  
The	  DGHC	  also	  signalled	  changes	  in	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  regional	  parties.	  While	  pre-­‐
1980s	  this	  relation	  was	  characterised	  by	  alliances,	  since	  1988	  the	  state	  took	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  
regional	  politics	  by	  channelling	  funds	  to	  the	  council.	  Some	  allege	  that	  this	  helped	  the	  government	  to	  
control	  the	  autonomy	  demands	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  (Lacina	  2009;	  Sarkar	  2013;	  Lacina	  2014).	  In	  this	  
context,	  concessions	  for	  more	  autonomy	  mainly	  served	  to	  cement	  the	  hegemony	  of	  one	  regional	  
party	  and	  to	  repress	  political	  competition	  (ibid.).	  Once,	  autonomy	  concessions	  reify	  the	  power	  of	  the	  
party	  elites,	  these	  refrain	  to	  raise	  new	  autonomy	  demands.	  When	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  
shakes,	  however,	  others	  jump	  in	  with	  demanding	  Gorkhaland	  again.	  In	  this	  instrumental	  reading	  (cf.	  
Brass	  1991)	  mobilisation	  for	  autonomy	  is	  but	  a	  tactic	  of	  local	  political	  competition	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  
Subba	  1992).	  The	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  transformed	  from	  an	  emotional	  expression	  of	  longing	  for	  
liberation,	  justice,	  and	  recognition	  to	  an	  instrument	  in	  regional	  politics.	  Thus,	  the	  spread	  of	  Gorkha	  
ethnic	  consciousness	  contributed	  to	  this	  establishment	  and	  sustenance	  of	  the	  dominant	  party-­‐
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regime.	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  totalitarian	  vision	  became	  embodied	  in	  a	  state-­‐supported	  dominant	  party	  
autocracy.	  	  
The	  establishment	  of	  the	  GJM	  in	  2007	  and	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  “democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  
Gandhian”	  and	  more	  inclusive	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland	  seemed	  to	  challenge	  this	  regime.	  But	  
instead	  of	  leading	  to	  a	  radical	  regime	  change	  the	  GJM	  also	  began	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  established	  strategies	  
for	  ruling.	  To	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  why	  people	  again	  lent	  their	  support	  to	  a	  party	  which	  
presumably	  rules	  by	  similar	  means	  like	  the	  GNLF,	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  second	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  since	  2007.	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4 “Gorkhaland	  is	  our	  dream.”	  The	  power	  of	  an	  imagination	  
	  
4.1 Introduction	  
It	  was	  another	  chilly	  morning	  on	  the	  tea	  plantation.	  As	  every	  morning	  Sita*,	  my	  host	  mother,	  was	  in	  a	  
hurry	  to	  get	  ready	  for	  work.	  After	  fetching	  water	  she	  had	  to	  cook	  breakfast	  for	  the	  family,	  pack	  her	  
lunch,	  and	  get	  her	  child	  ready	  for	  school.	  At	  around	  7.30	  am	  we	  would	  hurry	  to	  reach	  the	  working	  
place	  somewhere	  on	  the	  slopes	  of	  the	  vast	  plantation.	  “When	  we	  come	  late	  they	  will	  cut	  our	  
salaries”,	  Sita	  explained.	  After	  the	  kāmdārī	  (supervisor)	  had	  noted	  the	  attendance	  and	  instructed	  the	  
women	  for	  that	  day’s	  work,	  they	  wore	  their	  aprons	  and	  disappeared	  amongst	  the	  bushes	  on	  the	  
steep	  slopes,	  the	  bamboo	  ṭokrī	  (baskets)	  for	  the	  tea	  leaves	  fixed	  with	  a	  broad	  string	  to	  their	  
foreheads	  (see	  Picture	  1	  in	  Chapter	  1.4).	  When	  the	  sun	  came	  out	  or	  the	  rain	  started,	  the	  women	  
opened	  their	  colourful	  umbrellas,	  balancing	  them	  on	  their	  ṭokrī	  so	  to	  use	  both	  hands	  for	  work.	  But	  
what	  looked	  like	  a	  colourful	  part	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  picturesque	  landscape	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  scene	  of	  hard	  and	  
exhaustive	  work.	  Although	  the	  world	  famous	  Darjeeling	  tea	  fetches	  high	  prices	  at	  the	  international	  
market,	  the	  salary	  of	  those	  plucking	  the	  leaves	  was	  a	  meagre	  90	  INR	  a	  day	  during	  my	  stay	  there.	  This	  
adds	  to	  the	  harsh	  and	  hierarchical	  working	  conditions.	  	  
In	  many	  conversations	  women	  and	  men	  alike	  expressed	  their	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  plantation	  
labour.	  They	  were	  not	  only	  hoping	  for	  higher	  salaries	  and	  more	  opportunities	  to	  attain	  higher	  posts	  
in	  the	  plantation	  system	  but	  also	  for	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  management’s	  commitments	  towards	  the	  
workers,	  including	  coverage	  of	  their	  medical	  expenses,	  provision	  of	  an	  ambulance	  for	  emergencies,	  
and	  money	  for	  house	  constructions.	  Typically,	  such	  demands	  are	  forwarded	  through	  the	  labour	  
unions,	  who	  act	  as	  frontal	  organisations	  of	  the	  political	  parties.	  Most	  of	  them	  are	  affiliated	  to	  the	  
dominant	  GJM.	  Interestingly,	  nearly	  all	  workers	  expressed	  dissatisfaction	  with	  these.	  Many	  blamed	  
the	  union	  representatives,	  who	  instead	  of	  arguing	  for	  their	  case	  struck	  secret	  deals	  with	  the	  
management,	  allegedly	  to	  receive	  money	  and	  better	  positions	  in	  the	  plantation	  hierarchy	  in	  return.	  
Mostly,	  local	  union	  presidents	  were	  also	  leaders	  of	  the	  local	  or	  regional	  GJM	  branches,	  indicating	  
their	  party-­‐role	  rather	  than	  their	  union-­‐roles.	  Most	  workers’	  trust	  in	  the	  unions	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  
improve	  things	  was	  very	  low,	  and	  instead	  of	  engaging	  in	  a	  non-­‐existent	  labour	  movement,	  they	  
pinned	  their	  hopes	  on	  the	  vision	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  	  
So	  why	  do	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  continue	  to	  pin	  their	  hopes	  for	  a	  better	  life	  solely	  on	  the	  vision	  of	  
Gorkhaland	  and	  not	  on	  any	  alternative	  imaginations	  or	  non-­‐ethno-­‐regional	  discourses	  to	  negotiate	  
their	  claims	  on	  the	  state?	  Also	  beyond	  the	  tea	  plantations,	  most	  persons	  in	  Darjeeling	  I	  spoke	  to	  
agreed	  that	  Gorkhaland	  was	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  they	  were	  striving	  for,	  regardless	  of	  their	  socio-­‐
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economic	  background,	  age	  or	  education.	  Such	  commitment	  to	  Gorkhaland	  was	  shockingly	  underlined	  
by	  the	  death	  of	  three	  GJM	  followers	  in	  February	  2011.	  The	  administration	  had	  stopped	  the	  GJM’s	  
pada	  yatra86	  to	  the	  Dooars	  of	  Jalpaiguri	  district,	  which	  regional	  parties	  claim	  as	  part	  of	  Gorkhaland	  
(see	  map	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  Picture	  2).	  Tension	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  police	  barricades	  built	  up	  and	  when	  
hundreds	  of	  activists	  eventually	  tried	  to	  trespass	  the	  barricades	  three	  of	  them	  were	  shot	  dead	  by	  the	  
police,	  sparking	  violent	  protests	  in	  Darjeeling.	  	  
Yet,	  Gorkhaland	  is	  not	  the	  only	  available	  imagination	  projected	  upon	  this	  geographical	  space.	  Leaders	  
of	  the	  Indigenous	  Lepcha	  Tribal	  Association	  (ILTA)	  for	  instance	  see	  Darjeeling	  as	  part	  of	  their	  
imagined	  ancient	  kingdom	  “Mayel	  Lyang”,	  the	  Tibetan	  population	  imagines	  it	  as	  “Dorje-­‐ling”	  the	  
place	  of	  the	  mystic	  thunderbolt	  of	  Indo-­‐Tibetan	  Buddhism	  (cf.	  Samanta	  2000).	  Nationalist	  groups	  
from	  Nepal	  claim	  it	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  “Greater	  Nepal”	  and	  others	  in	  Darjeeling	  demand	  a	  merger	  of	  
the	  district	  with	  Sikkim	  of	  which	  it	  had	  formed	  a	  part	  before	  the	  Gorkha-­‐Kingdom	  captured	  it	  (see	  
Chapter	  3).	  More	  recently,	  Chief	  Minister	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  proclaimed	  to	  make	  a	  “Switzerland”	  out	  
of	  Darjeeling	  –	  yet	  within	  the	  West	  Bengal	  boundaries.	  But	  even	  after	  2007,	  the	  imagination	  of	  
Darjeeling	  as	  Gorkhaland	  prevails,	  and	  people’s	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  continues	  to	  be	  negotiated	  in	  
terms	  of	  Gorkha	  ethnicity	  which	  subsumes	  or	  sidelines	  other	  forms	  of	  identities,	  including	  class-­‐
based	  ones87.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  where	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  –	  37	  years	  after	  its	  invention	  
in	  1980	  –	  still	  draws	  its	  strength	  from.	  While	  politicians’	  self-­‐projection	  as	  true	  and	  committed	  
fighters	  for	  Gorkhaland	  clearly	  underlines	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  for	  legitimising	  
their	  existence	  (cf.	  Lacina	  2014),	  such	  an	  instrumental	  reading	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  (see	  Chapter	  1.2.2)	  
does	  not	  explain	  why	  the	  dream	  of	  Gorkhaland	  (and	  not	  any	  other)	  is	  so	  appealing	  that	  people	  would	  
subject	  themselves	  to	  injury	  or	  even	  death	  for	  it.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  powerful	  appeal	  of	  this	  imagination	  
lies	  in	  the	  way	  political	  leaders	  frame	  it	  as	  an	  “ethno-­‐scape”	  (Schetter	  and	  Weissert	  2007;	  Smith	  
1996c,	  453)	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  as	  a	  redemptive	  solution	  to	  all	  problems	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  on	  the	  
other.	  First,	  they	  produce	  Darjeeling	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  of	  Gorkhas	  by	  tying	  cultural,	  ethnic,	  and	  
historical	  elements	  to	  the	  claimed	  space.	  Through	  the	  selective	  presentation	  of	  data,	  cultural	  
elements,	  and	  history,	  such	  imagined	  geographies	  undergird	  regional	  boundaries	  and	  marginalise	  
alternative	  imaginations.	  Thereby	  they	  attain	  a	  strategic	  character	  (Reuber	  1999).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Journey	  by	  foot;	  also:	  foot	  pilgrimage	  of	  Hindus.	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  had	  led	  pada	  yatras	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Indian	  
independence	  agitation.	  
87	  Although	  after	  the	  DGHC	  agreement	  in	  1988	  the	  emergence	  of	  ethnic	  associations	  striving	  for	  tribal	  status	  of	  
select	  sub-­‐ethnic	  groups	  signalled	  an	  alternative	  for	  negotiating	  demands	  with	  the	  state,	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  in	  2007	  brought	  Gorkha	  ethnicity	  back	  to	  the	  forefront.	  Chapter	  8	  discusses	  the	  tribal-­‐
status	  demands	  in	  more	  detail.	  




Second,	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  politicians,	  ethnic-­‐based	  discrimination	  and	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  become	  
the	  sole	  explanation	  for	  problems,	  and	  Gorkhaland	  the	  only	  solution.	  Such	  frames	  are	  reflected	  in	  
Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  imagined	  geography.	  Importantly,	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  imaginative	  geography	  also	  
expresses	  subjectivities:	  Chapter	  1	  showed	  that	  movements	  for	  new	  States	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
expressions	  of	  “aware	  citizens”,	  who	  claim	  their	  rights	  from	  the	  state.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  I	  show	  that	  
the	  imagined	  geography	  of	  Gorkhaland	  is	  related	  to	  such	  subjectivities.	  Gorkhaland	  not	  only	  
expresses	  but	  also	  shapes	  people’s	  subjectivities	  evolving	  around	  aspirations	  for	  recognition	  and	  
justice	  embodied	  in	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  separate	  State.	  As	  a	  popular	  geography	  it	  carries	  hopes,	  
aspirations,	  and	  meanings	  and	  also	  mirrors	  individuals’	  perceived	  relations	  to	  the	  state.	  This	  chapter	  
aims	  to	  show	  how	  such	  subjectivities	  are	  formed	  and	  expressed	  through	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imagination,	  
and	  to	  explore	  why	  alternative	  imaginations	  are	  less	  appealing	  to	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  majority	  of	  
Darjeeling.	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  attempt	  to	  complement	  an	  instrumental	  reading	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  (see	  
Chapter	  1),	  which	  regards	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  mainly	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  political	  elites	  in	  
the	  struggle	  over	  resources	  with	  an	  approach	  that	  explains	  the	  popular	  appeal	  and	  power	  of	  the	  
imagination	  in	  mobilising	  the	  masses.	  
	  
	  
Picture	  2:	  Map	  of	  Gorkhaland	  as	  envisaged	  by	  the	  GJM,	  including	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  the	  adjoining	  
Dooars.The	  map	  is	  drawn	  on	  a	  sign-­‐board	  in	  the	  colours	  of	  the	  GJM	  party-­‐flag	  (green-­‐white-­‐yellow)	  which	  
displays	  a	  sun-­‐symbol,	  mountains,	  and	  crossed	  khukurīs	  as	  ethnic	  symbol.	  I	  took	  the	  picture	  on	  the	  road	  to	  
Singmari,	  north	  of	  Darjeeling	  town	  in	  February	  2011.	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In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  I	  first	  introduce	  the	  concepts	  of	  imagined	  geographies,	  regionalisation,	  and	  “deep	  
resources”	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  (Smith	  1996b;	  Radcliffe	  1998;	  Paasi	  2002a).	  Based	  on	  these,	  in	  Chapter	  
4.3	  I	  review	  attempts	  of	  the	  political	  elite	  in	  Darjeeling	  to	  design	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  while	  
simultaneously	  presenting	  it	  as	  the	  sole	  solution	  to	  all	  problems	  of	  the	  Gorkhas.	  In	  Chapter	  4.4,	  I	  
review	  alternative	  imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling,	  and	  show	  why	  they	  lack	  popular	  appeal.	  In	  the	  fifth	  
section	  I	  return	  to	  the	  tea	  workers	  I	  started	  this	  chapter	  with,	  and	  explore	  the	  connotations	  that	  
Gorkhaland	  holds	  for	  them.	  The	  discussion	  shows	  how	  Gorkhaland	  expresses	  their	  subjectivities	  as	  
framed	  by	  various	  leaders’	  rhetoric	  and	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  background	  and	  also	  outlines	  
differences	  and	  fractures	  between	  their	  imaginations	  and	  the	  political	  elites’	  imaginations.	  The	  
conclusion	  proposes	  that	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  does	  not	  only	  blur	  the	  boundaries	  between	  
ethnic-­‐	  and	  class-­‐consciousnesses	  but	  also	  obscures	  the	  role	  of	  political	  leaders	  in	  maintaining	  the	  
conditions	  against	  which	  the	  masses	  are	  protesting.	  
	  
4.2 Regionalisation,	  strategic	  imaginative	  geographies,	  and	  ethno-­‐symbolic	  resources88	  
I	  now	  introduce	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  to	  analyse	  how	  geographical	  imaginations	  form	  and	  
express	  ethnic	  consciousness	  and	  identities.	  Sarah	  Radcliffe	  defines	  imaginative	  geographies	  as	  “the	  
descriptions	  and	  discursive	  constructions	  around	  place	  which	  are	  made	  and	  re-­‐made	  within	  a	  
particular	  cultural	  setting”	  (Radcliffe	  1998,	  275).	  They	  are	  embedded	  in	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  historical	  
contexts	  and	  transcend	  physical	  territory	  (Said	  1978).	  I	  will	  show	  how	  imaginative	  geographies	  can	  
take	  different	  functions	  for	  the	  generation	  and	  justification	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism	  and	  autonomy	  
demands	  and	  also	  help	  in	  mobilising	  the	  masses	  to	  participate	  in	  such	  movements.	  I	  begin	  this	  
discussion	  by	  showing	  how	  imaginative	  geographies	  function	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  regions	  as	  ethno-­‐
scapes,	  and	  then	  turn	  to	  their	  strategic	  utilisation	  for	  justifying	  claims	  on	  space.	  I	  then	  show	  how	  
imaginative	  geographies	  in	  conjunction	  with	  redemptive	  promises	  can	  attain	  the	  role	  of	  social	  action	  
frames.	  I	  then	  display	  how	  these	  dimensions	  of	  imaginative	  geographies	  relate	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  
identities	  and	  subjectivities.	  	  
4.2.1 Regionalisation	  and	  ethno-­‐scapes	  
Regionalisation	  refers	  to	  the	  manifold	  cultural,	  political,	  and	  economic	  processes	  through	  which	  
regions	  come	  into	  being,	  reflected	  in	  collective	  social	  classifications,	  identifications,	  and	  practices	  
(Paasi	  2002a).	  One	  specific	  form	  of	  regions,	  which	  is	  important	  for	  this	  study	  is	  their	  construction	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  This	  section	  is	  partly	  based	  on	  Wenner	  (2013)	  and	  Wenner	  (2015,	  forthcoming).	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“ethno-­‐scapes”	  (Smith	  1996c,	  453;	  Schetter	  and	  Weissert	  2007).	  Anthony	  Smith’s	  approach	  to	  ethno-­‐
nationalism	  is	  useful	  to	  understand	  the	  spatial	  bases	  of	  ethno-­‐regionalism.	  
Anthony	  Smith	  stressed	  that	  ethnic	  ties	  and	  memories	  are	  indispensible	  for	  nations	  and	  nationalism	  
to	  emerge.	  Accordingly,	  he	  defines	  nations	  as	  “a	  named	  human	  population	  sharing	  a	  historic	  
territory,	  common	  myths	  and	  memories,	  a	  mass,	  public	  culture,	  a	  single	  economy	  and	  common	  rights	  
and	  duties	  for	  all	  members”	  (Smith	  1996a,	  359).	  Leaders	  need	  a	  repertoire	  to	  draw	  on	  in	  order	  to	  
mobilise	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  nationalist	  movements	  (Smith	  1996b,	  591).	  This	  repertoire	  consists	  
of	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  nationalism,	  namely	  (i)	  collective	  memories	  of	  a	  rich	  ethno-­‐history	  and	  a	  
golden	  age,	  (ii)	  belief	  in	  ethnic	  election,	  and	  (iii)	  collective	  belonging	  to	  an	  ancestral	  homeland	  or	  the	  
territorialisation	  of	  memory	  (Smith	  1996b).	  	  
First,	  idealised	  memories	  of	  a	  golden	  age	  define	  a	  normative	  standard	  to	  formulate	  and	  evaluate	  the	  
current	  position	  of	  a	  group.	  The	  ideal	  of	  a	  golden	  age	  induces	  a	  sense	  of	  regeneration	  and	  restoration	  
to	  a	  former	  glorious	  state	  which	  is	  contrasted	  with	  perceptions	  of	  inner	  decline	  and	  alienation.	  
Golden	  ages	  establish	  a	  link	  between	  the	  past	  and	  the	  future	  of	  a	  community	  in	  a	  certain	  space,	  
because	  the	  “national	  rebirth”	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  collective	  destiny	  (Smith	  1996b).	  The	  
second	  element,	  the	  belief	  in	  “ethnic	  election”(Smith	  1996c,	  452)	  stems	  from	  the	  ideal	  of	  
“chosenness”.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  a	  nationalist	  doctrine	  that	  expresses	  a	  nation’s	  authentic	  identity	  and	  its	  
distinctive	  and	  original	  ethnic	  culture	  through	  which	  it	  reveals	  its	  unique	  contribution	  to	  the	  world	  
(ibid.	  453).	  The	  third	  “deep	  resource”,	  the	  territorialisation	  of	  memory	  describes	  the	  process	  
whereby	  shared	  memories	  are	  attached	  to	  particular	  territories	  (Smith	  1996c).	  Narratives	  make	  the	  
landscape	  an	  indispensable	  element	  of	  a	  community’s	  history	  so	  that	  specific	  spaces	  become	  an	  
“ancestral	  homeland”	  (Smith	  1996b,	  590;	  Smith	  1996c,	  454),	  i.e.	  nations’	  territorial	  boundaries	  
derive	  their	  significance	  from	  the	  memories	  associated	  with	  them,	  or	  particular	  geographical	  areas	  
provide	  the	  scene	  for	  historic	  events	  such	  as	  migrations	  or	  battles,	  and	  function	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  
settlement	  (Smith	  1996b,	  589).	  This	  not	  only	  fosters	  territorial	  demands	  but	  also	  makes	  shared	  
memories	  national	  (Smith	  1996c,	  453).	  	  
Smith’s	  elaborations	  underline	  that	  ethno-­‐nationalism	  has	  a	  spatial	  base.	  Such	  construction	  of	  
linkages	  between	  selected	  ethno-­‐regional	  narratives,	  which	  link	  collective	  memories,	  perception	  of	  
golden	  ages,	  and	  the	  belief	  in	  ethnic	  election	  to	  a	  claimed	  area	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  strategic	  means.	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  dimension	  of	  imaginative	  geographies	  important	  for	  this	  study.	  
4.2.2 Strategic	  imagined	  geographies	  
Previous	  elaborations	  on	  regionalisation	  and	  the	  constitution	  of	  ethno-­‐scapes	  underlined	  that	  
imaginative	  geographies	  are	  not	  depictions	  of	  an	  objective	  “truth”	  but	  rather	  selective	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representations	  of	  an	  obscured	  reality	  which	  emphasise	  some	  aspects	  while	  ignoring	  others.	  In	  this	  
way	  they	  have	  the	  power	  to	  define	  and	  interpret	  the	  world	  (Said	  1978;	  Gregory	  1995;	  Reuber	  1999;	  
Said	  2000).	  Proponents	  of	  the	  “critical	  geopolitics”	  approach	  showed	  how	  imaginative	  geographies	  in	  
connection	  with	  power	  and	  knowledge	  can	  attain	  a	  hegemonic	  character	  and	  serve	  as	  powerful	  
instruments	  to	  legitimise	  the	  physical	  appropriation	  of	  space	  (Ó	  Tuathail	  and	  Agnew	  1992;	  Gregory	  
1995).	  Reuber	  termed	  such	  selective	  representations	  and	  descriptions	  of	  claimed	  territories	  
“strategic	  imaginative	  geographies”	  (Reuber	  1999).	  These	  are	  consciously	  constructed	  by	  actors	  to	  
bring	  their	  claims	  on	  space	  forward.	  They	  serve	  to	  inform	  and	  convince	  the	  public,	  media,	  or	  decisive	  
committees	  and	  also	  foster	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  potential	  supporters	  and	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  space-­‐
related	  objectives	  and	  their	  advocates	  (ibid.).	  The	  specific	  form	  of	  these	  strategic	  imaginative	  
geographies	  reflects	  the	  space-­‐related	  objectives,	  for	  example	  envisaged	  administrative	  boundaries,	  
the	  coherence	  of	  areas,	  and	  the	  functions	  and	  forms	  of	  governance	  of	  the	  envisaged	  territory.	  They	  
also	  express	  the	  socio-­‐economic,	  historic,	  and	  political	  context	  of	  their	  emergence.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  imagination	  is	  not	  only	  entangled	  with	  the	  broader	  structures	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  Indian	  
state	  but	  also	  reflects	  socio-­‐economically	  embedded	  aspirations	  of	  tea	  plantation	  workers.	  
Edward	  Said	  (2000)	  pointed	  out	  the	  function	  of	  selective	  representations	  and	  distortions	  of	  history	  as	  
elements	  of	  strategic	  imaginative	  geographies.	  Prioritisation	  and	  manipulation	  of	  memories	  and	  
narratives	  of	  places	  become	  elements	  of	  a	  cultural	  struggle	  over	  territory	  (ibid.).	  Such	  invented	  
versions	  of	  history	  can	  serve	  to	  legitimise	  current	  claims	  on	  territory	  and	  become	  part	  of	  a	  
hegemonic	  imagination	  of	  history	  and	  place	  (Radcliffe	  1998,	  275,	  280).	  Accordingly,	  also	  the	  
construction	  of	  regions	  as	  ethno-­‐scapes	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  “expressions	  of	  a	  perpetual	  struggle	  
over	  the	  meanings	  associated	  with	  space,	  representation,	  democracy	  and	  welfare”	  (Paasi	  2002a,	  
805).	  
4.2.3 Frames	  and	  identities	  
Reuber’s	  approach	  stressed	  that	  imagined	  geographies	  are	  functional	  in	  legitimising	  space-­‐related	  
objectives,	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  union	  State	  and	  in	  mobilising	  the	  population	  to	  support	  
such	  claims.	  This	  mobilising	  function	  is,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  below,	  supported	  by	  political	  elites’	  attempts	  to	  
frame	  such	  space-­‐related	  objectives	  as	  solution	  to	  a	  group’s	  problems.	  This	  way	  imaginative	  
geographies	  attain	  the	  form	  of	  social	  action	  frames.	  McAdam	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  define	  frames	  as	  
“conscious	  strategic	  efforts	  by	  groups	  […]	  to	  fashion	  shared	  understandings	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  
themselves	  that	  legitimate	  and	  motivate	  collective	  action”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996,	  6).	  
Frames	  identify	  problems,	  propose	  a	  solution,	  and	  motivate	  people	  to	  engage	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
demand	  (Snow	  and	  Benford	  1988).	  Their	  ability	  to	  promote	  certain	  views	  on	  the	  world	  directly	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relates	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  imagined	  geographies	  to	  shape	  identities	  and	  subjectivities	  (Radcliffe	  
1998;	  Boudreau	  2007;	  Gregory	  1995).	  
Radcliffe	  termed	  the	  relations	  between	  identities	  and	  imaginative	  geographies	  as	  “geographies	  of	  
identity”	  (Radcliffe,	  1998,	  275),	  which	  express	  feelings	  of	  belonging	  and	  affiliation	  to	  certain	  places,	  
regions,	  or	  the	  nation.	  Similarly,	  Boudreau	  (2007)	  regards	  imaginative	  geographies	  as	  “collectively	  
shared	  internal	  worlds	  of	  thoughts	  and	  beliefs	  that	  structure	  everyday	  life”	  (ibid.	  2596).	  They	  are	  
mental	  maps	  representing	  a	  space	  to	  which	  people	  relate	  and	  identify	  themselves	  with.	  They	  do	  not	  
only	  reflect	  a	  person’s	  socialisation	  and	  views	  on	  the	  world	  (Travares	  and	  Brosseau	  2006)	  but	  are	  also	  
loaded	  with	  his/her	  sorrows	  and	  feelings	  (Radcliffe	  1998).	  Importantly,	  Radcliffe	  (2001)	  shows	  that	  
such	  creation	  of	  shared	  meanings	  and	  common	  discourses	  is	  never	  complete,	  and	  geographies	  of	  
identity	  are	  not	  fixed	  but	  are	  in	  a	  continuous	  flux.	  In	  her	  research	  on	  the	  utilisation	  of	  geography	  in	  
creating	  national	  affiliations	  she	  showed	  how	  individuals	  and	  groups	  contest	  state-­‐produced	  national	  
imaginative	  geographies.	  They	  propose	  alternative	  affiliations	  and	  histories	  against	  the	  state’s	  
attempts	  to	  homogenise	  a	  populace	  (Krishna	  1994;	  Radcliffe	  and	  Westwood	  1996;	  Agnew	  2001).	  
Such	  “popular	  geographical	  identities”	  create	  new	  spaces	  through	  which	  (alternative)	  notions	  of	  
community,	  citizenship,	  and	  identity	  are	  expressed	  (Radcliffe	  2001,	  137).	  Accordingly,	  imaginative	  
geographies	  are	  not	  only	  a	  means	  and	  expression	  of	  the	  mental	  appropriation	  of	  space	  but	  have	  a	  
performative	  character.	  They	  produce	  the	  world	  they	  are	  envisaging	  (Massey	  2001,	  10).	  	  
In	  this	  reading,	  demands	  for	  new	  States	  are	  not	  just	  challenges	  to	  existing	  geographies	  of	  power,	  and	  
attempts	  to	  replace	  these	  with	  different	  political-­‐geographical	  orderings	  (Werlen	  1995,	  366)	  such	  as	  
sub-­‐national	  autonomy.	  They	  also	  challenge	  dominant	  identity	  ascriptions,	  which	  draw	  boundaries	  
between	  national	  and	  regional	  identities	  (Agnew	  and	  Brusa	  1999;	  Radcliffe	  2001;	  Wenner	  2013)	  and	  
neglect	  the	  existence	  of	  simultaneous	  and	  multiple	  overlapping	  affiliations	  (Radcliffe	  1998,	  289).	  	  
In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  imaginative	  geographies	  and	  their	  roles	  as	  
regions/ethno-­‐scapes,	  strategic	  means,	  and	  identity-­‐generating	  frames	  to	  explore	  which	  meanings	  
Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  imaginative	  geography	  conveys	  for	  different	  groups.	  I	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  
regionalisation	  and	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  ethno-­‐nationalism	  to	  show	  how	  political	  leaders	  draw	  
Darjeeling	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape,	  which	  attains	  strategic	  character	  in	  justifying	  the	  demand	  towards	  the	  
government	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  in	  mobilising	  the	  population	  on	  the	  other.	  As	  such	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  
and	  solution,	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  expresses	  and	  shapes	  ethnic	  identities	  and	  challenges	  
national	  geographies	  which	  confine	  Darjeeling	  to	  a	  marginal	  space,	  expressed	  in	  the	  Gorkhas’	  
“identity	  crisis”	  or	  “anxieties	  of	  belonging”	  (cf.	  Middleton	  2013b,	  609)	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  A	  comparison	  
of	  politician’s	  attempts	  to	  frame	  Darjeeling	  as	  Gorkhaland	  with	  alternative	  imaginations	  of	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Darjeeling,	  and	  perceptions	  of	  tea	  plantation	  residents,	  however,	  underlines	  that	  while	  the	  
imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  privileges	  certain	  identities	  it	  also	  excludes	  and	  neglects	  others.	  	  
	  
4.3 Ethno-­‐scapes,	  the	  “identity	  crisis”,	  and	  Gorkhaland	  
I	  now	  explore	  ways	  political	  leaders	  in	  Darjeeling	  frame	  Gorkhaland.	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  
redemptive	  properties	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand,	  which	  leaders	  claim	  could	  address	  the	  Gorkhas’	  
“identity	  crisis”	  and	  developmental	  grievances	  alike,	  and	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  ways	  they	  design	  Darjeeling	  
as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  by	  connecting	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  ethno-­‐nationalism	  to	  the	  claimed	  territory	  
(Smith	  1996b).	  These	  constructions	  also	  challenge	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  region	  to	  an	  imagined	  Indian	  
nation.	  In	  combination,	  these	  elements	  not	  only	  justify	  the	  statehood	  demand	  towards	  the	  
government	  but	  also	  construct	  subjectivities	  expressed	  in	  the	  visionary	  imaginary	  of	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  
national	  ethno-­‐scape	  (Wenner	  2013).	  In	  this	  way	  politicians	  utilise	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imagination	  as	  a	  
“frame”	  (Snow	  and	  Benford	  1988),	  which	  not	  only	  identifies	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  communities’	  
problems	  but	  also	  presents	  a	  suitable	  solution.	  The	  presentation	  is	  based	  on	  interviews	  which	  I	  
conducted	  with	  central	  leaders	  of	  the	  different	  Gorkha	  parties	  and	  organisations	  (GJM,	  CPRM,	  AIGL,	  
GNLF,	  and	  BGP)	  between	  January	  2011	  and	  July	  2012;	  party-­‐pamphlets/documents	  including	  the	  
GJM’s	  publications	  “Why	  Gorkhaland?”	  (GJM,	  2009);	  and	  “The	  case	  for	  Gorkhaland”	  (GJM,	  2008)	  
(which	  functioned	  as	  document	  presented	  towards	  the	  Indian	  government);	  as	  well	  as	  public	  
speeches	  of	  political	  leaders.	  	  
4.3.1 “Anxious	  belongings”	  and	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  “address”	  
Travelling	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  gives	  an	  impression	  of	  its	  fuzzy	  and	  –	  at	  least	  for	  me	  –	  invisible	  
boundaries.	  Although	  the	  hilly	  landscape	  towards	  the	  east,	  west,	  and	  north	  flows	  in	  a	  seeming	  
continuum,	  my	  friends	  regularly	  pointed	  at	  the	  invisible	  administrative	  and	  national	  borders	  which	  
give	  the	  district	  its	  shape.	  “Across	  that	  river	  Sikkim	  starts”,	  they	  said,	  or:	  “Can	  you	  see	  that	  mountain	  
far	  away?	  This	  belongs	  to	  Bhutan”.	  Once,	  while	  travelling	  on	  the	  road	  up	  to	  Mirik,	  a	  small	  town	  close	  
to	  Darjeeling’s	  western	  border,	  my	  friends	  pointed	  out:	  “Miriam,	  over	  there	  is	  Nepal!”	  I	  looked	  out	  of	  
the	  jeep	  window	  but	  could	  see	  nothing	  but	  a	  white	  wall	  of	  heavy	  fog.	  “Well,	  you	  cannot	  see	  it	  today	  
but	  Nepal	  is	  there”,	  my	  friend	  stated.	  It	  is	  this	  misty	  national	  border	  between	  Nepal	  and	  India	  that	  
divides	  two	  seemingly	  alike	  places,	  which	  provides	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  argument	  which	  Subash	  
Ghisingh	  framed	  as	  the	  Gorkhas’	  “identity	  crisis”.	  
Chapter	  3	  showed	  how	  Gorkha	  ethnic	  consciousness	  developed	  historically	  partly	  from	  the	  
realisation	  of	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  Indians’	  fuzzy	  relation	  to	  an	  evolving	  Indian	  nation.	  As	  argued,	  Subash	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Ghisingh	  had	  innovatively	  coupled	  the	  statehood	  demand	  to	  questions	  of	  citizenship,	  national	  
recognition,	  and	  security	  during	  a	  time	  of	  perceived	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  crisis.	  This	  not	  only	  
struck	  an	  emotional	  chord	  amongst	  the	  anxious	  population	  but	  also	  implanted	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  
the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  could	  address	  their	  “identity”-­‐problems.	  Although	  Ghisingh’s	  agitation	  
did	  not	  succeed	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  the	  “monster	  of	  identity”	  (Niraj	  Lama,	  interview,	  
14.5.2013)	  which	  he	  had	  created	  lived	  on.	  Twenty-­‐seven	  years	  later,	  when	  the	  second	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation	  started	  under	  the	  GJM,	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  again	  served	  to	  mobilise	  the	  masses,	  drawing	  on	  
the	  same	  anxieties	  of	  belonging	  (Middleton	  2013c,	  609)	  and	  existential	  fears.	  	  
Like	  Ghisingh	  previously,	  post	  2007,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  second	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  blamed	  the	  
1950	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  and	  Friendship	  (see	  Chapter	  3)	  for	  creating	  confusion	  about	  the	  Gorkhas’	  
national	  status,	  exacerbated	  by	  similar	  culture	  and	  language,	  and	  physical	  resemblance	  with	  the	  
Nepali	  neighbours	  across	  the	  border	  (interviews:	  R.B.	  Rai,	  2.4.2012,	  H.B.	  Chettri,	  7.2.2011).	  R.B.	  Rai	  
explained	  the	  difficulties	  for	  Gorkhas	  to	  fit	  into	  an	  envisaged	  Indian	  nation:	  
We	  Nepalese	  are	  as	  un-­‐Indian	  like	  Indians	  [...].	  If	  you	  go	  to	  Mirik	  [near	  the	  Nepal	  border]	  you	  
see:	  here	  is	  Nepal	  –	  there	  is	  India	  [...].	  There	  is	  no	  difference,	  hill,	  river,	  grass,	  people...	  You	  
cannot	  see	  that	  these	  are	  different	  countries.	  If	  we	  go	  there	  we	  do	  not	  feel	  that	  this	  is	  an	  
outside	  place,	  it	  looks	  like	  ours.	  (interview,	  2.4.2012)	  
Like	  Ghisingh	  before,	  the	  new	  leaders	  claimed	  that	  only	  a	  separation	  from	  West	  Bengal	  would	  solve	  
this	  “identity	  crisis”,	  “because	  the	  boundary	  is	  that	  thing	  which	  creates	  identity”	  (H.B.	  Chettri,	  
interview,	  7.2.2011).	  Enos	  Das	  Pradhan	  (from	  BGP)	  underlined	  the	  existential	  importance	  of	  
Gorkhaland.	  The	  new	  State,	  he	  claimed	  was	  “an	  attempt	  of	  delinking	  from	  Nepal	  because	  our	  future	  
lies	  in	  delinking	  from	  Nepal”	  (interview,	  16.7.2011).	  Leaders	  also	  related	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  
development	  to	  the	  “identity	  crisis”.	  Unemployment	  and	  lack	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  proper	  medical	  
facilities	  are	  attributed	  to	  an	  “internal	  colonialism”	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government,	  which	  exploited	  
their	  hills	  of	  their	  resources.	  H.B.	  Chettri,	  the	  then	  spokesperson	  of	  the	  GJM	  (and	  since	  2011	  MLA),	  
summarised	  this	  argument	  as	  follows:	  
So	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  if	  you	  want	  to	  resolve	  this	  crisis	  we	  will	  create	  a	  State	  [...].	  Then	  nobody	  will	  ask	  
you:	  where	  you	  are	  from.	  And	  your	  developmental	  agendas	  are	  taken	  care	  of,	  you	  are	  there	  to	  rule	  
yourself	  [...].	  At	  least	  you	  enter	  the	  mainstream	  of	  Indian	  politics.	  Right	  now	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  direct	  link	  
to	  the	  Indian	  government.	  We	  have	  to	  go	  via	  the	  State,	  so	  automatically	  you	  become	  some	  kind	  of	  
second	  class	  citizen.	  (interview,	  7.2.2011)	  
As	  developmental	  concerns	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  budgetary	  adjustments	  or	  autonomous	  
councils	  (E.D.	  Pradhan,	  interview,	  16.7.2011)	  all	  leaders	  unanimously	  stressed	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  as	  
the	  major	  problem	  which	  could	  only	  be	  addressed	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  State.	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4.3.2 Darjeeling	  as	  a	  national	  “ethno-­‐scape”	  
The	  Gorkha	  leaders	  face	  a	  dilemma:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  need	  to	  mobilise	  the	  masses	  based	  on	  an	  
ethnic	  rhetoric,	  which	  stresses	  uniqueness	  and	  differences	  from	  Bengal,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  they	  must	  
not	  appear	  as	  anti-­‐national	  but	  formulate	  their	  demand	  in	  the	  broader	  framework	  of	  the	  Indian	  
nation.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  as	  they	  are	  sometimes	  blamed	  for	  being	  secret	  agents	  of	  a	  
“Greater	  Nepal”	  (see	  Chapter	  4.4.5).	  The	  Gorkha	  leaders	  underline	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Indian	  
nation	  not	  only	  by	  stressing	  that	  their	  demand	  was	  raised	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Indian	  
constitution.	  They	  also	  interweave	  it	  with	  references	  to	  the	  colonial	  “martial	  race”	  theory	  and	  a	  
construction	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  frontier-­‐space,	  underlining	  geostrategic	  anxieties	  of	  the	  Indian	  
government.	  For	  instance,	  the	  leaders	  point	  at	  the	  Gorkhas’	  “loyalty”	  as	  brave	  soldiers,	  claiming	  that	  
“Gorkhaland	  could	  be	  a	  fortress”	  (H.B.	  Chettri,	  interview,	  17.2.2011),	  and	  a	  “buffer”	  State	  of	  
“Gorkhas	  [...]	  who	  have	  always	  proved	  their	  unstinting	  loyalty	  to	  the	  nation”	  (GJM	  2009,	  12,	  13).	  But	  
such	  geostrategic	  imaginative	  geographies	  alone	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  underscore	  the	  belonging	  of	  
people	  to	  the	  claimed	  territory.	  Rather,	  Gorkha	  leaders	  draw	  on	  the	  above	  introduced	  “deep	  
resources”	  of	  ethnicity:	  the	  claim	  to	  uniqueness,	  the	  territorialisation	  of	  history,	  and	  idealised	  
memories	  of	  a	  golden	  age	  (Smith	  1996b).	  
Uniqueness	  and	  boundaries	  
Gorkha	  leaders	  utilise	  the	  nationalist	  principles	  of	  uniqueness	  and	  “ethnic	  election”	  (Smith	  1996c,	  
452)	  to	  draw	  ethnic	  differences	  to	  Bengalis	  and	  undergird	  the	  envisaged	  boundaries	  of	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  State,	  including	  the	  contested	  Dooars	  region	  at	  the	  southern	  fringe	  of	  Bhutan.	  They	  do	  so	  
by	  describing	  both	  the	  Gorkhas	  and	  the	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  different,	  distinguished	  from	  the	  
people	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  Bengal	  by	  their	  culture,	  language	  (Nepali	  instead	  of	  Bengali),	  and	  physical	  
characteristics.	  Also	  the	  topographical	  distinction	  between	  “hills”	  and	  “plains”	  serves	  as	  reference	  to	  
underline	  that	  the	  Gorkhas	  are	  a	  “distinct	  race”	  (Thulung,	  2008,	  GJM).	  R.B.	  Rai	  (CPRM)	  portrayed	  
Darjeeling	  as	  the	  “social,	  political	  and	  symbolic	  centre	  of	  all	  Indian	  Gorkhas”	  (interview,	  17.7.2012),	  
thereby	  stressing	  its	  importance	  for	  Indian	  Nepalis	  living	  outside	  Darjeeling.	  To	  underline	  cultural	  
differences,	  in	  2008	  the	  GJM	  had	  directed	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  to	  wear	  traditional	  Nepali	  attire	  
such	  as	  chaubandi	  cholo89,	  daura	  shuruval90	  or	  daka	  topi	  91	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Also	  selective	  references	  
to	  the	  districts’	  history	  support	  the	  claim	  to	  uniqueness.	  Referring	  to	  the	  time	  when	  Darjeeling	  still	  
belonged	  to	  Sikkim,	  Bhutan,	  and	  Nepal,	  the	  political	  leaders	  argue	  that	  the	  territory	  had	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Traditional	  Nepalese	  short	  coat	  usually	  in	  the	  colourful	  daka	  fabric	  worn	  by	  women;	  it	  is	  twice	  folded	  on	  the	  
front	  side	  and	  is	  tied	  with	  four	  small	  ribbons	  
90	  Traditional	  Nepalese	  attire	  worn	  by	  men;	  the	  upper	  part	  consists	  of	  a	  twice	  folded	  knee-­‐long	  tunic,	  the	  lower	  
part	  of	  a	  wide	  paint	  in	  the	  same	  colour.	  
91	  Traditional	  Nepalese	  hat	  in	  the	  colourful	  daka	  fabric.	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artificially	  added	  to	  Bengal	  through	  treaties	  with	  “foreign	  countries”	  but	  had	  never	  been	  ruled	  by	  any	  
king	  of	  the	  “plains	  of	  Bengal”	  (GJM,	  2009,	  3).	  In	  this	  context	  they	  also	  point	  at	  the	  colonial	  
exclusionist	  governance	  which	  had	  separated	  it	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Bengal	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  	  
While	  such	  rhetoric	  creates	  differences	  with	  Bengal,	  Gorkha	  leaders	  stress	  their	  similarities	  to	  the	  
inhabitants	  of	  the	  Dooars,	  which	  they	  claim	  as	  part	  of	  the	  envisaged	  Gorkhaland.	  Such	  claims	  are	  
complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  belt	  at	  the	  southern	  fringe	  of	  Bhutan	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  Darjeeling	  
but	  to	  Jalpaiguri	  district,	  and	  has	  a	  mixed	  population	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Here,	  the	  GJM	  does	  not	  have	  a	  
majority	  hold92.	  Further,	  some	  adivasi	  and	  Bengali	  groups	  oppose	  the	  Dooars’	  incorporation	  into	  a	  
Gorkha	  State.	  Although	  the	  Gorkha	  leaders	  acknowledge	  the	  different	  demographic	  set-­‐up	  they	  
promote	  the	  togetherness	  of	  the	  regions	  by	  stressing	  	  the	  common	  cultural,	  social	  or	  linguistic	  
affinities.	  Nepali,	  the	  GJM	  claims,	  was	  the	  lingua	  franca	  of	  the	  Dooars	  (GJM	  2009,	  6,	  7).	  Both,	  the	  
Gorkhas	  and	  the	  adivasis	  are	  described	  as	  poor	  communities	  oppressed	  by	  the	  Bengalis.	  The	  
proclamation	  of	  the	  togetherness	  of	  Dooars	  and	  Darjeeling	  even	  culminated	  in	  a	  short-­‐time	  name-­‐
change	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  In	  a	  vast	  public	  meeting	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  in	  Darjeeling	  on	  30.6.201093,	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  announced	  the	  demand	  of	  a	  “Gorkha	  Adivasi	  Pradesh”:	  
We	  are	  the	  same	  matvālī	  jāt	  [alcohol-­‐drinking	  caste].	  We	  stay	  in	  the	  same	  place	  and	  work	  together.	  We	  
planted	  the	  tea	  bushes	  together	  [...].	  We	  were	  together	  yesterday,	  and	  we	  should	  be	  together	  today	  and	  
tomorrow.	  [...]	  We	  declare	  a	  ‘Gorkha	  Adivasi	  Pradesh’.	  This	  is	  for	  Gorkhas	  and	  for	  adivasis	  [...].	  We	  should	  
invite	  each	  other,	  we	  should	  love	  each	  other.	  
Other	  Gorkha	  leaders	  cite	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  Dooars	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  
Parliamentary	  Constituency	  till	  1976	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  the	  areas’	  togetherness	  (E.D.	  Pradhan,	  
interview,	  16.7.2011).	  To	  underline	  their	  claims	  to	  the	  Dooars,	  the	  GJM	  had	  also	  performed	  a	  pada	  
yatra	  from	  Darjeeling	  to	  the	  river	  Sunkosh	  at	  the	  Assam	  border,	  where	  its	  activists	  planted	  GJM	  flags	  
and	  performed	  a	  bhumi	  puja94.	  Participants	  of	  the	  week-­‐long	  journey	  were	  later	  celebrated	  in	  
Darjeeling95.	  The	  Gorkhas’	  claim	  to	  the	  Dooars	  was	  also	  shockingly	  underlined	  in	  February	  2011,	  
when	  three	  GJM	  activists	  were	  shot	  dead	  by	  the	  police	  while	  attempting	  to	  trespass	  police	  barricades	  
set-­‐up	  to	  prevent	  a	  pada	  yatra	  crossing	  over	  to	  Jalpaiguri	  district	  from	  Darjeeling.	  Also	  in	  slogans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  To	  increase	  its	  hold,	  in	  the	  2013	  panchayat	  elections	  the	  GJM	  struck	  an	  alliance	  with	  Barla-­‐led	  Jharkhand	  
Mukti	  Morcha	  (JMM)	  and	  secured	  13	  gram	  panchayats	  	  out	  of	  the	  70	  in	  the	  Dooars.	  TMC	  won	  17	  and	  the	  Left	  
Front	  18,	  while	  in	  the	  remaining	  gram	  panchayats	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  majority	  (TT,	  29.07.2013).	  
93	  Importantly,	  this	  massive	  meeting	  attended	  by	  Darjeeling	  MP	  Jaswant	  Singh	  (BJP)	  was	  held	  only	  few	  days	  
after	  the	  public	  outcry	  over	  the	  murder	  of	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  had	  triggered	  fierce	  protests	  against	  
the	  GJM	  and	  its	  president	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  It	  basically	  functioned	  as	  a	  presentation	  of	  strength	  and	  force	  
(see	  Chapter	  7	  and	  8).	  	  
94	  This	  Hindu	  religious	  ritual	  sanctifies	  the	  ground	  and	  is	  usually	  practised	  before	  construction	  of	  houses	  or	  
other	  structures	  starts.	  
95	  Importantly,	  to	  travel	  safely	  through	  the	  contested	  Dooars	  areas	  the	  GJM	  sought	  support	  from	  the	  
Kamptapur	  Progressive	  Party	  who	  demands	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Kamptapur	  State	  comprising	  Darjeeling	  and	  the	  
Dooars.	  The	  GJM	  alliance	  with	  the	  Greater	  Kamtapur	  United	  Forum	  split	  in	  2008	  (Bagchi	  2012).	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shouted	  during	  demonstrations	  and	  public	  meetings,	  GJM-­‐activists	  underline	  their	  claim	  on	  the	  
Dooars’	  territory	  (see	  Picture	  2).	  
Such	  performances,	  narratives,	  and	  selective	  representation	  of	  data	  serve	  to	  underline	  the	  envisaged	  
boundaries	  of	  a	  Gorkhaland	  State.	  Yet,	  although	  all	  parties	  stick	  to	  their	  claim	  to	  the	  Dooars,	  Bimal	  
Gurung’s	  “Gorkha	  Adivasi	  Pradesh”	  proposal	  did	  not	  enter	  the	  mainstream	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  was	  
soon	  dismissed,	  probably	  also	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  support	  amongst	  the	  adivasis	  who	  felt	  threatened	  
by	  the	  possible	  incorporation	  into	  a	  Gorkha	  State	  (The	  Statesman,	  31.08.2011)96.	  Eventually,	  the	  June	  
2012	  report	  of	  the	  Justice	  Syamlal	  Sen	  Committee,	  which	  was	  nominated	  to	  sort-­‐out	  territorial	  claims	  
of	  the	  GJM	  regarding	  the	  area	  to	  be	  included	  under	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA)	  
excluded	  the	  Dooars	  (except	  for	  five	  mouzas)	  based	  on	  reasons	  of	  lack	  of	  “compactness”,	  
“contiguity”,	  and	  “homogeneity”	  (Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  2012)97.	  Despite	  the	  initial	  protests	  of	  
the	  GJM	  against	  the	  lack	  of	  areal	  attribution	  the	  GTA	  was	  established	  on	  the	  former	  DGHC	  area	  in	  
August	  2012	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  
Territorialisation	  of	  memory	  
The	  territorialisation	  of	  memory	  describes	  the	  process	  where	  selected	  narratives	  are	  tied	  to	  a	  
(claimed)	  physical	  territory,	  and	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  regionalisation	  (Paasi	  2002a).	  For	  the	  
Gorkha	  leaders,	  the	  selection	  of	  narratives	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task.	  The	  “anxiety	  of	  belonging”	  (Middleton	  
2013b,	  609)	  and	  the	  entailed	  need	  to	  present	  Darjeeling’s	  population	  as	  genuine	  Indian	  citizens	  
forces	  them	  to	  play	  down	  the	  history	  of	  colonial-­‐time	  migration,	  or	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Besky	  (2013,	  139)	  
to	  prioritise	  a	  “primordial	  understanding”	  (in	  contrast	  to	  a	  “historical	  understanding”)	  of	  the	  
Gorkhas’	  relation	  to	  the	  land.	  	  
All	  interviewed	  leaders	  stressed	  that	  even	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Darjeeling,	  Nepalis	  had	  
already	  been	  staying	  there,	  and	  were	  incorporated	  in	  British	  India	  “together	  with	  their	  land”	  
(interviews	  E.D.	  Pradhan	  16.7.2011;	  R.B.	  Rai	  17.7.2011).	  The	  BGP’s	  website	  for	  instance	  describes	  the	  
Gorkhas	  as	  “people	  who	  were	  assimilated	  into	  British	  India	  along	  with	  their	  land	  under	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Sugaulee	  of	  1815	  and	  [the]	  descendants	  of	  those	  people	  of	  Nepali	  origin	  who	  migrated	  to	  India	  since	  
the	  pre-­‐British	  era”	  (BGP	  2015,	  my	  emphases).	  Such	  statements,	  which	  are	  often	  supported	  by	  
“scientific”	  accounts	  of	  the	  intellectual	  “study	  forum”98	  of	  the	  GJM,	  are	  intended	  to	  underline	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Instead,	  their	  leaders	  stress	  on	  the	  need	  for	  development,	  and	  have	  proposed	  bringing	  the	  areas	  under	  the	  
6th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution,	  which	  grants	  tribal	  autonomy	  under	  the	  respective	  State	  government.	  
97	  Significantly,	  the	  exact	  meaning	  of	  these	  criteria	  was	  not	  explicitly	  defined	  in	  the	  report	  (for	  a	  discussion	  see	  
Sarkar	  2013).	  For	  a	  map	  displaying	  the	  GJM’s	  areal	  demand	  and	  the	  Sen	  Committee’s	  recommendation	  see	  TT,	  
10.06.2012.	  
98	  Unlike	  the	  GNLF,	  the	  GJM	  from	  the	  beginning	  placed	  emphasis	  on	  giving	  a	  voice	  to	  intellectuals	  through	  the	  
“study	  forum”	  which	  besides	  backing	  up	  the	  party’s	  argumentation	  with	  “historical	  facts”	  initially	  also	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the	  Nepalis	  –	  like	  the	  Lepcha	  –	  form	  an	  indigenous	  population.	  Expressions	  such	  as	  “this	  land	  was	  
ours	  and	  still	  belongs	  to	  us”	  (Bimal	  Gurung,	  speech,	  7.5.2008),	  designations	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  
“homeland”	  (R.B.	  Rai,	  interview,	  17.7.2011),	  and	  references	  to	  nature	  such	  as	  “The	  image	  of	  the	  
himāl	  [mountain]	  as	  displayed	  on	  the	  100	  rupees	  note	  is	  our	  identity”	  (Bimal	  Gurung,	  speech,	  
7.5.2008)	  support	  the	  construction	  of	  such	  primordial	  ties	  by	  politicians.	  But	  although	  most	  
politicians	  prioritise	  such	  a	  primordial	  reading,	  some	  also	  acknowledge	  a	  historical	  appropriation	  of	  
the	  land.	  For	  instance,	  H.B.	  Chettri	  drew	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  Gorkhas’	  bodies,	  labour,	  
and	  the	  land:	  “Who	  made	  Darjeeling?	  The	  tea	  […]	  all	  planted	  by	  the	  Gorkhas,	  the	  roads	  were	  made	  
by	  them.	  Everything	  that	  Darjeeling	  is	  today	  is	  the	  blood	  and	  sweat	  of	  our	  ancestors.	  It	  is	  not	  some	  
Banerjee	  or	  Chatterjee	  [Bengali	  names]	  who	  created	  Darjeeling”	  (interview,	  7.2.2011).	  	  
Idealised	  memories	  of	  a	  golden	  age	  
A	  third	  element	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imaginary	  are	  idealised	  memories	  of	  a	  golden	  
age	  (Smith	  1996c).	  For	  Gorkha	  leaders,	  this	  “golden	  age”	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  colonial	  time	  (Britishko	  
pālo)	  with	  a	  caring	  and	  protective	  colonial	  government	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  They	  contrast	  such	  nostalgic	  
imaginations	  with	  a	  time	  of	  governmental	  neglect	  and	  developmental	  decline	  after	  Independence.	  
H.B.	  Chettri	  (GJM)	  claimed	  that:	  
Whatever	  wealth	  the	  colony	  had	  created	  here	  during	  the	  [...]	  British	  regime	  –	  nothing	  was	  added	  by	  
Bengal	  [...].	  See	  in	  terms	  of	  infrastructure	  [...].	  Look	  at	  the	  roads,	  it	  is	  getting	  worse.	  [...]	  All	  institutions	  
worth	  their	  name	  were	  created	  by	  the	  British.	  If	  you	  minus	  them,	  [it]	  is	  something	  like	  [...]	  English	  
literature	  without	  Shakespeare.	  [...]	  The	  place	  that	  was	  first	  [in	  catering	  to	  ]	  the	  need	  of	  West	  Bengal,	  
now	  that	  place	  has	  become	  impoverished	  due	  to	  the	  State’s	  discriminative	  policy.	  (interview,	  7.2.2011)	  
Part	  of	  this	  narrative	  of	  decline	  is	  the	  perceived	  threat	  posed	  by	  Bangladeshi	  migrants	  who	  –	  with	  
reference	  to	  demographic	  data	  -­‐	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  “overpopulated”	  previous	  Nepali	  strongholds	  
in	  Siliguri	  and	  the	  Dooars.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  leaders	  portray	  Gorkhaland	  as	  means	  to	  recreate	  
Darjeeling	  and	  revive	  its	  previous	  wealth.	  Thereby,	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  carries	  the	  
promise	  of	  self-­‐realisation	  on	  the	  own	  soil	  and	  attains	  a	  strong	  mobilising	  potential.	  	  
A	  “pan-­‐Indian	  grammar”	  
While	  such	  rhetoric	  evokes	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  group	  forging	  only	  an	  ethnic	  identity	  and	  regional	  
belonging,	  a	  closer	  look	  reveals	  that	  these	  imaginations	  transcend	  regionalist	  propaganda.	  The	  
expression	  of	  uniqueness	  and	  individuality,	  the	  emotional	  evocation	  of	  a	  lost	  golden	  age,	  and	  the	  
togetherness	  of	  people	  and	  place	  helps	  mobilising	  the	  population	  and	  fostering	  an	  ethno-­‐regional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
formulated	  policy	  recommendations.	  Being	  disappointed	  with	  the	  party’s	  political	  practices,	  many	  intellectuals	  
withdrew	  their	  support	  from	  the	  GJM	  after	  some	  time.	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consciousness.	  These	  references	  also	  draw	  on	  principles	  that	  are	  explicitly	  formulated	  in	  Indian	  
history	  or	  States’	  reorganisation	  and	  its	  constitution.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Gorkha	  leaders’	  stress	  on	  
cultural	  and	  linguistic	  differences	  and	  on	  the	  togetherness	  of	  people	  and	  place	  reflects	  the	  principle	  
of	  linguistically	  and	  culturally	  homogenous	  States,	  which	  served	  as	  a	  major	  basis	  for	  India’s	  
reorganisation	  in	  1956.	  The	  GJM	  takes	  direct	  recurrence	  to	  that	  principle:	  “In	  India,	  language	  has	  
provided	  an	  obvious	  basis	  for	  formulation	  of	  separate	  states,	  because	  linguistic	  groups	  are	  also	  
culturally	  distinct	  societies”	  (GJM	  2008,	  21).	  In	  this	  reading,	  the	  Gorkhas	  present	  a	  unique	  nation	  
worthy	  of	  getting	  its	  own	  State,	  as	  other	  communities	  such	  as	  the	  Punjabis,	  Tamils,	  and	  Marathis	  did.	  
The	  presentation	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  different	  place	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  only	  part	  of	  a	  strategy	  to	  
separate	  it	  from	  Bengal	  but	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  some	  criteria	  based	  on	  which	  Indian	  federalism	  stands	  
(Wenner	  2013).	  In	  this	  reading,	  the	  Gorkha	  leaders	  draw	  on	  what	  Baruah	  in	  his	  study	  on	  Assamese	  
sub-­‐nationalism	  has	  termed	  as	  “pan-­‐Indian	  grammar”	  (Baruah	  1999,	  91).	  Darjeeling	  becomes	  a	  
national	  ethno-­‐scape99.	  
4.3.3 Frames	  for	  subjectivities	  
As	  shown	  above,	  imaginative	  geographies	  and	  regionalisations	  stand	  in	  a	  direct	  relation	  to	  identities	  
and	  subjectivities.	  Also	  the	  imaginative	  geography	  of	  Gorkhaland	  as	  promoted	  by	  regional	  politicians	  
unites	  two	  aspects	  that	  offer	  specific	  geographies	  of	  identities	  as	  possible	  reference	  frames	  for	  
people’s	  subjectivities.	  	  
First,	  selected	  narratives	  which	  describe	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  different,	  appropriated,	  and	  previously	  
wealthy	  place	  powerfully	  link	  people,	  their	  past	  and	  their	  present	  to	  the	  claimed	  territory.	  The	  
endowment	  of	  place	  with	  selected	  narratives	  makes	  Darjeeling	  an	  “ancestral	  homeland”	  and	  also	  
underlines	  the	  Gorkhas’	  perceived	  “birth-­‐right”	  to	  the	  land.	  Such	  purposefully	  established	  links	  
between	  history,	  people,	  and	  place	  in	  the	  hegemonic	  narrative	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  leaders	  strives	  to	  
construct	  a	  “regional	  identity”	  (Paasi	  2002b,	  146),	  an	  emotionally	  laden	  collective	  identification	  of	  
people	  with	  their	  place.	  In	  politicians’	  narratives,	  Darjeeling	  becomes	  an	  ethno-­‐scape,	  a	  space	  of	  and	  
for	  the	  “Gorkhas”.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  In	  Wenner	  (2013)	  I	  showed	  how	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imaginary	  contests	  what	  Johnson	  &	  Coleman	  (2012)	  have	  
described	  as	  “internal	  othering”,	  the	  designation	  of	  difference	  to	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  a	  weaker	  region	  by	  a	  
more	  powerful	  one	  within	  a	  state	  (Jansson	  2003).	  	  




As	  a	  second	  element,	  Gorkhaland	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  ultimate	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  
“identity	  crisis”	  and	  developmental	  deprivation.	  Importantly,	  such	  problems	  are	  attributed	  to	  an	  
exploitative	  and	  neglecting	  state	  solely,	  making	  it	  the	  major	  enemy	  and	  opponent	  of	  the	  community.	  
In	  this	  context,	  Gorkhaland	  becomes	  a	  redemptive	  vision	  which	  proclaims	  that	  liberation/salvation	  is	  
only	  possible	  through	  the	  (attainment)	  of	  an	  own	  space	  separate	  from	  West	  Bengal.	  Gorkhaland	  
would	  provide	  a	  permanent	  address	  to	  the	  Nepalis,	  whose	  unsecure	  position	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  Indian	  
nation	  gives	  them	  a	  sense	  of	  deterritorialisation.	  Politicians	  claim	  that	  Gorkhaland	  would	  function	  as	  
a	  homeland	  also	  for	  those	  living	  outside	  of	  Darjeeling.	  They	  present	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  guarantor	  for	  
development,	  justice,	  equality,	  participation,	  autonomy,	  national	  recognition,	  and	  security.	  
Gorkhaland	  becomes	  a	  fit-­‐it-­‐all	  solution	  which	  can	  bring	  back	  the	  lost	  wealth	  of	  a	  previous	  golden	  
age.	  	  
	  
Picture	  3:	  During	  a	  GJM	  demonstration	  in	  Kalimpong,	  March	  2012.The	  women,	  dressed	  in	  saris	  printed	  with	  
the	  Nepali	  ḍaka	  colour	  shout	  slogans:	  “Without	  Terai	  Dooars	  there	  won’t	  be	  elections	  to	  GTA!	  –	  Terai	  Dooars	  
must	  be	  added!	  -­‐	  ‘We	  want	  justice’	  [Engl.]!	  –	  Our	  demand	  must	  come	  true!	  –	  Return	  the	  Gorkhas’	  land!	  –	  
Gorkhas	  need	  a	  land!	  –	  What	  do	  we	  demand?	  Gorkhaland	  –	  What	  do	  the	  people	  of	  the	  hills	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  
–	  What	  does	  the	  Muslim	  community	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  –	  What	  does	  the	  Bihari	  community	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  
–	  What	  does	  the	  Bhutia	  community	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  –	  What	  does	  the	  Lepcha	  community	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  
–	  What	  do	  those	  staying	  in	  the	  hills	  want?	  Gorkhaland	  –	  The	  one	  who	  brings	  Gorkhaland	  is	  Bimal	  Gurung!	  –	  
Bring	  Bimal	  Gurung	  dājū	  (elder	  brother)	  forward!	  –	  Jai	  Gorkha	  Jai	  Gorkha	  (long	  live	  the	  Gorkha)!	  –	  We	  need	  
our	  land!”	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Thus,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imaginary	  not	  only	  draws	  on	  selected	  ethnic	  markers	  but	  also	  continuously	  
reminds	  people	  of	  their	  ethnic	  belonging.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  reminds	  them	  of	  their	  incompleteness	  
in	  terms	  of	  belonging	  to	  an	  Indian	  nation.	  Gorkhaland	  attains	  the	  form	  of	  a	  promise	  for	  a	  bright	  
future.	  It	  becomes	  “a	  dream	  worth	  living,	  a	  dream	  worth	  dying	  for”	  (Middleton	  2010,	  156).	  I	  contend	  
that	  this	  imagination’s	  mobilising	  power	  lies	  in	  its	  utopian	  character.	  This	  makes	  it	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  
politicians,	  who	  –	  if	  they	  succeed	  in	  convincing	  the	  masses	  of	  their	  dedication	  and	  capability	  to	  fight	  
for	  the	  dream	  –	  can	  use	  it	  to	  mobilise	  support	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  parties	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  	  
But	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  Gorkhaland	  is	  not	  the	  only	  geographical	  
imagination	  projected	  on	  Darjeeling.	  I	  now	  briefly	  review	  some	  alternative	  imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling	  
outside	  the	  realm	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  formulated	  by	  some	  of	  the	  main	  contenders	  for	  
power	  and	  control	  over	  Darjeeling.	  
	  
4.4 Alternative	  imaginations	  
While	  the	  geographical	   imagination	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  Gorkhaland	  attained	  a	  hegemonic	  status,	  there	  
are	  actors,	  who	  promote	  alternative	   imaginations,	  and	   try	   to	  deconstruct	   the	   idea	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  
Gorkhaland.	   While	   some	   voices	   of	   dissent	   stem	   from	   Darjeeling	   itself	   such	   as	   the	   demand	   to	  
designate	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	   tribal	  area	   to	  bring	   it	  under	   the	  6th	  Schedule	   (GNLF),	   to	  merge	  Darjeeling	  
with	   Sikkim	   (Gorkha	   National	   Congress),	   or	   the	   Lepcha’s	   imagination	   of	   their	   ancient	   Kingdom	   of	  
“Mayel	  Lyang”,	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  also	  received	  critical	  responses	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  hills.	  
Amongst	  these	  groups	  are	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  (CPI-­‐M	  first	  and	  since	  2011,	  TMC),	  Bengali	  
groups	   in	   the	   plains	   (such	   as	   the	   Bangla	   O	   Bangla	   Bhasa	   Bachao	   Samiti	   (BOBBBS),	   Dooars	   Terai	  
Nagarik	   Manch),	   as	   well	   as	   one	   faction	   of	   the	   Akil	   Bharatiya	   Adivasi	   Vikash	   Parisad	   (ABAVF).	  
Imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling	  do	  not	  stop	  short	  at	  the	  national	  boundaries.	  Some	  nationalist	  groups	  in	  
Nepal	   demand	   the	   region	   to	   form	   part	   of	   a	   “Greater	   Nepal”.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	   alternative	  
imaginations	   the	   following	   chapter	   also	   provides	   a	   brief	   account	   on	   the	   view	   of	   the	   Indian	  
government.	   However,	   as	   I	   will	   show,	   none	   of	   these	   imaginations	   has	   been	   able	   to	   capture	   the	  
imagination	  of	  the	  majority	  in	  Darjeeling,	  underlining	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  redemptive	  statehood	  idea.	  
4.4.1 Views	  from	  the	  State:	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  TMC	  
Today,	  both	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  the	  TMC	  are	  strong	  opponents	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  and	  instead	  try	  
to	   accommodate	   ethnic	   aspirations	   through	   regional	   autonomy	   under	   the	   State’s	   authority.	  
Significantly,	   the	   CPI-­‐M	   (previously	   CPI)	   has	   made	   a	   u-­‐turn	   regarding	   the	   autonomy	   question.	  
Although	  the	  CPI	  had	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  new	  nation	  state	  Gorkhasthan	  in	  1947,	  the	  party’s	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policy	  changed	  considerably	  in	  the	  1950s,	  when	  it	  diverted	  from	  the	  Soviet	  doctrine	  of	  national	  self-­‐
determination	  and	   instead	   sought	   to	  accommodate	  ethnic	  movements	   through	   regional	  autonomy	  
(cf.	  Brass	  1985;	  see	  Chapter	  3).	  This	  approach	  finds	  expression	  in	  its	  concept	  of	  a	  “state-­‐within-­‐the-­‐
state”	  or	  an	  autonomous	  council	  under	   the	  State	  government	   (interviews,	  S.	  Pathak,	  23.7.2011;	  A.	  
Bhattacharya,	  9.7.2012).	  The	  CPI-­‐M	  leaders	  stressed	  that	  the	  party	  generally	  opposes	  all	  statehood	  
demands	   in	   India	   and	   instead	   aims	   at	   strengthening	   the	   existing	   States	   in	   order	   to	   balance	   the	  
influence	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  They	  claimed	  that	  separations	  on	  ethnic	  lines	  would	  not	  only	  
obscure	  the	  class	  divisions	  of	  society	  (K.B.	  Watter,	  interview,	  7.3.2012)	  but	  also	  endanger	  the	  internal	  
unity	  of	  India	  as	  many	  other	  demands	  for	  statehood	  would	  follow.	  	  
Ashok	   Bhattacharya,	   who	   played	   an	   important	   role	   during	   the	   CPI-­‐M	   government’s	   dealing	   with	  
Darjeeling,	  believed	   that	   the	  demand	   for	   statehood	  would	  make	   it	  easy	   for	  “foreign	  hands,	   the	  US	  
imperialists,	   [to	   take]	   advantage”	   (interview,	   9.7.2012).	   CPI-­‐M	   leaders	   also	   contradicted	   claims	   of	  
Darjeeling’s	  developmental	  backwardness	  and	  the	  Gorkhas’	  “identity	  crisis”.	  Pointing	  at	  Darjeeling’s	  
relatively	   high	   Human	   Development	   Index	   (see	   Chapter	   1),	   Ashok	   Bhattacharya	   stressed	   that	  
Darjeeling	  was	  well	  developed	  in	  West	  Bengal	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  provinces.	  Any	  grievances	  of	  
the	  Gorkhas	   should	   be	   addressed	   through	   “special	   developmental	   packages”	   instead	   of	   statehood	  
(ibid.).	  Further	  he	  claimed	  that	  Darjeeling	  had	  too	  small	  an	  area	  and	  little	  population	  and	  separation	  
was	   not	   economically	   viable	   (ibid.).	   The	   CPI-­‐M	   detected	   the	   “identity	   crisis”	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  
Gorkha	   leaders’	   argumentation	   as	   a	   “political	   strategy”	   of	  Gorkha	   leaders	   to	   attain	   statehood	   and	  
prescribed	  to	  address	  any	  problems	  related	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  discrimination	  through	  development	  and	  
not	   through	   territorial	  boundaries.	  Then	  Rajya	  Sabha	  member	  Saman	  Pathak	   (CPI-­‐M)	  also	   rejected	  
the	  notion	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  “homeland”	  for	  all	  Indian	  Nepalis	  (interview,	  23.7.2011).	  Also	  the	  Gorkha	  
parties’	  claim	  to	  the	  Dooars	  was	  rejected.	  Ashok	  Bhattacharya	  described	  this	  demand	  as	  “political”,	  
and	  as	  raised	  to	  “increase	  their	  area”	  (interview,	  9.7.2012).	  Ahead	  of	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  
the	  CPI-­‐M	   re-­‐iterated	   its	   inclination	   to	  bring	  Darjeeling	  under	   the	  6th	   Schedule,	   as	  Ghisingh	   (GNLF)	  
had	  demanded	  (see	  below).	  	  
Reflecting	  the	  CPI-­‐M’s	  stand	  on	  regional	  autonomy,	  till	  2011	  the	  State	  government	  had	  been	  involved	  
in	  bi-­‐partite	  and	  tri-­‐partite	  negotiations	  with	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  centre	  which	  focused	  on	  the	  creation	  
of	   an	   “interim	   council”	   for	  Darjeeling.	   But	   in	   July	   2011	   it	  was	   the	   new	  CM	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  who	  
eventually	  succeeded	  in	  bringing	  the	  new	  council	  on	  the	  paper	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  From	  the	  beginning	  
the	  TMC	  had	  employed	  a	  strategy	  of	  conciliation	  with	  the	  GJM.	  While	  none	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  leaders	  was	  
able	  to	  travel	  to	  Darjeeling	  hills	  during	  the	  revived	  agitation,	  already	  in	  2010	  Banerjee	  –	  then	  national	  
Railway	   minister	   –	   had	   met	   GJM	   top-­‐leaders	   in	   Darjeeling,	   and	   promised	   special	   developmental	  
assistance	   under	   her	   Ministry.	   After	   being	   elected	   Chief	   Minister	   in	   May	   2011,	   Banerjee	   has	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repeatedly	   stressed	   that	   the	   people	   of	   Darjeeling	   are	   her	   “brothers	   and	   sisters”,	   and	   described	  
Darjeeling	   as	   “her	   darling”	   or	   “my	   baby”	   (TT,	   12.10.2011).	   Thus,	   while	   the	   Gorkha	   organisations	  
attempt	  at	  drawing	  a	  sharp	  cultural	  and	  ethnic	  line	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  Bengalis,	  Banerjee	  
does	  not	  only	  stress	  unity	  between	  the	  plains	  and	  the	  hills	  but	  also	  her	  motherly	  attention.	  This	  also	  
became	  visible	  in	  her	  frequent	  visits	  to	  the	  hills,	  and	  special	  financial	  support	  after	  the	  earthquake	  in	  
September	  2011.	  The	  heart	  of	  her	  strategy	  to	  appease	  the	  hills	   is	   the	  slogan	  of	  “peace,	  democracy	  
and	  development”.	  Stressing	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  division	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  West	  Bengal,	  the	  CM	  
attempts	  to	  replace	  the	  vision	  of	  Gorkhaland	  with	  the	  geographical	   imagination	  of	  “Switzerland”	  to	  
be	   created	   from	   Darjeeling.	   At	   a	   public	   function	   at	   the	   central	   Chowrasta	   in	   Darjeeling	   town	   in	  
October	  2011,	  briefly	  after	   the	  GTA	  Act	  was	  promulgated,	  Banerjee	  underlined:	   “Darjeeling	  will	  be	  
Switzerland	  and	  everybody’s	  dreamland.	  The	  master	  plan	  for	  tourism	  development	  is	  underway,	  and	  
once	  implemented	  the	  region	  will	  turn	  into	  Switzerland”	  (cited	  in:	  SME	  Times,	  12.10.2011).	  
Thus,	  similar	  to	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  approach,	  developmental	  funding	  becomes	  an	  official	  means	   in	  the	  TMC	  
strategy	   to	   contain	   the	   Gorkhas’	   statehood	   aspirations.	   The	   vision	   of	   Switzerland	   as	   promoted	   by	  
Banerjee	   yet	  mainly	  emphasises	   the	   touristic	  potential	   of	  Darjeeling.	   This	  one-­‐sided	  vision	   thereby	  
neglects	  not	  only	  ethnic	  sentiments	  including	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  but	  also	  problems	  associated	  with	  
plantation	  or	  agricultural	   labour.	   The	  GJM’s	  occasional	   revival	  of	   the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  post	   the	  
2011	   GTA	   agreement	   and	   the	   CM’s	   reiteration	   that	   there	   would	   be	   no	   partition	   of	   West	   Bengal	  
combined	   with	   her	   attempts	   to	   establish	   TMC	   units	   in	   the	   hills	   (see	   Chapter	   8)	   have	   led	   to	   a	  
continuous	   up	   and	   down	   in	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   GJM	   and	   the	   State	   government.	   Till	   date,	  
however,	   the	  State	  government	  has	  always	  managed	   to	  bring	   the	  GJM	  back	   into	   its	   fold,	   although	  
neither	   the	   autonomous	   council	   model	   nor	   the	   imaginative	   geography	   of	   “Switzerland”	   hold	   any	  
popular	  appeal	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
4.4.2 Views	  from	  the	  centre:	  BJP	  and	  INC	  
In	  India,	  the	  decision	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  States	  is	  with	  the	  central	  government,	  although	  
experience	  has	  shown	  new	  States	  are	  hardly	  created	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  respective	  State	  
government	  (cf.	  Tillin	  2013)100.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  stand	  of	  the	  parties	  ruling	  the	  national	  
government	  is	  important.	  This	  concerns	  the	  INC	  which	  governed	  India	  during	  the	  violent	  1986	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  and	  during	  the	  revived	  movement	  post	  2007.	  Since	  2014	  the	  Bharatiya	  Janata	  
Party	  (BJP)	  during	  which	  legislation	  the	  three	  States	  of	  Jharkhand,	  Chattisgarh	  and	  Uttarakhand	  were	  
created	  in	  2000,	  overtook	  national	  power.	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  The	  creation	  of	  Telangana	  in	  2014	  was	  an	  exception.	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History	  suggests	  that	  the	  INC	  generally	  takes	  a	  rather	  conservative	  approach	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  
States.	  This	  becomes	  visible	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  reframe	  ethnic	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  as	  
developmental	  grievances,	  which	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  autonomous	  councils.	  Describing	  the	  
centre	  as	  a	  moderator	  between	  State	  government	  and	  the	  GJM,	  Ajay	  Maken	  (MoS	  Home	  Affairs)	  
stated	  that	  it	  “wants	  the	  region	  to	  prosper”	  and	  expressed	  hopes	  for	  an	  early	  execution	  of	  the	  
interim	  authority	  to	  solve	  developmental	  issues	  (cited	  in:	  Indian	  Express,	  19.3.2010).	  Although	  the	  
INC	  has	  not	  made	  an	  explicit	  statement	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand,	  its	  role	  in	  the	  DGHC	  negotiations	  
and	  its	  involvement	  after	  2008	  in	  tri-­‐partite	  negotiations	  on	  an	  autonomous	  council	  underline	  that	  
the	  party	  is	  not	  in	  favour	  of	  statehood	  for	  Darjeeling.	  While	  the	  party	  eventually	  gave	  in	  to	  the	  long-­‐
pending	  demand	  for	  Telangana	  in	  July	  2013,	  it	  continued	  to	  ignore	  the	  Gorkhas’	  renewed	  pledges.	  	  
Unlike	  the	  INC,	  the	  BJP	  takes	  a	  more	  explicit	  stand	  on	  the	  statehood	  question,	  and	  regularly	  
proclaims	  its	  sympathy	  for	  regional	  aspirations	  and	  “greater	  decentralisation	  through	  smaller	  States”	  
(BJP	  2014,	  8).	  This	  programme	  made	  the	  BJP	  an	  attractive	  partner	  for	  the	  GJM,	  who	  supported	  it	  in	  
the	  2009	  and	  2014	  parliamentary	  elections,	  hoping	  that	  it	  would	  forward	  its	  statehood	  claim	  in	  Delhi.	  
Yet,	  the	  appendixes	  to	  the	  BJP	  election	  manifestos	  only	  make	  lose	  promises	  and	  lack	  clear	  reference	  
to	  statehood.	  In	  the	  2014	  appendix	  to	  the	  manifesto	  the	  party	  again	  promised	  to	  	  
sympathetically	  examine	  and	  appropriately	  consider	  the	  long	  pending	  demands	  of	  the	  Gorkhas,	  the	  
adivasis	  and	  other	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  the	  Dooars	  region.	  (cited	  in:	  ToI,	  9.4.2014)101	  
Also	  Narendra	  Modi,	  who	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  after	  the	  2014	  elections,	  pledged	  his	  sympathy	  to	  
the	  Gorkhas	  before	  the	  2014	  elections.	  At	  a	  public	  meeting	  in	  Kaphrail	  near	  Siliguri	  he	  described	  
them	  as	  trustworthy	  security	  guards	  and	  defenders	  of	  the	  country	  (Modi,	  speech,	  cited	  in:	  Darjeeling	  
Times,	  10.4.2014).	  Thereby,	  he	  indirectly	  rendered	  Darjeeling	  a	  place	  of	  chaukidārs	  (watchmen)102,	  
an	  identity	  ascription	  which	  is	  strongly	  rejected	  by	  most	  Gorkhas.	  Modi	  further	  assured:	  	  “I	  want	  to	  
tell	  my	  Gorkha	  brothers,	  your	  dreams	  are	  our	  dreams,	  you	  (sic)	  be	  able	  to	  live	  with	  dignity,	  your	  
rights	  be	  protected,	  you	  get	  development	  opportunities	  all	  together.”	  (ibid.)	  
Despite	  such	  vague	  exclamations	  without	  any	  direct	  reference	  to	  statehood,	  the	  GJM-­‐supported	  BJP	  
candidates	  won	  the	  national	  elections	  from	  the	  Darjeeling	  constituency	  twice	  (in	  2009	  and	  2014)	  
with	  huge	  margins	  (see	  Table	  1	  in	  Chapter	  1).	  On	  his	  official	  Facebook	  page	  Bimal	  Gurung	  claims	  that	  
during	  a	  meeting	  BJP	  heavy-­‐weight	  L.K.	  Advani	  “told	  the	  delegation	  that	  the	  GJM	  must	  continue	  its	  
fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  justice	  would	  finally	  prevail.	  He	  agreed	  that	  Darjeeling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Already	  in	  2009	  the	  BJP	  had	  stated	  that:	  “We	  will	  sympathetically	  examine	  and	  appropriately	  consider	  the	  
long	  pending	  demands	  of	  the	  Gorkhas,	  the	  adivasis	  and	  other	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  Dooars	  region”	  
(cited	  in:	  The	  Hindu,	  9.4.2014).	  
102	  Chaukidār	  is	  a	  term	  used	  for	  watchmen,	  and	  carries	  a	  derogatory	  association	  for	  the	  Gorkhas,	  many	  of	  
whom	  feel	  that	  other	  Indians	  ignore	  their	  intellectual	  and	  other	  capabilities.	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was	  never	  a	  part	  of	  Bengal”	  (Facebook,	  25.5.2014)103.	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  icy	  relations	  between	  the	  
TMC	  led	  West	  Bengal	  government	  and	  the	  BJP	  led	  centre,	  and	  the	  latter’s	  attempts	  to	  target	  West	  
Bengal	  (The	  Hindu,	  8.6.2014)	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  assume	  that	  such	  “support”	  is	  rather	  politically	  
intended.	  This	  resembles	  attempts	  of	  the	  INC	  in	  the	  1980s,	  who	  is	  blamed	  for	  funding	  Ghisingh’s	  
movement	  to	  disturb	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  led	  West	  Bengal	  government	  (cf.	  Kohli	  1997b)	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  
Besides,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  national	  government’s	  considerations	  regarding	  
Gorkhaland	  are	  also	  shaped	  by	  concerns	  for	  national	  security	  (cf.	  Bagchi	  2012).	  Darjeeling	  belongs	  to	  
the	  so	  called	  “chicken	  neck”,	  the	  small	  section	  of	  Indian	  territory	  shaped	  by	  four	  international	  
boundaries	  (Nepal,	  Bhutan,	  Bangladesh,	  and	  –	  via	  Sikkim	  –	  China),	  which	  connects	  the	  heart	  land	  to	  
the	  conflict-­‐ridden	  North-­‐East.	  Any	  disturbances	  in	  this	  geopolitically	  sensitive	  region	  are	  thus	  seen	  
as	  threats	  to	  national	  security	  (Ramachandran	  2011;	  Unnithan	  2011).	  Modi’s	  reference	  during	  the	  
above	  mentioned	  public	  meeting	  in	  Kaprail	  to	  “Bangladeshi	  infiltrators”,	  who	  allegedly	  deprived	  the	  
Indian	  citizens	  of	  jobs	  and	  land	  (cited	  in:	  Darjeeling	  Times,	  10.4.2014)	  underlines	  such	  concerns.	  
Thus,	  any	  government	  probably	  wants	  to	  avoid	  any	  prolonged	  disturbances	  or	  uproar	  in	  this	  area.	  
This	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  speedy	  action	  of	  the	  centre	  INC	  and	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  during	  the	  
large	  scale	  protests	  against	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  proposal	  in	  2007-­‐2008	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  
4.4.3 Alternative	  voices	  from	  within	  
Tribal	  Darjeeling	  –	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  demand	  
Although	   it	  was	   Subash	  Ghisingh	  who	  empowered	   the	   vision	  of	  Gorkhaland,	   in	   the	  early	   2000s	  he	  
started	  working	   on	   another	   idea,	   namely	   to	   bring	   Darjeeling	   under	   the	   6th	   Schedule	   of	   the	   Indian	  
constitution.	  The	  6th	  Schedule	  grants	   regional	  autonomy	  under	   the	  purview	  of	   the	   respective	  State	  
government	   to	   areas	   with	   large	   tribal	   population.	   Unlike	   the	   DGHC	   agreement,	   the	   6th	   Schedule	  
provides	   constitutionally	   guaranteed	   autonomy	   and	   is	   considered	   stronger	   than	   other	   regional	  
autonomy	  agreements.	  Originally	  it	  had	  been	  created	  as	  a	  safeguard	  for	  the	  mainly	  tribal	  populated	  
North-­‐Eastern	  States	  of	  India.	  But	  although	  by	  2005,	  only	  32	  percent	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  population	  were	  
Scheduled	  Tribes	  (Middleton	  2010,	  35),	  in	  December	  2005	  Ghisingh	  signed	  a	  tripartite	  Memorandum	  
of	  Settlement	  in	  Delhi	  to	  bring	  Darjeeling	  under	  the	  6th	  Schedule.	  In	  the	  consecutive	  months	  he	  tried	  
to	   convince	   people	   in	  Darjeeling	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   Schedule,	  which	   he	   described	   as	   providing	  
special	  political	  protection	  and	  security	  through	  its	  constitutional	  guarantee.	  Part	  of	  this	  strategy	  was	  
also	  to	  make	  people	  believe	  that	  they	  were	  actually	  “tribal”	  (see	  Chapter	  3):	  
The	  6th	  Schedule	  is	  not	  for	  the	  people	  [...],	  it	  is	  for	  the	  soil,	  to	  make	  this	  soil	  tribal	  (janjātīko).	  [...]	  Whatever	  
land	  is	  there	  in	  the	  hills	  –	  all	  this	  will	  be	  tribal	  land	  [...].	  And	  we	  will	  get	  political	  protection,	  total	  protection	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  Last	  accessed:	  27.5.2014.	  This	  statement	  was	  not	  confirmed	  by	  any	  official	  BJP	  sources.	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of	   tribals	   –	  we	   are	   tribals	   [...].	  When	   the	   land	   becomes	   tribal	   then	   all	  who	   stay	   here	   become	   tribal.	   All	  
insects	  become	   tribal,	   the	  dogs	  and	  goats	  all	  become	   tribal.	   (S.	  Ghisingh,	   speech	  at	  Norbung	   tea	  estate,	  
17.12.2006)	  
	  
Such	   attempts	   were	   coupled	   with	   forced	   performances	   of	   “tribalness”,	   such	   as	   the	   direction	   to	  
worship	  a	  shīlā	  (sacred	  stone)	  instead	  of	  Godess	  Durga	  during	  Dashain	  (the	  Nepalese	  main	  religious	  
festival)	  and	  processions	  of	  jhākrīs	  (shamans)	  and	  public	  display	  of	  their	  performances.	  Further,	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  North-­‐Eastern	  State	  of	  Meghalaya	  out	  of	  a	  previous	  6th	  Schedule	  
area	   the	   GNLF	   described	   it	   as	   a	   stepping	   stone	   towards	   statehood104.	   Some	   GNLF	   leaders	   also	  
expressed	   the	  belief	   that	  under	   the	  6th	   Schedule	   the	   tea	  proprietors	  would	  have	   to	   lease	   the	   land	  
from	  the	  regional	  government	  and	  not	  from	  the	  State	  government	  as	  at	  present,	  which	  would	  make	  
it	  easier	  to	  control	  them.	  Yet,	  before	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  could	  be	  passed	  by	  the	  national	  parliament	  
in	   late	   2007,	   the	   popular	   uproar	   against	   Ghisingh	   in	   Darjeeling	   had	   reached	   a	   critical	   point.	  
Spearheaded	  by	  the	  GJM,	  an	  alliance	  against	  the	  6th	  Scheduled	  was	  formed,	  which	  managed	  to	  bring	  
its	  implementation	  to	  a	  halt	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  The	  alliance	  opposed	  the	  bill	  on	  grounds	  that	  the	  plains	  
areas	   of	   Siliguri	   including	   its	   important	   infrastructure	   (railway	   station,	   university,	   medical	   college,	  
airport,	  etc.)	  and	  the	  Dooars	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  envisaged	  autonomous	  area	  and	  that	  privileges	  
to	   the	   minority	   tribal	   population	   would	   result	   in	   a	   split	   of	   the	   Gorkha	   community,	   leading	   to	  
“fragmentation,	   division	   and	   discrimination”	   (GJM	  2007,	   6).	   Although	   the	   6th	   Schedule	   did	   not	   yet	  
become	   a	   reality,	   Ghisingh	   continued	   promoting	   this	   idea	   in	   Darjeeling,	   and	   made	   it	   part	   of	   his	  
strategy	  to	  re-­‐claim	  the	  lost	  control105	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  
Darjeeling	  as	  part	  of	  “Mayel	  Lyang”	  
While	   the	   Gorkha	   parties	   mainly	   represent	   Nepali	   speaking	   groups,	   which	   are	   in	   majority	   in	  
Darjeeling	   hills,	  minority	   groups	   such	   as	   the	   Lepcha,	   who	   constituted	   2%	   of	   the	   hill	   population	   in	  
2001	   (Chapter	   1)	   find	   less	   representation	   amongst	   them106.	   Instead,	   the	   Indigenous	   Lepcha	   Tribal	  
Association	  (ILTA),	  which	  calls	  itself	  a	  non-­‐political	  organisation	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  preserve	  and	  revive	  
Lepcha	   culture,	   language,	   and	   script,	   and	   to	   fight	   for	   the	   upliftment	   of	   the	   community	   in	  
developmental	   terms,	   claims	   to	   represent	   the	   group.	   The	   Lepcha	   are	   considered	   the	  aborigines	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  In	  fact,	  the	  other	  north-­‐eastern	  States	  of	  Arunachal	  Pradesh,	  Manipur,	  Mizoram,	  Nagaland	  and	  Tripura	  had	  
been	  Union	  Territories	  before	  being	  upgraded	  to	  States.	  
105	  This	  strategy	  includes	  the	  distribution	  of	  leaflets	  with	  extended	  written	  explanations	  about	  the	  properties	  of	  
the	  6th	  Schedule	  to	  re-­‐established	  party	  units	  in	  various	  villages,	  and	  Ghisingh’s	  statements	  during	  the	  2011	  
Legislative	  Assembly	  Election	  campaign	  reiterating	  his	  demand.	  Also	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  reassured	  its	  support	  to	  the	  6th	  
Schedule	  ahead	  of	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections.	  
106	  This	  is	  a	  development	  that	  started	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  All	  India	  Gorkha	  League	  (AIGL)	  in	  1944,	  
which	  unlike	  previous	  organisations	  explicitly	  spoke	  for	  the	  Nepalis,	  keeping	  the	  Tibetans	  and	  Lepcha	  out	  of	  
their	  purview	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Despite	  the	  GJM’s	  attempts	  to	  include	  minority	  groups	  through	  via	  its	  “minority	  
front”	  it	  apparently	  never	  managed	  to	  entice	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Lepcha.	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Darjeeling	   district	   and	   have	   their	   highest	   concentration	   in	   the	   Kalimpong	   sub-­‐division.	   Instead	   of	  
joining	   the	   Gorkhaland	   struggle,	   the	   ILTA	   promotes	   a	   view	   of	   Darjeeling	   district	   as	   part	   of	   their	  
imagined	  ancient	  kingdom	  “Mayel	  Lyang”,	  the	  “land	  of	  hidden	  paradise”	  (Tamlong	  2010).	  	  
Although	   Lepcha	   leaders	  define	   clear	   territorial	  boundaries	  of	  Mayel	   Lyang	   (as	  extending	   from	   the	  
Himalayas	   to	   Titalaya	   in	   the	   South,	   to	   Gipmochi	  mountain	   at	   the	   junction	   of	   Sikkim,	   Bhutan,	   and	  
Tibet	  in	  the	  east,	  and	  to	  Arun	  river	  in	  Nepal	  in	  the	  west,	  ibid.),	  anthropologist	  Jenny	  Bentley	  stresses	  
that	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  Lepcha’s	  imagined	  ancestral	  homelands	  (personal	  communication).	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  
symbolises	  an	  idealised	  “golden	  age”	  of	  the	  Lepcha.	  With	  reference	  to	  historical	  British	  sources	  and	  
place	  names	  deriving	   from	   Lepcha	   language,	   Lyangsong	   Tamsang,	   the	   President	   of	   ILTA,	   described	  
the	  Lepcha	  as	  the	  “true	  masters	  of	  the	  soil”	  (interview,	  11.3.2012).	  According	  to	  him	  the	  place	  name	  
for	   Darjeeling	   had	   previously	   been	   “Daar-­‐yjoo-­‐Lyaang”,	   meaning	   “Abode	   of	   Gods/Goddesses”	   in	  
Lepcha	  language,	  and	  was	  subsequently	  changed	  by	  the	  Tibetans	  and	  the	  British	  to	  “Dorje-­‐lyang”	  and	  
“Darjeeling”	  respectively.	  To	  support	  his	  argument	  he	  claims	  that	  huge	  portions	  of	  land	  were	  owned	  
by	  the	  Lepcha.	  He	  portrays	  Darjeeling’s	  history	  as	  a	  story	  of	  decline	  and	  destruction:	  a	  once	  beautiful	  
place	   has	   been	   destroyed	   by	   the	   intruding	   outsiders	   rendering	   the	   Lepcha	   a	   deprived	   group.	  
Importantly,	   many	   Lepcha	   refuse	   to	   be	   included	   into	   the	   “Gorkha”	   fold	   and	   instead	   stress	   their	  
distinctiveness	  as	  an	  own	  ethnic	  community.	  	  
Fearing	  a	  further	  marginalisation	  –	  also	  in	  response	  to	  the	  revived	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  –	  in	  2010	  
the	  ILTA	  and	  other	  Lepcha	  bodies	  formed	  the	  “Lepcha	  Rights	  Movement”,	  which	  began	  campaigning	  
for	  a	  non-­‐territorial	  council	   for	  the	  group.	  Bentley	   interpreted	  this	  demand	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  
Lepcha’s	   sensed	   need	   to	   symbolically	   reclaim	   the	  Darjeeling	   hills	   as	   their	   indigenous	   space	   (Jenny	  
Bentley,	   personal	   communication).	   In	   September	  2011,	   around	   the	   same	   time	  as	   the	  GTA	  Act	  was	  
passed,	  the	  West	  Bengal	  CM	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  non-­‐territorial	  Lepcha	  development	  board.	  
Eventually,	   in	  early	  2013,	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  passed	  the	  bill	   for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
“Mayel	   Lyang	   Lepcha	   Development	   Board”,	   significantly	   naming	   the	   Lepcha’s	   geographical	  
imagination	   (and	   in	   clear	   contradistinction	   to	   the	   “Gorkhaland	   Territorial	   Administration”	   of	   the	  
GJM).	   I	   address	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   board	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   Darjeeling’s	   political	  
landscape	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
Sikkim	  merger	  and	  Union	  Territory	  
A	  third	  alternative	  for	  Darjeeling	  voiced	  from	  within	  the	  region	  is	  the	  claim	  of	  a	  break-­‐away	  faction	  of	  
the	  Darjeeling	  District	  Congress	  Committee	  to	  merge	  Darjeeling	  district	  with	  Sikkim.	  In	  January	  2004,	  
they	   founded	   the	   Gorkha	   Rastriya	   Congress	   (Gorkha	   National	   Congress,	   GRC)	   (Sarkar	   2013,	   90).	  
Taking	   reference	   to	   the	   district’s	   pre-­‐colonial	   history,	   they	   argue	   that	   the	   easiest	  way	   to	   separate	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  an	  imagination	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Darjeeling	   from	  West	   Bengal	   was	   via	   its	   re-­‐attachment	   to	   Sikkim.	   They	   justify	   this	   proposal	   with	  
reference	  to	  the	  shared	  history,	  similar	  culture,	  and	  geographical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  two	  regions	  
and	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  documented	  history	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  Sikkim	  (see	  leaflet	  of	  the	  CRC	  for	  the	  
2014	   Lok	   Sabha	   elections).	   Although	   their	   demand	   reiterates	   the	   claim	   for	   separation	   from	  West	  
Bengal,	  the	  imagination	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  part	  of	  Sikkim	  has	  so	  far	  had	  less	  popular	  appeal.	  The	  reason	  
is	   probably	   not	   only	   the	   group’	   lack	   of	   organisational	   strength	   but	   also	   the	   public’s	   sensing	   that	  
Sikkim’s	  current	  CM	  Pawan	  Chambling	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  Sikkimese	  people	  reject	  a	  merger	  of	  the	  
two	  regions.	  	  
Another	   alternative	   proposal	   was	   undertaken	   by	   members	   of	   Darjeeling	   District	   Congress	  
Committee,	   who	   proposed	   to	   make	   Darjeeling	   a	   Union	   Territory	   instead	   of	   a	   separate	   State.	  
Although	   this	   proposal	   would	   meet	   most	   of	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   Gorkhaland	   aspirants	   (including	  
separation	   from	  West	  Bengal,	  and	  a	  new	  name	   for	   the	  area	  expressing	   its	   inhabitants’	  ethnicity	  as	  
Gorkhas),	   it	   has	   so	   far	   not	   received	  much	   public	   response.	   This	   is	   surprising	   as	   the	   history	   of	   the	  
emergence	   of	  many	  North-­‐Eastern	   States	   suggests	   the	   potential	   upgrading	   of	   Union	   Territories	   to	  
full-­‐fledged	  States	  (e.g.	  Mizoram,	  Nagaland,	  Manipur,	  and	  Tripura).	  
4.4.4 Voices	  from	  the	  plains:	  Bengalis,	  adivasis,	  and	  Kamptapuris	  	  
The	  Gorkha	   groups’	   demand	   to	   include	   the	   Siliguri	   sub-­‐division	   and	   parts	   of	   the	  Dooars	   is	  met	   by	  
fierce	  opposition	  of	  Bengali	  and	  some	  adivasi	  groups.	  In	  general,	  in	  order	  to	  support	  their	  opposition	  
to	  Gorkhaland,	   the	   groups	  evoke	   two	   imaginative	   geographies:	   the	   first	   designs	  North	  Bengal	   as	   a	  
place	  overrun	  by	   illegal	  Nepali	   immigrants;	   the	  second	  portrays	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	   threat	   to	  national	  
integrity.	  Instead,	  the	  BOBBBS,	  aims	  at	  a	  “strong	  and	  resurgent	  Bengal”	  for	  Bengalis	  being	  “in	  control	  
of	   their	   own	  destiny”,	   thereby	  helping	   the	  Bengali	   race	  out	   of	   its	   “perilous	   state”	   (BOBBBC	  2011).	  
This	   includes	  the	  “assimilation”	  of	  other	  groups	   into	  Bengali	  culture	  and	   language.	  Referring	  to	  the	  
1865	  Treaty	  of	  Titalia,	  the	  BOBBBS	  portrays	  Darjeeling	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Bengal	  but	  remains	  silent	  
on	  the	  district’s	  special	  administrative	  status	  as	  excluded	  district	  during	  colonial	  time.	  	  
The	   main	   adivasi	   organisation	   in	   the	   Dooars,	   the	   ABAVP	   has	   a	   split	   opinion	   on	   the	   Gorkhaland	  
demand.	  The	  organisation	  initially	  strongly	  opposed	  the	  Gorkhas’	  claim	  to	  the	  Dooars,	  where	  adivasis	  
form	  a	  major	  part	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  instead	  demanded	  6th	  Schedule	  status	  for	  the	  belt	  (not	  to	  
be	   confused	  with	   Ghisingh’s	   6th	   Schedule	   petition)107.	   Yet,	   in	   October	   2011	   a	   faction	   led	   by	   tribal	  
leader	  John	  Barla	  agreed	  to	  demand	  the	  “Gorkhaland	  Adivasi	  Territorial	  Administration”	  (GATA),	  an	  
extended	   GTA,	   which	   would	   include	   the	   Dooars	   under	   its	   direction.	   John	   Barla	   justified	   this	   joint	  
demand	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  need	  to	  deliver	  something	  (i.e.	  work,	  employment,	  etc.)	  to	  his	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  The	  resistance	  saw	  violent	  clashes	  between	  GJM	  and	  ABAVP	  supporters	  in	  January	  2009,	  when	  thousands	  of	  
GJM	  supporters	  were	  campaigning	  in	  the	  Dooars	  (ToI,	  20.1.2009).	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because	  otherwise	  they	  would	  join	  other	  parties:	  “Within	  the	  GTA	  there	  is	  very	  much	  development.	  
So	   what	   is	   given	   to	   the	   hills	   should	   also	   be	   given	   here”	   (interview,	   17.3.2012)108 .	   After	   the	  
government	  appointed	  Sen	  Committee’s	  recommendations	  to	  not	  include	  the	  Dooars	  under	  the	  GTA,	  
however,	  the	  alliance	  between	  Barla	  and	  GJM	  faded.	  	  
Another	   territorial	   claim	   is	   brought	   forward	  by	   groups	   (such	   as	   the	  Kamatapur	   People’s	   Party,	   the	  
extremist	  Kamatapur	  Liberation	  Organisation,	  and	  the	  Greater	  Cooch	  Behar	  Democratic	  Party),	  who	  
demand	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Kamatapur/Kamptapur,	  or	  Greater	  Cooch	  Behar	  State	  including	  the	  area	  of	  
Darjeeling	   and	   Dooars	   for	   the	   Rajbanshi	   people.	   They	   justify	   their	   demand	   with	   reference	   to	   the	  
ancient	   Kamata	   Kingdom,	   which	   comprised	   the	   areas	   of	   present	   North	  West	   Bengal	   and	   parts	   of	  
Assam	  and	  Bangladesh	  in	  the	  16th	  century	  (Das	  2009)109.	  Significantly,	  till	  March	  2008,	  the	  GJM	  had	  a	  
political	  alliance	  with	  the	  Greater	  Kamtapur	  United	  Forum110,	  which	  later	  broke	  down	  due	  to	  conflicts	  
over	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  envisaged	  States	  (Bagchi	  2012,	  117)111.	  
4.4.5 The	  international	  dimension:	  Darjeeling	  as	  “Greater	  Nepal”?	  
There	  has	  been	  confusion	  about	  whether	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  was	  a	  secret	  conspiracy	  to	  
create	  a	  “Greater	  Nepal”	  (see	  discussion	  in:	  Subba	  1992;	  Bagchi	  2012).	  The	  imagination	  of	  Greater	  
Nepal	  is	  promoted	  by	  nationalist	  groups	  in	  Nepal,	  who	  demand	  a	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  the	  pre-­‐1816	  
national	  boundaries	  between	  Nepal	  and	  India.	  In	  their	  argumentation,	  the	  1950	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  and	  
Friendship	  has	  made	  all	  previous	  treaties	  obsolete,	  including	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Sugauli	  of	  1816	  between	  
the	  Gorkha	  kingdom	  and	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  (see	  time-­‐line,	  Appendix	  A).	  Accordingly,	  they	  
demand	  a	  reestablishment	  of	  the	  previous	  boundaries	  and	  a	  return	  of	  the	  “lost	  areas”	  between	  river	  
Sutlej	  (bordering	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  West)	  and	  Teesta	  (in	  Darjeeling)	  in	  the	  East	  (United	  Nepal	  
Nationalist	  Front,	  UNNF,	  interview,	  26.6.2011).	  Similar	  to	  the	  Gorkha	  parties,	  the	  UNNF	  describes	  
Darjeeling	  and	  Sikkim	  as	  primordial	  homelands	  of	  Nepalis	  who	  had	  settled	  there	  even	  before	  the	  
British	  time.	  Their	  well-­‐elaborated	  argumentation	  conveys	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐Indian	  sentiment.	  In	  their	  
view,	  India	  does	  not	  only	  “colonise”	  the	  lost	  territories	  and	  encroaches	  areas	  along	  the	  border	  but	  
also	  interferes	  in	  Nepal’s	  internal	  political	  affairs.	  Thus,	  the	  demand	  for	  Greater	  Nepal	  must	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  After	  allying	  with	  the	  GJM	  Barla,	  in	  December	  2011	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  ABAVP	  and	  now	  leads	  the	  
Jharkhand	  Mukti	  Morcha	  (JMM)	  in	  the	  Dooars.	  For	  the	  2013	  panchayat	  elections	  in	  the	  Dooars	  the	  JMM	  allied	  
with	  the	  GJM.	  
109	  The	  Kamatapur	  Kingdom	  was	  included	  into	  British	  India	  as	  the	  Princerly	  State	  of	  Cooch	  Behar	  and	  in	  1950	  
was	  joined	  with	  West	  Bengal	  allegedly	  against	  the	  will	  of	  its	  population	  (Das	  2009,	  24).	  
110	  This	  comprises	  the	  Kamtapur	  Progressive	  Party,	  Greater	  Cooch	  Behar	  Democratic	  Party,	  and	  the	  Assam-­‐
based	  All	  Cooch	  Rajbanshi	  Students’	  Union.	  
111	  Already	  the	  AIGL	  had	  an	  alliance	  with	  Kamptapuri	  groups,	  who	  were	  signatories	  to	  the	  demand	  for	  
Uttarakhand	  in	  1949	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	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understood	  as	  the	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	  weight	  against	  these	  perceived	  Indian	  colonialist	  tendencies	  
in	  Nepal.	  	  
Although	  the	  UNNF	  does	  not	  have	  any	  direct	  links	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  advocates	  in	  Darjeeling,	  they	  
welcome	  the	  demand	  and	  see	  it	  as	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Greater	  Nepal	  (ibid.).	  
However,	  all	  political	  groups	  in	  Darjeeling	  strongly	  reject	  such	  attempts	  of	  merger	  with	  Nepal.	  Taking	  
into	  account	  that	  one	  mainstay	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  is	  the	  complete	  dissociation	  from	  Nepal	  
through	  being	  a	  State	  in	  India,	  which	  would	  end	  the	  confusion	  about	  the	  Gorkhas’	  belonging	  to	  the	  
Indian	  nation,	  and	  people’s	  stress	  on	  their	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  differences	  to	  Nepal,	  any	  allegations	  
that	  Gorkhaland	  was	  a	  conspiracy	  to	  merge	  Darjeeling	  with	  Nepal	  are	  baseless.	  	  
4.4.6 Marginal	  imaginations	  
The	   brief	   outline	   underlines	   that	   Darjeeling	   is	   strongly	   contested	   in	   discursive	   terms	   and	   holds	  
different	  meanings	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  people,	  conveying	  distinct	  identities	  outside	  of	  the	  Gorkha-­‐
spectrum.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  clear	  with	  the	  powerful	  Mayel	  Lyang	  formulation	  of	  the	  Lepcha	  
most	  of	  whom	  do	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  within	  the	  Gorkha-­‐identity.	  While	  some	  of	  these	  alternative	  
imaginations	  create	  distinct	  histories	  of	  the	  claimed	  territory,	  others	  rather	  aim	  at	  a	  deconstruction	  
of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  claim.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  State	  government’s	  approach	  to	  “Switzerland”	  or	  
the	   Bengalis’	   opposition	   claims	   that	   all	   Nepalis	   were	   “foreigners”.	   All	   the	   reviewed	   imaginations	  
make	   strong	   use	   of	   selective	   versions	   of	   Darjeeling’s	   history.	   Yet,	   none	   of	   these	   alternative	  
imaginations	  is	  strong	  enough	  to	  replace	  the	  dominant	  vision	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  which	  since	  the	  1980s	  
mesmerizes	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  masses.	  This	  is	   largely	  because	  they	  lack	  reference	  to	  the	  Gorkhas’	  
ethnicity	  and/or	  deny	  or	  do	  not	  address	   the	  “identity	   crisis”.	  As	  will	  become	  clear	   in	   the	   following	  
chapters,	   however,	   this	  marginalisation	   is	   also	   a	   result	   of	   the	  dominant	   reign	  of	   the	  GJM,	   and	   the	  
lacking	  organisational	  strength	  of	  advocates	  of	  alternative	  imaginations.	  
	  
4.5 Class	  and	  ethnicity	  –	  popular	  geographies	  of	  Gorkhaland	  
In	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  review	  of	  political	  processes	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  suggested	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  
Gorkha	  ethnic	  consciousness	  in	  Darjeeling	  was	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  
the	  language	  movement,	  which	  spread	  the	  awareness	  of	  ethnic	  belonging	  to	  the	  Gorkhas	  from	  the	  
elites	  to	  the	  general	  masses.	  This	  provided	  the	  base	  for	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  to	  design	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  
all-­‐encompassing	  vision	  for	  Darjeeling.	  But	  like	  all	  studies	  on	  the	  1980s	  more	  recent	  studies	  on	  the	  
revived	  movement	  post	  2007	  remain	  largely	  silent	  on	  what	  Gorkhaland	  means	  to	  those	  in	  whose	  
names	  it	  is	  being	  demanded	  and	  whether	  the	  frames	  promoted	  by	  political	  elites	  are	  adopted,	  
adjusted,	  or	  rejected.	  Such	  an	  understanding	  is	  important	  as	  –	  with	  a	  view	  to	  understand	  the	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construction	  of	  political	  authority	  as	  a	  two-­‐sided	  relation	  between	  rulers	  and	  the	  ruled	  –	  the	  public	  
response	  to	  politicians’	  statehood	  rhetoric	  affects	  their	  support	  amongst	  the	  masses.	  A	  comparison	  
of	  political	  elites’	  and	  non-­‐elite	  understandings	  of	  Gorkhaland	  also	  reveals	  how	  representative	  the	  
formers’	  accounts	  are	  (cf.	  Corbridge	  2002;	  Shah	  2012).	  
To	  understand	  whether	  the	  Gorkha	  leaders’	  attempts	  to	  design	  Darjeeling	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  of	  
unique	  Gorkhas	  loyal	  to	  –	  but	  not	  recognised	  by	  –	  the	  Indian	  nation	  are	  successful	  and	  why	  the	  vision	  
of	  Gorkhaland	  is	  more	  appealing	  than	  others	  to	  a	  majority	  in	  Darjeeling,	  I	  now	  explore	  what	  
meanings,	  hopes,	  and	  aspirations	  the	  statehood	  idea	  conveys	  for	  those	  in	  whose	  names	  it	  is	  being	  
demanded.	  I	  focus	  on	  accounts	  of	  tea-­‐plantation	  workers	  and	  residents	  (from	  three	  different	  tea-­‐
plantations	  I	  visited	  in	  2012	  and	  2013).	  I	  also	  add	  statements	  of	  shopkeepers	  and	  drivers,	  mainly	  
from	  rural	  areas.	  I	  distinguish	  between	  pro-­‐Gorkhaland	  and	  Gorkhaland-­‐critical	  accounts.	  All	  
respondents	  belonged	  to	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  majority	  of	  the	  district	  (and	  not	  to	  other	  groups	  such	  
as	  the	  Lepcha	  or	  the	  Bhutia).	  I	  accomplish	  these	  data	  with	  findings	  from	  Besky’s	  (2013)	  
comprehensive	  anthropological	  study	  on	  tea	  plantation	  labourers.	  Importantly,	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  
persons	  I	  spoke	  to	  were	  able	  to	  relate	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  underlines	  its	  importance	  for	  the	  
population.	  Yet,	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  when	  I	  stayed	  on	  the	  plantations,	  many	  respondents’	  accounts	  
were	  coupled	  with	  feelings	  of	  disappointment	  and	  anger	  towards	  politicians,	  owing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  prolonged	  agitation	  since	  2007	  had	  not	  brought	  the	  wished	  results	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  
4.5.1 Development,	  identity,	  and	  the	  land-­‐question	  
Most	  plantation	  workers	  situated	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  of	  the	  
tea	  plantation	  labour.	  Particularly	  female	  labourers	  believed	  that	  in	  Gorkhaland	  their	  wages	  would	  
increase	  and	  more	  facilities112	  would	  be	  provided.	  This	  also	  concerned	  higher	  positions	  in	  the	  
plantation	  labour	  hierarchy.	  The	  fact	  that	  mostly	  non-­‐Nepalis	  are	  employed	  in	  manager	  or	  assistant-­‐
manager	  positions	  causes	  many	  grievances	  amongst	  both	  male	  and	  female	  workers,	  who	  feel	  that	  
the	  “outsiders”	  would	  never	  allow	  them	  to	  climb	  up.	  These	  “outsiders”	  were	  often	  perceived	  as	  not	  
caring	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  plantation,	  e.g.	  by	  refusing	  to	  replace	  old	  bushes	  with	  new	  ones.	  Besky	  
(2013)	  saw	  a	  close	  relation	  of	  female	  workers’	  attempts	  to	  preserve	  the	  landscape	  of	  the	  tea	  
plantation	  and	  statehood	  as	  in	  Gorkhaland,	  more	  caring	  managers	  would	  invest	  in	  a	  renovation	  of	  
the	  plantation.	  She	  also	  found	  that	  such	  aspirations	  were	  related	  to	  an	  idealised	  “moral	  economy”	  
between	  labour,	  management,	  and	  land.	  For	  workers,	  this	  referred	  to	  reciprocal	  relationships,	  where	  
labours	  cared	  for	  the	  land	  of	  the	  plantation	  and	  the	  management	  in	  turn	  cared	  for	  the	  labour,	  i.e.	  by	  
providing	  facilities	  (ibid.	  17,	  28).	  Besky	  interprets	  labourers’	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  Such	  facilities	  include	  those	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Plantation	  Labour	  Act	  (1952),	  such	  as	  money	  for	  firewood,	  
ration,	  water	  supply,	  house	  constructions	  and	  repair,	  basket,	  umbrella,	  blankets,	  and	  shoes	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	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revive	  this	  moral	  economy	  and	  with	  it	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  tea	  plantation.	  In	  this	  context,	  “justice”	  for	  
labourers	  meant	  to	  be	  in	  control	  of	  the	  tea	  plantation	  land	  (ibid.).	  Statehood	  and	  an	  “own”	  
government	  for	  Darjeeling	  would	  allow	  the	  control	  of	  the	  plantation	  proprietors	  and	  put	  an	  end	  to	  
exploiting	  practices.	  	  
While	  Besky	  interprets	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  solely	  as	  related	  to	  the	  tea	  plantation	  and	  -­‐
labour,	  many	  accounts	  of	  workers	  also	  suggested	  their	  association	  of	  Gorkhaland	  with	  a	  better	  life	  
outside	  of	  the	  plantation.	  Particularly	  female	  workers	  stressed	  that	  Gorkhaland	  would	  provide	  new	  
employment	  opportunities	  outside	  the	  rigid	  plantation	  system,	  e.g.	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  
industries.	  Few	  women	  also	  explained	  that	  once	  Gorkhaland	  was	  attained	  non-­‐Nepali	  groups	  such	  as	  
Marwaris	  and	  Bengalis,	  who	  dominate	  private	  enterprises	  would	  leave113	  so	  that	  Nepalis	  could	  
overtake	  their	  business	  
Especially,	  female	  workers	  in	  their	  role	  of	  mothers	  imagined	  such	  a	  future	  outside	  of	  the	  plantation	  
for	  their	  children,	  whom	  they	  wanted	  to	  educate	  and	  enable	  an	  alternative	  life	  and	  income.	  Also	  
younger	  persons	  –	  many	  of	  them	  educated	  at	  least	  up	  to	  class	  10	  but	  unemployed	  –	  connected	  their	  
hopes	  for	  more	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  better	  education	  facilities	  (such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
university	  as	  proposed	  by	  politicians)	  with	  Gorkhaland.	  Instead	  of	  migrating	  to	  other	  places	  such	  as	  
Delhi	  or	  Mumbai,	  there	  would	  be	  sufficient	  employment	  opportunities	  for	  well-­‐qualified	  people	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  None	  of	  the	  younger	  people	  I	  spoke	  to	  wanted	  to	  work	  on	  the	  plantation	  underlining	  the	  
generational	  shift	  in	  aspirations	  for	  a	  better	  life.	  
But	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  plantation	  labour	  or	  lack	  of	  
employment	  opportunities.	  The	  statehood	  imagination	  is	  also	  directly	  formulated	  in	  opposition	  to	  
the	  West	  Bengal	  government.	  Many	  respondents	  expressed	  their	  belief	  that	  in	  Gorkhaland	  profits	  
from	  tea	  and	  other	  local	  resources	  such	  as	  hydro-­‐power	  and	  taxes	  would	  remain	  with	  the	  people	  
instead	  of	  going	  to	  the	  hands	  of	  Bengalis	  (many	  of	  whom	  run	  the	  tea	  plantations)	  and	  the	  Bengali	  
government.	  They	  blame	  the	  latter	  for	  neglecting	  the	  genuine	  needs	  of	  the	  hills	  in	  terms	  of	  
infrastructure	  and	  economic	  development.	  Such	  accounts	  reproduce	  a	  perception	  of	  state	  
exploitation	  as	  proposed	  by	  politicians.	  Some	  expressed	  the	  belief	  that	  once	  Gorkhaland	  was	  
attained,	  Darjeeling	  would	  become	  like	  the	  neighbouring	  State	  of	  Sikkim,	  which	  is	  perceived	  as	  well-­‐
developed,	  rich,	  and	  well-­‐equipped	  with	  central	  government’s	  financial	  support	  (see	  the	  notion	  of	  
“transferred	  jealousy”,	  Chapter	  3).	  Like	  some	  politicians,	  some	  people	  contrasted	  the	  current	  
situation	  of	  perceived	  governmental	  neglect	  and	  exploitation	  with	  a	  better	  Britishko	  pālo	  (British	  
time,	  see	  Chapter	  3)	  and	  acknowledged	  the	  colonisers’	  role	  in	  developing	  the	  now	  deteriorated	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place.	  Some	  elders	  relativised	  this	  nostalgic	  “golden	  age”	  with	  their	  memories	  of	  the	  harsh	  working	  
conditions	  during	  the	  Britishko	  pālo.	  	  
Besides	  such	  material	  aspirations,	  the	  imaginary	  of	  Gorkhaland	  also	  contains	  immaterial	  aspects	  
related	  to	  class	  and	  status:	  An	  aspect	  frequently	  mentioned	  by	  both	  male	  and	  female	  labourers	  is	  the	  
perception	  of	  exploitation	  connected	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  inferiority.	  For	  instance,	  some	  women	  stressed	  
that	  the	  Nepali	  jāti	  would	  always	  be	  working	  under	  someone	  else,	  that	  they	  were	  munīko	  mānchhe	  
(people	  of	  the	  lower-­‐level114),	  and	  expendable	  (jhuse-­‐muse).	  For	  many,	  the	  imagination	  of	  
Gorkhaland	  promises	  an	  end	  to	  such	  status	  and	  underlines	  the	  close	  interrelation	  of	  their	  
subjectivities,	  their	  longing	  for	  perceived	  rights,	  and	  the	  imagination	  of	  statehood.	  	  
Besides	  expressing	  such	  developmental	  aspirations,	  some	  female	  workers	  and	  more	  male	  workers	  
also	  drew	  a	  direct	  connection	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  to	  the	  question	  of	  their	  Indian	  identity,	  as	  
promoted	  by	  political	  leaders.	  Gorkhaland	  would	  ensure	  their	  existence	  (astitva)	  as	  Indian	  citizens.	  
One	  woman,	  who	  was	  active	  in	  the	  local	  Nari	  Morcha,	  explained	  that	  Gorkhaland	  would	  give	  them	  an	  
“own	  address”,	  reiterating	  the	  party	  rhetoric:	  “People	  in	  the	  plains	  call	  us	  foreigners.	  If	  we	  have	  an	  
own	  land	  (jagā)	  then	  we	  can	  say	  that	  we	  are	  Gorkhas.	  People	  will	  recognise	  us	  as	  Gorkhas”	  
(interview,	  11.6.2012).	  
Such	  concerns	  about	  their	  recognition	  as	  Indians	  reflect	  the	  aforementioned	  “anxieties	  of	  belonging”.	  
These	  concerns	  are	  often	  underlined	  by	  anecdotes	  of	  journeys	  to	  Siliguri,	  the	  Bengali	  dominated	  
business	  hub	  in	  the	  plains,	  where	  the	  workers	  do	  not	  only	  struggle	  with	  the	  Hindi	  and	  Bengali	  
languages	  but	  are	  apparently	  frequently	  asked	  by	  bus	  conductors	  whether	  they	  needed	  a	  bus	  to	  the	  
nearby	  Nepal	  border.	  This	  gives	  them	  the	  feeling	  of	  not	  being	  treated	  as	  Indian	  citizens.	  Others	  
recited	  stories	  of	  travelling	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  India,	  where	  they	  were	  continuously	  held	  for	  Nepali	  
citizens	  due	  to	  their	  looks	  and	  language.	  Appropriating	  politicians’	  rhetoric,	  many	  people	  simply	  
assumed	  that	  if	  they	  can	  tell	  others	  that	  they	  stemmed	  from	  Gorkhaland	  everybody	  would	  know	  that	  
this	  was	  an	  Indian	  State,	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  the	  confusion	  about	  their	  citizenship.	  Reflecting	  such	  
anxieties,	  many	  respondents	  emphasised	  their	  differences	  to	  Nepalese	  citizens	  in	  terms	  of	  language	  
and	  culture.	  Often,	  they	  proudly	  explained	  that	  the	  caste	  system	  in	  Darjeeling	  was	  not	  as	  rigid	  as	  in	  
Nepal,	  or	  even	  non-­‐existent.	  Instead	  of	  arranged	  marriages	  non-­‐caste	  based	  love	  marriages	  
prevailed.	  These	  accounts	  of	  difference	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  question	  of	  identity	  for	  
persons	  outside	  the	  party-­‐activist	  spectrum	  as	  well.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  The	  term	  “below”	  refers	  mainly	  to	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  but	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  topographical	  
difference	  between	  “upper”	  bazaar	  places,	  and	  “lower”lying	  tea	  and	  bastī	  -­‐	  areas	  (compare	  the	  idiom	  of	  talako	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  Chapter	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While	  in	  this	  context	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  land	  (jagā)	  refers	  to	  a	  symbolic	  dimension	  of	  space	  in	  form	  of	  
an	  “address”,	  for	  tea	  workers	  it	  equally	  relates	  to	  the	  material	  dimension	  of	  land,	  expressed	  in	  the	  
following	  statement	  of	  a	  female	  worker:	  	  
We	  don’t	  have	  our	  own	  land.	  We	  need	  our	  own	  land	  so	  we	  cannot	  be	  evicted.	  The	  [tea]	  
factory	  would	  be	  in	  our	  own	  land,	  the	  children	  could	  get	  educated.	  Right	  now	  everything	  is	  in	  
Bengal’s	  hand.	  (interview,	  20.5.2012)	  
This	  statement	  points	  at	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  question	  of	  land	  to	  legal	  land-­‐ownership	  of	  workers.	  
Labourers’	  houses	  are	  built	  on	  the	  plantation	  land	  which	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State,	  so	  
that	  they	  do	  not	  possess	  any	  legal	  land-­‐ownership	  papers.	  By	  law	  only	  plantation	  labourers’	  families	  
are	  allowed	  to	  dwell	  on	  this	  land,	  while	  those	  who	  are	  not	  working	  must	  find	  a	  different	  place	  to	  
stay.	  Although	  this	  rule	  is	  practically	  dysfunctional	  in	  Darjeeling	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  the	  insecure	  feeling	  
pertains.	  Coupled	  with	  memories	  of	  the	  evictions	  of	  Nepali-­‐speakers	  from	  Bhutan	  since	  the	  late	  
1980s	  (the	  so	  called	  Lhotshampa)	  and	  of	  violent	  displacements	  of	  Nepalis	  from	  other	  North-­‐Eastern	  
States	  (see	  Chapter	  3),	  particularly	  men	  stressed	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  would	  make	  the	  
land	  on	  which	  their	  houses	  are	  build	  legally	  as	  “their	  own”.	  This	  would	  protect	  them	  from	  evictions	  
from	  both,	  the	  plantations	  and	  from	  India.	  Such	  concerns	  lend	  a	  material	  dimension	  to	  the	  demand	  
for	  a	  “homeland”,	  which	  complements	  politicians’	  emphasis	  on	  the	  symbolic	  dimension	  of	  an	  “own”	  
space.	  	  
Another	  difference	  between	  tea	  labourers’	  and	  politicians’	  construction	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐
scape	  was	  the	  former’s	  emphasis	  on	  a	  historical	  appropriation	  of	  the	  land,	  in	  contrast	  to	  politicians’	  
claim	  that	  the	  Gorkhas	  formed	  an	  indigenous	  population	  (cf.	  Besky	  2013,	  139).	  Many	  workers	  
described	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  place,	  where	  their	  ancestors	  had	  migrated	  to	  and	  had	  planted	  tea	  (thus	  
after	  the	  British	  acquirement	  of	  Darjeeling).	  This	  narrative	  often	  includes	  descriptions	  of	  Darjeeling	  as	  
covered	  with	  a	  thick	  forest	  full	  of	  wild	  animals	  which	  had	  to	  be	  cut-­‐down	  in	  hard	  labour	  to	  clear	  it	  for	  
the	  tea	  plantations.	  Such	  stories	  of	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  land	  reflect	  memories	  of	  the	  Britishko	  
pālo	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  This	  fits	  to	  Besky’s	  (2013)	  observation	  of	  a	  togetherness	  of	  land,	  migration,	  and	  
labour	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  plantation	  workers	  (ibid.	  151).	  Chettri	  (2013)	  adds	  an	  ethnic	  component	  
to	  this	  togetherness:	  she	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  process	  of	  19th	  century	  labour	  migration	  the	  ethnic	  
background	  of	  migrants	  coincided	  with	  their	  class	  position.	  Accordingly,	  workers	  see	  economic	  
deprivation	  as	  “inadvertently	  related	  to	  ethnicity”	  (ibid.	  5).	  This	  suggests	  a	  conflation	  of	  ethnic	  and	  
class	  identities.	  
Besides	  the	  historical	  memories	  of	  labour	  migration	  and	  land	  appropriation,	  also	  the	  first	  Gorkhaland	  
movement	  and	  chhyāsī	  (’86)	  form	  a	  shared	  memory	  amongst	  plantation	  residents	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  
There	  is	  hardly	  a	  village	  in	  Darjeeling	  that	  did	  not	  experience	  fights	  and	  killings	  between	  the	  GNLF	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and	  CPI-­‐M	  cadres.	  Various	  memorials	  dedicated	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  agitation,	  often	  decorated	  with	  
a	  khukurī,	  keep	  such	  memories	  alive,	  and	  function	  as	  spatial	  markers	  of	  a	  territorialised	  memory	  (cf.	  
Smith	  1996d)115.	  	  
When	  it	  came	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  the	  demanded	  Gorkhaland	  State,	  
however,	  respondents	  were	  often	  confused	  and	  lacked	  a	  clear	  geographic	  imagination.	  Instead	  they	  
pointed	  at	  the	  “leaders”	  (netā)	  who	  would	  know	  the	  answer.	  Most	  of	  them	  simply	  claimed	  that	  
Gorkhaland	  should	  be	  created	  where	  Gorkhas/Nepalis	  lived.	  Reflecting	  a	  strong	  feeling	  of	  being	  
different	  from	  the	  plains	  and	  the	  Bengalis	  in	  terms	  of	  language	  and	  culture,	  most	  also	  agreed	  on	  
boundaries	  between	  Gorkhaland	  and	  the	  Bengali	  dominated	  plains.	  Yet,	  when	  asked	  about	  the	  
Dooars,	  most	  had	  difficulties	  to	  explain	  why	  these	  should	  be	  included	  in	  Gorkhaland.	  A	  few	  
respondents	  had	  vague	  ideas	  about	  Nepalis	  previously	  beeing	  in	  majority	  there,	  and	  suggested	  to	  
“re-­‐claim”	  the	  land	  from	  other	  groups	  who	  “came	  later”.	  Some	  people	  mentioned	  similarities	  with	  
the	  adivasis,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  also	  working	  on	  the	  tea	  plantations,	  suggesting	  an	  awareness	  of	  
being	  of	  the	  same	  socio-­‐economic	  class.	  Most	  people,	  however,	  did	  not	  have	  any	  personal	  
connections	  to	  the	  Dooars	  and	  had	  actually	  never	  travelled	  there.	  
4.5.2 Gorkhaland	  “for	  the	  rich	  only”:	  Critical	  voices	  
Although	  a	  majority	  of	  people	  I	  asked	  about	  Gorkhaland	  saw	  in	  it	  the	  solution	  to	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  identity-­‐problems,	  a	  few	  respondents	  were	  more	  critical	  about	  its	  redemptive	  promises.	  
Some	  elderly	  female	  workers,	  for	  instance,	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  the	  leaders’	  rhetoric	  by	  
introducing	  their	  accounts	  of	  Gorkhaland	  with:	  “They	  say”.	  When	  I	  asked	  them	  who	  “they”	  refered	  
to,	  one	  woman	  mentioned	  the	  “King	  of	  Darjeeling,	  Bimal	  Gurung”.	  Such	  ironic	  statements	  expressed	  
their	  doubts	  about	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  presidents’	  promises	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
positioned	  them	  in	  a	  feudal	  hierarchy	  (“King”)116.	  One	  male	  labourer	  described	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  “fairy	  
tale”,	  which	  would	  never	  come	  true,	  expressing	  an	  increasing	  degree	  of	  resignation	  on	  politician’s	  
inability	  to	  bring	  the	  new	  State	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  5).	  Others	  also	  doubted	  whether	  Gorkhaland	  would	  
actually	  bring	  about	  the	  envisaged	  changes.	  One	  female	  worker	  explained:	  
Even	  if	  there	  was	  Gorkhaland	  we	  still	  would	  have	  to	  work	  here.	  We	  are	  the	  ones	  on	  the	  
floor/ground	  (bhūīko),	  we	  can	  never	  climb	  up.	  We	  don’t	  care	  about	  Gorkhaland.	  But	  if	  there	  
was	  Gorkhaland	  it	  would	  be	  good,	  we	  say	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  for	  our	  children.	  (7.5.2012)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Political	  parties	  keep	  these	  memories	  alive	  in	  the	  yearly	  Martyr’s	  Day	  (27	  July),	  where	  the	  fighters	  of	  the	  
movement	  are	  remembered	  in	  public	  meetings	  and	  ceremonies.	  
116	  Importantly,	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  had	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “King	  of	  the	  hills”,	  and	  even	  called	  himself	  so	  (see	  
Chapter	  5).	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An	  elderly	  woman	  underlined	  that	  she	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  plantation	  labour	  than	  the	  
statehood	  and	  doubted	  whether	  Gorkhaland	  was	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  improvement	  on	  the	  
plantation:	  
We	  don’t	  care	  about	  Gorkhaland.	  Gorkhaland-­‐Sorkhaland	  ke	  ke	  bhanchha.	  [They	  say	  
Gorkhaland	  or	  whatever].	  We	  care	  about	  whether	  the	  proprietor	  (mālik)	  will	  give	  us	  facilities	  
and	  wages.	  (4.5.2012)	  
Also	  other	  persons	  doubted	  whether	  Gorkhaland	  would	  actually	  bring	  about	  improvements	  of	  their	  
socio-­‐economic	  condition.	  A	  25-­‐years	  old	  driver	  claimed	  that	  Gorkhaland	  would	  only	  hold	  benefits	  
for	  educated	  persons.	  “I	  will	  still	  be	  a	  driver	  and	  have	  to	  see	  how	  to	  earn	  money.	  There	  won’t	  be	  any	  
benefits	  for	  less-­‐educated	  persons,	  it	  will	  be	  the	  same	  like	  now.”	  Also	  another	  man	  claimed	  that	  
Gorkhaland	  would	  be	  “for	  the	  rich	  only”	  while	  “people	  like	  him”	  would	  remain	  the	  same.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  doubts	  might	  stem	  from	  the	  perceived	  social	  gap	  between	  political	  leaders,	  who	  in	  the	  
popular	  imagination	  became	  richer	  during	  the	  statehood	  movement,	  and	  the	  common	  people,	  who	  
remained	  in	  the	  same	  state	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  deprivation	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  But	  the	  material	  benefits	  
of	  statehood	  were	  doubted.	  Some	  also	  questioned	  the	  identity-­‐providing	  function	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  
Kundan,	  a	  30	  years	  old	  shopkeeper,	  explained	  that	  an	  own	  State	  would	  provide	  respect	  and	  a	  
government	  that	  speaks	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  discriminated	  against,	  but	  added:	  
I	  don’t	  believe	  in	  jāti	  [ethnic	  group]	  identity.	  Look	  at	  the	  Marwaris,	  they	  don’t	  have	  an	  own	  State	  
but	  they	  don’t	  have	  any	  identity	  problems.	  Persons	  get	  big	  posts,	  no	  matter	  whether	  they	  are	  
Gorkhas	  or	  not.	  (8.7.2012)	  
Although	  such	  critical	  accounts	  are	  not	  very	  common	  they	  show	  that	  some	  people’s	  priorities	  and	  
interpretations	  differ	  from	  politicians’	  accounts.	  	  
4.5.3 Development	  versus	  identity?	  
The	  above	  description	  underlines	  that	  tea	  plantation	  workers/residents’	  accounts	  only	  partly	  
reflected	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  political	  elites.	  Similarities	  were	  found	  regarding	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  
“different”	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  West	  Bengal	  and	  from	  Nepal	  and	  apprehensions	  towards	  the	  State	  
government	  in	  Kolkata,	  which	  is	  perceived	  as	  neglecting	  and	  exploiting	  Darjeeling,	  culminated	  in	  a	  
feeling	  of	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  marginality.	  Respondents	  also	  often	  connected	  the	  question	  
of	  their	  “Indian	  identity”	  to	  the	  statehood	  demand,	  and	  some	  persons	  reiterated	  the	  political	  
rhetoric	  that	  a	  State	  of	  their	  own	  would	  put	  an	  end	  to	  their	  perceived	  insecure	  status	  in	  the	  Indian	  
nation.	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Unlike	  politicians,	  however,	  tea	  labourers	  connected	  statehood	  intimately	  with	  an	  improvement	  of	  
their	  labour	  condition	  (or	  the	  “moral	  economy”,	  cf.	  Besky	  2013)	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  
plantation	  economy.	  This	  indicates	  the	  situatedness	  of	  their	  imagination	  in	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  
context.	  Expressing	  a	  strong	  feeling	  of	  inferiority,	  labourers	  intimately	  related	  the	  statehood	  demand	  
to	  hopes	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  upliftment.	  These	  were	  not	  only	  expressed	  in	  an	  improvement	  of	  
the	  labour-­‐conditions	  (i.e.	  improved	  salaries,	  facilities,	  and	  restoration	  of	  plantation	  land)	  but	  also	  in	  
their	  longing	  for	  employment	  opportunities	  outside	  the	  plantation,	  which	  would	  enable	  their	  children	  
to	  live	  independently	  from	  tea	  labour.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  such	  material	  and	  social-­‐status	  aspirations,	  most	  political	  elites	  emphasised	  the	  
“identity	  crisis”	  and	  –	  except	  for	  the	  CPRM	  –	  even	  usually	  excluded	  the	  labour	  question	  from	  their	  
accounts.	  The	  GJM’s	  non-­‐commitment	  to	  the	  labour	  agenda	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  the	  
’86	  nor	  the	  recurrent	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland	  seriously	  challenged	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  
Darjeeling’s	  tea	  economy	  (Besky	  2013,	  140).	  Ironically,	  the	  GJM’s	  prioritisation	  of	  the	  identity-­‐
question	  over	  labour	  issues	  was	  underlined	  by	  P.T.	  Sherpa,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  tea	  plantation	  
labour	  union.	  In	  front	  of	  party-­‐workers	  at	  a	  GJM	  meeting117	  he	  even	  condemned	  labour	  issues	  as	  
hindering	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  Gorkhaland:	  	  
I	  appeal	  to	  all	  people.	  We	  should	  not	  be	  fighting	  for	  petty	  things	  like	  money	  for	  firewood,	  
slippers,	  shoes	  or	  baskets.	  Because	  petty/unworthy	  (masino	  khudre)	  ‘politics’	  [Engl.]	  causes	  
problems	  for	  the	  organisation.	  We	  should	  be	  satisfied	  with	  what	  we	  have	  and	  focus	  on	  our	  
main	  aim:	  Gorkhaland.	  (speech	  at	  Gymkhana/Darjeeling,	  14.6.2012)	  
Against	  this	  backdrop,	  the	  initial	  question	  of	  why	  tea	  plantation	  labourers	  expressed	  their	  demands	  
for	  socio-­‐economic	  upliftment	  in	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  language	  of	  Gorkhaland	  instead	  of	  engaging	  in	  a	  
class-­‐based	  labour	  movement	  comes	  back	  to	  mind.	  This	  question	  itself,	  however,	  might	  be	  
misleading,	  as	  my	  discussion	  showed	  that	  such	  clear-­‐cut	  divisions	  between	  ethnic	  and	  class-­‐identities	  
are	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  described	  context.	  Respondents	  regarded	  their	  economic	  status	  as	  an	  
outcome	  of	  a	  discriminative	  policy	  of	  “outsider”	  Bengalis	  on	  the	  plantations,	  and	  of	  a	  neglecting	  state	  
policy	  of	  the	  “Bengali”	  government.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  historical	  conflation	  of	  ethnic	  and	  class-­‐
identities	  (see	  Chettri	  2013,	  cited	  above),	  ethnicity	  (and	  not	  class)	  becomes	  the	  explanation	  for	  
exploitation	  and	  governmental	  neglect.	  The	  boundaries	  between	  “class”	  and	  “ethnic”	  identity	  are	  
blurred.	  Thus,	  for	  workers	  it	  is	  logical	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  ethnic-­‐based	  movement,	  which	  promises	  them	  
“their	  own	  land”	  for	  self-­‐realisation	  outside	  of	  the	  perceived	  exploitation	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State.	  In	  
this	  sense,	  the	  way	  labourers	  imagine	  Gorkhaland	  translates	  their	  “class”-­‐based	  concerns	  into	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  This	  meeting	  had	  been	  called	  to	  publicly	  condemn	  the	  areal	  recommendations	  for	  the	  GTA	  of	  the	  Sen	  
Committee	  and	  re-­‐emphasised	  the	  GJM’s	  struggle	  for	  Gorkhaland.	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ethnic	  agenda.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  movement	  in	  the	  name	  of	  class	  but	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  idea	  of	  
Gorkhaland,	  which	  expresses	  people’s	  dreams	  and	  aspirations.	  	  
The	  statehood	  discourse	  does	  not	  replace	  the	  labour	  discourse	  but	  subsumes	  it	  under	  its	  dominant	  
ethnic	  rhetoric,	  fostered	  through	  reference	  to	  “deep	  resources”	  (Smith	  1996b)	  of	  ethnic	  identity118.	  
Gorkhaland	  conveys	  imaginations	  of	  a	  better	  life	  and	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  all	  problems.	  It	  is	  
this	  intersection	  of	  such	  emotionally	  laden	  ethnic	  elements	  with	  these	  utopian	  traits	  that	  makes	  the	  
idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  so	  appealing	  to	  a	  majority.	  It	  underlines	  that	  this	  demand	  is	  not	  emerging	  from	  
the	  need	  to	  “avoid”	  the	  state	  (Scott	  2009)	  but	  as	  a	  way	  to	  become	  more	  fully	  incorporated	  into	  it	  (cf.	  
Karlsson	  2013).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  statehood	  imaginary	  reminds	  people	  of	  their	  fuzzy	  relationship	  
to	  the	  Indian	  nation,	  and	  keeps	  “anxieties	  of	  belonging”	  alive.	  Together,	  this	  makes	  it	  a	  powerful	  tool	  
for	  political	  elites	  to	  justify	  their	  existence.	  
	  
4.6 Conclusion	  	  
This	  chapter	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  why	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  is	  so	  appealing	  to	  the	  Nepali-­‐
speaking	  majority	  of	  Darjeeling,	  and	  in	  how	  far	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  separate	  State	  for	  the	  Gorkhas	  relates	  
to	  people’s	  subjectivities	  and	  identities.	  To	  approach	  these	  issues	  the	  chapter	  first	  analysed	  the	  
construction	  of	  Gorkhaland	  by	  politicians.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  imaginative	  geographies,	  
regionalisation,	  and	  Smith’s	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  ethnicity	  (Radcliffe	  1998;	  Paasi	  2002a;	  Smith	  1996b;	  
Reuber	  1999),	  it	  showed	  that	  political	  elites	  attempt	  to	  strategically	  design	  Darjeeling	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐
scape	  and	  to	  frame	  regional	  identities.	  I	  contrasted	  such	  constructions	  with	  the	  meanings	  
Gorkhaland	  holds	  for	  those	  in	  whose	  names	  the	  new	  State	  is	  being	  demanded,	  i.e.	  tea	  plantation	  
workers	  and	  dwellers.	  The	  analysis	  underlined	  that	  Gorkhaland	  attains	  much	  of	  its	  mobilising	  appeal	  
from	  the	  ways	  Gorkha	  politicians	  construct	  it	  (i)	  as	  an	  ethno-­‐scape	  of	  Gorkhas,	  which	  connects	  
selected	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  nationalism	  (cf.	  Smith	  1996b)	  and	  versions	  of	  the	  places’	  history	  to	  the	  
claimed	  territory;	  (ii)	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  an	  imagined	  Indian	  nation	  expressed	  through	  the	  
mobilisation	  of	  a	  “pan-­‐Indian	  grammar”	  (Baruah	  1999),	  which	  legitimises	  the	  statehood	  demand	  with	  
reference	  to	  principles	  of	  Indian	  nationalism;	  and	  (iii)	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  all	  identity,	  security,	  and	  socio-­‐
economic	  problems	  the	  Indian	  Gorkhas	  are	  facing.	  In	  constructing	  such	  images,	  politicians’	  draw	  on	  
available	  “deep	  resources”	  of	  ethno-­‐nationalism,	  such	  as	  a	  historical	  understanding	  of	  people’s	  
relation	  to	  the	  land	  or	  shared	  memories.	  They	  shape	  and	  mobilise	  these	  to	  create	  an	  emotional	  
attachment	  to	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  Through	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  images	  politicians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Importantly,	  this	  blurring	  of	  boundaries	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  bad	  associations	  people	  still	  hold	  towards	  the	  
CPI-­‐M/CPI,	  which	  had	  emphasised	  the	  class-­‐identity	  prior	  to	  the	  first	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	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design	  Gorkhaland	  as	  a	  utopian	  vision	  which	  draws	  on	  deeply	  held	  “anxieties	  of	  belonging”	  (cf.	  
Middleton	  2013b,	  609),	  issues	  that	  were	  also	  prevalent	  in	  accounts	  of	  various	  tea	  plantation	  workers.	  	  
This	  analysis	  complements	  the	  initially	  introduced	  understanding	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  ethnic	  
identity,	  which	  reduces	  it	  as	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  political	  and	  economic	  benefits,	  and	  as	  an	  instrument	  in	  
political	  elites’	  struggles	  for	  state	  resources	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  by	  unveiling	  the	  emotional	  attachment	  of	  
people	  to	  place.	  Politicians	  cater	  to	  this	  emotional	  base	  in	  their	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐scape.	  This	  
underlines	  that	  ethnic	  consciousness	  is	  shaped	  and	  reinforced	  in	  the	  interplay	  between	  people’s	  
emotions,	  aspirations,	  and	  imaginations	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  politicians’	  rhetoric	  frames	  as	  devices	  
to	  explain	  the	  world	  and	  present	  a	  solution	  to	  stylised	  problems	  on	  the	  other.	  This	  intersection	  does	  
not	  only	  sustain	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  over	  time	  but	  also	  makes	  it	  a	  handy	  tool	  for	  old	  and	  new	  
politicians	  to	  legitimise	  their	  existence	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  The	  inability	  of	  alternative	  geographical	  
imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling	  to	  challenge	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imagination	  underlines	  its	  hegemony	  
amongst	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  groups	  of	  Darjeeling.	  This	  ultimately	  shrinks	  the	  possibilities	  to	  gain	  a	  
political	  hold	  in	  Darjeeling	  for	  those,	  who	  promote	  differing	  visions	  that	  lack	  reference	  to	  the	  
“identity	  crisis”	  or	  Gorkha-­‐ethnic	  identity.	  	  
A	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	  imaginative	  geography	  of	  Gorkhaland	  concerns	  its	  relation	  to	  identities.	  The	  
analysis	  revealed	  that	  indeed	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  expresses	  what	  Radcliffe	  (1998)	  had	  
called	  “geographies	  of	  identities”.	  It	  positions	  citizens	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  imagined	  Indian	  nation	  while	  
drawing	  on	  their	  awareness	  as	  a	  unique	  ethnic	  group	  as	  Gorkhas.	  The	  imagination	  does	  not	  stop	  
short	  at	  this	  point	  but	  rather	  –	  in	  combination	  with	  its	  utopian	  appeal	  –	  simultaneously	  coveys	  a	  
vision	  for	  an	  anticipated	  future	  “geographies	  of	  identities”	  in	  an	  “own”	  State.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
Gorkhaland	  expresses	  political	  subjectivities	  in	  form	  of	  an	  increasingly	  “aware	  citizenry”	  posing	  
demands	  towards	  the	  state	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Gorkhaland	  becomes	  the	  vehicle	  for	  public	  aspirations	  
for	  justice,	  freedom	  from	  exploitation,	  and	  national	  recognition.	  Importantly,	  such	  aspirations	  for	  a	  
“better	  life”	  as	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  autonomy	  are	  formulated	  towards	  the	  state	  only	  but	  not	  
directed	  towards	  their	  own,	  regional	  leaders.	  I	  contend	  that	  by	  making	  the	  state	  the	  sole	  and	  main	  
enemy	  of	  the	  group,	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  indirectly	  obscures	  the	  role	  of	  the	  regional	  
leaders	  in	  maintaining	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  conditions	  in	  Darjeeling	  against	  which	  people	  
are	  protesting,	  a	  claim	  I	  will	  undergird	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
Importantly,	  the	  comparison	  between	  politicians’	  and	  plantation	  residents’	  accounts	  also	  uncovered	  
differences	  in	  the	  way	  these	  groups	  advertise	  or	  imagine	  Gorkhaland.	  While	  politicians	  emphasise	  
the	  “identity”-­‐providing	  abilities	  of	  Gorkhaland;	  labourers	  stressed	  material,	  socio-­‐economic,	  and	  
developmental	  needs	  including	  the	  question	  of	  legal	  land-­‐ownership.	  Thus,	  politicians	  referred	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mainly	  to	  the	  “symbolic”	  and	  labourers	  to	  the	  “material”	  dimension	  of	  the	  demanded	  land.	  Further,	  
tea	  plantation	  labourers	  emphasise	  their	  historical	  relation	  to	  the	  land,	  i.e.	  during	  the	  process	  of	  
labour	  migration	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  tea	  economy,	  while	  politicians	  prioritise	  the	  indigeneity	  of	  
the	  Gorkhas.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  former	  regard	  the	  ethno-­‐scape	  as	  historically	  appropriated,	  the	  latter	  
design	  it	  (mainly)	  as	  primordially	  inherited.	  This	  obvious	  mismatch	  between	  political	  elites’	  and	  
plantation	  residents’	  imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling	  has	  serious	  consequences	  for	  the	  representative	  and	  
inclusive	  function	  of	  the	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  as	  promoted	  by	  politicians.	  
Although	  my	  discussion	  has	  shown	  that	  workers	  “chose”	  (cf.	  Chettri	  2013)	  to	  voice	  the	  question	  of	  
labour	  through	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  rhetoric,	  for	  them	  the	  boundaries	  between	  class	  and	  ethnic	  
consciousness	  are	  blurred.	  Politicians’	  emphasis	  on	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  in	  their	  imagination	  of	  
Gorkhaland	  reflects	  their	  neglect	  of	  this	  labour	  question119.	  I	  conclude	  that	  ultimately	  the	  complex	  
and	  contradictory	  conglomerate	  of	  developmental,	  labour,	  and	  ethnic	  identity-­‐questions	  in	  the	  
broader	  context	  of	  relations	  to	  the	  state	  and	  to	  Indian	  nationalism,	  coupled	  with	  the	  political	  elites’	  
need	  to	  sustain	  a	  public	  movement,	  results	  in	  the	  marginalisation	  of	  the	  issues,	  which	  are	  of	  utmost	  
importance	  for	  those	  who	  struggle	  to	  meet	  their	  ends	  in	  the	  tea	  economy.	  Ironically,	  the	  perception	  
that	  the	  autonomous	  councils	  (DGHC,	  GTA)	  have	  not	  delivered	  the	  promised	  developmental	  benefits	  
(see	  Chapters	  5,	  6	  and	  8)	  proves	  a	  handy	  tool	  for	  the	  ruling	  politicians	  to	  continue	  claiming	  that	  only	  
a	  separate	  State	  can	  address	  people’s	  grievances.	  But	  despite	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  political	  
leaders’	  and	  workers’	  imaginations	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  and	  the	  latter’s	  ignorance	  of	  the	  labour	  question,	  
the	  majority	  of	  them	  continue	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  ruling	  party.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  appeal	  of	  
the	  ruling	  party	  cannot	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  alone	  and	  points	  at	  
the	  importance	  of	  other	  factors	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  discussion	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Besky	  (2013)	  claims	  that	  political	  elites’	  neglect	  of	  the	  “moral	  economy”	  (which	  in	  her	  view	  leads	  to	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  movements’	  failure	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  labours)	  stems	  from	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
primordial	  relation	  of	  Gorkhas	  to	  the	  land	  (ibid.	  21,	  37).	  This	  account	  however	  fails	  to	  explain	  why	  politicians’	  
(strategic	  and	  rhetoric)	  emphasis	  on	  primordial	  ties	  should	  hinder	  them	  to	  (practically)	  address	  the	  current	  
labour	  question	  of	  their	  main	  constituents,	  e.g.	  via	  their	  tea	  labour	  union.	  I	  propose	  that	  in	  view	  of	  the	  party-­‐
political	  nature	  of	  the	  “movement”	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  neglect	  of	  the	  labour	  
question	  is	  more	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  ties	  between	  the	  tea	  proprietors	  and	  the	  ruling	  party	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	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5 Changing	  parties,	  changing	  leaders,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  
	  
5.1 Introduction	  
The	  foregoing	  chapters	  underlined	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  imagination	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  political	  
mobilisation	  because	  of	  its	  widespread	  emotional	  appeal	  amongst	  the	  Nepali-­‐speaking	  majority	  of	  
Darjeeling.	  The	  imagination	  of	  Gorkhaland	  does	  not	  only	  express	  people’s	  longing	  for	  national	  
recognition	  but	  also	  aspirations	  for	  justice,	  liberation,	  and	  participation	  formulated	  towards	  the	  
state.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  shapes	  and	  re-­‐shapes	  political	  subjectivities.	  Despite	  differences	  between	  the	  
political	  leaders’	  emphasis	  on	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  and	  the	  rather	  socio-­‐economically	  grounded	  
aspirations	  of	  tea	  workers,	  most	  people	  shared	  the	  belief	  that	  Gorkhaland	  (and	  not	  any	  other	  
demand)	  was	  the	  solution	  to	  all	  problems,	  both	  identity	  and	  development	  related.	  In	  the	  following	  
chapters,	  I	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  new	  party	  since	  October	  2007	  established	  its	  dominance	  
against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  such	  justice-­‐seeking	  public.	  	  
So	  far,	  the	  discussions	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  suggested	  that	  the	  GJM	  and	  other	  regional	  parties	  draw	  
their	  normative	  legitimacy	  (and	  public	  support)	  largely	  from	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  rhetoric.	  In	  this	  and	  
the	  following	  two	  chapters	  I	  will	  relativise	  this	  impression	  by	  exploring	  other	  factors,	  which	  equally	  
account	  for	  public	  support	  to	  the	  GJM.	  These	  factors	  broadly	  reflect	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  authoritarian	  
rule	  (co-­‐optation/patronage,	  repression,	  and	  legitimacy)	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  1	  although	  –	  as	  I	  will	  
show	  –	  the	  boundaries	  between	  these	  three	  pillars	  cannot	  be	  drawn	  as	  sharply.	  To	  begin	  this	  
exploration,	  this	  chapter	  concentrates	  on	  the	  role	  of	  a	  leader’s	  reputation	  in	  gaining	  support.	  I	  ask	  
why	  since	  October	  2007	  a	  majority	  in	  Darjeeling	  decided	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  at	  that	  
time	  prominent	  GNLF	  leader	  and	  DGHC	  councillor,	  and	  not	  to	  any	  other	  Gorkha	  leader	  (like	  Madan	  
Tamang	  of	  AIGL	  or	  R.B.	  Rai	  of	  CPRM).	  
To	  answer	  this	  question	  I	  first	  recall	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  overthrow	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  In	  
Chapter	  5.2	  I	  review	  the	  story	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  emergence	  and	  explore	  what	  factors	  made	  people	  switch	  
sides	  from	  the	  GNLF	  to	  the	  GJM	  and	  why	  the	  GJM	  became	  the	  main	  voice	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  I	  then	  ask	  
why	  it	  was	  only	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  not	  any	  other	  leader	  or	  outfit,	  who	  could	  garner	  majority	  support	  
of	  the	  population.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  reputation/“reputation	  management”	  (Bailey	  1971)	  
and	  studies	  on	  leadership	  in	  South	  Asia	  (Alm	  2006;	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010a)	  I	  introduce	  a	  three-­‐fold	  
categorisation	  of	  leadership	  types	  (or	  “masks”,	  cf.	  Bailey	  1971)	  (Chapter	  5.3).	  This	  helps	  me	  to	  
analyse	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  one	  explanatory	  factor	  for	  his	  popular	  appeal	  at	  the	  critical	  juncture	  
in	  2007	  (Chapter	  5.4).	  Although	  Bimal	  Gurung	  resembles	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “charismatic	  
leader”	  (Madsen	  and	  Snow	  1991;	  Eatwell	  2006),	  I	  show	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  his	  ability	  to	  draw	  on	  the	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Gorkhaland	  demand	  but	  also	  his	  reputation	  as	  muscleman	  and	  able	  social	  worker	  that	  made	  people	  
support	  him	  before	  other	  leaders.	  In	  Chapter	  5.4.2	  I	  then	  analyse	  the	  forms	  of	  “reputation	  
management”	  (Bailey	  1971)	  Gurung	  and	  his	  associates	  used	  to	  maintain	  his	  image	  and	  contrast	  it	  
with	  public	  expectations	  and	  perceptions	  of	  his	  leadership	  after	  2007.	  The	  conclusion	  outlines	  
fractures	  in	  the	  image	  of	  the	  leader	  after	  the	  GJM	  presumably	  compromised	  on	  the	  statehood	  
agenda.	  	  
	  
5.2 A	  “critical	  juncture”:	  From	  Gurung	  to	  Ghisingh	  
I	  now	  continue	  the	  narrative	  of	  political	  events	  in	  Darjeeling	  from	  Chapter	  3,	  and	  turn	  to	  a	  more	  
detailed	  account	  of	  the	  events	  and	  context	  factors,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  and	  
the	  GNLF	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM	  between	  2005	  and	  2007/08.	  In	  Chapter	  1	  I	  had	  
identified	  these	  events	  as	  a	  “critical	  juncture”,	  which	  opened	  up	  possibilities	  of	  change	  of	  the	  
dominant	  party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling.	  I	  complement	  information	  from	  newspaper	  articles	  (mainly	  
from	  The	  Telegraph,	  between	  September	  2007	  and	  July	  2008)	  with	  accounts	  of	  journalists,	  
intellectuals,	  party-­‐workers,	  and	  followers	  collected	  between	  2011	  and	  2013	  to	  derive	  a	  more	  
comprehensive	  story.	  	  
When	  in	  2007	  Bimal	  Gurung	  challenged	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  and	  established	  the	  new	  outfit	  GJM	  as	  a	  
new	  alternative	  to	  the	  GNLF,	  political	  change	  had	  long	  been	  overdue	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Recalling	  the	  
GNLF-­‐rule,	  in	  interviews	  and	  conversations	  many	  persons	  expressed	  their	  disappointment	  with	  
Ghisingh	  and	  other	  DGHC-­‐councillors	  who	  instead	  of	  providing	  socio-­‐economic	  upliftment	  of	  the	  
masses	  “ate”	  the	  money	  to	  cater	  to	  their	  “selfish”	  needs.	  In	  explaining	  Ghisingh’s	  overthrow,	  one	  
commenter	  pointed	  out	  that	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  DGHC	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  young	  
unemployed	  men	  had	  grown	  up,	  whose	  jealous	  aspirations	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  council	  could	  not	  be	  
met	  by	  the	  GNLF.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  in	  December	  2005,	  Ghisingh	  had	  secretly	  signed	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  
Settlement	  with	  the	  central	  and	  State	  government	  to	  bring	  the	  three	  Darjeeling	  hill-­‐subdivisions	  and	  
some	  additional	  mouzas	  in	  the	  Terai	  under	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  (see	  Chapter	  
4).	  The	  related	  attempts	  to	  render	  Darjeeling	  “tribal”	  by	  interfering	  into	  people’s	  ways	  of	  religious	  
worship	  and	  the	  political	  undertone	  of	  such	  attempts	  further	  alienated	  the	  masses	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  
The	  agreement,	  which	  read	  “full	  and	  final”	  increased	  doubts	  about	  his	  proclaimed	  Gorkhaland	  
agenda.	  Opposition	  groups	  also	  heavily	  criticised	  it	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  would	  jeopardise	  the	  
Gorkhas’	  unity	  by	  privileging	  government-­‐recognised	  “scheduled	  tribes”	  before	  other	  groups.	  An	  
insider	  commented:	  “People	  thought	  it	  was	  a	  conspiracy	  of	  the	  government”	  as	  Ghisingh,	  probably	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sensing	  the	  public	  mood	  turning	  against	  him,	  utilised	  the	  agreement	  to	  justify	  withholding	  elections	  
to	  the	  DGHC	  and	  to	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  (scheduled	  for	  2004	  and	  2005	  respectively).	  After	  in	  March	  
2005	  all	  DGHC	  councillors	  had	  resigned,	  the	  State	  government	  appointed	  him	  the	  non-­‐elected	  
“caretaker	  chairman”	  of	  the	  council	  while	  drawing	  on	  a	  provision	  in	  the	  DGHC	  Act	  120	  (The	  Hindu,	  
20.3.2005;	  TT,	  24.3.2005).	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  Ghisingh	  became	  more	  distanced	  and	  his	  public	  appearances	  became	  lesser.	  Some	  
even	  hold	  that	  he	  became	  paranoid	  or	  mad.	  Ghisingh,	  who	  had	  always	  made	  sure	  that	  no	  other	  GNLF	  
leader	  came	  close	  to	  him,	  became	  increasingly	  isolated.	  Such	  accounts	  also	  suggest	  Ghisingh’s	  loss	  of	  
normative	  legitimacy	  due	  to	  his	  perceived	  diversion	  from	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda	  and	  of	  factual	  
legitimacy	  due	  to	  his	  inability	  to	  deliver	  socio-­‐economic	  improvements	  in	  view	  of	  the	  majority.	  
Instead,	  Ghisingh	  increasingly	  relied	  on	  repression	  for	  ruling	  (compare	  Chapter	  3).	  But	  despite	  the	  
public	  dissatisfaction	  and	  anger,	  nobody	  succeeded	  in	  mobilising	  the	  masses	  against	  him.	  People	  
wanted	  change	  –	  but	  nobody	  dared	  to	  openly	  oppose	  Ghisingh	  fearing	  victimisation	  or	  death.	  
Prashant	  Tamang	  and	  the	  Indian	  Idol	  competition	  
The	  long-­‐awaited	  trigger	  to	  overthrow	  Ghisingh	  came	  from	  a	  rather	  unexpected	  incident.	  In	  2007,	  
Prashant	  Tamang,	  a	  Darjeeling-­‐based	  youngster	  employed	  with	  the	  Kolkata	  police,	  participated	  in	  the	  
“Indian	  Idol”	  reality	  show.	  His	  struggle	  in	  this	  Indian	  singing-­‐competition,	  screened	  on	  national	  TV,	  
mesmerised	  the	  masses.	  Beyond	  Darjeeling,	  Nepalis	  worldwide	  established	  Prashant-­‐fan-­‐clubs	  and	  
collected	  money	  to	  vote	  him	  (via	  SMS)	  to	  the	  next	  rounds	  of	  the	  competition.	  While	  Subash	  
Ghisingh’s	  silence	  on	  Prashant	  further	  alienated	  the	  masses,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  (at	  that	  time	  a	  GNLF	  
leader	  and	  former	  DGHC	  councillor)	  sensed	  the	  pulse	  and	  started	  supporting	  the	  Prashant-­‐wave	  
financially	  and	  organisationally121.	  Pravesh*,	  a	  supporter	  of	  Prashant,	  who	  later	  became	  a	  high-­‐level	  
GJM	  leader,	  recalled:	  
Financially	  we	  were	  crushed;	  we	  needed	  someone	  to	  help	  us.	  We	  decided	  to	  meet	  Mr	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  [...]	  because	  he	  was	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  person	  who	  could	  understand	  the	  feeling	  of	  young	  people	  
[...].	  He	  is	  a	  genuine	  [...]	  person	  with	  a	  big	  heart,	  willing	  to	  help	  anyone.	  Luckily	  he	  accepted.	  And	  
we	  made	  him	  president	  of	  the	  Prashant	  Fan	  Club.	  [...]	  So	  Mr	  Gurung	  was	  the	  main	  person	  to	  
receive	  Prashant	  Tamang	  in	  [Darjeeling]	  [...].	  Thousands	  of	  people	  came	  to	  cheer	  for	  Prashant.	  
(interview,	  10.4.2012)	  
More	  and	  more	  people	  got	  hooked	  with	  the	  Fan	  Club,	  enabling	  Gurung	  to	  use	  it	  for	  mobilisation	  and	  
networking.	  Some	  respondents	  recalled	  that	  it	  was	  initially	  non-­‐political,	  but	  slowly	  became	  a	  
platform	  for	  opposition	  to	  Ghisingh.	  Many	  people	  also	  remember	  the	  “unity”	  and	  emotional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  The	  1994	  amendment	  of	  the	  DGHC	  Act	  formally	  entitled	  the	  State	  government	  to	  do	  so	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  83).	  
121	  For	  examples	  by	  distributing	  phone	  vouchers	  in	  value	  of	  1.5	  lakh	  to	  people	  (TT,	  8.9.2007).	  
Changing	  parties,	  changing	  leaders,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  
136	  
	  
excitement	  of	  these	  days122.	  Prashant’s	  victory	  in	  the	  competition	  on	  September	  23,	  2007	  was	  not	  
only	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  Nepalis	  but	  also	  for	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  who	  denied	  other	  leaders	  the	  right	  to	  
capitalise	  on	  the	  victory	  (TT,	  25.9.2007).	  Subsequent	  blessings	  from	  Ghisingh	  and	  other	  GNLF	  leaders	  
appeared	  to	  come	  too	  late.	  	  
The	  festive	  mood	  took	  an	  abrupt	  end	  when	  a	  Delhi-­‐based	  Radio	  jockey	  asked	  who	  the	  chaukidār	  
(watchman)	  would	  be	  if	  all	  Nepalis	  became	  Indian	  Idols.	  Feeling	  reduced	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  the	  
chaukidār	  Gorkha	  (see	  Chapter	  4),	  this	  comment	  sparked	  wide	  protests	  in	  the	  hills	  and	  triggered	  
clashes	  of	  Prashant	  fans	  with	  locals	  in	  Siliguri	  that	  left	  more	  than	  50	  people	  injured	  (TT,	  
28./29.9.2007)123.	  In	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Prashant	  Fan	  Club,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  (and	  not	  the	  GNLF)	  called	  a	  
one	  day	  bandh	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills,	  demanding	  “strong	  action”	  against	  the	  FM	  station	  (TT,	  29.9.2007).	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  political	  crisis	  in	  Darjeeling,	  this	  incident	  reminded	  the	  Gorkhas	  of	  their	  “anxious	  
belonging”	  (cf.	  Middleton	  2013b)	  to	  the	  Indian	  nation.	  Apparently,	  winning	  the	  Indian	  Idol	  
competition	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  address	  their	  resurfacing	  “identity	  crisis”.	  
Gurung	  challenges	  Ghisingh	  
Meanwhile,	  on	  1st	  October	  2007,	  the	  union	  cabinet	  approved	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  status	  and	  
announced	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  “Gorkha	  Hill	  Council”	  once	  the	  parliament	  passes	  the	  bill	  (TT,	  
2.10.2007).	  While	  the	  GNLF	  was	  celebrating	  the	  cabinet	  approval	  “with	  gun	  wielding	  bodyguards	  in	  
tow”	  (ibid.),	  for	  Gurung	  this	  was	  the	  signal	  to	  openly	  challenge	  Ghisingh.	  Claiming	  that	  people	  should	  
accept	  “nothing	  short	  of	  Gorkhaland”,	  he	  called	  upon	  the	  youth	  to	  join	  him	  in	  a	  peaceful	  and	  
democratic	  agitation	  while	  announcing	  that	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  sacrifice	  his	  live	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  hill	  
people	  (TT,	  3.10.2007).	  After	  Gurung’s	  public	  challenge,	  the	  All	  Gorkha	  Student	  Union	  (AGSU)	  led	  by	  
Roshan	  Giri	  and	  the	  AIGL	  followed	  suit	  and	  supported	  the	  statehood	  demand	  at	  public	  meetings	  at	  
Kurseong	  motor	  stand	  and	  Darjeeling	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  (TT,	  6.10.2007).	  	  
On	  October	  4,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  GNLF	  for	  “anti-­‐party	  activities”	  while	  the	  GNLF	  
and	  Ghisingh	  –	  returning	  from	  a	  two-­‐week-­‐long	  “study	  trip”	  to	  Indonesia	  –	  announced	  a	  public	  
meeting	  to	  advertise	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  (TT,	  5.10.2007)124.	  Unimpressed,	  on	  Sunday,	  7th	  October	  2007,	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  founded	  the	  Gorkha	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (GJM)	  at	  a	  public	  meeting	  attended	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  The	  Telegraph	  correspondent	  Vivek	  Chettri	  commented:	  “his	  [Prashant	  Tamang’s]	  voice	  cut	  across	  
differences	  in	  class,	  politics	  and	  nationality	  to	  unite	  the	  entire	  hill	  people	  and	  help	  them	  forge	  new	  
relationships	  with	  others”	  (TT,	  24.9.2007).	  
123	  Allegedly	  a	  procession	  of	  around	  2,000	  fans	  of	  Prashant	  marching	  to	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  office	  to	  file	  a	  
memorandum	  against	  the	  Delhi-­‐based	  radio	  jockey	  had	  blocked	  the	  way	  of	  an	  ambulance.	  Locals	  protest	  
against	  this	  erupted	  in	  a	  fight	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  
124	  Gurung	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  never	  been	  a	  member	  of	  GNLF	  but	  a	  publicly	  elected	  DGHC	  
representative	  of	  his	  constituency	  Singmari/Tukvar.	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more	  than	  20,000	  people	  at	  Darjeeling	  motor	  stand.	  K.S.	  Ramudamu,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Akhil	  
Bharatiya	  Nepali	  Anushuti	  Jati	  Sangh	  (SC	  association)	  representing	  about	  9.7	  percent	  of	  the	  hill	  
population	  (SC),	  presided	  over	  the	  meeting,	  expressing	  the	  SC	  apprehensions	  over	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  
bill	  as	  this	  threatened	  to	  privilege	  only	  groups	  classified	  as	  “scheduled	  tribes”	  (ST).	  Also	  AGSU	  lent	  
support	  (TT,	  8.10.2007);	  its	  leader	  Roshan	  Giri	  later	  became	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  GJM.	  Insiders	  
underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  alliances	  for	  establishing	  an	  initial	  base	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Within	  five	  
weeks	  after	  the	  GJM’s	  establishment,	  the	  GNLF	  affiliated	  student’s	  front	  switched	  sides.	  The	  alliance	  
also	  included	  non-­‐party	  domains	  such	  as	  tribal	  associations,	  the	  ex-­‐paramilitary	  welfare	  association,	  
and	  the	  hawkers’	  union,	  who	  expressed	  their	  support	  to	  the	  new	  outfit.	  Even	  Sikkim	  Chief	  Minister	  
Pawan	  Chambling	  openly	  announced	  his	  support	  for	  Gorkhaland	  (TT,	  1.11.2007).	  Importantly,	  also	  
respected	  intellectuals	  joined	  the	  GJM	  hoping	  that	  Gurung	  –	  unlike	  Ghisingh	  –	  would	  seek	  advice	  
from	  educated	  persons.	  Many	  of	  them	  were	  later	  accommodated	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  “Study-­‐forum”.	  The	  
initially	  inclusive	  and	  social	  character	  of	  the	  movement	  was	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  GJM	  was	  
not	  yet	  a	  political	  party.	  Instead,	  Gurung	  described	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  of	  the	  jāti,	  
while	  asking	  members	  of	  other	  hill	  parties	  to	  unite	  under	  the	  common	  banner	  till	  Gorkhaland	  was	  
achieved	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  However,	  the	  organisation	  with	  its	  layered	  authority	  structure	  and	  frontal	  
organisations	  such	  as	  labour,	  youth,	  and	  women’s	  wing	  resembled	  that	  of	  a	  party	  from	  the	  beginning	  
on.	  By	  April	  2008,	  the	  GJM	  officially	  attained	  the	  status	  of	  a	  political	  party	  (Election	  Commission	  India	  
2008).	  
Extending	  the	  base	  	  
In	  the	  following	  months	  people	  joined	  the	  new	  outfit	  “like	  a	  wave”	  (interviews).	  Those	  advocating	  
change	  met	  with	  relatively	  low	  resistance,	  reflecting	  the	  popular	  anger	  and	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  
GNLF.	  Many	  founding	  members	  recalled	  that	  they	  did	  not	  even	  wait	  for	  Bimal	  Gurung	  to	  come	  to	  
visit	  them	  but	  instead	  went	  to	  meet	  him	  on	  their	  own	  initiatives.	  After	  receiving	  GJM-­‐flags	  these	  new	  
party-­‐workers	  convinced	  people	  back	  in	  their	  villages	  about	  the	  new	  outfit.	  In	  the	  villages	  themselves	  
the	  decision	  to	  change	  affiliation	  to	  the	  GJM	  was	  often	  jointly	  facilitated	  by	  the	  samāj	  (see	  Chapter	  
1).	  Lending	  support	  to	  one	  party	  only	  was	  (and	  still	  is)	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  means	  to	  avoid	  clashes	  and	  
conflicts	  in	  villages.	  In	  some	  places	  villagers	  also	  followed	  respectable	  local	  leaders	  to	  join	  the	  new	  
outfit.	  These	  new	  party-­‐workers	  helped	  organising	  various	  meetings	  where	  Gurung	  spoke	  against	  the	  
6th	  Schedule	  and	  in	  support	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  Facilitated	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  frontal	  organisations	  
such	  as	  the	  labour	  and	  youth	  wings	  the	  GJM	  managed	  to	  establish	  bases	  all	  over	  Darjeeling	  and	  
Kurseong	  sub-­‐divisions.	  The	  taking	  over	  of	  political	  dominance	  took	  only	  longer	  in	  Kalimpong	  sub-­‐
division,	  which	  was	  a	  stronghold	  of	  the	  GNLF.	  Some	  attributed	  this	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  GNLF	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central	  leaders	  stemmed	  from	  here	  and	  also	  to	  the	  region’s	  agricultural	  (not	  tea	  plantation)	  
character.	  	  
By	  March	  2008,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  elected	  GNLF	  municipality	  members	  had	  switched	  sides	  to	  the	  GJM,	  
which	  invested	  the	  party	  with	  formal	  authority	  over	  these	  governmental	  institutions.	  In	  an	  attempt	  
to	  extend	  its	  control	  over	  the	  local	  bodies,	  too,	  on	  April	  24,	  2008,	  the	  Morcha	  demanded	  the	  
dissolution	  of	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  (scheduled	  elections	  in	  2005	  had	  been	  withheld).	  Instead	  they	  
asked	  for	  local	  “boards”	  to	  be	  established,	  which	  took	  the	  GJM	  into	  consideration	  (TT,	  25.4.2008).	  
Instead	  of	  establishing	  such	  new	  boards,	  however,	  the	  State	  government	  appointed	  bureaucrats	  as	  
the	  new	  officers	  in-­‐charge	  of	  the	  gram	  panchayats.	  
The	  process	  of	  overtaking	  power	  did	  not	  always	  proceed	  smoothly.	  The	  pressure	  of	  GNLF	  for	  a	  
speedy	  decision	  on	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  in	  Delhi	  made	  it	  the	  main	  object	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  following	  
months.	  The	  party’s	  calls	  for	  bandhs	  were	  spoiled	  by	  the	  GJM	  (TT,	  5.11.2007;TT,	  3.11.2007),	  which	  
staged	  further	  protest	  programmes	  for	  Gorkhaland	  and	  against	  Ghisingh,	  the	  6th	  Schedule,	  and	  
alleged	  corruption.	  Part	  of	  this	  agitation	  was	  staging	  a	  gherau	  of	  DGHC’s	  main	  office	  Lal	  Kothi	  (which	  
was	  dealt	  with	  by	  additional	  forces	  sent	  to	  Darjeeling	  by	  the	  State	  government	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  
November;	  TT,	  6.11.2007;	  TT,	  7.11.2007),	  the	  burning	  of	  copies	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill,	  the	  initiation	  
of	  long	  bandhs	  that	  spanned	  over	  multiple	  days,	  or	  the	  performance	  of	  hunger	  strikes	  in	  front	  of	  
administrative	  offices	  (TT,	  3.12.2007).	  Regular	  clashes	  between	  members	  of	  the	  GNLF	  and	  GJM	  often	  
left	  activists	  injured	  and	  arrested,	  or	  houses	  burned	  (TT,	  23.11.2007).	  Also	  in	  the	  following	  months	  
clashes	  between	  GNLF	  and	  GJM	  activists	  (often	  over	  the	  removal	  of	  party-­‐flags)	  regularly	  led	  to	  
spontaneous	  bandhs	  to	  press	  for	  the	  arrest	  of	  GNLF	  leaders	  (TT,	  25.1.2008;	  TT,	  26.1.2008).	  The	  newly	  
formed	  Kalimpong	  Citizens’	  Forum’s	  request	  to	  Gurung	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  bandhs	  and	  violence	  (TT,	  
31.1.2008),	  however,	  went	  idle125.	  
The	  vast	  protests	  in	  Darjeeling,	  and	  the	  Morcha’s	  mobilisation	  of	  one	  BJP	  leader	  (TT,	  26.11.2007)	  
caught	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  central	  government	  in	  Delhi.	  On	  pledges	  of	  the	  BJP,	  the	  6thSchedule	  bill	  
was	  placed	  before	  a	  parliamentary	  standing	  committee.	  Deferring	  the	  bill,	  the	  committee	  –	  headed	  
by	  the	  senior	  BJP	  leader	  Sushma	  Swaraj	  (Chattopadhyay	  2008)	  –	  invited	  the	  Darjeeling	  parties	  for	  a	  
hearing	  to	  Delhi,	  where	  they	  submitted	  a	  joint	  memorandum	  (excluding	  the	  AIGL	  and	  GNLF)	  for	  the	  
creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  (TT,	  19.12.2007).	  The	  GJM	  also	  held	  a	  dharna	  in	  front	  of	  the	  parliament	  (TT,	  
21.12.2007).	  Back	  in	  Darjeeling,	  an	  optimistic	  Bimal	  Gurung	  publicly	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  create	  
Gorkhaland	  by	  March	  10,	  2010,	  or	  otherwise	  commit	  suicide	  (TT,	  28.12.2007).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125Already	  in	  November	  2007,	  eminent	  intellectuals	  had	  initiated	  peace	  rallies	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  Kalimpong,	  
amidst	  initial	  clashes	  and	  regular	  bandhs	  (TT,	  28.11.,	  29.11.2007).	  	  





To	  spur	  up	  the	  agitation	  and	  to	  press	  for	  Ghisingh’s	  resignation	  and	  the	  State	  government’s	  
withdrawal	  of	  Ghisingh’s	  support,	  in	  the	  following	  months	  the	  Morcha	  continued	  with	  its	  protest	  
activities.	  These	  included	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  non-­‐cooperation	  movement,	  i.e.	  the	  non-­‐payment	  of	  taxes	  
and	  electricity	  bills	  to	  undergird	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  hill-­‐resources	  should	  remain	  with	  the	  people.	  Also	  
post-­‐offices	  and	  banks	  were	  closed	  sporadically.	  The	  GJM	  even	  established	  highway	  patrols	  and	  
hindered	  Ghisingh,	  who	  had	  travelled	  to	  Delhi	  to	  re-­‐enter	  Darjeeling	  hills	  in	  February	  2008	  (TT,	  
16.2.2008).	  More	  and	  more	  people	  joined	  the	  Morcha’s	  indefinite	  hunger	  strike	  to	  press	  for	  the	  
sacking	  of	  Ghisingh.	  
Also	  CPRM	  president	  R.B.	  Rai	  lent	  support	  to	  the	  GJM	  agitation	  (TT,	  22.2.2008)126,	  broadening	  Bimal	  
Gurung’s	  alliance.	  Only	  AIGL	  leader	  Madan	  Tamang,	  who	  demanded	  “collective	  leadership”	  of	  the	  
movement	  distanced	  himself	  from	  the	  GJM	  (TT,	  31.12.2007,	  29.1.2008).	  Despite	  being	  confronted	  
with	  such	  large	  protests,	  Ghisingh	  –	  meanwhile	  in	  Kolkata	  –	  continued	  to	  refer	  to	  himself	  as	  the	  “king	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Later,	  also	  famous	  Naxalite	  leader	  Kanu	  Sanyal	  pledged	  support	  for	  the	  statehood	  demand	  (The	  Statesman,	  
2.12.2008).	  Also	  four	  left	  parties	  allied	  with	  the	  GJM	  (TT	  26.2.2008).	  
	  
Picture	  4:	  Members	  of	  the	  Nari	  Morcha	  block	  the	  main	  road	  during	  a	  band	  at	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  in	  Darjeeling	  
town,	  January	  2011.	  On	  the	  left	  side	  is	  the	  poster-­‐wall	  (postering	  bhittā),	  on	  the	  right	  side	  in	  the	  background	  
the	  speaker’s	  venue	  (Gitaṅge	  Dāḍā	  )	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  Photo	  by	  author.	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of	  the	  hills”	  (TT,	  24.2.2008).	  Still	  announcing	  his	  supremacy	  over	  the	  Gorkhaland-­‐demand,	  he	  
claimed:	  “Gorkhaland	  is	  my	  monkey;	  it	  will	  dance	  the	  way	  I	  get	  it	  to”	  (cited	  in:	  The	  Hindu,	  15.3.2008).	  
But	  eventually	  West	  Bengal	  CM	  Buddhadeb	  Bhattacharya	  gave	  in	  to	  the	  public	  pressure	  and	  on	  
February	  29,	  2008	  Ghisingh	  had	  to	  accept	  the	  State	  government’s	  condition	  to	  tender	  his	  resignation	  
as	  “caretaker	  “of	  the	  DGHC	  by	  March	  10	  (Chattopadhyay	  2008;	  TT,	  1.3.2008).	  The	  same	  day,	  the	  
central	  parliamentary	  standing	  committee	  recommended	  a	  re-­‐assessment	  of	  the	  draft	  bill	  of	  6th	  
Schedule,	  and	  returned	  it	  to	  the	  State	  government,	  thereby	  postponing	  the	  process	  indefinitely.	  
Confronted	  with	  the	  State	  government’s	  withdrawal	  of	  support	  and	  the	  Centre’s	  sacking	  of	  the	  6th	  
Schedule	  bill,	  eventually	  Ghisingh	  gave	  in.	  On	  March	  5,	  2008,	  he	  resigned	  from	  his	  post	  as	  the	  care-­‐
taker	  of	  DGHC,	  ending	  a	  nearly	  20	  years	  lasting	  rule.	  The	  State	  government	  placed	  IAS-­‐officer	  B.L.	  
Meena	  as	  caretaker	  to	  look	  after	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  DGHC.	  Secured	  by	  the	  police,	  Ghisingh	  secretly	  
returned	  to	  the	  hills	  on	  March	  16,	  2008	  (TT,	  17.3.2008).	  	  
Ousting	  of	  Ghisingh	  	  
With	  Ghisingh’s	  resignation,	  the	  GJM	  now	  concentrated	  on	  its	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  The	  party	  
also	  increasingly	  included	  the	  Dooars	  in	  its	  programmes,	  organising	  political	  meetings	  (one	  attended	  
by	  around	  25,000	  people,	  TT,	  21.4.2008)	  and	  a	  two-­‐weeks	  long	  pada	  yatra	  (foot	  march)	  from	  
Darjeeling	  to	  Sunkosh	  (at	  the	  Assamese	  border)127,	  which	  demarcated	  the	  demanded	  Gorkhaland	  
area	  by	  planting	  flags	  (TT,	  14.4.2008)	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Owing	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  population	  and	  
political	  groups	  such	  programmes	  often	  entailed	  clashes,	  e.g.	  in	  Siliguri,	  where	  the	  Bengali	  majority	  
opposed	  to	  be	  included	  in	  a	  Gorkha	  State	  (TT,	  29.4.2008;	  TT,	  9.4.2008).	  
In	  Darjeeling,	  the	  GJM	  continued	  with	  its	  cleansing	  drive	  against	  those,	  who	  were	  still	  with	  the	  GNLF,	  
mainly	  its	  leaders	  and	  former	  DGHC	  councillors.	  The	  GJM	  refused	  them	  membership	  in	  the	  GJM	  and	  
instead	  asked	  them	  to	  leave	  the	  hills	  (TT,	  5.9.2008).	  Various	  news	  of	  clashes	  between	  the	  two	  
parties,	  and	  the	  burning	  and	  ransacking	  of	  GNLF	  leaders’	  houses	  (e.g.	  TT,	  1.3.2008;	  TT,28.2.2008;	  
TT,24.1.2008)	  added	  to	  accusations	  of	  social	  boycott	  and	  oppression	  of	  those	  resisting	  the	  GJM	  (TT,	  
12.2.2008).	  	  
In	  an	  interview,	  one	  middle-­‐level	  GJM	  leader	  recalled	  that	  he	  received	  orders	  from	  upper-­‐level	  party	  
leaders	  to	  burn	  a	  house	  of	  a	  local	  GNLF	  leader.	  This	  suggests	  that	  such	  violence	  was	  not	  necessarily	  
an	  expression	  of	  a	  spontaneous	  outbreak	  of	  anger	  but	  may	  also	  have	  been	  orchestrated	  by	  the	  
leadership.	  Another	  friend	  pointed	  at	  the	  social	  pressure	  to	  participate	  in	  such	  violent	  activities,	  
even,	  “if	  you	  don’t	  like	  it”.	  This	  and	  other	  accounts	  underline	  that	  many	  people	  joined	  the	  GJM	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  This	  agitation	  was	  initially	  supported	  by	  the	  Kamptapur	  Progressive	  Party	  and	  the	  Greater	  Cooch	  Behar	  Party	  
(TT,	  29.3.2008).	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because	  “staying	  with	  the	  ‘majority’	  [Engl.]	  was	  safe”	  (see	  Chapter	  7).	  In	  October	  2008,	  when	  the	  
GJM	  mandated	  the	  people	  to	  wear	  traditional	  Nepali	  attire	  that	  would	  represent	  their	  ethnic	  
distinctiveness	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  (see	  Chapter	  4)	  and	  later	  the	  harsh	  treatment	  
towards	  those,	  who	  defied	  this	  order	  (by	  smearing	  black	  colour	  on	  their	  faces)	  added	  to	  the	  
mounting	  apprehensions	  towards	  the	  party	  (TT,	  22.08.2008;	  TT,	  15.10.2008).	  However,	  the	  GJM	  later	  
changed	  the	  mandate	  to	  a	  “request”	  (Lama	  2008).	  Also,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
Personnel	  (GLP)	  in	  2008,	  was	  seen	  with	  some	  suspicion.	  Purportedly,	  the	  GLP,	  which	  was	  getting	  a	  
monthly	  salary	  from	  the	  GJM,	  was	  to	  provide	  crowd	  and	  traffic	  control	  during	  public	  party	  events	  (TT,	  
8.1.2011).	  They	  received	  a	  (military)	  training	  by	  ex-­‐servicemen	  from	  the	  hills	  and	  lived	  in	  army-­‐like	  
camps.	  Accounts	  suggest	  that	  they	  also	  became	  active	  in	  social	  policing	  (e.g.	  arresting	  drug-­‐dealers	  or	  
punishing	  hand-­‐holding	  couples,	  TT,	  11.6.2013).	  
Eventually,	  on	  July	  25,	  2008,	  during	  a	  gherau	  of	  GNLF	  Darjeeling	  branch	  committee	  president	  Deepak	  
Gurung,	  Pramila	  Sharma,	  a	  female	  activist	  was	  shot	  dead	  allegedly	  by	  a	  bullet	  from	  the	  politician’s	  
house.	  An	  angry	  mob	  set	  his	  house	  on	  fire	  and	  he	  was	  only	  able	  to	  escape	  with	  help	  from	  the	  police,	  
before	  being	  arrested	  for	  alleged	  murder.	  This	  incident	  ended	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  stay	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
Fearing	  angry	  retaliation,	  secured	  by	  police,	  he	  left	  Darjeeling	  hills	  and	  would	  not	  return	  till	  2011128.	  
In	  March	  2008,	  the	  GJM	  publicly	  called	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  commission	  to	  investigate	  the	  corruption	  
in	  the	  DGHC.	  Yuva	  Morcha	  activists	  and	  senior	  leader	  H.B.	  Chettri	  also	  demanded	  an	  end	  to	  
corruption	  (TT,	  12.3.2008;	  TT,	  17.3.2008).	  Such	  a	  commission	  was,	  however,	  never	  established.	  Only	  
in	  September	  2008,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  asked	  his	  supporters	  to	  stop	  socially	  boycotting	  GNLF	  and	  CPI-­‐M-­‐
supporters	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  express	  their	  sympathy	  for	  Gorkhaland	  (TT,	  1.9.2008).	  
Within	  ten	  months,	  the	  GJM	  had	  brought	  the	  powerful	  “king	  of	  the	  hills”	  to	  fall,	  ousted	  or	  silenced	  
most	  of	  his	  active	  supporters,	  and	  destroyed	  signs	  of	  his	  existence	  (mainly	  by	  replacing	  the	  party	  
flags	  with	  the	  new	  ones,	  or	  by	  eradicating	  the	  name	  of	  the	  old	  leader,	  see	  Picture	  5).	  This	  suggests	  
that	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  speedy	  overtake	  was	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐incumbency,	  which	  made	  it	  
easy	  for	  the	  new	  GJM	  activists	  to	  bring	  people	  on	  their	  side.	  Supported	  by	  Gurung’s	  alliances	  with	  
other	  groups,	  the	  large-­‐scale	  mobilisation	  eventually	  forced	  the	  State	  government	  to	  withdraw	  its	  
support	  from	  Ghisingh.	  The	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  those,	  who	  refused	  to	  change	  their	  political	  
affiliation	  and	  the	  perception	  that	  staying	  with	  the	  new	  majority	  would	  be	  safest,	  facilitated	  the	  
overthrow.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Protected	  by	  the	  electoral	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  in	  2011,	  Ghisingh	  held	  some	  rallies	  ahead	  of	  the	  State	  Assembly	  
elections	  in	  Darjeeling.	  He	  returned	  to	  his	  exile	  in	  Jalpaiguri	  shortly	  after	  the	  elections	  after	  a	  GNLF	  supporter	  
died	  in	  a	  clash	  with	  GJM	  activists.	  He	  made	  a	  new	  and	  successful	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐enter	  Darjeeling	  ahead	  of	  the	  
2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  





Although	  these	  factors	  explain	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  overtake	  and	  the	  way	  it	  was	  organised,	  they	  do	  not	  
answer	  the	  question	  why	  it	  was	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  not	  any	  other	  leader,	  who	  led	  the	  powerful	  
alliance	  against	  Ghisingh	  and	  thereby	  became	  the	  new	  dominant	  voice	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  
Gorkhaland.	  In	  the	  following	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  was	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  reputation,	  which	  played	  a	  decisive	  
role	  in	  paving	  the	  path	  for	  attaining	  this	  position.	  
	  
5.3 Leaders	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  
I	  now	  introduce	  a	  framework	  to	  study	  the	  reputation	  of	  leaders.	  This	  framework	  evolves	  from	  the	  
concepts	  of	  the	  “mask”	  (Bailey	  1971),	  “reputation	  management”	  (ibid.),	  and	  a	  three-­‐fold	  
categorisation	  of	  South	  Asian	  leadership-­‐styles	  (Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010a)129.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “leader”	  to	  
refer	  to	  what	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  call	  netā.	  These	  are	  powerful	  persons	  usually	  in	  the	  party-­‐political	  
context,	  who	  command	  a	  following	  amongst	  and	  beyond	  the	  party-­‐workers.	  This	  understanding	  fits	  
to	  Bailey’s	  (1988)	  conceptualisation	  of	  leadership	  as	  “the	  art	  of	  controlling	  followers”	  (ibid.	  5).	  
Leaders	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  “dominate”	  others,	  to	  make	  another	  person	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  
regardless	  of	  the	  persons’	  agreement	  to	  a	  command	  (ibid.;	  Weber	  1972).	  According	  to	  an	  emic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  As	  the	  leaders	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  male	  I	  only	  use	  the	  masculine	  pronoun	  in	  the	  
following.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  women	  cannot	  take	  the	  same	  roles	  and	  wear	  the	  same	  masks.	  
	  
Picture	  5:	  Sign	  board	  at	  the	  Lebong	  Stadium.	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  name	  was	  erased.	  Picture	  taken	  in	  June	  2012.	  
Changing	  parties,	  changing	  leaders,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  
143	  
	  
understanding,	  netās	  in	  Darjeeling	  include	  local	  party-­‐presidents	  and	  medium-­‐level	  chair	  holders	  
(such	  as	  the	  councillors,	  appointed	  or	  elected	  zonal	  presidents),	  besides	  members	  of	  the	  central	  
committees	  and	  the	  top-­‐level	  persons.	  
5.3.1 Reputations,	  masks,	  and	  the	  bases	  of	  authority	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  leaders’	  bases	  of	  authority	  and	  related	  to	  this,	  the	  supporters’	  
considerations	  to	  willingly	  follow	  a	  certain	  leader.	  This	  question	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  leaders’	  
performance	  is	  an	  element	  of	  the	  “supply-­‐	  side”	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  through	  which	  they	  try	  to	  
cater	  to	  public	  demands	  and	  expectations	  (the	  “demand-­‐side”)	  (cf.	  Karateke	  2005,	  Chapter	  1).	  I	  
contend	  that	  a	  comparison	  of	  both	  sides	  helps	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  Gurung’s	  (initial)	  success.	  
Various	  case-­‐studies	  on	  leadership	  in	  South	  Asia	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  leader’s	  “reputation”	  
for	  gaining	  support.	  Bailey	  (1971)	  broadly	  defined	  reputation	  as	  “the	  opinions	  which	  other	  people	  
have	  about”	  another	  person	  (ibid.	  4).	  He	  also	  stressed	  that	  reputation	  can	  be	  a	  means	  of	  
manipulation	  to	  attain	  other	  aims.	  Besides	  spreading	  rumours	  and	  gossip,	  the	  wearing	  of	  a	  “mask”	  is	  
a	  part	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “reputation	  management”	  (ibid.	  5).	  A	  mask	  helps	  its	  wearer	  to	  present	  only	  
certain	  sides	  of	  his	  personality	  while	  hiding	  those	  which	  might	  not	  appeal	  to	  the	  public	  (ibid.	  292).	  It	  
usually	  represents	  common	  social	  and	  moral	  norms	  and	  values.	  The	  contributions	  in	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  
(2010a)	  show	  that	  leaders	  can	  choose	  amongst	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  such	  masks,	  conveying	  practical	  and	  
ideological	  strategies	  appropriate	  for	  the	  respective	  domains	  in	  which	  they	  (attempt	  to)	  rule130.	  
Accordingly,	  a	  study	  of	  leaders’	  masks	  helps	  to	  denominate	  different	  leadership	  styles	  and	  traits,	  
which	  reflect	  differing	  bases	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  authority.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  empirical	  material	  from	  
Darjeeling,	  I	  propose	  an	  analytical	  frame	  along	  three	  masks	  which	  I	  call:	  the	  messiah,	  the	  social	  
worker,	  and	  the	  muscle	  man/boss131.	  Leaders	  usually	  switch	  between	  masks	  or	  can	  combine	  them	  
according	  to	  the	  cause,	  which	  they	  claim	  to	  embody	  in	  certain	  situations.	  Thus	  the	  categorisation	  
serves	  to	  summarise	  traits	  of	  leaders	  as	  ideal	  types	  and	  analytical	  devices,	  which	  in	  reality	  often	  
appear	  mixed	  and	  display	  a	  situational	  contingency	  (Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010b,	  xxx).	  	  
The	  messiah	  
Leaders	  can	  gain	  legitimacy	  by	  monopolising	  a	  moral	  aim	  or	  drawing	  on	  a	  cause	  or	  ideology	  (Bailey	  
1988,	  56	  ff.).	  They	  present	  themselves	  as	  saviours	  of	  society	  and	  defender	  of	  its	  values	  and	  
sometimes	  gain	  additional	  legitimacy	  by	  evoking	  deities.	  I	  call	  such	  leaders	  “messiah”	  (cf.	  Arias	  1995;	  
Dogan	  2009).	  The	  idea	  of	  charismatic	  leadership	  –	  despite	  its	  analytical	  flaws	  (Kraemer	  2002;	  Dawson	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Such	  domains	  can	  be	  social	  movements,	  clans,	  castes,	  or	  villages	  (Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010b,	  xxii).	  
131This	  partly	  resembles	  Price	  and	  Ruud’s	  (2010b)	  categorisation	  of	  leadership-­‐styles	  into	  “bosses,	  lords	  and	  
captains”.	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2006;	  Eatwell	  2006)	  –	  in	  many	  ways	  resembles	  this	  idea	  of	  leader	  as	  messiah.	  The	  concept	  stresses	  
the	  exceptional	  circumstances	  of	  a	  charismatic	  leaders’	  rise	  to	  power,	  and	  followers’	  unquestionable	  
hopes	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  leader	  to	  solve	  an	  actual	  or	  fabricated	  crisis.	  Charismatic	  leaders	  
gain	  strength	  through	  their	  impersonation	  and	  monopolisation	  of	  a	  common	  cause	  (Eatwell	  2006;	  
Pinto	  and	  Larsen	  2006;	  Wehler	  2007).	  Coupled	  with	  a	  shared	  feeling	  of	  despair,	  lack	  of	  self-­‐esteem,	  
and	  coping-­‐capability	  during	  the	  crisis,	  this	  creates	  a	  strong	  emotional	  dependence	  of	  followers	  on	  
the	  leader	  who	  –	  if	  successful	  in	  solving	  the	  crisis	  –	  derives	  his	  legitimacy	  from	  his	  perceived	  
exceptional	  and	  heroic	  abilities	  (Madsen	  and	  Snow	  1991).	  People	  follow	  him	  because	  of	  their	  belief	  
in	  a	  (moral)	  cause	  and	  the	  leaders’	  capability	  to	  forward	  this.	  His	  support	  is	  based	  on	  his	  monopoly	  
“of	  the	  right	  to	  communicate	  with	  or	  symbolise	  whatever	  mystical	  value	  it	  is	  that	  holds	  the	  group’s	  
devotion”	  (Bailey	  1969,	  82).	  Bailey	  termed	  such	  supporters	  as	  a	  “moral	  team”,	  pointing	  at	  the	  
leaders’	  normative	  legitimacy.	  Defying	  such	  moral	  ,	  however,	  Pappas	  (2008)	  points	  at	  the	  
instrumental	  functions	  of	  the	  messiah	  mask.	  He	  claims	  that	  leaders	  draw	  on	  underlying	  emotions,	  
collective	  memories,	  or	  national	  aspirations	  to	  design	  powerful	  social	  action	  frames	  (Snow	  and	  
Benford	  1988),	  which	  result	  in	  radical	  mass	  movements	  and	  help	  the	  leader	  to	  gain	  power	  (Pappas	  
2008,	  1221).	  Although	  drawing	  on	  a	  cause/ideology	  helps	  a	  leader	  to	  rise,	  if	  the	  cause	  cannot	  be	  
attained	  or	  the	  following	  loses	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  leaders’	  capability	  or	  commitment	  to	  the	  shared	  aim,	  
he	  is	  prone	  to	  lose	  support	  and	  has	  to	  seek	  other	  bases	  of	  support	  (Bailey	  1988,	  57).	  
Social	  worker	  
A	  second	  mask	  often	  mentioned	  in	  literature	  on	  leadership	  in	  South	  Asia	  is	  the	  “social	  worker”.	  
Following	  the	  “general	  rule	  [that]	  one’s	  reputation	  should	  be	  kept	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  altruistic	  
end	  of	  the	  spectrum”	  (Bailey	  1971,	  283),	  leaders	  attempt	  to	  appear	  as	  generous	  deliverers	  of	  
development,	  wealth,	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  assistance	  such	  as	  protection	  for	  their	  respective	  
communities	  or	  clients	  (Alm	  2006;	  Piliavsky	  2014b;	  Price	  2007).	  Although	  leaders	  can	  use	  their	  power	  
for	  personal	  or	  party-­‐political	  gain,	  part	  of	  the	  social	  worker	  mask	  is	  to	  make	  their	  deeds	  and	  actions	  
appear	  as	  guided	  by	  altruist	  moral	  principles	  only.	  As	  altruist	  benefactors	  (Mines	  and	  Gourishankar	  
1990)	  they	  couch	  their	  deliveries	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  “gift”	  (Price	  1989;	  Perera-­‐Mubarak	  2012).	  
Thus,	  social	  workers	  distinguish	  themselves	  through	  their	  generosity/altruism	  and	  their	  (proclaimed)	  
distance	  from	  “politics”.	  Although	  such	  lords	  have	  and/or	  sometimes	  display	  the	  capacity	  of	  using	  
force,	  violence	  is	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  constant	  feature	  of	  their	  style	  (Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010b,	  xxv).	  	  
The	  social	  worker	  mask	  caters	  to	  public	  expectations,	  which	  are	  shaped	  by	  both	  moral	  beliefs	  and	  
instrumental	  considerations	  and	  define	  what	  a	  good	  leader	  and	  the	  relationship	  to	  him,	  should	  be	  
like	  (Piliavsky	  2014b).	  Various	  studies	  showed	  that	  people	  in	  South	  Asia	  expect	  an	  “ideal	  leader”	  to	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be	  a	  trustworthy,	  selfless,	  and	  generous	  servant	  of	  people	  (Piliavsky	  2014b;	  Alm	  2006;	  Price	  2007)132.	  
Leaders’	  ability	  and	  readiness	  to	  distribute	  wealth	  equip	  them	  with	  a	  “moral	  authority”	  (Price	  1999,	  
325).	  Their	  normative	  legitimacy	  (achieved	  through	  reference	  to	  altruism)	  is	  undergirded	  with	  factual	  
measures	  (the	  effective	  distribution	  of	  goods	  and	  services).	  In	  contrast,	  if	  leaders	  are	  perceived	  
selfish	  and	  greedy	  they	  will	  lose	  respect	  (Manor	  2000;	  Alm	  2006).	  People	  often	  use	  the	  expression	  
“broker”	  (dalāl)	  to	  denounce	  those	  who	  are	  believed	  to	  deal	  with	  public	  goods	  for	  selfish	  gains	  
(Piliavsky	  2014b,	  27).	  Yet,	  although	  the	  leader	  as	  social	  worker	  stresses	  on	  his	  moral	  qualities,	  people	  
appear	  to	  follow	  him	  based	  on	  material	  or	  transactional	  considerations,	  too.	  Bailey	  (1969)	  terms	  such	  
followers	  “transactional	  group”	  or	  “contract	  teams”,	  where	  “the	  followers	  do	  not	  feel	  themselves	  
beholden	  to	  the	  leader	  or	  to	  any	  cause	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience	  but	  evaluate	  the	  relationship	  with	  
the	  leader	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  [potential]	  profit.”	  (ibid.	  75).	  	  
The	  boss/muscle	  man	  
A	  third	  mask	  leaders	  can	  wear	  is	  the	  one	  of	  the	  “muscle	  man”	  or	  “boss”	  (Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010b).	  Like	  
the	  social	  worker	  also	  the	  boss	  can	  act	  as	  a	  middleman	  between	  followers	  and	  upper	  levels	  of	  power	  
(ibid.).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  social	  worker,	  however,	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  claim	  that	  such	  brokerage	  activities	  
appear	  more	  centred	  around	  the	  leaders’	  consideration	  of	  maintaining	  personal	  dominance,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  former’s	  more	  pronounced	  altruistic	  moral	  considerations	  (ibid.	  xxiv).	  Bosses	  tend	  to	  
be	  affiliated	  to	  a	  political	  party	  (ibid.).	  Further,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  social	  worker,	  their	  utilisation	  of	  
violence	  to	  get	  things	  done	  is	  more	  visible,	  for	  example,	  by	  their	  association	  to	  criminals	  or	  goondas	  
(Berenschot	  2011a),	  or	  the	  employment	  of	  violent	  practices	  themselves.	  Vaishnav	  (2011a),	  for	  
instance,	  underlined	  that	  criminals	  turned	  politicians	  use	  their	  (criminal)	  reputation	  to	  portray	  
themselves	  as	  “Robin	  Hoods”	  who	  steal	  from	  the	  rich	  to	  help	  their	  communities	  (see	  also	  Michelutti	  
2008;	  Shani	  2010).	  Michelluti	  (2010)	  showed	  that	  indeed	  a	  goonda-­‐reputation	  helps	  politicians	  in	  
North-­‐India	  to	  appear	  as	  capable	  providers	  for	  their	  respective	  communities	  (see	  also	  Vaishnav	  
2012).	  Goondas	  hold	  a	  reputation	  of	  being	  physically	  strong,	  powerful,	  brave,	  and	  bold	  men,	  
underlining	  their	  masculinity	  and	  fearlessness	  (Michelutti	  2007).	  Such	  a	  reputation	  is	  not	  only	  
catered	  through	  their	  look	  (e.g.	  sunglasses	  and	  leather	  jacket,	  ibid.)	  but	  also	  through	  performative	  
acts	  of	  violence,	  which	  give	  them	  the	  image	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  using	  violence	  and	  create	  their	  “local	  
standing”.	  Such	  attitude	  reflects	  socio-­‐cultural	  idioms	  of	  masculinity,	  often	  associated	  with	  Hindu	  
Gods	  such	  as	  Krishna	  (ibid.)	  or	  Shiva	  (Hansen	  2001).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Price	  argues	  that	  such	  popular	  expectations	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  kingly	  tradition	  of	  “gift-­‐giving”.	  In	  the	  
ancient	  monarchical	  political	  culture	  (Price	  1989;	  Price	  1999),	  subjects	  believed	  that	  their	  well-­‐being	  was	  
dependent	  on	  discrete	  acts	  of	  mercy	  and	  generosity	  of	  superior	  beings	  (Price	  1989,	  571).	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Chapter	  6	  will	  complement	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  positive	  associations	  of	  a	  goonda	  reputation	  by	  
displaying	  goondas’	  practical	  roles	  in	  creating	  party-­‐based	  resource	  monopolies.	  Chapter	  7	  focuses	  
on	  goondas’	  roles	  in	  generating	  the	  image	  of	  a	  “strongman”	  party	  coupled	  with	  means	  of	  hard	  
repression.	  	  
5.3.2 The	  real	  world	  and	  moral	  norms	  
This	  overview	  suggested	  that	  leaders	  can	  wear	  different	  masks	  to	  meet	  socially	  held	  imaginations	  of	  
an	  “ideal	  leader”	  grounded	  in	  social	  norms,	  values,	  and	  aspirations.	  The	  diversity	  of	  such	  aspirations,	  
which	  reflect	  both	  transactional	  and	  moral	  considerations	  underlines	  that	  leaders	  have	  to	  change	  
their	  masks	  or	  wear	  several	  at	  one	  time	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  changing	  needs	  and	  contexts.	  For	  
instance,	  followers	  might	  shift	  their	  bases	  of	  support	  from	  moral	  to	  transactional	  considerations,	  
when	  a	  leader	  is	  perceived	  too	  egoistic	  (Bailey	  1969,	  45).	  Leaders	  can	  meet	  such	  challenges	  by	  
staging	  rituals	  “of	  collective	  solidarity”	  instead	  of	  using	  resources	  to	  reward	  dissatisfied	  followers	  
(ibid.),	  thereby	  trying	  to	  re-­‐attain	  moral	  authority.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  switching	  of	  masks	  indicates	  
differing	  or	  changing	  bases	  of	  their	  authority	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  
It	  is,	  however,	  not	  granted	  that	  leaders’	  attempts	  to	  present	  themselves	  in	  certain	  ways	  are	  always	  
successful.	  Bailey	  outlined	  a	  dilemma	  of	  leaders	  by	  pointing	  at	  the	  real	  world	  challenges,	  which	  a	  
leader	  can	  often	  only	  meet	  by	  exempting	  himself	  from	  the	  moral	  values	  and	  normative	  constraints	  of	  
a	  society	  (i.e.	  not	  to	  break	  the	  law)	  (Bailey,	  1988).	  This	  can	  raise	  doubts	  about	  his	  moral	  integrity.	  Yet	  
Bailey	  claims	  that	  “virtuous	  leaders”	  (who	  live	  up	  to	  such	  normative	  constraints)	  are	  prone	  to	  be	  
ineffective	  (ibid.	  169)	  (underlining	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  “criminal”	  reputation	  can	  serve	  a	  leader	  to	  gain	  
authority,	  as	  discussed	  above).	  
A	  second	  dilemma	  concerns	  notions	  of	  equality	  and	  individuality.	  Even	  when	  leaders	  (particularly	  as	  
social	  workers)	  attempt	  to	  appear	  equal	  with	  their	  followers,	  notions	  of	  individuality	  and	  agency	  
suggest	  their	  superiority	  over	  others	  (Mines	  and	  Gourishankar	  1990).	  Although	  such	  notions	  serve	  
the	  leader	  to	  gain	  a	  reputation	  of	  a	  capable	  agent,	  his	  failure	  to	  deliver	  to	  growing	  constituencies	  and	  
rising	  expectations	  as	  opposed	  to	  perceived	  wealth	  and	  power	  can	  contradict	  the	  image	  of	  a	  selfless	  
leader	  (ibid.;	  Hachhethu	  2008).	  Such	  notions	  of	  selfishness	  and	  corruption	  express	  what	  Alm	  (2006)	  
described	  as	  an	  “anti-­‐individualistic	  critique”	  (ibid.	  225,	  239).	  	  
Thus,	  although	  wearing	  certain	  masks	  helps	  leaders	  to	  cover	  moral	  trespasses	  and	  keep	  hopes	  for	  
factual	  deliveries	  up,	  people	  might	  not	  perceive	  them	  as	  what	  they	  wish	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  
(ibid.	  206).	  Drawing	  on	  the	  three-­‐fold	  classification	  of	  leaders’	  masks	  (messiah,	  social	  worker,	  and	  
boss)	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  why	  people	  approved	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung	  as	  the	  new	  representative	  
of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand,	  and	  review	  the	  factors	  that	  resulted	  in	  his	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  Darjeeling.	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5.4 The	  reputation	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  born	  in	  1964	  to	  tea	  garden	  workers	  in	  Tukvar,	  situated	  on	  a	  slope	  north	  of	  
Darjeeling	  town	  (see	  Map,	  p.	  xxi).	  He	  had	  joined	  the	  struggle	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  the	  1980s	  as	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  GNLF’s	  militant	  Gorkha	  Volunteers	  Cell	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Accounts	  hold	  that	  after	  the	  
agitation	  he	  engaged	  himself	  as	  a	  contractor,	  before	  he	  won	  the	  by-­‐polls	  of	  the	  Singmari/Tukvar-­‐
DGHC	  constituency	  as	  an	  independent	  candidate	  and	  subsequently	  became	  member	  of	  the	  GNLF	  in	  
1999.	  Unlike	  Ghisingh	  he	  never	  pursued	  higher	  education	  (as	  he	  says	  because	  he	  had	  to	  provide	  for	  
his	  family;	  interview	  in:	  Sharma	  2012).	  In	  2007,	  besides	  Bimal	  Gurung	  there	  were	  two	  other	  
prominent	  political	  leaders	  in	  the	  hills:	  Madan	  Tamang,	  president	  of	  the	  AIGL	  and	  R.B.	  Rai,	  president	  
of	  the	  CPRM.	  Unlike	  Gurung,	  both	  were	  regarded	  as	  educated	  and	  politically	  experienced,	  and	  had	  
fought	  in	  the	  opposition	  against	  Ghisingh	  for	  many	  years133.	  To	  explain	  why	  it	  was	  Gurung,	  whom	  
people	  followed	  before	  other	  leaders,	  I	  now	  describe	  the	  elements	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  reputation.	  I	  
begin	  with	  a	  review	  of	  opinions	  people	  held	  about	  him	  during	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  revived	  
Gorkhaland	  movement	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  In	  the	  second	  section	  I	  analyse	  how	  Gurung	  involved	  in	  
“reputation	  management”	  during	  and	  after	  2007	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  masks	  of	  the	  messiah,	  strong	  
man,	  and	  social	  worker.	  I	  contrast	  these	  attempts	  with	  their	  perceptions	  amongst	  the	  “ruled”.	  	  
5.4.1 Gurung	  in	  2007:	  Reputation	  and	  resources	  
Accounts	  from	  various	  respondents	  (including	  party-­‐insiders,	  intellectuals,	  and	  followers/activists)	  
suggests	  that	  there	  were	  two	  factors	  explaining	  Gurung’s	  rise:	  (i)	  his	  available	  resources	  (in	  form	  of	  
knowledge/networking,	  and	  finances),	  and	  (ii)	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  generous,	  strong,	  and	  capable	  
leader.	  Shyam*,	  a	  regional	  expert	  with	  a	  long-­‐time	  overview	  of	  hill	  politics,	  explained	  that	  Gurung’s	  
political	  involvement	  in	  the	  GNLF	  had	  allowed	  him	  to	  get	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  local	  and	  
medium-­‐level	  leaders	  throughout	  Darjeeling.	  “It	  is	  a	  small-­‐area	  politics	  [...].	  A	  leader	  [like	  Gurung]	  
would	  personally	  know	  each	  and	  every	  important	  guy	  in	  all	  the	  villages	  here”	  (interview,	  4.3.2012).	  
Unlike	  Ghisingh,	  who	  had	  to	  build	  up	  such	  connections	  before	  mobilising	  people	  during	  the	  1980s,	  
Gurung’s	  already	  existing	  networks	  allowed	  him	  to	  convince	  people	  without	  the	  tedious	  travel	  to	  
each	  and	  every	  place.	  Instead,	  people	  came	  to	  meet	  him	  (interviews).	  Further,	  his	  economic	  activities	  
as	  a	  contractor	  (and	  probably	  also	  as	  a	  councillor)	  provided	  him	  with	  an	  initial	  economic	  base	  for	  his	  
endeavour.	  There	  are	  also	  rumours	  claiming	  that	  Gurung	  and	  his	  band	  of	  strongmen	  were	  sometimes	  
“employed”	  by	  politicians	  in	  Sikkim	  before	  and	  during	  elections.	  Rajesh*,	  an	  insider,	  stressed	  that	  
once	  Bimal	  Gurung	  started	  overtaking	  power,	  various	  contractors	  came	  to	  him	  to	  pledge	  their	  loyalty	  
(in	  form	  of	  donations)	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  prospects	  to	  win	  tenders	  for	  potential	  developmental	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projects.	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  tea	  plantation	  proprietors	  initially	  gave	  (and	  still	  give)	  large	  
amounts	  of	  money	  to	  Gurung,	  because	  “they	  had	  some	  issues	  with	  Ghisingh”	  (Gurung	  heavily	  denies	  
such	  allegations,	  interview,	  7.7.2012).	  	  
Also	  Madan	  Tamang,	  like	  Gurung	  commanded	  sufficient	  economic	  resources,	  and	  R.B.	  Rai’s	  CPRM	  
could	  possibly	  have	  expanded	  its	  existing	  party	  network.	  Yet,	  none	  of	  the	  leaders	  managed	  to	  win	  a	  
larger	  support	  base.	  This	  points	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  second	  factor,	  Gurung’s	  reputation.	  Shyam	  
pointed	  out:	  “The	  image	  is	  very	  important	  here	  for	  a	  leader	  [...].	  You	  have	  to	  be	  a	  leader	  who	  has	  all	  
the	  means,	  the	  boys	  and	  the	  goons	  and	  everything	  under	  your	  disposal”	  (interview,	  4.3.2012).	  
Various	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  in	  2007	  consisted	  of	  three	  elements:	  (i)	  his	  
capability	  of	  using	  violence	  or	  “muscle”	  power,	  and	  related	  to	  this	  (ii)	  his	  strength,	  braveness,	  
capability,	  and	  straightforwardness,	  and	  (iii)	  his	  generosity	  as	  an	  accessible	  social	  worker.	  All	  these	  
are	  influenced	  by	  Gurung’s	  personal	  history	  and	  its	  perception	  by	  the	  population.	  While	  people	  in	  
Darjeeling	  town	  and	  the	  surrounding	  areas	  had	  already	  heard	  about	  Gurung	  long	  before	  he	  
challenged	  Ghisingh,	  others	  only	  learned	  about	  him	  during	  the	  Prashant	  Tamang	  campaign	  (see	  
above).	  Accordingly,	  accounts	  differ	  in	  their	  emphasis.	  
Most	  respondents	  from	  Darjeeling	  town	  pointed	  at	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  strongman.	  They	  
recalled	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  “man	  for	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business”	  and	  his	  “right-­‐
hand”	  and	  “muscleman”.	  Journalist	  Niraj	  Lama	  stressed	  that	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  not	  so	  much	  Ghisingh	  but	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  who	  was	  feared:	  “He	  was	  the	  scariest	  man	  in	  the	  hills”	  (interview,	  14.5.2013).	  Also	  
Rajesh	  described	  Bimal	  as	  the	  person,	  who	  “can	  collect	  all	  sorts	  of	  elements	  and	  can	  create	  fear	  
amongst	  people”.	  He	  was	  the	  one	  to	  beat	  up	  people	  and	  to	  enforce	  bandhs	  in	  town.	  “Everybody	  
knew	  him”	  (Shyam,	  interview,	  4.3.2012).	  	  
The	  open	  display	  of	  violence	  served	  Gurung	  to	  underline	  this	  strongman	  reputation.	  Also	  his	  origin	  
from	  Tukvar	  tea	  garden,	  which	  town	  people	  consider	  as	  “dangerous”	  contributed	  to	  people’s	  fear	  
attributed	  to	  him,	  exacerbated	  by	  general	  apprehensions	  towards	  the	  lower-­‐lying	  tea	  plantation	  
areas	  and	  their	  inhabitants,	  whom	  town-­‐people	  often	  regard	  as	  uneducated	  and	  violent	  (see	  Chapter	  
7).	  Shyam	  held	  this	  strong-­‐man	  reputation	  functional	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  establishment	  
of	  the	  majority:	  
The	  hard	  core,	  the	  ‘muscle	  power’	  [Engl.]	  you	  need	  for	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  thing	  [was	  with	  Bimal	  
Gurung].	  So	  that’s	  how	  it	  started.	  The	  town	  people,	  his	  area	  [Tukvar]	  and	  the	  Lebong	  valley	  
support	  him.	  And	  he	  had	  a	  huge	  public	  meeting	  here	  in	  October	  2007.	  And	  then	  [...]	  he	  took	  
all	  his	  supporters	  and	  went	  to	  specific	  tea-­‐gardens.	  And	  seeing	  so	  many	  supporters	  behind	  
him	  people	  said	  ‘Ok,	  he	  is	  the	  man.	  There	  are	  so	  many	  people	  following	  him.’	  (interview	  
4.3.2012)	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Against	  this	  backdrop	  in	  2007,	  there	  had	  actually	  not	  been	  a	  real	  change	  of	  power	  but	  simply	  a	  
change	  of	  the	  colours	  of	  the	  flag	  as	  Ghisingh’s	  muscle-­‐power	  had	  always	  been	  with	  Gurung.	  Rajesh	  
sadly	  admitted:	  	  
People	  saw	  that	  Bimal	  is	  the	  last	  man	  of	  Ghisingh.	  If	  he	  challenges	  the	  leadership	  then	  he	  will	  
go.	  Otherwise	  other	  leaders	  did	  not	  have	  that	  kind	  of	  background.	  But	  we	  never	  thought	  that	  
he	  would	  be	  a	  good	  alternative	  to	  Ghisingh	  [...].	  This	  is	  the	  tragedy,	  irony	  [...].	  People	  had	  to	  
choose	  between	  two	  devils	  [saying]	  why	  don't	  we	  support	  the	  devil	  with	  more	  power	  so	  that	  
we	  can	  remain	  safe?	  (interview,	  22.3.2012)	  
Such	  accounts	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  town-­‐people	  supported	  Gurung	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  
Gorkhaland	  or	  simply	  out	  of	  fear.	  However,	  they	  underline	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  considered	  the	  
only	  capable	  leader	  to	  challenge	  Ghisingh	  –	  exactly	  because	  of	  his	  strongman	  reputation.	  	  
Binita*,	  a	  shopkeeper,	  who	  had	  initially	  joined	  the	  GJM	  female	  wing	  Nari	  Morcha,	  stressed	  that	  
Gurung’s	  reputation	  of	  being	  “rowdy”	  made	  him	  appear	  as	  a	  person,	  who	  does	  what	  he	  says.	  She	  
added	  that	  he	  was	  “young	  and	  full	  of	  energy”.	  People	  believed	  that	  he	  “would	  bring	  Gorkhaland	  for	  
sure.	  Because	  he	  is	  young,	  he	  is	  a	  right	  person	  –	  […]	  a	  straight	  person,	  not	  tricky.”	  Another	  GJM	  
activist	  (outside	  of	  Darjeeling	  town)	  described	  him	  as	  a	  straight	  and	  trustworthy	  person,	  who	  does	  
not	  promise	  what	  he	  cannot	  hold.	  Such	  accounts	  underline	  that	  Gurung	  held	  a	  reputation	  as	  an	  
honest,	  brave,	  young,	  and	  strong	  leader	  and	  indicates	  that	  despite	  the	  fear	  initiated	  by	  rumours	  
about	  his	  deeds	  as	  Ghisingh’s	  henchman,	  his	  strongman	  reputation	  actually	  helped	  him	  to	  gain	  
support	  amongst	  people,	  who	  held	  him	  capable	  for	  achieving	  Gorkhaland	  and	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  
long-­‐awaited	  end	  to	  Ghisingh’s	  rule.	  As	  another	  local	  GJM	  leader	  put	  it:	  “We	  were	  waiting	  for	  the	  
right	  person	  to	  challenge	  Subash	  Ghisingh”	  (interview,	  June	  2012).	  
The	  second	  side	  to	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  points	  at	  his	  image	  as	  a	  genuine	  social	  worker	  and	  accessible	  
leader.	  Various	  persons	  even	  outside	  of	  Darjeeling	  town	  and	  surrounding	  areas	  had	  heart	  about	  his	  
“good	  work”	  in	  his	  constituency	  Tukvar,	  where	  he	  had	  successfully	  generated	  employment	  for	  the	  
unemployed	  youth	  and	  managed	  to	  restrict	  drug-­‐abuse,	  alcoholism,	  and	  robberies.	  He	  was	  also	  
known	  for	  maintaining	  law	  and	  order	  during	  melas	  (fairs)	  by	  punishing	  drunkards	  with	  his	  group	  of	  
strongmen.	  This	  reputation	  was	  propped	  up	  by	  stories	  of	  his	  welfare	  activities,	  e.g.	  the	  distribution	  of	  
money	  to	  needy	  people.	  Gurung’s	  financial	  support	  to	  the	  Prashant	  Tamang	  agitation,	  which	  Urmila	  
Rumba,	  central	  leader	  of	  the	  Nari	  Morcha	  claimed	  he	  “paid	  from	  his	  own	  pocket”	  (interview,	  
3.4.2012)	  underlines	  this	  image	  of	  the	  generous	  leader.	  	  
Unlike	  Ghisingh,	  Gurung	  was	  and	  is	  further	  perceived	  as	  an	  accessible	  leader	  with	  a	  sympathetic	  ear	  
for	  people.	  One	  female	  activist	  underlined	  that	  he	  as	  a	  son	  of	  tea	  garden	  workers	  was	  one	  of	  them	  
and	  was	  able	  to	  understand	  problems	  of	  poor	  people	  (interview,	  18.5.2012).	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These	  accounts	  underline	  that	  it	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  strongman	  reputation	  with	  perceptions	  of	  
braveness	  and	  generosity	  (social	  worker-­‐mask)	  which	  constituted	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  his	  taking	  over	  of	  power.	  They	  also	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  mainly	  his	  image	  as	  Ghisingh’s	  right-­‐
hand	  man	  –	  who	  held	  the	  actual	  muscle-­‐power	  –	  which	  underlined	  considerations	  of	  the	  town-­‐
population	  to	  support	  him	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  safe.	  Doubts	  about	  his	  poor	  educational	  background	  were	  
addressed	  through	  the	  involvement	  of	  prominent	  intellectuals	  in	  the	  initial	  phases	  of	  the	  new	  
movement.	  These	  factors	  clearly	  distinguished	  him	  from	  the	  other	  opposition	  leaders.	  Although	  
Madan	  Tamang	  (AIGL)	  was	  respected	  as	  a	  bright,	  intellectual,	  and	  wealthy	  person	  people	  claimed	  
that	  he	  failed	  to	  establish	  links	  to	  the	  grassroots	  and	  instead	  appeared	  as	  arrogant	  and	  distanced.	  
Although	  regarded	  as	  honest	  and	  educated,	  he	  not	  only	  lacked	  the	  strongman	  and	  social	  worker	  
reputation	  amongst	  the	  masses	  but	  also	  Gurung’s	  inherited	  GNLF-­‐networks	  over	  the	  district.	  R.B.	  Rai	  
(CPRM)	  still	  suffers	  from	  the	  stigma	  of	  having	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  during	  the	  ’86	  
Gorkhaland	  agitation.	  Although	  some	  people	  acknowledged	  his	  intellectual	  background	  and	  long-­‐
time	  political	  experience	  and	  decency,	  they	  could	  not	  forget	  the	  bad	  memories	  of	  the	  perceived	  
misdeeds	  of	  the	  “red	  flag”.	  I	  return	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  networks	  in	  
maintaining	  Gurung’s	  authority	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  and	  now	  continue	  to	  focus	  on	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  
management.	  
5.4.2 Reputation	  management	  2007	  and	  after	  
Following	  the	  argument	  that	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  strongman	  and	  social	  worker	  was	  an	  important	  
impetus	  for	  gaining	  power,	  living	  up	  to	  this	  reputation	  becomes	  one	  important	  strategy	  for	  the	  
leader	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  So	  how	  did	  Bimal	  Gurung	  himself	  cater	  to	  such	  images	  and	  the	  related	  public	  
expectations?	  
To	  research	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  management	  in	  and	  after	  2007,	  I	  draw	  on	  his	  political	  
speeches,	  an	  interview	  from	  the	  Darjeeling	  Times	  (2008),	  my	  own	  interview	  conducted	  with	  him	  in	  
July	  2012,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  his	  representation	  in	  the	  media,	  mainly	  the	  local	  newspaper	  Himalaya	  
Darpan	  and	  on	  Facebook.	  The	  speeches	  analysed	  were	  held	  at:	  
• the	  GJM	  foundation	  meeting	  at	  Darjeeling	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  on	  October	  7,	  2007,	  attended	  by	  
20,000	  people	  (cited	  as:	  Gurung	  2007)134;	  
• the	  public	  meeting	  at	  Siliguri	  on	  May	  7,	  2008,	  attended	  by	  more	  than	  100,000	  people	  (TT,	  
8.5.2008)	  (cited	  as:	  Gurung	  2008);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Towns	  Middleton	  for	  providing	  me	  his	  audio-­‐record	  of	  this	  speech	  as	  the	  GJM	  refused	  to	  
share	  their	  material	  despite	  repeated	  requests.	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  to	  a	  friend,	  who	  wishes	  to	  be	  anonymous	  
here	  for	  sharing	  the	  video-­‐material	  of	  other	  speeches	  between	  2008	  and	  2010.	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• the	  public	  meeting	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  (near	  Darjeeling	  town)	  on	  May	  30,	  2010,	  briefly	  
after	  the	  murder	  of	  AIGL-­‐leader	  Madan	  Tamang	  had	  sparked	  public	  outrage	  against	  the	  GJM	  
in	  Darjeeling	  town;	  the	  meeting	  was	  attended	  by	  a	  crowd	  of	  several	  hundred	  (cited	  as:	  
Gurung	  2010);	  	  
• the	  public	  meeting	  to	  celebrate	  the	  GTA-­‐agreement	  at	  Darjeeling	  Chowrasta	  on	  July	  21,	  
2011,	  attended	  by	  several	  hundred	  (cited	  as:	  Gurung	  2011);	  and	  
• the	  protest	  meeting	  against	  the	  areal	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Sen	  Committee	  at	  Darjeeling	  
Gymkhana	  on	  June	  14,	  2012,	  attended	  by	  several	  hundred	  party-­‐activists	  (cited	  as:	  Gurung	  
2012).	  	  
The	  analysis	  shows,	  how	  Gurung	  drew	  on	  the	  masks	  of	  messiah,	  strongman/muscle-­‐man,	  and	  social	  
worker	  in	  response	  to	  particular	  situations.	  	  
The	  messiah	  
Particularly	  in	  the	  earlier	  phases	  of	  the	  agitation,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  invested	  into	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  
messiah,	  created	  through	  a	  self-­‐portrayal	  of	  a	  heroic	  victor	  over	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  GNLF	  and	  
as	  a	  brave	  opponent	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  who	  sacrifices	  himself	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  his	  
community.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  visible	  in	  two	  political	  speeches:	  the	  one,	  which	  he	  delivered	  
on	  the	  GJM	  foundation	  day	  on	  October	  7,	  2007	  and	  the	  other	  at	  Gandhi	  Maidan	  in	  Siliguri	  in	  May	  
2008.	  Both	  meetings	  were	  attended	  by	  several	  thousands	  of	  people.	  	  
To	  convey	  an	  image	  of	  a	  trustworthy	  and	  genuine	  leader,	  in	  his	  maiden	  speech	  held	  at	  Darjeeling’s	  
political	  centre,	  the	  Chowk	  Bazaar/motor	  stand,	  Gurung	  positioned	  himself	  under	  Mahakal	  Baba,	  
Darjeeling’s	  local	  incarnation	  of	  God	  Shiva,	  who	  also	  symbolises	  masculine	  power.	  “I	  stand	  here	  in	  
front	  of	  the	  God,	  Mahakal	  Baba,	  for	  all	  the	  children	  of	  the	  hills	  (pahaḍ)”	  (Gurung	  2007).	  He	  then	  
proclaimed	  his	  oath	  to	  the	  God	  not	  to	  betray	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  “jāti”	  (read:	  Gorkhas)135.	  To	  underline	  
his	  dedication	  he	  added:	  “If	  you	  want	  me	  [...]	  to	  cut	  my	  hand	  and	  feet	  [for	  Gorkhaland]	  then	  I	  will	  do	  
so	  and	  show	  it	  to	  you	  all	  [applause].	  [...]	  People	  must	  have	  truthfulness	  (shātyātā).	  And	  only	  then	  
Gorkhaland	  will	  become	  reality.”	  Claiming	  to	  be	  inspired	  by	  the	  God,	  Gurung	  then	  introduced	  the	  
new	  flag	  of	  the	  GJM	  not	  as	  a	  party	  flag	  but	  as	  the	  flag	  of	  the	  jāti,	  thereby	  not	  only	  denying	  political	  
aspirations	  but	  also	  fixing	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  demand	  on	  himself	  and	  the	  new	  outfit.	  Such	  claims	  
were	  equally	  supported	  by	  the	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  meeting-­‐venues,	  where	  the	  slogan	  “We	  want	  
Gorkhaland”	  was	  printed	  on	  the	  three-­‐coloured	  banners	  of	  the	  GJM,	  and	  by	  the	  Nepali-­‐topi	  which	  
Gurung	  used	  to	  wear	  during	  these	  initial	  meetings,	  designating	  him	  as	  an	  ethnic	  Gorkha.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  The	  reference	  to	  (Hindu)	  religion	  becomes	  clear	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  organisation	  of	  big	  pujas	  (see	  Chapter	  6),	  or	  
Gurung’s	  occasional	  pilgrimages	  to	  religious	  sites	  such	  as	  Varanasi.	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But	  Gurung	  did	  not	  stop	  at	  only	  fixing	  the	  Gorkhaland-­‐issue	  on	  himself.	  Large	  parts	  of	  his	  initial	  
speeches	  were	  designed	  to	  invest	  himself	  with	  the	  image	  of	  a	  genuine	  and	  trustworthy	  leader.	  
Hitting	  at	  Ghisingh	  and	  other	  GNLF	  leaders	  served	  him	  to	  attain	  this	  reputation.	  His	  maiden	  speech	  
culminates	  in	  a	  roundabout	  critique	  of	  their	  style	  of	  leadership	  and	  functioning.	  Gurung	  brandished	  
the	  GNLF	  councillors	  as	  self-­‐centred	  chamchās136	  lacking	  any	  (masculine)	  guts	  and	  agency	  to	  criticise	  
Ghisingh	  and	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  socio-­‐economically	  deprived	  people.	  He	  denounced	  Ghisingh	  as	  
Yamaraj,	  the	  God	  of	  death,	  who	  killed	  all	  those	  raising	  their	  voice	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  He	  criticised	  him	  
heavily	  for	  not	  living	  up	  to	  his	  developmental	  promises	  and	  instead	  leaving	  people	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
deprivation	  while	  selfishly	  “eating”	  money,	  including	  even	  the	  compensation	  for	  those	  martyrs,	  who	  
died	  in	  the	  ’86-­‐agitation.	  He	  also	  drew	  an	  image	  of	  Ghisingh	  as	  a	  mad	  leader,	  who	  deceived	  people	  
and	  ruled	  through	  secrecy	  without	  taking	  others’	  opinions	  into	  consideration,	  while	  “selling	  the	  soil”	  
to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  for	  ulterior	  motives	  and	  leaving	  the	  Gorkhaland	  issue	  behind.	  
Through	  his	  interference	  in	  religious	  matters	  (see	  Chapter	  3)	  he	  had	  chased	  the	  gods	  from	  the	  hills	  
away,	  Gurung	  claimed.	  	  
In	  contradistinction	  to	  Ghisingh,	  Gurung	  describes	  himself	  as	  a	  genuine	  and	  generous	  leader	  who	  
cares	  for	  poor	  people	  by	  distributing	  his	  personal	  wealth	  amongst	  them.	  Particularly	  in	  his	  Siliguri	  
speech,	  which	  addresses	  an	  instance	  of	  violence	  against	  Gorkhaland	  activists	  in	  Siliguri,	  he	  presents	  
himself	  as	  a	  seeker	  of	  justice	  and	  protector	  of	  the	  community	  from	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government.	  
Unlike	  others	  he	  did	  not	  involve	  in	  kuṭnitī	  (here:	  ‘bad’	  politics;	  intrigues	  and	  secrecy)137	  and	  brought	  
the	  cause	  of	  Gorkhaland	  forward	  in	  a	  straight	  manner:	  
When	  Bimal	  Gurung	  does	  politics	  then	  it	  is	  for	  his	  mother	  [read:	  Darjeeling	  hills],	  it	  is	  for	  his	  
soil!	  [...]	  They	  [GNLF	  leaders]	  say	  ‘We	  want	  Gorkhaland’.	  And	  the	  other	  day	  they	  get	  votes	  
and	  that's	  it	  for	  them!	  That	  practice	  has	  been	  ended!	  I	  have	  sworn	  on	  the	  Gita,	  Bible,	  Chandi	  
[one	  form	  of	  Godess	  Durga],	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  chair	  [read:	  power]	  must	  not	  arise	  [...].	  
Because	  people	  should	  not	  be	  betrayed.	  They	  should	  be	  led	  according	  to	  (moral)	  principles	  
(nitī)!	  (Gurung	  2008)	  
Later	  he	  reinstated	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  an	  “identity	  for	  the	  [...]	  deprived	  Gorkhalis	  around	  the	  
world”	  was	  his	  “moral	  responsibility”	  and	  not	  expression	  of	  “any	  ulterior	  motive”	  (interview	  in	  
Darjeeling	  Times,	  23.8.2008).	  Claims	  such	  as	  “I	  never	  go	  back	  on	  my	  words”	  intend	  to	  underline	  his	  
moral	  dedication	  and	  trustworthiness	  (ibid.).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Literally:	  spoons.	  It	  is	  a	  derogatory	  term	  used	  for	  “yes-­‐men”,	  sycophants,	  creepers,	  and	  bootlickers.	  
137	  This	  term	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  writings	  of	  famous	  Indian	  political	  philosopher	  Kautiliya	  (3rd	  century	  BC)	  and	  
often	  translated	  as	  “diplomacy”.	  In	  Sanskrit	  one	  possible	  meaning	  of	  the	  prefix	  kuṭ	  is	  “illusion,	  fraud,	  trick,	  
untruth,	  and	  falsehood”.	  Together	  with	  nīti	  (conduct)	  the	  Sanskrit	  word	  can	  thus	  be	  translated	  as	  
“untruthfulness”,	  which	  comes	  close	  to	  kuṭnitī’s	  negative	  association	  in	  Darjeeling	  (personal	  communication,	  
Dagmar	  Wujastyk).	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As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Gurung	  expressed	  this	  proclaimed	  change	  in	  political	  style	  by	  announcing	  
a	  “new	  dawn”	  in	  Darjeeling,	  symbolised	  by	  the	  sun	  on	  the	  GJM-­‐flag	  (Gurung	  2007).	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  
again	  claimed	  inspiration	  from	  Mahakal	  Baba.	  Part	  of	  this	  “new	  dawn”	  was	  the	  announcement	  of	  an	  
end	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  buying	  political	  support	  with	  money	  and	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  relations	  
between	  leaders	  and	  followers,	  all	  expressed	  in	  the	  idiom	  of	  sachet	  jantā	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Another	  
element	  of	  this	  new	  culture	  is	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  peaceful	  and	  Gandhian	  movement	  in	  contrast	  
to	  the	  violent	  agitation	  of	  ‘86.	  Since	  2007,	  prior	  to	  every	  meeting	  Gurung	  and	  other	  central	  leaders	  
performed	  a	  puja	  in	  front	  of	  Gandhi’s	  image.	  Such	  performances	  and	  announcements	  intend	  to	  raise	  
hopes	  amongst	  the	  people	  for	  a	  different	  political	  regime,	  embodied	  by	  Gurung	  as	  the	  new-­‐style	  
leader	  and	  saviour	  of	  socially	  shared	  norms.	  Gurung	  not	  only	  announced	  a	  revival	  of	  Gorkhaland	  but	  
also	  directly	  catered	  to	  people’s	  hopes	  for	  a	  political	  regime	  change,	  where	  honesty	  and	  commitment	  
dominate	  over	  corruption	  and	  violence.	  All	  this	  fits	  into	  the	  mask	  of	  the	  messiah.	  Gurung	  reinstates	  
himself	  as	  a	  capable	  and	  genuine	  leader,	  who	  will	  not	  only	  bring	  about	  a	  political	  change	  in	  Darjeeling	  
but	  also	  make	  Gorkhaland	  a	  reality.	  This	  was	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  power-­‐
shift	  and	  the	  revived	  agitation	  as	  Gurung	  had	  to	  make	  people	  believe	  that	  he	  was	  a	  better	  option	  
compared	  to	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  other	  hill-­‐leaders.	  	  
Once	  this	  reputation	  was	  created,	  Gurung	  capitalised	  on	  it	  also	  in	  later	  stages	  of	  his	  rule,	  particularly	  
in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  evident	  in	  his	  speech	  held	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  on	  May	  
30,	  2010	  briefly	  after	  the	  murder	  of	  AIGL	  leader	  Madan	  Tamang	  had	  sparked	  a	  unique	  outbreak	  of	  
public	  anger	  against	  the	  GJM	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  (see	  Chapter	  8).	  Gurung	  –	  who	  had	  been	  in	  
Kalimpong	  –	  could	  only	  return	  to	  Darjeeling	  under	  police	  protection.	  This	  critical	  situation	  was	  
exacerbated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Gurung’s	  announced	  deadline	  of	  March	  10,	  2010	  by	  which	  he	  wanted	  to	  
achieve	  Gorkhaland	  or	  “otherwise	  commit	  suicide”	  passed	  without	  much	  progress	  on	  the	  statehood	  
question.	  Instead,	  the	  GJM	  had	  begun	  to	  involve	  in	  tripartite	  negotiations	  on	  an	  “interim	  authority”	  
since	  March	  2010.	  All	  this	  put	  Gurung’s	  legitimacy	  as	  leader	  for	  Gorkhaland	  at	  stake.	  To	  confront	  the	  
decline	  in	  his	  authority	  the	  whole	  public	  meeting	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  was	  framed	  in	  a	  way	  to	  
reinstate	  Gurung’s	  image	  as	  the	  genuine	  leader	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  Also	  Darjeeling’s	  prominent	  Member	  
of	  Parliament	  Jaswant	  Singh	  (BJP)138	  attended	  the	  meeting	  as	  a	  special	  guest.	  Prior	  to	  Gurung’s	  
speech	  thousands	  of	  flag-­‐swinging	  people	  danced	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  a	  song	  “our	  shared	  aim	  is	  
Gorkhaland”,	  while	  the	  leader,	  himself	  dressed	  in	  a	  red	  daura	  shuruval	  and	  wearing	  a	  Nepali	  topi	  
waved	  a	  big	  GJM	  flag	  over	  his	  followers.	  Flanked	  by	  two	  female	  GLP	  volunteers,	  he	  again	  proclaimed	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  GJM’s	  support	  to	  Singh	  and	  his	  election	  as	  Darjeeling’s	  MP	  for	  the	  national	  Lok	  Sabha	  in	  2009	  had	  been	  
pushed	  by	  hopes	  for	  getting	  a	  prominent	  voice	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  Delhi.	  Singh	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  Minister	  
for	  External	  Affairs	  under	  the	  1998-­‐2002	  BJP	  national	  government,	  and	  as	  Finance	  Minister	  till	  2004.	  He,	  
however,	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  expectations.	  From	  August	  2009	  to	  June	  2010	  he	  had	  been	  expelled	  
from	  the	  BJP	  due	  to	  a	  controversy	  surrounding	  his	  book	  on	  the	  Indian	  partition.	  	  
Changing	  parties,	  changing	  leaders,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	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himself	  as	  the	  genuine	  bringer	  of	  Gorkhaland	  and	  announced	  an	  end	  to	  the	  ongoing	  talks	  about	  an	  
interim	  council.	  He	  reiterated	  his	  earlier	  oath	  on	  the	  Gita	  not	  to	  betray	  the	  demand:	  
So	  far	  we	  never	  betrayed	  our	  aim.	  Like	  milk	  is	  white,	  the	  GJM	  has	  the	  same	  whiteness,	  and	  it	  
has	  worked	  accordingly!	  [...]	  They	  [government]	  tried	  to	  buy	  us	  often	  but	  we	  were	  not	  sold	  
[...].	  We	  are	  working	  for	  our	  children	  [...].	  The	  GJM	  is	  carrying	  the	  issue	  of	  Gorkhaland!	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  himself	  is	  nothing,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  has	  an	  aim	  fixed	  on	  him.	  (Gurung	  2011)	  
Gurung	  used	  a	  martial	  rhetoric	  to	  underline	  his	  trustworthiness,	  e.g.	  regarding	  the	  areal	  question	  of	  
the	  Dooars:	  
I	  have	  said,	  if	  I	  will	  leave	  an	  inch	  of	  Dooars,	  you	  can	  cut	  my	  body	  into	  pieces.	  Yes,	  because	  the	  
people	  believe	  in	  leadership.	  People	  believe	  that	  chairman	  Bimal	  Gurung	  will	  not	  leave	  us,	  he	  
will	  not	  leave	  the	  Dooars	  and	  Siliguri.	  I	  must	  not	  betray	  their	  belief.139	  (ibid.)	  
Even	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  in	  July	  2011,	  Gurung	  reinstated	  that	  he	  would	  not	  give	  up	  the	  demand	  
for	  Gorkhaland.	  He	  equally	  wore	  his	  messiah	  mask	  when	  condemning	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  
Sen	  Committee	  whose	  report	  had	  smashed	  the	  GJM’s	  hopes	  to	  include	  vast	  areas	  of	  the	  Dooars	  
under	  the	  GTA	  authority	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  His	  announcement	  of	  the	  “final	  fight”	  for	  Gorkhaland	  
(Gurung	  2012)	  suggested	  his	  utilisation	  of	  the	  demand	  as	  a	  means	  of	  pressure	  towards	  the	  State	  
government.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  Gurung	  increasingly	  went	  down	  on	  rival	  parties	  by	  accusing	  their	  leaders	  of	  ulterior	  
motives	  when	  they	  demanded	  Gorkhaland	  and	  for	  being	  against	  Gorkhaland.	  His	  anger	  was	  
particularly	  directed	  at	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Task	  Force	  (an	  alliance	  including	  the	  AIGL,	  
CPRM,	  BGP	  and	  others,	  see	  Chapter	  1).	  He	  even	  accused	  them	  of	  having	  links	  to	  Maoist	  groups	  and	  
of	  establishing	  militant	  “underground	  training	  camps”	  in	  the	  forests	  around	  Kalimpong	  (TT,	  7.2.2012,	  
TT,	  8.2.2012).	  He	  also	  regularly	  defamed	  the	  CPRM	  by	  blaming	  their	  leaders	  for	  the	  atrocities	  during	  
the	  agitation	  of	  ’86	  (Gurung	  2010;	  interview,	  7.7.2012).	  To	  counter	  threats	  from	  rival	  groups	  and	  
their	  critique	  at	  Gurung’s	  genuineness	  and	  ability	  (see	  Chapter	  8),	  Gurung’s	  construction	  of	  rivals	  as	  
non-­‐genuine	  leaders	  becomes	  an	  attempt	  to	  retain	  the	  monopoly	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  issue	  as	  a	  
means	  for	  his	  legitimation.	  	  
Thus,	  although	  Gurung	  failed	  in	  keeping	  his	  promise	  to	  provide	  Gorkhaland	  by	  March	  2010,	  and	  
instead	  agreed	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  GTA	  (where	  he	  subsequently	  became	  the	  chief),	  he	  still	  wears	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Here,	  Gurung	  directly	  refers	  to	  the	  interim	  set-­‐up	  negotiations,	  where	  the	  question	  of	  areal	  demarcation	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  points	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  and	  the	  GJM.	  In	  the	  same	  
speech	  Gurung	  introduces	  the	  demand	  of	  a	  “Gorkha	  Adivasi	  Pradesh”	  including	  Darjeeling	  and	  the	  contested	  
Dooars	  areas	  to	  be	  the	  new	  State	  instead	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  This	  idea,	  which	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  strategic	  device	  
to	  bring	  the	  adivasis	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  fold,	  was	  dismissed	  soon	  after	  it	  apparently	  failed	  to	  convince	  the	  agitators	  
(see	  Chapter	  4).	  




Picture	  6:	  One	  of	  various	  yellow	  stickers	  decorating	  the	  GJM’s	  main	  party	  office	  in	  Singmari/Darjeeling.	  
	  
his	  messiah-­‐mask	  and	  thereby	  tries	  to	  keep	  his	  reputation	  as	  genuine	  deliverer	  of	  Gorkhaland	  alive.	  
Significantly,	  not	  he	  but	  GJM	  General	  Secretary	  Roshan	  Giri	  had	  undersigned	  the	  agreement	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  the	  party,	  a	  fact	  which	  Gurung	  recurrently	  stressed	  in	  his	  speeches.	  When	  I	  visited	  the	  GJM	  
party-­‐office	  in	  July	  2012,	  yellow	  stickers	  with	  the	  face	  of	  the	  leader	  proclaimed	  “Have	  faith	  on	  me,	  I	  
will	  gift	  you	  Gorkhaland”	  (see	  Picture	  6).	  Importantly,	  after	  the	  central	  government’s	  announcement	  
to	  give	  in	  to	  the	  long-­‐standing	  demand	  for	  a	  Telangana	  State	  in	  the	  end	  of	  July	  2013,	  the	  Morcha	  
initiated	  a	  month-­‐long	  general	  strike	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  and	  switched	  back	  to	  its	  radical	  movement	  
mode.	  During	  this	  time,	  Gurung	  again	  heavily	  drew	  on	  his	  messiah-­‐mask.	  He	  underlined	  his	  
commitment	  to	  Gorkhaland	  by	  resigning	  from	  his	  post	  as	  GTA	  chief	  for	  a	  few	  months	  (till	  December	  
2013).	  	  
Gurung	  as	  strong	  and	  capable	  leader	  
Closely	  related	  to,	  and	  interwoven	  with	  his	  mask	  of	  the	  messiah,	  is	  Gurung’s	  mask	  of	  a	  strongman.	  He	  
invests	  into	  a	  reputation	  as	  strong,	  brave	  and	  capable	  leader	  with	  the	  power	  to	  protect	  his	  followers	  
and	  to	  challenge	  the	  State	  and	  Union	  governments.	  In	  his	  maiden	  speech	  (2007)	  Gurung	  described	  
himself	  as	  a	  “man	  who	  does	  not	  wear	  bangles”	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  “eunuchs”	  of	  the	  GNLF,	  who	  did	  not	  
have	  the	  guts	  to	  challenge	  or	  openly	  criticise	  Ghisingh,	  while	  he	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  do	  so	  even	  
under	  threat	  of	  his	  life	  (Gurung	  2007;	  2008).	  This	  claim	  to	  such	  “masculine”	  power	  is	  underlined	  by	  
his	  reference	  to	  Mahakal	  Baba,	  a	  male	  incarnation	  of	  God	  Shiva.	  	  
In	  his	  maiden	  speech	  he	  also	  promised	  protection	  to	  those,	  who	  faced	  trouble	  when	  defecting	  from	  
the	  GNLF.	  Such	  proclamations	  did	  not	  only	  attempt	  at	  re-­‐ensuring	  people,	  who	  feared	  repression	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while	  joining	  the	  new	  outfit,	  but	  also	  served	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  the	  actual	  power	  in	  Darjeeling	  was	  
with	  Gurung.	  Gurung	  used	  his	  strong-­‐man	  mask	  to	  challenge	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  West	  Bengal	  
government	  by	  underlining	  his	  authority	  over	  the	  majority	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  population.	  In	  Siliguri	  for	  
instance	  Gurung	  did	  not	  stop	  short	  of	  comparing	  himself	  with	  big	  leaders	  like	  Nehru,	  Indira	  Gandhi,	  
or	  the	  Dalai	  Lama,	  who	  had	  previously	  held	  meetings	  at	  the	  same	  venue.	  Threats	  to	  bring	  the	  hills	  to	  
a	  stand-­‐still	  if	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  did	  not	  meet	  people’s	  claims	  for	  justice	  and	  Gorkhaland	  
are	  part	  of	  his	  mask	  as	  strong	  protector	  of	  people	  and	  the	  seeker	  of	  justice.	  He	  supported	  such	  
threats	  with	  a	  loud	  and	  aggressive	  voice.	  Such	  shouting	  emerges	  as	  sudden	  eruptions	  from	  his	  
otherwise	  rather	  calm	  speech.	  Coupled	  with	  the	  messiah-­‐mask,	  Gurung	  compares	  himself	  with	  a	  
“bulldozer”,	  who	  will	  clear	  the	  road	  to	  Gorkhaland	  or	  a	  “growing	  fire	  which	  nobody	  can	  douse,	  not	  
even	  Subash	  Ghisingh”	  (Gurung	  2008).	  Certainly,	  Gurung’s	  success	  in	  ousting	  Ghisingh	  and	  to	  stop	  
the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  catered	  to	  his	  reputation	  as	  strong	  and	  capable	  leader,	  who	  accomplished	  to	  do	  
what	  other	  opposition	  forces	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  do	  in	  several	  years	  of	  resistance.	  
In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  GJM	  this	  strongman	  mask	  particularly	  served	  to	  support	  his	  messiah-­‐claim	  
as	  victor	  over	  Ghisingh	  and	  bringer	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  This	  helped	  him	  to	  win	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  population	  
and	  to	  diminish	  their	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  by	  the	  GNLF	  by	  positioning	  himself	  as	  a	  protector.	  People,	  
who	  had	  been	  waiting	  for	  years	  for	  a	  political	  change	  now	  saw	  in	  Gurung	  the	  strong	  and	  long-­‐
awaited	  messiah	  to	  rescue	  them	  from	  the	  GNLF’s	  reign	  and	  bring	  about	  political	  change	  in	  the	  hills.	  	  
Later	  speeches,	  however,	  suggest	  that	  Gurung	  utilised	  his	  strongman	  reputation	  increasingly	  to	  
threaten	  rivals	  and	  defectors.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  clear	  in	  his	  speech	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  in	  
May	  2010.	  In	  protest	  against	  Madan	  Tamang’s	  murder	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  had	  torn	  GJM	  
posters	  and	  flags.	  Here,	  besides	  reiterating	  his	  genuineness	  (see	  above),	  Gurung	  directly	  threatened	  
those	  who	  dared	  to	  challenge	  his	  authority.	  While	  denying	  any	  responsibility	  for	  Tamang’s	  murder	  by	  
reiterating	  the	  GJM’s	  “non-­‐violent”	  approach,	  Gurung	  pointed	  at	  the	  power	  of	  majority	  in	  direct	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  Gorkhaland	  claim:	  	  
Those	  who	  tore	  down	  the	  flags,	  the	  posters,	  flex	  -­‐	  they	  should	  see	  the	  crowd	  today!	  [...]	  You	  
should	  remember	  that	  it	  is	  harmful	  to	  touch	  the	  fire.	  You	  will	  burn	  your	  hand.	  [...]	  The	  GJM	  is	  
the	   fire	  of	  Gorkhaland.	   [...]	   It	  does	  not	  cool	  down	  easily.	   It	  becomes	  hotter	  until	   the	  aim	   is	  
achieved.	  Therefore,	  do	  not	  touch	  it	  as	  your	  hands	  will	  be	  burnt!	  (Gurung	  2010)	  
Such	   rhetoric	   equates	   critiques	   of	   the	   GJM	   with	   critiques	   of	   Gorkhaland.	   While	   stressing	   his	  
authority,	  he	  then	  proclaimed:	  “I	  excuse	  you.	  Because	  I	  am	  not	  Bimal	  Gurung	  of	  1986	  but	  of	  2007”	  
(ibid.),	   acting	   as	   a	   king	   who	   holds	   court	   while	   presenting	   himself	   as	   a	   forgiving	   and	   peace-­‐loving	  
leader.	  Gurung	  also	  attempted	  to	  ridicule	  perceived	  attempts	  of	  challenging	  his	  power	  by	  underlining	  
his	  personal	  reach	  over	  the	  district	  and	  its	  people:	  “I	  have	  reached	  every	  home	  and	  every	  place	  [...].	  I	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have	  made	  them	  [people]	  ‘conscious’	  [Engl].	  Therefore,	  such	   lākhs	  [100,000s]	  of	  people	  came	  upon	  
my	  request.	  Such	  crowds	  never	  had	  happened	  before”	  (ibid.).	  In	  contrast	  he	  ridicules	  the	  AIGL	  for	  not	  
having	  any	  mass-­‐support.	  
Gurung	  as	  social	  worker	  and	  accessible	  leader	  
A	  third	  mask	  Gurung	  wears	  is	  the	  one	  of	  a	  social	  worker,	  a	  patron	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  an	  accessible	  
leader.	  Already	  in	  his	  maiden	  speech	  in	  2007,	  he	  distinguished	  himself	  from	  other	  “selfish”	  GNLF	  
leaders	  by	  proclaiming	  his	  generosity,	  i.e.	  by	  sharing	  his	  wealth	  with	  needy	  persons	  (Gurung	  2007).	  
While	  initially	  the	  messiah	  and	  strongman	  mask	  prevailed	  in	  Gurung’s	  public	  presentations,	  this	  
social	  worker	  mask	  gained	  prominence	  in	  the	  later	  phases	  of	  the	  agitation,	  particularly	  after	  the	  GTA-­‐
agreement,	  which	  shifted	  the	  focus	  from	  statehood	  to	  development	  of	  the	  region.	  In	  the	  public	  
meeting	  to	  celebrate	  the	  GTA	  agreement,	  Gurung	  –	  this	  time	  not	  wearing	  any	  traditional	  ethnic	  attire	  
–	  had	  to	  convince	  people	  that	  the	  council	  was	  a	  good	  solution	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  Unimpressed	  by	  
the	  oppositions’	  critique,	  Gurung	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  dedicated	  patron	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  people.	  
Designating	  himself	  as	  “father	  of	  all	  Indian	  Gorkhas”	  he	  promised	  to	  work	  for	  his	  “children”.	  He	  said	  
that	  the	  common	  people	  (sādhāraṇ	  mānchhe)	  and	  not	  leaders	  should	  benefit	  from	  the	  council:	  
And	  this	  big	  gift	  is	  not	  only	  for	  Bimal	  Gurung	  und	  Roshan	  Giri	  [GJM	  General	  Secretary]	  to	  eat,	  
it	   should	  be	   for	   all	   people	   to	  eat	   (chhapāunu).	   [...]	  We	  are	  only	  one	  medium.	  We	  are	  only	  
there	  to	  provide,	  to	  speak,	  and	  to	  feed.	  But	  you	  are	  here	  to	  use	  it.	  (Gurung	  2011)	  
Also	  in	  his	  later	  protest	  speech	  against	  the	  Sen	  Committee’s	  areal	  recommendations	  in	  July	  2012	  he	  
drew	  upon	  his	  social	  worker	  image.	  Already	  before	  Gurung	  entered	  the	  stage	  various	  representatives	  
of	  GJM’s	  frontal	  organisations	  lauded	  him	  as	  an	  able	  deliverer	  of	  development,	  who	  had	  reached	  
each	  and	  every	  place	  in	  Darjeeling	  to	  involve	  in	  ground-­‐level	  work.	  Gurung	  then	  described	  himself	  as	  
a	  generous	  social	  worker,	  who	  provided	  support	  to	  the	  needy	  even	  in	  rivals’	  areas	  out	  of	  humanity	  
and	  not	  due	  to	  any	  political	  intentions.	  	  
Responding	  to	  the	  CPRM’s	  critique,	  which	  questioned	  his	  right	  to	  distribute	  development	  (as	  he	  was	  
not	  elected	  then),	  Gurung	  underlined	  his	  capability	  to	  provide:	  “Bimal	  Gurung	  does	  not	  need	  
permission,	  he	  orders!	  Remember	  this!	  [...].	  We	  order	  on	  behalf	  of	  our	  party”	  (Gurung	  2012).	  He	  then	  
defamed	  the	  CPRM,	  whose	  allegedly	  wealthy	  leaders	  were	  oppressing	  people	  in	  their	  strongholds	  by	  
not	  providing	  development	  and	  punishing	  rivals	  through	  social	  boycott.	  Also	  in	  the	  interview	  I	  
conducted	  with	  Gurung	  in	  July	  2012,	  he	  reiterated	  that	  “a	  good	  leader	  should	  work	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  
people”,	  and	  presented	  himself	  as	  a	  medium	  who	  “recommends”	  projects	  to	  the	  respective	  
developmental	  institutions	  while	  denying	  any	  “authority	  to	  issue	  cheques	  or	  work	  orders”	  (Gurung	  
2012;	  interview,	  7.7.2012).	  He	  strongly	  refused	  any	  allegations	  of	  corruption	  or	  receiving	  money	  from	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the	  tea	  plantation	  proprietors	  but	  stressed	  that	  he	  was	  working	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  plantation	  workers,	  
e.g.	  by	  raising	  their	  wages	  in	  2011140.	  To	  support	  his	  dedication	  Gurung	  regularly	  involved	  in	  welfare-­‐
campaigns	  in	  the	  district	  including	  prolonged	  stays	  at	  chosen	  places.	  There,	  he	  would	  announce	  the	  
construction	  of	  infrastructure	  (such	  as	  roads,	  community	  halls),	  distribute	  money	  or	  construction	  
materials	  to	  individuals,	  and	  organises	  health	  camps	  and	  football	  tournaments.	  In	  May	  2012,	  for	  
instance,	  he	  spent	  nearly	  two	  weeks	  at	  Rangmook/Cedars	  tea	  estate,	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  
stronghold	  of	  the	  CPRM.	  This	  campaign	  was	  widely	  covered	  in	  the	  local	  newspapers	  and	  sparked	  
outrage	  amongst	  CPRM	  workers	  who	  defamed	  him	  for	  his	  politically	  intended	  attack	  on	  their	  place	  
(see	  Chapter	  8).	  
A	  second	  element	  of	  Gurung’s	  social	  worker	  mask	  is	  that	  of	  the	  accessible	  leader,	  who	  does	  not	  
stand	  above	  people	  but	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  He	  regularly	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  “son	  of	  poor	  people”	  
(interview	  in:	  Sharma	  2012).	  Also	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  a	  speech	  suggests	  this:	  
I	  don't	  think	  you	  should	  worship	  me.	   I	  converse	  with	  you	  people	  everywhere	  in	  streets	  and	  
lanes.	  [...]	  Wherever	  you	  want	  me,	  I	  come	  there	  and	  work	  for	  you.	  I	  stay	  in	  your	  heart.	  I	  bring	  
all	  your	  work	  forward.	  Because,	  today	  a	  leader	  is	  not	  like	  a	  god.	  (Gurung	  2012)	  
Most	  of	  his	  followers	  call	  Gurung	  “dājū”	  (elder	  brother	  in	  Nepali),	  outlining	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  
intimacy	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  leader.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  they	  usually	  greet	  him	  by	  bowing	  
down	  in	  front	  of	  him	  to	  receive	  his	  blessing,	  pointing	  at	  the	  clear	  hierarchy	  and	  submission	  under	  
their	  leader.	  Also	  Gurung’s	  proclaimed	  roles	  as	  the	  “father”	  and	  patron	  of	  the	  Gorkhas	  and	  his	  
sometimes	  extravagant	  dresses	  set	  him	  apart	  from	  others.	  Although	  Gurung	  often	  wears	  traditional	  
Nepali	  attire	  at	  public	  functions,	  the	  fabric	  of	  his	  dress	  is	  special,	  usually	  expensive	  and	  more	  
colourful	  than	  the	  typical	  one.	  Such	  performances	  underline	  his	  individuality	  and	  agency	  and	  set	  him	  
apart	  from	  the	  crowd	  of	  which	  he	  claims	  to	  be	  a	  member	  (cf.	  Mines	  and	  Gourishankar	  1990).	  	  
Different	  situations,	  different	  masks	  
In	  sum,	  the	  discussion	  of	  Gurung’s	  masks	  supports	  the	  contention	  that	  leaders	  have	  different	  
registers	  at	  their	  disposal,	  which	  they	  choose	  according	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  certain	  situations	  (Price	  and	  
Ruud	  2010b;	  Bailey	  1988).	  Also	  Gurung	  stressed	  different	  traits	  of	  his	  personality	  as	  a	  leader	  
according	  to	  differing	  situations.	  While	  in	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  movement	  the	  messiah	  coupled	  with	  
the	  strongman	  mask	  prevailed,	  later	  he	  emphasised	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  capable	  social	  worker.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  he	  attempted	  to	  prop-­‐up	  his	  legitimacy	  derived	  from	  monopolising	  the	  statehood	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  Together	  with	  other	  unions,	  the	  GJM	  had	  successfully	  agitated	  for	  a	  wage-­‐hike	  from	  56	  INR	  to	  90	  INR	  in	  
2011.	  Significantly,	  however,	  at	  the	  July	  2012-­‐GJM	  meeting	  tea	  union	  president	  had	  underlined	  that	  the	  
plantation	  workers	  should	  stop	  demanding	  “small	  things”	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  struggle	  (see	  
Chapter	  4).	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demand	  with	  factual	  measures,	  embodied	  in	  the	  mask	  of	  the	  social	  worker	  and	  caring	  patron.	  The	  
combination	  of	  the	  masks	  renders	  him	  a	  patron	  and	  protector	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  Gorkhaland	  lovers.	  
Gurung	  becomes	  a	  social	  worker	  and	  messiah	  with	  “bossish”	  appeal.	  Throughout,	  Gurung	  presents	  
himself	  as	  a	  leader	  guided	  by	  moral	  considerations	  and	  denies	  oppositions’	  allegations	  of	  his	  
“ulterior”	  motives.	  It	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  three	  masks,	  which	  sets	  Gurung	  apart	  from	  other	  
political	  leaders	  who	  solely	  draw	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  issue	  but	  apparently	  fail	  to	  present	  themselves	  
as	  strong	  and/or	  generous	  persons.	  
5.4.3 Losing	  legitimacy?	  Changing	  perceptions	  after	  2007	  
After	  having	  explored	  the	  differing	  masks	  Gurung	  wears	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “supply-­‐side”	  of	  legitimacy	  
(see	  Chapter	  1)	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  these	  masks	  were	  perceived	  by	  those	  from	  whom	  
Gurung	  wanted	  to	  win	  support.	  What	  people	  expect	  a	  “good”	  leader	  to	  be	  like	  and	  whether	  Gurung	  
manages	  to	  live	  up	  to	  such	  expectations.	  How	  far	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  present	  himself	  as	  a	  messiah,	  
a	  strong	  and	  capable	  leader,	  and	  a	  social	  worker	  reflected	  in	  the	  ways	  people	  perceived	  him.	  Was	  
Gurung’s	  reputation	  management	  successful?	  	  
The	   following	   accounts	   on	   Bimal	   Gurung	   are	   based	   mostly	   on	   responses	   from	   tea	   plantation	  
residents	  from	  the	  three	  tea	  estates,	  where	  I	  stayed	  in	  2012	  and	  2013.	  These	  also	  include	  statements	  
of	  activists,	  followers,	  and	  rivals.	  Their	  accounts	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  situated	  in	  the	  specific	  socio-­‐
economic	   and	   cultural	   context	   of	   the	   tea	   plantation,	   characterised	   by	   strict	   hierarchies,	  
dependencies,	   and	   a	   common	   feeling	   of	   inferiority	   and	   powerlessness	   (see	   Chapter	   1).	   Before	  
displaying	   both	   positive	   and	   negative	   opinions	   about	   Bimal	   Gurung,	   I	   first	   present	   what	   most	  
respondents	  conceived	  as	  an	  “ideal”	   leader.	  Such	  images,	  which	  form	  part	  of	  the	  “demand”	  side	  of	  
legitimacy	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  explicitly	  capture	  the	  perspectives	  of	  the	  “ruled”.	  
The	  “ideal”	  leader	  
The	  lack	  of	  self-­‐confidence	  apparent	  in	  many	  accounts	  of	  tea	  plantation	  workers	  clearly	  influences	  
their	  positioning	  towards	  upper-­‐level	  political	  leaders,	  whom	  especially	  female	  workers	  conceived	  as	  
being	  unreachably	  high	  “up”	  (māthi).	  In	  this	  context,	  accounts	  displaying	  imaginations	  of	  an	  “ideal”	  
leader	  suggest	  that	  he	  should	  bridge	  this	  gap	  and	  attend	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  sorrows	  of	  the	  grassroots.	  
He	  should	  be	  selfless,	  generous,	  and	  honest.	  Such	  moral	  idioms	  serve	  as	  a	  reference	  frame	  for	  
leaders’	  evaluation	  and	  equally	  frame	  people’s	  expectations	  towards	  them.	  These	  include	  the	  hope	  
for	  leaders’	  support	  in	  getting	  employment	  or	  attaining	  higher	  positions	  at	  the	  tea	  plantation,	  in	  
getting	  jobs	  as	  teachers	  mediated	  through	  the	  party,	  or	  in	  taking	  care	  of	  financial	  problems,	  mainly	  
for	  medical	  expenses.	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But	  besides	  such	  factual	  expectations	  projected	  on	  leaders	  in	  general,	  respondents	  also	  expected	  
them	  to	  be	  honest	  about	  the	  statehood	  demand.	  Such	  moral	  expectations	  were	  contrasted	  with	  
critique	  at	  selfishness	  expressed	  in	  the	  idioms	  of	  “eating”	  (khānū)	  (mainly	  regarding	  corruption)	  and	  
“selling	  the	  demand”	  (bechnū).	  Such	  idioms	  express	  the	  fear	  that	  “bad”	  leaders	  would	  strive	  for	  
“selfish”	  gains	  by	  misusing	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  people’s	  trust.	  The	  vernacular	  term	  ghoṭālā	  
(scam,	  cozenage)	  summarises	  such	  perceptions	  of	  leaders	  who	  selfishly	  “steal”	  money	  which	  was	  
intended	  for	  the	  public,	  mostly	  from	  state	  developmental	  contracts141.	  There	  are,	  however,	  
differences	  in	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  traits	  of	  an	  “ideal”	  leader.	  While	  many	  supporters	  also	  expressed	  
hopes	  to	  benefit	  economically	  from	  a	  leaders’	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  rival	  CPRM	  activists	  rated	  a	  
leaders’	  honesty	  to	  accomplish	  Gorkhaland	  higher,	  a	  point	  I	  discuss	  later	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  8).	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  as	  a	  good	  leader	  
Indeed,	  some	  GJM	  activists	  and	  followers	  attributed	  the	  outlined	  features	  of	  an	  “ideal”	  leader	  to	  
Bimal	  Gurung.	  Those	  who	  described	  him	  as	  generous	  pointed	  at	  his	  distribution	  of	  money	  and	  other	  
things	  to	  the	  needy.	  In	  their	  opinion,	  he	  did	  not	  keep	  the	  money	  he	  (presumably)	  got	  from	  
contractors	  with	  himself	  but	  instead	  used	  it	  for	  helping	  others	  at	  the	  “grassroots”.	  In	  contrast,	  most	  
respondents	  were	  aware	  that	  leaders	  of	  other	  parties	  lacked	  such	  financial	  resources	  and	  one	  could	  
not	  expect	  them	  to	  help	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  Others	  attributed	  the	  reopening	  of	  their	  tea	  estates	  or	  the	  
wage	  hike	  in	  2011	  to	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM.	  For	  some,	  Gurung’s	  welfare	  campaigns	  proved	  his	  
dedication	  to	  help	  the	  poor.	  Even	  though	  some	  thought	  of	  such	  campaigns	  as	  not	  morally	  but	  rather	  
politically	  motivated	  (“to	  garner	  votes”),	  the	  leader’s	  motivation	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  matter	  as	  long	  as	  
they	  benefitted	  somehow.	  Also	  GJM	  activists	  praised	  Gurung	  for	  a	  comparatively	  equal	  distribution	  
of	  contracts	  amongst	  them	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  GNLF	  time)	  and	  claimed	  there	  was	  less	  corruption	  
(ghoṭālā)	  compared	  to	  earlier.	  	  
A	  second	  element	  of	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  is	  the	  conviction	  amongst	  followers	  that	  he	  would	  bring	  
Gorkhaland,	  despite	  the	  prolonged	  agitation	  and	  the	  compromise	  on	  the	  GTA.	  One	  teacher	  from	  a	  
GJM-­‐stronghold	  expressed	  his	  trust	  in	  Gurung	  by	  pointing	  at	  his	  oath	  on	  the	  Gita	  and	  the	  Bible.	  Also	  
others	  perceived	  the	  GJM	  as	  fighting	  for	  the	  “jāti”.	  Moreover,	  accounts	  of	  several	  female	  workers	  
from	  a	  GJM	  stronghold	  equated	  the	  GJM	  and	  Bimal	  Gurung	  with	  Gorkhaland.	  They	  hardly	  had	  any	  
information	  on	  other	  parties	  promoting	  the	  same	  aim.	  One	  woman	  even	  said	  that	  “Bimal	  Gurung	  is	  
like	  a	  god	  for	  us”.	  This	  clearly	  reflects	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  monopolise	  the	  statehood	  demand.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  Often	  this	  term	  is	  used	  in	  conjunction	  with	  expressions	  of	  “eating”	  (khānū).	  “To	  eat	  ghoṭālā”	  (ghoṭālā	  
khānū)	  means	  to	  gain	  personal	  benefits	  from	  the	  contract	  work	  by	  skimming	  money	  through	  the	  use	  of	  minor	  
construction	  materials	  or	  faking	  bills.	  Ghoṭālā	  is	  a	  term	  more	  regularly	  used	  than	  “corruption”	  (bhrasṭachār)	  in	  
Darjeeling.	  
Changing	  parties,	  changing	  leaders,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  reputation	  
161	  
	  
The	  third	  but	  less	  prominent	  element	  in	  people’s	  positive	  accounts	  on	  Gurung	  was	  reference	  to	  his	  
strength	  and	  braveness.	  Several	  respondents	  suggested	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  the	  only	  leader	  
strong	  enough	  to	  overthrow	  Ghisingh	  (see	  above).	  Some	  activists	  also	  praised	  his	  ability	  to	  unite	  
people	  in	  the	  joined	  struggle	  for	  statehood.	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  as	  a	  bad	  leader	  
Yet,	  not	  all	  accounts	  on	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM	  were	  positive	  and	  opinions	  were	  sharply	  divided	  
amongst	  the	  plantation	  workers.	  Although	  such	  critique	  was	  largely	  pointed	  at	  the	  local	  party-­‐
leaders,	  it	  also	  impacted	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  good	  leader.	  Importantly,	  such	  critique	  was	  hardly	  
ever	  voiced	  in	  the	  open	  and	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  resistance	  to	  Gurung	  (see	  Chapter	  8),	  or	  the	  
openly	  voiced	  critiques	  of	  rival	  parties’	  members.	  
Many	  persons	  in	  the	  plantation	  criticised	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  local	  leaders	  in	  particular	  for	  being	  
dishonest	  and	  for	  misusing	  people’s	  trust	  for	  their	  “selfish”	  economic	  gains.	  Instead	  of	  looking	  after	  
people’s	  problems	  and	  the	  village	  needs	  by	  distributing	  what	  they	  presumably	  received	  from	  Bimal	  
Gurung,	  they	  were	  allegedly	  only	  concerned	  about	  their	  own	  benefits.	  Answering	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  the	  party	  had	  given	  to	  them,	  many	  people	  stressed	  that	  only	  local	  leaders	  (or	  “portfolio”	  
[Engl.]-­‐holders)	  had	  benefitted.	  They	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  unequal	  distribution.	  Such	  selfishness	  is	  
also	  attributed	  to	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  who	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  some	  misused	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  as	  a	  
begging	  bowl	  to	  gain	  benefits	  from	  the	  State	  government.	  Some	  people	  even	  denounced	  Gurung	  as	  a	  
“liar”.	  One	  female	  worker	  pronounced	  this:	  
They	  say	  they	  would	  bring	  Gorkhaland.	  They	  are	  using	  us	  people	  to	  support	  them.	  What	  
would	  netās	  be	  without	  the	  people?	  But	  then	  they	  forget	  us	  and	  what	  they	  promised	  to	  us.	  I	  
don’t	  understand	  politics	  here.	  (interview,	  14.5.2012)	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  reputations	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung	  (probably	  involuntarily)	  had	  amongst	  both	  
rural	  and	  urban	  population	  is	  that	  of	  a	  womanizer.	  Rumours	  about	  his	  many	  affairs	  with	  devoted	  
female	  activists	  of	  the	  Nari	  Morcha	  or	  the	  GLP	  added	  to	  stories	  about	  his	  many	  weddings.	  Some	  
people	  joked	  by	  calling	  him	  “Bijan”	  (Nepali	  for	  seed/sperm)	  Gurung.	  Some	  other	  leaders	  also	  had	  
such	  derogatory	  pet	  names142.	  	  
A	  comparably	  open	  forum	  for	  critique	  is	  Facebook,	  which	  gained	  prominence	  with	  the	  increase	  of	  
smart-­‐phones,	  especially	  amongst	  the	  youth.	  Recurrent	  accounts	  in	  groups	  such	  as	  “GTA	  go	  back”	  
depict	  Gurung	  as	  a	  thief	  running	  away	  with	  developmental	  funds	  (Facebook,	  Darjeeling	  Boy	  Riderzz,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  MLA	  Harka	  Bahadur	  Chettri	  is	  called	  “Pharka”	  (Nepali	  for	  return/go	  back)	  Bahadur	  Chettri,	  reflecting	  his	  
return	  to	  the	  GJM	  inspite	  of	  quitting	  after	  Madan	  Tamang’s	  murder	  and	  	  general	  secretary	  Roshan	  Giri	  is	  
sometimes	  called	  “Shoṣaṇ”	  (Nepali	  for	  exploitation)	  Giri.	  Such	  jokes	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “hidden	  
transcript”	  (Scott	  1990)	  whereby	  those	  subjected	  to	  rule	  express	  a	  kind	  of	  resistance.	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20.12.2012)	  or	  as	  a	  broker	  of	  the	  government	  (ibid.).	  The	  general	  mood	  in	  such	  groups	  expresses	  
disappointment	  and	  anger	  with	  Gurung	  and	  also	  with	  other	  political	  leaders.	  Such	  accounts	  are,	  
however,	  contrasted	  by	  those	  lauding	  Gurung	  for	  his	  decisions	  and	  policy.	  This	  division	  in	  the	  
Facebook	  community	  reflects	  the	  good	  and	  bad	  opinions	  on	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  While	  some	  publicly	  
proclaim	  their	  loyalty	  towards	  the	  leader	  others	  openly	  (or	  using	  pseudonyms)	  oppose	  him.	  	  
In	  sum,	  such	  accounts	  express	  feelings	  of	  betrayal	  and	  perceived	  exploitation	  similar	  to	  those	  
associated	  with	  Ghisingh	  before	  he	  came	  to	  fall.	  Despite	  this	  critique,	  however,	  a	  majority	  continues	  
to	  support	  Gurung	  (at	  least	  passively).	  In	  this	  context,	  respondents’	  regular	  expressions	  of	  fear	  from	  
violence	  and	  oppression	  if	  opposing	  the	  GJM	  suggest	  their	  perceived	  compulsion	  to	  follow	  (I	  explore	  
this	  dimension	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  7).	  	  
Rivals’	  voices	  –	  struggles	  over	  reputation	  
While	  the	  two	  earlier	  sections	  displayed	  accounts	  of	  GJM	  activists	  and	  followers,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  
opinions	  of	  outspoken	  GJM	  rivals	  as	  members	  of	  opposition	  parties.	  These	  strive	  for	  destroying	  
Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  genuine	  leader	  and	  instead	  accuse	  him	  of	  being	  selfish,	  dishonest,	  and	  
incapable	  of	  achieving	  Gorkhaland,	  a	  leader	  selling	  the	  demand	  for	  personal	  gain	  and	  ruling	  through	  
violence.	  To	  underline	  their	  critique	  they	  point	  at	  Gurung’s	  agreement	  on	  the	  GTA	  and	  the	  murder	  of	  
Madan	  Tamang	  for	  which	  they	  hold	  him	  responsible.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Gurung,	  leaders	  such	  as	  Madan	  
Tamang	  or	  R.B.	  Rai	  are	  presented	  as	  genuine	  and	  honest,	  sacrificing	  personal	  economic	  wealth	  or	  
positions	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  Not	  only	  public	  speeches	  or	  contributions	  in	  local	  newspapers	  voice	  such	  
critique	  but	  also	  posters	  placed	  at	  central	  places	  in	  the	  towns	  do	  so.	  Accounts	  of	  local	  CPRM	  activists	  
suggest	  that	  the	  parameters	  for	  their	  evaluation	  differ	  from	  those	  who	  emphasise	  that	  leaders	  
should	  share	  their	  wealth	  and	  deliver	  development.	  Instead,	  they	  elevated	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand	  
above	  developmental	  aspirations	  suggesting	  that	  an	  “ideal”	  leader	  should	  first	  concentrate	  on	  
Gorkhaland	  even	  if	  this	  means	  to	  compromise	  on	  socio-­‐economic	  agendas.	  Thereby	  they	  underlined	  
their	  conviction	  of	  not	  “being	  bought”	  by	  any	  of	  Gurung’s	  welfare-­‐campaigns,	  which	  they	  
condemned	  as	  politically	  motivated.	  Thereby	  they	  questioned	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  present	  himself	  
as	  guided	  by	  “moral”	  considerations143.	  Besides,	  rivals	  often	  criticised	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM	  for	  their	  
reign	  through	  “muscle	  power”	  or	  violence	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  7).	  
A	  very	  pronounced	  critique,	  which	  contrasts	  such	  moral	  aspirations	  towards	  leaders	  with	  their	  
perceived	  conduct	  and	  which	  drew	  some	  media	  attention	  in	  Darjeeling,	  was	  expressed	  on	  a	  public	  
poster	  of	  an	  (till	  date)	  unknown	  outfit,	  the	  Krantikari	  Mukti	  Sena	  (Revolutionary	  Liberation	  Army,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  this	  argumentation	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  when	  discussing	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  domination.	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KMS).	  Their	  poster	  reads	  as	  a	  manifesto	  for	  “ideal”	  leaders	  contrasted	  with	  a	  disappointed	  and	  angry	  
public.	  It	  spelled	  out	  a	  warning	  towards	  the	  political	  leaders,	  yet	  without	  directly	  naming	  Gurung:	  
Politics	  should	  be	  done	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  public,	  leaders	  should	  not	  only	  move	  around	  in	  good	  
cars,	  and	  sell	  the	  aspiration	  of	  the	  people	  and	  the	  soil	  (māṭo).	  Leaders	  and	  individuals	  
supporting	  the	  State	  and	  creating	  disturbance	  –	  be	  aware.	  Whenever	  the	  aspirations	  are	  
sold,	  when	  exploitation	  crosses	  the	  line	  of	  endurance,	  when	  the	  public	  starts	  to	  get	  robbed,	  
then	  the	  KMS	  will	  come	  forward.	  When	  some	  parties	  start	  playing	  theatre	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
revolution	  then	  we	  will	  not	  answer	  with	  words	  but	  with	  bullets.	  No	  one	  here	  has	  the	  right	  to	  
play	  with	  the	  emotions	  of	  our	  love	  towards	  freedom	  […].	  Leader	  exploiting	  the	  people,	  be	  
aware!	  KMS	  (photographed	  in	  Mirik,	  5.6.2013)	  
Such	  critique	  not	  only	  reflects	  ideals	  of	  leadership	  by	  condemning	  “exploitation”	  or	  the	  “sale	  of	  
aspirations”,	  it	  also	  expresses	  public	  aspirations	  for	  honesty	  and	  dedication	  for	  a	  common	  cause.	  It	  
attempts	  to	  remind	  leaders	  of	  the	  ultimate	  dependence	  of	  their	  success	  on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  public	  
and	  represents	  the	  attempt	  of	  a	  group	  to	  define	  what	  is	  morally	  right	  or	  wrong	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  
political	  leaders.	  As	  such	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  politically	  aware	  subject,	  which	  
formulates	  its	  demands	  towards	  the	  regional	  leaders	  and	  not	  (only)	  towards	  the	  state	  (as	  in	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  rhetoric).	  The	  existence	  of	  the	  ominous	  KMS,	  however,	  remained	  reduced	  to	  this	  poster	  
and	  the	  group	  never	  came	  out	  in	  the	  open.	  
The	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  
The	  presented	  accounts	  underline	  that	  public	  evaluations	  of	  Gurung	  draw	  on	  both,	  moral	  and	  
instrumental	  considerations;	  this	  renders	  the	  ruled	  “moral	  teams”	  as	  well	  as	  “transactional	  groups”	  
(Bailey	  1969,	  75,	  82).	  Two	  very	  common	  elements	  depicting	  people’s	  aspirations	  towards	  the	  leader	  
are	  the	  idioms	  of	  the	  serving	  patron	  caring	  for	  the	  poor	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  trustworthy	  
contender	  of	  the	  moral	  claim	  of	  Gorkhaland	  on	  the	  other.	  Contradictory	  accounts	  of	  Gurung’s	  
conduct	  as	  leader,	  however,	  display	  how	  divided	  Darjeeling’s	  people	  are	  about	  him.	  While	  some	  
praised	  him	  for	  his	  generosity	  and	  honesty,	  many	  who	  lacked	  direct	  experience	  with	  Gurung	  relied	  
on	  their	  impressions	  of	  local	  leaders	  to	  evaluate	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  GJM	  in	  general.	  Yet,	  a	  
majority	  of	  the	  accounts	  expressed	  doubts	  about	  Gurung’s	  leadership	  qualities	  and	  suggested	  that	  
the	  initial	  wave	  in	  favour	  of	  Gurung	  has	  abated	  towards	  2012.	  His	  inability	  to	  bring	  the	  promised	  
Gorkhaland	  as	  well	  as	  the	  perceived	  insufficient	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  resulted	  both	  in	  a	  
loss	  of	  his	  normative	  and	  factual	  legitimacy	  (Chapter	  1).	  	  
Although	  Gurung’s	  differing	  masks	  of	  the	  messiah	  and	  the	  social	  worker	  attempt	  to	  cater	  to	  such	  
expectations,	  the	  citied	  critical	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  his	  reputation	  management	  was	  not	  always	  
successful.	  Particularly	  opposition	  parties	  proclaim	  that	  Gurung	  is	  not	  “really”	  the	  leader	  he	  pretends	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to	  be.	  Such	  struggle	  over	  a	  leaders’	  reputation	  becomes	  one	  main	  part	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  political	  
legitimacy.	  In	  Chapter	  8	  I	  will	  further	  explore	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  such	  critique	  for	  the	  
political	  authority	  of	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM.	  	  
	  
5.5 Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  reviewed	  the	  events,	  which	  led	  to	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  downfall	  in	  2007/2008	  and	  to	  the	  
rise	  of	  a	  new	  dominant	  leader,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  the	  Gorkha	  Liberation	  Front	  (GJM)	  as	  voice	  at	  the	  
forefront	  of	  a	  revived	  statehood	  agitation.	  I	  showed	  how	  in	  2007	  people’s	  hopes	  for	  a	  new	  political	  
regime	  and	  liberation	  were	  translated	  into	  support	  for	  the	  GJM,	  and	  how	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  the	  
president	  of	  the	  GJM,	  responded	  to	  such	  aspirations	  by	  portraying	  himself	  as	  a	  capable,	  strong,	  and	  
generous	  leader	  of	  the	  Gorkhas.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  useful	  concepts	  of	  reputation,	  reputation	  
management,	  and	  masks	  (Bailey	  1971;	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  2010b),	  I	  argued	  that	  Gurung’s	  reputation	  as	  
muscle-­‐man	  and	  generous	  leader	  (in	  combination	  with	  his	  already	  existing	  economic	  resources	  and	  
networks)	  is	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  his	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  Darjeeling.	  This	  reputation	  distinguished	  him	  from	  
other	  leaders	  such	  as	  Madan	  Tamang	  or	  R.B.	  Rai.	  	  
Gurung	  wears	  a	  mask	  of	  a	  messiah,	  and	  was	  thereby	  able	  to	  embody	  not	  only	  Gorkhaland	  but	  also	  
public	  aspirations	  for	  a	  new	  political	  regime	  during	  times	  of	  a	  perceived	  political	  crisis.	  A	  
disenfranchised	  mass	  was	  waiting	  for	  an	  able	  challenger	  of	  Ghisingh,	  who	  had	  not	  only	  failed	  in	  
providing	  development	  but	  seemingly	  also	  sold	  Gorkhaland	  to	  settle	  for	  the	  6th	  Schedule,	  an	  
agreement,	  which	  rivals	  said	  was	  a	  “risk”	  to	  the	  Gorkhas’	  unity.	  Capitalising	  on	  the	  success	  of	  
Prashant	  Tamang	  in	  the	  Indian	  Idol	  reality	  show,	  Gurung	  not	  only	  drew	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  
but	  also	  proclaimed	  a	  change	  in	  political	  style	  and	  leadership	  in	  Darjeeling	  by	  going	  down	  heavily	  on	  
the	  GNLF	  leaders	  for	  being	  “selfish”	  and	  “selling	  the	  soil”.	  His	  success	  in	  ousting	  Ghisingh	  and	  
stopping	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  supported	  Gurung’s	  image	  as	  a	  charismatic	  hero	  rescuing	  the	  subdued	  hills	  
from	  an	  oppressive	  “king”.	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  monopolise	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  were	  supported	  
by	  his	  defamations	  of	  rival	  leaders	  whom	  he	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  represent	  the	  cause	  based	  on	  
allegations	  of	  dishonesty	  and	  selfishness.	  	  
To	  underline	  and	  maintain	  his	  reputation,	  Gurung	  wore	  different	  masks:	  the	  messiah-­‐mask,	  the	  
strongman	  mask,	  and	  the	  social	  worker	  mask.	  These	  masks	  reflect	  not	  only	  the	  concrete	  situations	  
and	  political	  developments	  but	  also	  display	  shifting	  emphasis	  on	  certain	  traits	  by	  which	  he	  attempted	  
to	  maintain	  his	  public	  support	  base.	  Through	  these	  masks	  Gurung	  attracted	  those	  who	  projected	  
their	  hopes	  for	  a	  long-­‐awaited	  and	  capable	  messiah	  on	  him	  and	  joined	  the	  GJM	  to	  struggle	  for	  a	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common	  cause.	  Drawing	  on	  Gorkhaland	  equipped	  the	  GJM	  with	  a	  strong	  programmatic	  appeal	  and	  
provided	  Gurung	  with	  a	  strong	  normative	  base	  for	  legitimising	  his	  authority.	  Simultaneously,	  via	  his	  
social	  worker	  mask	  he	  also	  catered	  to	  those,	  who	  had	  previously	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  GNLF	  
patronage	  and	  were	  hoping	  for	  a	  new	  chance	  to	  gain	  material	  benefits	  through	  their	  engagement	  
with	  the	  party.	  	  
Yet,	  as	  Bailey	  found,	  although	  drawing	  on	  a	  normative	  cause	  helps	  a	  leader	  to	  gain	  power	  it	  can	  also	  
become	  risky	  if	  the	  cause	  is	  not	  achieved	  or	  people	  perceive	  the	  leader	  to	  compromise	  on	  it	  (Bailey	  
1988,	  57).	  Subsequently,	  also	  Gurung	  was	  increasingly	  criticised	  for	  not	  living	  up	  to	  the	  high	  
expectations	  people	  initially	  invested	  into	  him.	  The	  GJM’s	  engagement	  in	  negotiations	  on	  an	  “interim	  
council”	  from	  2010	  on	  and	  its	  eventual	  agreement	  on	  the	  GTA	  in	  2011	  was	  perceived	  by	  many	  as	  a	  
compromise	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  entailed	  a	  loss	  of	  Gurung’s	  normative	  legitimacy.	  Further,	  
accounts	  of	  plantation	  workers	  underline	  that	  many	  of	  them	  –	  albeit	  supporting	  the	  statehood	  
demand	  –	  also	  sought	  improvements	  of	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions,	  which	  forced	  Gurung	  to	  
prop-­‐up	  his	  authority	  with	  factual	  measures	  (cf.	  Karateke	  2005).	  His	  emphasis	  on	  the	  social	  worker	  
mask	  is	  a	  response	  to	  such	  expectations.	  	  
Critical	  accounts,	  however,	  suggest	  that	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  “deliver”	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  social	  
worker	  were	  not	  always	  successful.	  Instead	  of	  living	  up	  to	  proclamations	  of	  a	  “new	  dawn”	  in	  politics,	  
people’s	  hopes	  for	  a	  different	  (i.e.	  less	  violent	  and	  corrupt)	  political	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  were	  
shattered	  by	  the	  conduct	  of	  Gurung	  and	  other	  GJM	  leaders.	  These	  were	  increasingly	  perceived	  as	  
compromising	  and	  betraying	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda.	  Further,	  instead	  of	  becoming	  an	  inclusive	  
social	  movement,	  the	  revived	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  again	  declined	  to	  a	  single-­‐party	  dominated	  
agitation.	  Incidences	  of	  violence	  against	  rivals	  also	  raised	  doubts	  about	  whether	  the	  new	  party	  would	  
actually	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  substantial	  political	  change	  in	  Darjeeling	  or	  whether	  the	  
announcement	  of	  a	  “democratic	  and	  non-­‐violent”	  movement	  was	  simply	  a	  rhetoric	  device.	  But	  
despite	  contradicting	  people’s	  aspirations	  expressed	  in	  the	  idiom	  of	  Gorkhaland	  (see	  Chapter	  4),	  the	  
GJM	  continued	  to	  win	  elections	  (e.g.	  in	  2011,	  and	  2014),	  and	  is	  still	  recognised	  as	  the	  only	  
negotiation	  partner	  by	  both	  the	  West	  Bengal	  and	  the	  central	  governments.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  two	  chapters,	  I	  show	  how	  the	  GJM	  compensated	  its	  loss	  of	  normative	  and	  factual	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The	  previous	  chapter	  showed	  how	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM	  came	  into	  power.	  It	  identified	  both,	  
Gurung’s	  available	  resources	  in	  form	  of	  money	  and	  networks,	  and	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  social	  worker	  
and	  a	  genuine,	  strong	  leader	  as	  factors	  explaining	  why	  it	  was	  him	  and	  not	  another	  leader	  gaining	  
majority	  support.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  Gorkhaland	  agenda	  invested	  Gurung	  with	  
normative	  legitimacy	  while	  his	  “social	  worker”	  mask	  suggested	  his	  willingness	  to	  deliver	  material	  
benefits	  to	  loyal	  followers.	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  such	  public	  expectations	  and	  the	  gradual	  decline	  
of	  Gurung’s	  perceived	  ability	  to	  live	  up	  to	  these,	  this	  and	  the	  following	  chapter	  explore	  two	  more	  
strategies	  through	  which	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  political	  party	  maintained	  its	  power.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  
establishment	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  over	  developmental	  institutions.	  These	  function	  as	  an	  
important	  means	  in	  maintaining	  the	  party’s	  “mobilising	  function”	  and	  reflect	  its	  obligation	  to	  
“deliver”	  material	  benefits	  to	  its	  supporters	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010,	  139).	  Chapter	  7	  then	  
explores	  the	  functions	  and	  effects	  of	  hard	  repression	  against	  party	  rivals.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  both	  
strategies	  ultimately	  shrank	  the	  spaces	  for	  open	  critique	  of	  the	  GJM,	  the	  possibilities	  for	  a	  more	  
inclusive	  statehood	  movement	  and	  thereby	  contributed	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  monopolisation	  of	  the	  
statehood	  movement.	  Together,	  resource	  monopolies	  and	  hard	  repression	  become	  important	  
aspects	  to	  explain	  the	  persistence	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regime.	  	  
	  
6.1 Trouble	  at	  the	  “peace	  puja”	  
Since	  1980,	  the	  date	  April	  5	  has	  been	  a	  special	  day	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills.	  It	  marks	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  
Gorkha	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  (GNLF).	  As	  in	  every	  year,	  also	  in	  2012	  the	  remaining	  activists	  of	  the	  
GNLF	  had	  planned	  to	  celebrate	  its	  anniversary	  at	  various	  places	  in	  Darjeeling.	  One	  of	  them	  was	  the	  
small	  market	  town	  Bagargaun*	  in	  the	  plains	  close	  to	  Siliguri.	  Here,	  the	  administration	  had	  granted	  
the	  GNLF	  permission	  to	  hold	  their	  meeting	  in	  close	  vicinity	  to	  the	  local	  police	  post.	  Much	  to	  the	  
annoyance	  of	  the	  GNLF,	  also	  the	  GJM	  was	  seeking	  permission	  to	  hold	  a	  meeting	  of	  its	  youth	  wing	  
here	  on	  April	  5.	  But	  fearing	  clashes	  between	  the	  archenemies	  GNLF	  and	  GJM,	  the	  administration	  
denied	  permission.	  So	  instead	  the	  GJM	  decided	  to	  set	  up	  a	  “world	  peace	  puja”	  (form	  of	  religious	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worship),	  scheduled	  from	  April	  3-­‐7,	  to	  be	  held	  on	  a	  field	  next	  to	  the	  police	  post.	  Who	  would	  not	  allow	  
a	  prayer	  for	  world-­‐peace?144	  
When	  I	  reached	  the	  site	  one	  day	  before	  the	  GNLF	  foundation	  day,	  the	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  usually	  
quiet	  and	  peaceful	  market	  place	  was	  tense.	  Two	  water	  cannon-­‐trucks	  were	  parked	  in	  vicinity	  of	  the	  
GJM	  venue.	  Sushma*,	  the	  local	  GNLF	  leader	  nervously	  told	  me	  that	  she	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  eat	  for	  
days.	  I	  could	  sense	  how	  tense	  she	  was.	  But	  despite	  frequent	  requests	  by	  the	  local	  GJM	  leaders	  (some	  
of	  her	  relatives)	  to	  cancel	  the	  party	  programme,	  she	  refused.	  “I	  wished	  all	  Gorkhas	  would	  fight	  united	  
for	  Gorkhaland	  instead	  of	  fighting	  each	  other.	  I	  feel	  the	  GJM	  activists	  are	  only	  after	  the	  money,”	  she	  
alleged.	  Nirman*,	  the	  local	  GJM	  leader	  also	  seemed	  tense.	  He	  expressed	  his	  fear	  from	  violent	  clashes	  
between	  the	  two	  parties:	  “Tomorrow,	  we	  have	  to	  live	  in	  the	  same	  village.	  How	  shall	  that	  work	  if	  
there	  is	  violence?”	  On	  my	  question	  why	  he	  was	  still	  an	  active	  member	  of	  the	  GJM	  despite	  his	  
apprehensions,	  he	  hesitantly	  admitted	  that	  he	  was	  hoping	  for	  some	  kind	  of	  “recovery”	  through	  the	  
party	  as	  he	  once	  had	  taken	  a	  loan	  to	  meet	  the	  expenses	  of	  organising	  a	  public	  GJM	  meeting.	  “I	  am	  
not	  free”,	  he	  admitted.	  Sachin*,	  another	  activist	  in	  his	  twenties,	  expressed	  his	  hope	  that	  by	  
supporting	  the	  GJM	  programme	  his	  prospects	  of	  being	  given	  a	  contract	  through	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  
committee	  would	  increase	  although	  he	  did	  not	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  disturbing	  the	  GNLF.	  Initially	  he	  had	  
strongly	  believed	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  Gorkhaland	  and	  even	  participated	  in	  the	  pada	  yatra	  
to	  the	  Assamese	  border	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  This	  was	  four	  years	  ago.	  Now	  Sachin	  sadly	  concluded:	  
“Gorkhaland	  is	  not	  a	  movement	  for	  money	  -­‐	  but	  the	  leaders	  make	  it	  a	  movement	  for	  money.”	  	  
On	  the	  morning	  of	  April	  5,	  holy	  Hindu	  chants	  sounded	  over	  the	  “peace	  puja“-­‐venue.	  A	  priest	  and	  
hundreds	  of	  participants	  were	  performing	  puja	  at	  a	  small	  make-­‐shift	  mandir	  (temple)	  below	  the	  large	  
tent,	  which	  decorated	  the	  place.	  Although	  the	  venue	  gave	  no	  indication	  of	  the	  GJM	  –	  underlining	  its	  
seemingly	  “non-­‐political”	  intension	  -­‐	  the	  small	  bazaar	  was	  decorated	  with	  new	  GJM	  flags,	  and	  many	  
of	  the	  jeeps	  with	  puja	  attendants	  carried	  small	  party	  flags.	  But	  the	  peaceful	  atmosphere	  was	  to	  be	  
mistaken.	  When	  I	  walked	  to	  the	  bazaar,	  suddenly	  a	  pick-­‐up	  with	  about	  10	  GNLF	  activists	  holding	  up	  
the	  green	  party	  flag	  approached	  the	  police	  station	  close	  to	  the	  peace	  puja	  venue.	  Before	  it	  could	  
reach,	  however,	  it	  was	  stopped	  by	  a	  mob	  of	  men,	  who	  seemingly	  appeared	  out	  of	  nowhere.	  They	  
surrounded	  the	  truck,	  and	  started	  to	  hit	  and	  shake	  it	  while	  shouting,	  and	  tried	  to	  get	  the	  driver	  out.	  
Being	  outnumbered,	  and	  faced	  with	  this	  sudden	  blockade	  the	  driver	  took	  the	  back	  gear	  and	  speeded	  
back	  the	  road	  before	  fleeing	  the	  place.	  Despite	  the	  heavy	  police	  presence	  (and	  the	  nearby	  police	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  In	  fact	  the	  GJM	  regularly	  organises	  such	  large-­‐scale	  pujas,	  often	  sponsored	  by	  regional	  business	  people	  and	  
attended	  by	  party	  followers	  and	  activists.	  They	  are	  attended	  by	  high-­‐profile	  GJM	  leaders	  (including	  Bimal	  
Gurung)	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  strategy	  to	  remind	  people	  of	  leaders’	  dedication	  to	  (Hindu)	  
religion.	  Besides	  being	  a	  site	  to	  offer	  religious	  worship,	  such	  pujas	  also	  provide	  an	  occasion	  for	  supporters	  to	  
travel	  and	  socialise.	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station),	  only	  when	  the	  mob	  of	  angry	  men	  attempted	  to	  intrude	  a	  house,	  where	  they	  believed	  the	  
owner	  of	  the	  GNLF	  truck	  was	  hiding,	  the	  police	  interfered.	  Also	  a	  female	  GJM-­‐leader	  engaged	  in	  
negotiations	  between	  activists	  and	  the	  police.	  Anticipating	  more	  trouble,	  some	  shop-­‐keepers	  had	  
already	  closed	  their	  shutters.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  GJM-­‐organised	  peace-­‐puja	  continued,	  with	  speakers	  
blasting	  peaceful	  chants	  over	  the	  tensed	  atmosphere.	  Although	  the	  puja	  was	  scheduled	  till	  April	  7,	  
already	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  April	  6	  activists	  broke	  down	  the	  tents.	  After	  the	  puja	  was	  finished,	  
indeed	  peace	  returned	  to	  Bagargaun.	  The	  GNLF	  had	  successfully	  been	  silenced.	  	  
Events	  like	  this	  raise	  questions	  on	  the	  bases	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  public	  support.	  The	  cited	  accounts	  of	  GJM	  
activists	  at	  the	  peace	  puja	  suggest	  that	  their	  participation	  was	  motivated	  by	  hopes	  for	  rewards	  in	  
form	  of	  contracts	  and	  money	  more	  than	  by	  their	  emotional	  attachment	  to	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  demand	  (or	  “world	  peace”).	  They	  participated	  in	  the	  event	  even	  though	  they	  did	  not	  
approve	  of	  violence	  against	  the	  GNLF.	  Also	  activists	  at	  other	  sites	  often	  expressed	  their	  hopes	  for	  
gaining	  access	  to	  government	  jobs	  (e.g.	  as	  teachers)	  or	  contracts	  through	  the	  GJM.	  Had	  the	  
statehood	  movement	  indeed	  become	  a	  “movement	  for	  money”,	  as	  Sachin	  claimed?	  	  
Chapter	  5	  demonstrated	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  initial	  reputation	  as	  a	  capable	  and	  honest	  leader,	  strong	  
enough	  to	  deliver	  Gorkhaland,	  received	  first	  cracks	  after	  the	  party	  engaged	  with	  the	  government	  in	  
negotiations	  on	  an	  interim	  council.	  Further,	  inspite	  of	  his	  mask	  of	  a	  “social	  worker”,	  the	  public	  
increasingly	  began	  to	  perceive	  him	  and	  other	  GJM	  leaders	  as	  selfish	  persons,	  who	  “sold”	  Gorkhaland	  
for	  their	  personal	  wealth.	  This	  resulted	  in	  losses	  of	  normative	  and	  factual	  legitimacy.	  Yet,	  the	  GJM	  
supported	  candidates	  won	  both	  the	  national	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  in	  2009	  and	  2014	  and	  the	  West	  
Bengal	  Assembly	  polls	  in	  2011,	  by	  huge	  margins	  (Table	  1	  in	  Chapter	  1).	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  
research	  on	  authoritarian	  regimes	  holds	  that	  such	  losses	  in	  normative	  legitimacy	  have	  to	  be	  
compensated	  by	  other	  measures,	  including	  the	  co-­‐optation	  of	  elites,	  repression,	  and/or	  the	  provision	  
of	  social	  goods	  such	  as	  socio-­‐economic	  improvements	  (Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Karateke	  2005).	  
Drawing	  on	  this	  assumption,	  I	  contend	  that	  both,	  the	  decline	  of	  public	  trust	  towards	  the	  GJM’s	  ability	  
to	  achieve	  Gorkhaland	  and	  the	  increasing	  demands	  of	  its	  activists	  for	  tangible	  benefits	  made	  leaders	  
rely	  on	  so-­‐called	  “money”	  and	  “muscle	  power”	  to	  maintain	  their	  regional	  authority	  expressed	  in	  their	  
position	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  mobilise	  followers145.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  show	  how	  the	  GJM	  successfully	  established	  “resource	  monopolies”	  (Greene	  2010,	  
808)	  via	  its	  State-­‐accepted	  control	  over	  developmental	  institutions	  in	  Darjeeling.	  The	  partisan	  
distribution	  of	  such	  resources	  through	  political	  patronage	  functioned	  as	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  the	  
party’s	  widespread	  activists’	  networks	  by	  promising	  benefits	  to	  active	  supporters	  and	  contractors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  “Money”	  and	  “muscle	  power”	  are	  no	  vernacular	  terms	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  were	  solely	  used	  by	  
intellectuals/journalists	  during	  interviews	  in	  their	  descriptions	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  rule.	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Such	  distribution	  is	  equally	  perceived	  as	  a	  means	  of	  repression,	  as	  people	  fear	  to	  be	  denied	  access	  to	  
developmental	  schemes.	  This	  makes	  political	  patronage	  one	  major	  strategy	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
GJM’s	  political	  authority146.	  Further,	  the	  above	  incidence	  at	  Bagargaun	  suggests	  that	  activists’	  
expectation	  of	  benefits	  through	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  monopoly	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  violent	  
repression	  of	  rivals.	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  hard	  repression	  is	  a	  means	  for	  party	  activists	  and	  leaders	  to	  
underline	  their	  loyalty	  towards	  the	  party	  president	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  Thus,	  violence	  against	  rivals	  
becomes	  a	  currency	  in	  the	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  the	  scarce	  patronage	  resources.	  Yet,	  
ultimately,	  the	  GJM’s	  dependence	  on	  developmental	  resources	  diminishes	  its	  authority	  as	  it	  gives	  the	  
State	  government	  (as	  a	  provider	  of	  these	  resources)	  a	  tool	  to	  control	  regional	  elite	  construction.	  	  
To	  substantiate	  this	  argument,	  Chapter	  6.2	  grounds	  the	  discussion	  in	  relation	  to	  research	  on	  resource	  
monopolies,	  patronage,	  and	  corruption	  in	  South	  Asia.	  Emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  role	  of	  party-­‐
organisations	  in	  state	  capture.	  Chapters	  6.3	  and	  6.4	  explore	  how	  the	  GJM	  filled	  the	  governmental	  
vacuum	  left	  after	  Ghisingh’s	  ousting	  by	  capturing	  and	  monopolising	  access	  to	  developmental	  state	  
institutions	  such	  as	  the	  DGHC	  and	  the	  gram	  panchayats.	  Based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  patronage	  
not	  only	  helps	  leaders	  to	  gain	  reputations	  as	  selfless	  and	  generous	  social	  workers	  but	  is	  equally	  a	  
means	  of	  soft	  repression	  (Piliavsky	  2014b;	  Way	  and	  Levitsky	  2006),	  I	  explore	  how	  party-­‐activists,	  
followers,	  and	  rivals	  experience	  the	  rules	  of	  access	  and	  distribution	  (Chapter	  6.5).	  This	  helps	  me	  to	  
display	  some	  intricate	  connections	  between	  “money”	  and	  “muscle	  power”	  (or	  patronage	  and	  hard	  
repression).	  Together,	  I	  contend	  in	  Chapter	  6.6,	  these	  function	  as	  important	  means	  in	  a	  “politics	  of	  
silencing”	  as	  juxtaposed	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  claims	  to	  “non-­‐violence”	  and	  “democracy”.	  This	  has	  serious	  
implications	  for	  the	  form	  and	  inclusive	  nature	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement.	  I	  draw	  on	  case-­‐studies	  
and	  accounts	  of	  insiders	  and	  complement	  these	  with	  statements	  of	  party	  leaders	  and	  activists,	  and	  
public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  practices.	  	  
	  
6.2 Patronage,	  resource	  monopolies,	  and	  “muscle-­‐power”	  
I	  now	  introduce	  approaches	  to	  analyse	  how	  parties	  and	  politicians	  garner	  public	  support	  through	  the	  
distribution	  and	  promise	  of	  patronage.	  I	  first	  briefly	  contextualise	  patronage	  in	  India	  historically	  
before	  concentrating	  on	  clientelism	  or	  political	  patronage	  as	  a	  strategy	  in	  politics.	  I	  then	  introduce	  
research,	  which	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  patronage	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  where	  
dominant	  parties	  establish	  “resource	  monopolies”	  (Greene	  2010,	  808)	  to	  cater	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  There	  are	  trustworthy	  accounts	  which	  substantiate	  that	  besides	  developmental	  schemes,	  the	  GJM	  derives	  
its	  “money	  power”	  from	  financial	  contributions	  of	  tea	  proprietors	  and	  other	  business-­‐people.	  Due	  to	  the	  secret	  
nature	  of	  such	  sources,	  these	  cannot	  be	  further	  discussed.	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their	  clientele.	  This	  discussion	  complements	  the	  earlier	  introduction	  to	  co-­‐optation/patronage	  from	  
Chapter	  1.	  
6.2.1 Patronage	  and	  the	  developmental	  state	  
Paul	  Brass	  stressed	  that	  local	  structures	  of	  power	  cannot	  persist	  without	  the	  control	  over	  
government	  institutions	  (Brass	  1984).	  Also	  recent	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  access	  state	  
resources	  and	  to	  deliver	  them	  to	  a	  chosen	  clientele	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  bases	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  
South	  Asia	  (Jeffrey	  and	  Lerche	  2000;	  Hansen	  2001;	  Chandra	  2003;	  Véron	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Leaders	  have	  to	  
give	  their	  potential	  followers	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  “deliver”	  benefits	  to	  
them.	  Their	  investment	  in	  a	  reputation	  as	  selfless	  and	  generous	  “social	  workers”	  (see	  Chapter	  5)	  
underlines	  their	  compulsion	  to	  live	  up	  to	  followers’	  expectations.	  Patronage,	  broadly	  defined	  as	  a	  
reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  persons	  of	  different	  hierarchical	  position	  that	  includes	  the	  inter-­‐
personal	  exchange	  of	  valued	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  reciprocal	  return	  (Piliavsky	  
2014b,	  5),	  is	  one	  important	  means	  of	  such	  political	  mobilisation.	  	  
Historically,	  structures	  of	  patronage	  in	  India	  have	  undergone	  significant	  changes.	  Earlier	  studies	  
identified	  patrons	  as	  land-­‐lords	  or	  members	  of	  higher	  castes,	  who	  provided	  protection	  to	  labourers	  
or	  lower-­‐caste	  clients.	  Patronage	  was	  mainly	  associated	  with	  economic	  status	  differences	  or	  caste-­‐
hierarchies	  (Weiner	  1965;	  Weingrod	  1968;	  Scott	  1969;	  Brass	  1984).	  After	  Independence	  such	  
traditional	  structures	  changed:	  Krishna	  (2007)	  identified	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  spread	  of	  
education,	  and	  increasing	  political	  competition	  as	  factors	  that	  entailed	  the	  emergence	  of	  patrons	  
stemming	  from	  different	  caste	  and	  economic	  backgrounds	  (see	  also:	  Gupta	  1998;	  Alm	  2006,	  23;	  Price	  
2007).	  Amongst	  these	  are	  the	  so	  called	  “naya	  netas”	  (new	  leaders),	  educated	  persons,	  who	  support	  
others	  in	  accessing	  state	  services.	  They	  are	  not	  necessarily	  member	  of	  political	  parties	  or	  higher	  caste	  
groups	  (Krishna	  2007).	  	  
Many	  authors	  identified	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “developmental	  state”	  (Chatterjee	  1998,	  2;	  Kochanek	  
2010;	  see	  also	  Kothari	  1965)	  as	  important	  factor	  to	  change	  patronage	  relations	  and	  public	  
expectations	  towards	  leaders	  and	  the	  state.	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  competitive	  party	  
politics	  and	  factionalism	  since	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  (INC)	  gave	  more	  
power	  to	  party-­‐leaders	  and	  state	  officials	  in	  channelling	  goods	  to	  selected	  clientele	  (Wilkinson	  2006,	  
14).	  Indira	  Gandhi’s	  “garibi	  hatau”(abolish	  poverty)	  campaign	  established	  the	  idea	  “that	  the	  state	  
was	  the	  principal,	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  the	  sole,	  agent	  of	  bettering	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  people	  and	  
providing	  relief	  in	  times	  of	  adversity”	  (Chatterjee	  1998,	  21).	  The	  emergence	  of	  this	  “developmental	  
state”	  (Chatterjee	  1998)	  went	  along	  with	  changing	  political	  aspirations	  expressing	  individuals’	  
increasing	  awareness	  of	  their	  entitlements	  (such	  as	  embodied	  in	  social	  movements,	  see	  Chapter	  1).	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“New	  plebeian	  identities”	  (Hansen	  2001,	  9)	  emerged,	  extending	  the	  pressure	  on	  politicians	  or	  parties	  
to	  deliver	  the	  services	  people	  began	  to	  recognise	  as	  their	  rights.	  Against	  this	  backdrop	  it	  is	  not	  
surprising	  that	  the	  state	  and	  its	  developmental	  machinery	  in	  form	  of	  projects	  and	  welfare	  schemes	  
became	  a	  major	  resource	  for	  aspiring	  leaders	  or	  incumbents	  to	  maintain	  and	  gain	  public	  support	  by	  
granting	  access	  to	  their	  potential	  followers	  through	  patronage147.	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  explore	  how	  GJM	  leaders	  use	  patronage	  as	  a	  means	  to	  garner	  political	  support	  in	  
forms	  of	  votes	  or	  attendance	  at	  party-­‐programmes	  and	  agitations.	  Such	  political	  patronage	  –	  which	  I	  
use	  interchangeably	  with	  clientelism	  –	  refers	  to	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  between	  political	  power-­‐
holders/seekers	  and	  their	  respective	  supporters,	  where	  the	  former	  (promise	  to)	  dispense	  valued	  
benefits	  to	  the	  later	  contingent	  on	  their	  political	  support	  (Wilkinson	  2006,	  8;	  de	  Wit	  1996,	  51)148.	  This	  
instrumental	  understanding	  of	  patronage	  stands	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  what	  Chandra	  (2003)	  has	  termed	  a	  
“patronage	  democracy”	  which	  I	  detail	  in	  the	  following.	  
6.2.2 From	  patronage	  to	  “patronage	  democracy”	  
The	  model	  of	  a	  “patronage	  democracy”	  (Chandra	  2003)	  evolved	  from	  the	  attempt	  to	  explain	  ethnic	  
favouritism	  in	  Indians’	  voting	  behaviour.	  The	  model	  draws	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  elected	  officials	  or	  
candidates,	  who	  have	  the	  discretion	  to	  implement	  laws	  and	  allocate	  jobs	  and	  services	  at	  the	  disposal	  
of	  the	  state,	  are	  striving	  for	  votes	  to	  retain	  their	  office	  and	  access	  to	  the	  resources.	  They	  (black-­‐)	  
market	  “promises”	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  scarce	  goods	  in	  return	  for	  votes.	  A	  second	  premise	  of	  the	  
model	  is	  that	  voters	  lack	  concrete	  information	  of	  the	  actual	  distribution	  of	  the	  promised	  (and	  scarce)	  
benefits.	  Therefore,	  they	  do	  not	  only	  base	  their	  voting	  decisions	  on	  the	  record	  of	  past	  patronage	  
transactions	  but	  also	  tend	  to	  support	  ethnic	  parties	  because	  they	  expect	  their	  candidates	  to	  favour	  
members	  of	  their	  group	  before	  others.	  Accordingly,	  officials	  or	  candidates	  target	  (ethnic)	  group	  
members	  because	  the	  provision	  of	  benefits	  to	  one	  group	  member	  sends	  signals	  to	  others	  that	  they	  
too	  could	  benefit	  in	  future.	  Thus,	  investing	  in	  an	  identity	  “offers	  [voters]	  the	  best	  available	  means	  by	  
which	  to	  obtain	  desired	  benefits,	  and	  not	  because	  such	  identification	  is	  valuable	  in	  itself”	  (ibid.	  11).	  
The	  same	  could	  apply	  in	  Darjeeling,	  where	  people	  invest	  in	  a	  party-­‐based	  identity,	  e.g.	  by	  placing	  
party	  flags	  on	  their	  houses,	  anticipating	  benefits	  as	  “group	  members”.	  
Chandra’s	  model	  underlines	  the	  importance	  for	  leaders	  to	  “capture”	  the	  state	  so	  to	  continue	  with	  
the	  distribution	  of	  patronage,	  which	  is	  necessary	  to	  garner	  votes.	  State	  capture	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
the	  appropriation	  of	  governmental	  development	  programmes,	  welfare	  schemes,	  and	  governmental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  For	  a	  detailed	  study	  on	  patronage	  of	  religious	  leaders	  please	  refer	  to	  Mines	  &	  Gourishankar	  (1990).	  
148	  Patronage	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  a	  solely	  instrumental	  relationship.	  Rather,	  various	  studies	  underline	  that	  it	  is	  
embedded	  in	  morally	  defined	  conceptions	  about	  the	  “proper”	  roles	  and	  conduct	  of	  leaders	  (Manor	  2000;	  Alm	  
2006;	  Krishna	  2007;	  Price	  2007;	  Piliavsky	  2014b)	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	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jobs	  (e.g.	  police,	  teachers)	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  structures,	  which	  enable	  or	  restrict	  other	  
groups	  or	  individuals	  to	  access	  such	  benefits.	  State	  capture	  is	  often	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
corruption	  or	  the	  “abuse	  of	  power	  by	  public	  officials	  to	  provide	  benefits	  to	  individuals	  or	  groups	  in	  
return	  for	  financial	  benefits,	  public	  sector	  jobs	  or	  political	  support”	  (Kochanek	  2010,	  365).	  An	  
extreme	  form	  of	  exclusive	  state	  capture	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  “resource	  monopolies”	  (Greene	  
2010,	  808),	  often	  through	  a	  dominant	  political	  party.	  Such	  resource	  monopolies	  are	  an	  important	  
means	  for	  control	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  
6.2.3 Resource	  monopolies,	  punishment	  regimes,	  and	  decentralisation	  
While	  Chandra’s	  model	  of	  a	  “patronage	  democracy”	  is	  concerned	  with	  explaining	  ethnic	  favouritism	  
in	  voting	  behaviour,	  studies	  on	  patronage	  in	  dominant	  party	  or	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
focus	  on	  its	  utilisation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  repression	  and	  mobilisation.	  Magaloni	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  explore	  the	  
role	  of	  political	  parties	  as	  patronage	  systems,	  which	  channel	  state	  resources	  to	  a	  selected	  clientele.	  
They	  claim	  that	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  their	  authority,	  parties	  in	  dominant	  party	  regimes	  need	  to	  cater	  to	  
the	  interests	  of	  elites	  through	  co-­‐optation	  (“bargaining	  function”)	  and	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  citizens,	  who	  
expect	  a	  continuing	  delivery	  of	  resources	  and	  goods,	  through	  the	  party.	  In	  this	  way	  leaders	  use	  the	  
party	  machine	  to	  mobilise	  mass	  support	  (“mobilising	  function”)	  (ibid.	  139)	  which	  helps	  them	  to	  
counter	  threats	  to	  their	  rule	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Privileges	  are	  allocated	  based	  on	  (perceived)	  degrees	  of	  
citizens’	  loyalty	  and	  withdrawn	  from	  defectors.	  This	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  “punishment	  regime”	  (ibid.	  128).	  
In	  this	  instrumental	  logic,	  “the	  more	  [a	  party]	  monopolises	  valuable	  resources,	  the	  more	  capable	  a	  
one-­‐party	  regime	  is	  of	  trapping	  citizens	  into	  supporting	  the	  system”(ibid.	  129;	  Magaloni	  2006).	  This	  
particularly	  affects	  poor	  voters,	  whose	  livelihoods	  often	  depend	  on	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  party	  
(Blaydes	  2006;	  Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010).	  Such	  contentions	  are	  supported	  by	  Greene’s	  (2010)	  
study	  on	  the	  single-­‐party	  regime	  in	  Mexico.	  Greene	  holds	  that	  via	  punishment	  and	  rewards	  through	  
the	  party’s	  patronage	  system,	  “resource	  monopolies”	  sustain	  “political	  monopolies”	  (Greene	  2010,	  
808).	  
Various	  authors	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutions	  in	  channelling	  such	  
patronage	  resources.	  Elections	  and	  formal	  party	  organisations	  for	  instance	  can	  serve	  as	  conflict	  
management	  tools	  for	  elites	  and	  help	  to	  regularise	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  (Gandhi	  and	  Lust-­‐Okar	  
2009;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Also	  de	  Wit	  (1996)	  in	  his	  study	  on	  elite	  dominated	  political	  control	  in	  
Madras	  slums	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  party	  organisation	  in	  channelling	  patronage.	  He	  
compared	  a	  party	  with	  a	  “political	  machine”	  –	  a	  stable,	  centralised	  and	  disciplined	  hierarchy.	  Party	  
organisations	  can	  also	  be	  employed	  as	  surveillance	  tools	  to	  monitor	  citizens’	  loyalty	  and	  to	  sanction	  
rivals	  (Magaloni	  2006).	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Also	  informal	  organisations	  are	  important	  in	  channelling	  patronage.	  This	  is	  very	  pronounced	  in	  
neopatrimonial	  and	  presidential	  systems.	  Neopatrimonial	  systems	  are	  “organised	  around	  hierarchical	  
and	  personalistic	  networks	  that	  are	  typically	  informal,	  non-­‐transparent,	  exclusivist	  and	  generally	  non-­‐
institutionalised”	  (Rubongoya	  2007;	  Collins	  2009,	  254).	  A	  president	  at	  the	  top	  of	  this	  hierarchy	  rules	  
through	  providing	  patronage	  to	  informal	  cliques,	  who	  control	  their	  own	  sub-­‐ordinate	  groups.	  These	  
cliques	  expect	  rewards	  in	  forms	  of	  control	  over	  lucrative	  posts	  or	  other	  resources	  in	  return	  for	  their	  
loyalty	  (Collins	  2009,	  255).	  Authority	  in	  such	  systems	  is	  personalised	  and	  rooted	  in	  these	  reciprocal	  
exchange	  networks.	  If	  such	  patronage	  networks	  are	  controlled	  by	  a	  towering	  leader,	  who	  sanctions	  
sub-­‐ordinate	  leaders’	  deliveries	  to	  their	  respective	  clientele,	  this	  is	  called	  “presidentialism”	  
(Rubongoya	  2007,	  7).	  
The	  dependency	  of	  such	  systems	  on	  a	  regular	  supply	  of	  resources,	  however,	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  
(Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002,	  7;	  Burnell	  2006,	  553;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  De	  Wit	  (1996),	  for	  instance,	  
stressed	  that	  a	  party	  as	  political	  machine	  relies	  heavily	  on	  material	  incentives	  and	  rewards	  to	  win	  the	  
loyalty	  of	  cadre	  and	  followers	  (de	  Wit	  1996,	  58).	  This	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  relation	  of	  
the	  political	  party	  to	  the	  state.	  In	  the	  model,	  the	  government	  administration	  takes	  the	  role	  of	  ‘price	  
producers’	  and	  the	  electorate	  becomes	  the	  ‘price	  consumers’	  (de	  Wit	  1996,	  59).	  The	  leader	  (or	  
politician),	  who	  stands	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  network,	  acts	  as	  a	  broker	  between	  the	  two	  groups,	  
representing	  the	  “patron”	  of	  the	  poor.	  But	  if	  the	  resource	  supply	  diminishes,	  the	  party-­‐machine	  and	  
the	  reputation	  of	  the	  leader	  as	  “patron”	  are	  endangered	  (ibid.).	  	  
State	  capture	  or	  the	  establishment	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  are	  not	  only	  sustained	  by	  electoral	  
successes	  of	  incumbents	  yet.	  Studies	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  decentralisation	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  patronage	  
and	  corruption	  in	  India	  point	  at	  the	  role	  of	  local	  politicians	  and	  state	  officials	  at	  the	  district	  and	  
panchayat	  levels.	  Their	  positions	  as	  elected	  representatives	  or	  connections	  to	  politicians	  (Banerjee	  
2011)	  help	  them	  to	  act	  as	  mediators,	  brokers,	  or	  gatekeepers	  for	  gaining	  access	  to	  powerful	  upper	  
bodies	  such	  as	  party	  leaders	  or	  to	  state	  sponsored	  welfare	  schemes	  and	  developmental	  contracts	  
(Ruud	  2000;	  Bardhan	  and	  Mookherjee	  2003;	  Bardhan	  and	  Mookherjee	  2006;	  Berenschot	  2011b;	  
Perera-­‐Mubarak	  2012;	  Sadanandan	  2012).	  Their	  ability	  to	  channel	  the	  flow	  of	  resources	  makes	  them	  
play	  both	  an	  enabling	  and	  disabling	  role	  for	  local	  citizens,	  who	  often	  rely	  on	  their	  services	  to	  get	  
things	  done	  (Corbridge,	  Williams,	  and	  Srivastava	  2003;	  Véron	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Berenschot	  2011a)149.	  	  
For	  instance,	  Veron	  et	  al.’s	  (2006)	  study	  on	  the	  employment	  guarantee	  scheme	  in	  villages	  of	  West	  
Bengal	  underlines	  how	  elected	  panchayat	  councillors,	  State	  level	  politicians,	  the	  activists	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Besides	  political	  leaders	  (netās),	  also	  other	  persons	  can	  take	  such	  intermediary	  functions	  (e.g.	  holy	  men,	  
dadas,	  criminals,	  educated	  persons)	  (Mines	  and	  Gourishankar	  1990;	  Hansen	  2001;	  Krishna	  2003).	  Not	  all	  of	  
them	  necessarily	  have	  political	  affiliation.	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communist	  party	  (CPI-­‐M),	  and	  contractors	  form	  institutionalised	  “corruption	  networks”.	  They	  decide	  
on	  the	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  the	  benefits	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  beneficiaries	  for	  their	  personal	  or	  
political	  gain	  (ibid.	  1937)	  and	  thereby	  function	  as	  intermediaries	  or	  brokers.	  Also	  other	  studies	  show	  
how	  such	  actors	  attain	  the	  role	  of	  “gatekeepers”	  (Manor	  2000;	  Simon	  2009;	  Reddy	  and	  Haragopal	  
1985;	  Banerjee	  2011;	  Alm	  2006).	  The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  such	  state-­‐capture	  creates	  or	  sustains	  
new	  elites	  of	  “political	  entrepreneurs”	  (Veron	  et	  al	  2006,	  1924),	  who	  do	  not	  aim	  at	  political	  but	  at	  
short-­‐term	  personal	  gains	  through	  their	  positions	  in	  government	  or	  close	  to	  it	  (ibid.;	  see	  also	  
Sadanandan	  2012,	  223).	  	  
Bardan	  and	  Mookherjee	  (2003;	  2006)	  identify	  the	  lack	  of	  local	  accountability	  structures	  and	  of	  
democratic	  functioning	  as	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  decentralisation	  in	  poverty	  alleviation	  
programmes	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Under	  such	  conditions,	  instead	  of	  leading	  to	  greater	  
accountability,	  decentralisation	  entails	  more	  patronage	  and	  clientelism	  at	  the	  local	  level	  
(Sadanandan	  2012).	  Interestingly,	  more	  electoral	  competition	  correlates	  with	  a	  more	  equal	  
distribution	  of	  programmes	  (ibid.).	  These	  latter	  studies	  are	  important	  not	  only	  because	  this	  thesis	  is	  
concerned	  with	  clientelism	  in	  decentralised	  institutions	  (the	  DGHC	  and	  gram	  panchayats)	  but	  also	  
because	  they	  suggest	  that	  local	  leaders	  do	  not	  necessarily	  cater	  to	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  their	  
respective	  parties	  but	  (also)	  strive	  for	  personal	  gain	  by	  utilising	  their	  party-­‐positions.	  
6.2.4 From	  “money”	  to	  “muscle	  power”	  
Research	  on	  the	  “criminalisation	  of	  politics”	  (Kochanek	  2010;	  Berenschot	  2011a;	  Vaishnav	  2012)	  
additionally	  underlines	  the	  functions	  of	  criminals	  or	  goondas	  in	  the	  networks	  described	  above.	  While	  
Chapter	  5	  elaborated	  on	  the	  reputation-­‐creating	  functions	  of	  a	  goonda	  or	  strongman	  image,	  I	  here	  
point	  at	  their	  role	  in	  the	  acquirement	  of	  material	  resources.	  There	  are	  various	  studies,	  which	  suggest	  
that	  “money”	  power	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  strong-­‐men,	  goondas	  or	  the	  so-­‐called	  
“muscle”	  power.	  The	  term	  “criminalisation	  of	  politics”	  describes	  “the	  increasing	  presence	  of	  persons	  
with	  criminal	  records	  among	  elected	  representatives	  at	  local,	  state,	  and	  even	  national	  levels”	  
(Chatterjee	  2011,	  21;	  see	  also:	  Kochanek	  2010;	  Vaishnav	  2011b;	  Wakode	  2011).	  	  
Kochanek	  (2010)	  sees	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  process	  in	  the	  1960s,	  when	  Congress	  leaders	  increasingly	  
relied	  on	  local	  “thugs”	  to	  secure	  their	  election	  (ibid.	  376).	  Many	  authors	  explain	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  
pointing	  at	  politicians’	  obligation	  to	  deliver	  and	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  state	  resources	  for	  their	  
expecting	  clientele.	  This	  puts	  them	  under	  pressure	  as	  the	  non-­‐delivery	  can	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  votes	  
and	  popular	  support,	  and	  gives	  those	  an	  advantage	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  “bend	  the	  law”	  in	  order	  to	  
provide	  for	  their	  clientele	  (Vaishnav	  2012).	  This	  favours	  criminals	  and	  the	  use	  of	  illegal	  activities	  in	  
politics.	  As	  displayed	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  politicians’	  physical	  strength,	  masculinity,	  and	  possession	  of	  
Silencing	  dissent	  I.	  Resource	  monopolies,	  “money”,	  and	  “muscle	  power”	  
176	  
	  
“muscle	  power”	  are	  symbolically	  equated	  with	  political	  strength	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  deliver	  (the	  mask	  
of	  the	  “boss”).	  	  
Berenschot	  (2011a)	  describes	  how	  goondas	  enter	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  with	  local	  politicians	  in	  
Gujarat.	  In	  his	  case-­‐study,	  goondas	  utilise	  their	  money	  and	  muscle-­‐power	  to	  enable	  local	  politicians	  
to	  be	  (re-­‐)elected	  (e.g.	  through	  buying	  or	  intimidating	  voters)	  and	  in	  turn	  enjoy	  politicians’	  protection	  
from	  criminal	  persecution.	  In	  another	  study,	  Jeffrey	  and	  Lerche	  (2000)	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  
powerful	  land-­‐holding	  elite,	  the	  Jats	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  “colonised	  the	  state”	  by	  occupying	  local	  police	  
positions	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  connections	  to	  local	  politicians	  and	  ability	  to	  pay	  bribes	  and	  thereby	  
managed	  to	  keep	  its	  members	  out	  of	  the	  purview	  of	  criminal	  punishment.	  These	  studies	  point	  at	  the	  
interdependencies	  between	  “money”	  and	  “muscle”	  power,	  and	  the	  patronage	  nature	  of	  criminal-­‐
leader	  relations.	  
Such	  violence	  is	  not	  exclusive	  to	  enforce	  only	  the	  dominant	  party’s	  claim	  on	  developmental	  
resources	  and	  contracts.	  My	  data	  suggest	  that	  resources	  are	  also	  fiercely	  struggled	  over	  within	  the	  
party.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  in	  this	  context	  the	  violent	  repression	  of	  party	  rivals	  functions	  as	  a	  means	  for	  
activists	  to	  gain	  appreciation	  of	  the	  party-­‐president	  and	  prove	  their	  loyalty.	  This,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  
increases	  the	  chances	  for	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  scarce	  and	  contested	  patronage	  resources.	  Such	  
repression	  equally	  finds	  application	  in	  silencing	  unwanted	  voices	  within	  the	  statehood	  agitation.	  
6.2.5 Patronage	  as	  “soft	  repression”	  
The	  introduced	  approaches	  display	  the	  importance	  of	  party-­‐organisations	  in	  institutionalising	  reward	  
and	  punishment	  systems,	  and	  underline	  the	  role	  of	  patronage	  in	  keeping	  the	  organisation	  together	  
as	  long	  as	  followers	  continue	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  party-­‐leaders	  to	  distribute	  
rewards	  (cf.	  Chandra	  2003).	  They	  also	  underline	  the	  function	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  leaders	  as	  
gatekeepers	  and	  intermediaries	  between	  state	  and	  society.	  While	  some	  point	  at	  the	  enabling	  role	  of	  
such	  brokers	  to	  help	  citizens	  access	  state	  benefits,	  the	  literature	  on	  one-­‐party	  regimes	  and	  
decentralisation	  underlines	  the	  coercive	  function	  of	  patronage	  in	  situations,	  where	  access	  to	  (state)	  
resources	  is	  monopolised	  by	  one	  group	  (Véron	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Bardhan	  and	  Mookherjee	  2006;	  
Sadanandan	  2012).	  Although	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  to	  loyal	  followers	  can	  help	  leaders	  to	  live	  
up	  to	  public	  expectations	  and	  to	  legitimise	  their	  authority,	  the	  fear	  of	  exclusion	  makes	  patronage	  a	  
means	  of	  soft	  repression	  and	  underlines	  dependency	  on	  the	  distributive	  party-­‐system	  (Greene	  2010;	  
Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010;	  Wenner	  2014).	  The	  withholding	  or	  blocking	  of	  access	  to	  developmental	  
state	  resources	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  form	  of	  soft	  repression	  as	  it	  increases	  the	  (anticipated)	  
opportunity	  costs	  for	  joining	  the	  opposition	  or	  openly	  voicing	  critique	  (Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002).	  
Literature	  on	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  politics	  suggested	  that	  this	  state	  capture	  is	  often	  supported	  by	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the	  use	  of	  threats	  and	  violence	  (Berenschot	  2011a).	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  the	  following	  analysis,	  however,	  
violence	  against	  rivals	  is	  not	  necessarily	  (and	  only)	  an	  expression	  of	  hostility	  towards	  them	  but	  also	  a	  
means	  in	  the	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  scarce	  patronage	  rewards.	  
Equipped	  with	  these	  concepts	  I	  now	  display	  how	  the	  Morcha	  established	  a	  resource	  monopoly	  over	  
developmental	  resources	  in	  Darjeeling,	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  party’s	  ability	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  I	  
concentrate	  on	  the	  time	  between	  2008	  and	  2012,	  when	  the	  DGHC	  and	  local	  gram	  panchayats	  were	  
led	  by	  a	  government-­‐appointed	  administrator/secretaries	  and	  lacked	  an	  elected	  counterpart.	  I	  
complement	  the	  discussion	  by	  statements	  recorded	  after	  the	  GTA	  elections	  in	  July	  2012.	  
	  
6.3 Capturing	  the	  state	  
In	  order	  to	  analyse	  how	  the	  capture	  of	  developmental	  institutions	  in	  Darjeeling	  enabled	  the	  GJM	  to	  
sustain	  its	  mobilising	  function,	  I	  begin	  with	  displaying	  how	  GJM	  leaders	  described	  “development”	  as	  
a	  means	  for	  maintaining	  political	  support.	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  how	  the	  GJM	  
established	  a	  “resource	  monopoly”	  over	  developmental	  resources.	  This	  includes	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
rules	  of	  access	  to	  these	  resources,	  the	  ways	  of	  distribution,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  administration	  in	  
this.	  The	  captured	  institutions	  include	  projects	  channelled	  through	  the	  DGHC	  and	  other	  district	  level	  
departments	  such	  as	  the	  Public	  Health	  Engineering	  (PHE)	  besides	  schemes	  such	  as	  the	  Pradhan	  
Mantri	  Gram	  Sadak	  Yojana	  (PMGSY),	  the	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  
Scheme	  (MGNREGS)	  and	  other	  welfare	  schemes	  such	  as	  the	  Indira	  Awaz	  Yojana	  (housing	  scheme),	  
funds	  for	  the	  Economically	  Weaker	  Section	  (EWS),	  or	  disaster	  relief.	  I	  choose	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  
district	  level	  DGHC	  and	  the	  locally	  implemented	  MGNREGS	  as	  two	  case	  studies.	  Chapter	  6.4	  analyses	  
how	  such	  practices	  were	  experienced	  and	  interpreted	  by	  potential	  recipients	  and	  opposition	  
members.	  
6.3.1 The	  need	  to	  deliver	  
Running	  a	  party	  is	  expensive.	  The	  GJM	  for	  example	  covers	  expenses	  for	  political	  work,	  including	  
paying	  for	  transportation	  and	  food	  during	  demonstrations	  or	  public	  meetings.	  One	  major	  expense	  is	  
probably	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Personnel	  (GLP,	  see	  Chapters	  3	  and	  5),	  a	  force	  of	  supposed	  13,000	  (TT,	  
29.6.2012)	  young	  men	  and	  women	  formed	  in	  2008,	  who	  are	  paid	  a	  salary	  of	  1,500	  to	  1,700	  INR	  per	  
month	  (TT,	  12.11.2012).	  The	  Telegraph	  estimated	  a	  monthly	  expense	  of	  2.21	  crore	  INR	  (22.1	  million	  
INR)	  for	  the	  GLP’s	  salaries	  only	  (TT,	  29.06.2012).	  Further,	  accounts	  of	  party	  supporters	  suggest	  that	  
they	  expect	  their	  leaders	  to	  share	  their	  (presumed)	  wealth	  with	  them	  or	  to	  help	  them	  out	  in	  times	  of	  
financial	  crises	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Many	  of	  the	  GJM-­‐party	  workers	  I	  spoke	  to	  praised	  “dājū”	  (Nepali	  for	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elder	  brother)	  Bimal	  Gurung	  for	  giving	  them	  some	  money	  (usually	  some	  thousand	  rupees)	  when	  they	  
met	  him,	  and	  expressed	  their	  expectations	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  party	  (e.g.	  by	  getting	  contracts	  or	  
jobs).	  Also	  other	  party	  leaders	  such	  as	  the	  zonal	  presidents	  distribute	  money	  to	  their	  clientele.	  In	  
2013,	  Pravesh*	  (previously	  a	  zonal	  president	  and	  since	  August	  2012	  an	  elected	  councillor	  
(sabhashād)	  of	  the	  GTA)	  told	  me	  that	  he	  spent	  about	  10,000	  INR	  a	  day	  providing	  help	  to	  needy	  
persons,	  or	  to	  finance	  party	  activities.	  Earlier,	  when	  he	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  “social	  worker”,	  who	  
“helps	  the	  poor	  people”,	  he	  had	  also	  pointed	  at	  the	  instrumental	  use	  of	  welfare	  activities:	  
To	  sustain	  our	  party	  we	  simply	  need	  something...practical	  thing	  I	  am	  telling.	  Tomorrow,	  why	  
do	  these	  people	  support	  us?	  If	  there	  is	  some	  improvement	  in	  our	  economic	  condition,	  if	  our	  
roads	  are	  build,	  if	  we	  are	  given	  water	  [...].	  Ultimately,	  to	  sustain	  a	  party,	  the	  grassroots	  level	  
is	  important.	  If	  you	  cannot	  care	  for	  deprived	  people	  [...]	  there	  will	  be	  a	  problem.	  If	  we	  bring	  
these	  [schemes	  from	  the	  government]	  people	  will	  be	  happy.	  And	  they	  say:	  who	  did	  this?	  The	  
GJM	  did	  this.	  (interview,	  10.4.2012)	  
He	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  leader,	  who	  was	  working	  for	  the	  people,	  instead	  of	  sitting	  above	  them.	  
Also	  Bimal	  Gurung	  described	  a	  “good”	  leader	  as	  a	  person	  who	  works	  “for	  the	  benefit	  of	  people”	  
(interview,	  7.7.2012)	  (compare	  the	  debate	  on	  his	  “masks”	  in	  Chapter	  5).	  Development	  should	  be	  
“practically”	  done	  and	  needs-­‐based	  (ibid.).	  At	  a	  public	  meeting	  to	  celebrate	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
GTA,	  he	  stressed	  the	  party’s	  role	  as	  a	  middleman	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  channel	  development	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  public:	  “We	  are	  only	  the	  medium.	  We	  are	  only	  there	  to	  provide,	  to	  speak	  and	  to	  feed”	  
(speech,	  21.7.2011).	  	  
All	  this	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  where	  the	  GJM	  leaders	  get	  their	  money	  from	  to	  finance	  these	  activities,	  
which	  Pravesh	  described	  as	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  his	  support	  base	  and	  to	  establish	  an	  image	  of	  able	  
and	  benevolent	  provider	  of	  development	  and	  welfare.	  When	  I	  asked	  Pravesh	  this	  question	  he	  
appeared	  slightly	  hurt.	  Agitated,	  he	  then	  extensively	  explained	  how	  margins	  from	  his	  private	  business	  
helped	  him	  to	  meet	  such	  expenses.	  Later	  he	  justified	  taking	  percentages	  from	  contractors	  as	  he	  
would	  re-­‐distribute	  this	  money	  to	  needy	  persons	  and	  supporters.	  Also	  Bimal	  Gurung	  stressed	  that	  
the	  money	  came	  from	  his	  (private)	  tea,	  fruit	  and	  vegetable	  plantations,	  cow	  and	  pig-­‐farming	  or	  small-­‐
contractor	  business	  in	  sand	  trade	  (interview,	  7.7.2012).	  But	  the	  immense	  expenditure	  of	  the	  GJM	  can	  
obviously	  hardly	  be	  met	  without	  some	  other	  sources.	  Upon	  my	  question,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  admitted	  that	  
some	  of	  the	  money	  also	  came	  from	  his	  “friends:	  contractors,	  rich	  people”	  whom	  he	  requests	  “to	  give	  
something	  for	  the	  poor”	  (ibid.).	  There	  are	  also	  indications	  that	  the	  party	  benefitted	  from	  “donations”	  
from	  the	  tea	  proprietors	  (although	  Gurung	  heavily	  denied	  such	  accusations).	  	  
Accounts	  from	  party-­‐workers	  and	  party	  rivals	  equally	  suggest	  that	  also	  the	  DGHC	  –	  despite	  lacking	  an	  
elected	  body	  or	  chairman	  after	  Ghisingh’s	  resignation	  in	  2008	  –	  functioned	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	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finance	  and	  patronage	  for	  the	  GJM.	  Drawing	  on	  accounts	  from	  party-­‐workers,	  -­‐leaders,	  and	  rivals	  I	  
now	  sketch	  how	  the	  DGHC	  functioned	  after	  Ghisingh’s	  resignation	  in	  2008	  till	  its	  succession	  by	  the	  
GTA	  in	  August	  2012.	  
6.3.2 A	  bureaucracy	  of	  patronage:	  the	  DGHC	  
To	  illustrate	  how	  the	  GJM	  established	  a	  resource	  monopoly	  over	  developmental	  funds	  I	  draw	  on	  
accounts	  of	  party-­‐workers	  and	  leaders	  and	  on	  my	  own	  observations.	  These	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
corruption	  network	  institutionalised	  around	  the	  DGHC,	  which	  not	  only	  includes	  GJM	  members	  but	  
also	  state	  bureaucrats	  and	  contractors.	  	  
When	  the	  DGHC	  was	  established	  in	  1988	  under	  a	  State	  Act	  it	  consisted	  of	  a	  general	  council	  and	  an	  
executive	  council,	  which	  were	  supposed	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  solely	  executive	  functions	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  
socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  development.	  The	  DGHC’s	  general	  council	  consisted	  of	  42	  members	  
(amongst	  them	  28	  were	  elected	  councillors	  and	  14	  were	  government	  nominated),	  the	  chief	  
executive,	  the	  vice-­‐chairman,	  and	  a	  government	  appointed	  executive	  officer.	  The	  chairman,	  vice-­‐
chairman,	  and	  seven	  members	  from	  the	  general	  council’s	  42	  members	  (5	  nominated	  by	  the	  chief	  
executive	  councillor,	  2	  by	  the	  government)	  formed	  the	  executive	  council	  (Sarkar	  2013).	  	  
After	  elections	  to	  the	  DGHC	  were	  not	  held	  as	  scheduled	  in	  2004,	  in	  March	  2005	  the	  GNLF	  councillors	  
had	  resigned	  to	  increase	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  to	  make	  Ghisingh	  the	  “caretaker”	  of	  the	  DGHC	  
(The	  Hindu,	  20.3.2005;	  TT,	  24.3.2005).	  After	  Ghisingh,	  too,	  resigned	  from	  his	  post	  as	  caretaker	  
chairman	  in	  March	  2008,	  the	  DGHC	  was	  scraped	  of	  all	  its	  once	  elected	  leaders.	  To	  fill	  this	  
governmental	  vacuum,	  on	  May	  11,	  2008	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  appointed	  the	  IAS	  (Indian	  
Administrative	  Service)	  officer	  B.L.	  Meena	  (till	  then	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  commissioner	  from	  Jalpaiguri)	  
as	  the	  new	  caretaker	  administrator.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  new	  elections	  to	  the	  council	  however,	  neither	  
the	  general	  nor	  the	  executive	  council	  were	  functioning	  afterwards.	  Also	  the	  respective	  DGHC	  
departments	  continued	  functioning	  only	  administratively	  but	  lacked	  any	  supervision	  by	  elected	  
representatives.	  This	  made	  the	  State	  appointed	  caretaker	  administrator	  the	  only	  de	  jure	  authority	  to	  
decide	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  still-­‐available	  funds	  (granted	  by	  the	  State	  and	  central	  governments).	  
Besides,	  the	  district	  administration	  continued	  to	  handle	  those	  departments	  which	  were	  not	  under	  
the	  purview	  of	  the	  DGHC.	  	  
A	  DGHC	  report	  suggests	  that	  also	  after	  2008	  its	  funds	  continued	  to	  be	  utilised:	  in	  the	  financial	  year	  
2007/08	  a	  total	  sum	  of	  about	  906.6	  million	  INR	  and	  in	  2008/09	  of	  590	  million	  INR150.	  The	  DGHC	  
report,	  however,	  lacked	  clarity	  on	  the	  total	  sums	  of	  money	  sanctioned	  and	  lacked	  detailed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  These	  sums	  exclude	  the	  money	  utilised	  under	  the	  MGNREGS,	  which	  was	  1,155,689,000	  INR	  in	  the	  financial	  
year	  2007/08	  and	  140,673,000	  INR	  in	  2008/09.	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information	  on	  the	  ends	  of	  expenditure	  in	  many	  places.	  Numbers,	  too,	  were	  partly	  incoherent.	  
Although	  till	  2009,	  the	  GJM	  publicly	  demanded	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  DGHC,	  an	  insider	  claimed	  that	  
the	  GJM	  increasingly	  started	  utilising	  the	  DGHC	  after	  a	  massive	  cyclone	  (Aila)	  had	  caused	  vast	  
devastations	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  hills	  in	  May	  2009,	  and	  people	  began	  demanding	  financial	  relief.	  The	  
government	  had	  provided	  200	  million	  INR	  disaster	  relief,	  which	  were	  channelled	  through	  the	  DGHC.	  	  
In	  April	  2010,	  DGHC	  administrator	  B.L.	  Meena	  accussed	  the	  GJM	  of	  channelling	  65-­‐70	  %	  of	  the	  DGHC-­‐
development	  fund	  (worth	  200	  crore	  INR	  or	  2,000	  millions	  INR)	  to	  its	  frontal	  organisations	  between	  
2008	  and	  2010	  (TT,	  24.4.2010).	  Gurung,	  however,	  denied	  any	  authority	  over	  these	  funds.	  In	  my	  
interview	  he	  instead	  stressed	  his	  role	  as	  a	  mediator	  who	  gives	  “recommendations”	  to	  the	  respective	  
state	  departments	  only	  (interview,	  7.7.2012).	  But	  accounts	  of	  GJM	  activists	  underline	  the	  perceived	  
centrality	  of	  the	  GJM	  in	  channelling	  developmental	  funds	  and	  schemes.	  On	  a	  Sunday,	  when	  I	  was	  
waiting	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  head	  office	  to	  see	  whether	  I	  could	  attend	  a	  party	  meeting,	  some	  young	  men	  
entered	  the	  room	  and	  handed	  an	  application	  for	  a	  water-­‐supply	  project	  (responsibility	  of	  the	  Public	  
Health	  Engineering	  Department)	  to	  the	  office	  peon.	  He	  explained	  that	  on	  a	  Sunday	  they	  could	  not	  
meet	  the	  GJM	  president	  and	  asked	  them	  to	  return	  later.	  However,	  he	  took	  their	  hand-­‐written	  
application	  and	  stamped	  a	  “received”	  sign	  with	  the	  date	  on	  it.	  Later,	  he	  told	  me	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  his	  
work	  consisted	  of	  receiving	  applications	  for	  projects	  from	  the	  different	  shakhās151	  and	  zones.	  
Applications	  along	  inner-­‐party	  chains	  of	  command	  
The	  literature	  review	  (Chapter	  6.2)	  pointed	  at	  the	  centrality	  of	  a	  (hierarchical)	  party	  organisation	  in	  
channelling	  patronage	  and	  benefits	  which	  helps	  parties	  maintaining	  their	  “mobilising	  function”	  (cf.	  
Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010,	  139).	  Also	  in	  Darjeeling,	  accounts	  of	  party	  workers	  suggest	  the	  centrality	  
of	  the	  GJM’s	  organisational	  structure.	  Shakhā	  level	  party	  activists	  had	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  party’s	  
hierarchical	  organisation:	  Prashakhās	  and	  shakhās	  as	  well	  as	  “blocks”	  are	  settled	  at	  the	  gram	  
panchayat	  level,	  zones	  represent	  the	  (former)	  DGHC	  constituencies,	  the	  mahākumā	  committee	  is	  at	  
the	  sub-­‐divisional	  level,	  and	  the	  central	  and	  core	  committees	  at	  the	  district-­‐level.	  The	  GJM	  president	  
is	  on	  the	  top	  of	  this	  hierarchy.	  While	  the	  central	  committee	  with	  its	  86	  members	  (in	  2012)	  is	  
constituted	  from	  representatives	  from	  lower	  levels,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  core-­‐committee,	  which	  has	  
only	  17	  members,	  mentioned	  that	  important	  decisions	  were	  taken	  there.	  The	  municipality	  areas	  have	  
town	  and	  ward	  committees.	  The	  exact	  organisation	  below	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  level	  differs	  from	  place	  
to	  place,	  probably	  to	  satisfy	  aspiring	  local	  or	  medium	  level	  leaders	  by	  granting	  them	  posts	  in	  
intermediary	  committees.	  Splits	  in	  shakhās	  can	  also	  stem	  from	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  over	  funds	  
which	  weaken	  the	  party	  organisation	  at	  the	  ground	  level.	  Besides,	  the	  GJM	  has	  various	  frontal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151Shakhā	  and	  prashakhā	  are	  the	  lowest	  level	  party	  units.	  One	  shakhā	  –	  usually	  referring	  to	  a	  village	  –	  has	  
several	  prashakhās.	  A	  larger	  village	  can	  also	  have	  several	  shakhās.	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organisations	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  The	  organisation	  also	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  channelling	  
applications	  for	  developmental	  funds.	  	  
Upon	  my	  request,	  my	  friend	  Sachin*,	  a	  shakhā	  activist	  and	  GJM	  founding	  member,	  hesitantly	  
explained	  the	  application	  procedure	  to	  me	  under	  the	  condition	  of	  anonymity.	  According	  to	  him,	  one	  
formal	  application	  is	  submitted	  in	  the	  respective	  state	  department	  (either	  under	  the	  DGHC,	  or	  others	  
like	  Public	  Works	  Department	  or	  Public	  Health	  Engineering).	  This	  application	  is,	  however,	  useless	  
without	  political	  support	  of	  the	  GJM.	  Thus,	  a	  second	  application	  towards	  the	  party	  has	  to	  be	  filed.	  
This	  inner-­‐party	  application	  process	  proceeds	  along	  the	  hierarchical	  party	  organisation	  (as	  depicted	  
in	  Picture	  7).	  To	  apply	  for	  a	  fund,	  a	  shakhā	  needs	  to	  file	  a	  project	  application	  to	  the	  block	  and/or	  
zonal	  president,	  who	  –	  contingent	  on	  his/her	  support	  –	  forwards	  it	  to	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  and	  then	  to	  
the	  central	  party	  committees	  and	  to	  president	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  who	  can	  forward	  the	  application	  to	  the	  
concerned	  DGHC	  (or	  other	  state)	  department.	  This	  means	  that	  party	  leaders	  at	  the	  different	  levels	  
function	  as	  brokers,	  who	  structure	  the	  flow	  of	  resources	  along	  this	  hierarchical	  chain.	  Once	  approved	  
(or	  “recommended”	  as	  Bimal	  Gurung	  put	  it,	  interview,	  7.7.2012)	  by	  the	  president,	  a	  local	  unit’s	  
application	  is	  likely	  to	  succeed	  at	  the	  DGHC	  or	  the	  respective	  Department.	  An	  insider	  pointed	  out	  
that	  this	  step-­‐wise	  procedure	  leaves	  conflicts	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  scarce	  funds	  largely	  to	  the	  
sub-­‐divisional	  (mahākumā)	  committee,	  which	  functions	  as	  a	  gatekeeper,	  and	  thereby	  saves	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  from	  inner-­‐party	  critique152.	  	  
Also	  zonal	  presidents	  or	  “convenors”	  could	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  the	  channelling	  of	  applications	  
and	  funds	  between	  upper	  and	  lower	  party	  levels.	  After	  Ghisingh’s	  ousting,	  Gurung	  and	  his	  close	  aides	  
had	  nominated	  them	  to	  inofficially	  (and	  non-­‐electively)	  overtake	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  former	  DGHC	  
councillors.	  An	  insider	  explained	  that	  these	  middle-­‐level	  leaders	  had	  been	  recruited	  from	  amongst	  
engaged	  party	  activists,	  mainly	  founding	  members,	  who	  had	  successfully	  established	  the	  GJM	  in	  their	  
respective	  places.	  They	  were,	  however,	  not	  formally	  elected	  by	  their	  respective	  local	  constituencies.	  
Also	  Pravesh	  had	  not	  only	  mobilised	  support	  for	  the	  Prashant	  Tamang	  fan-­‐club	  (see	  Chapter	  5)	  but	  
also	  established	  the	  GJM	  in	  his	  place.	  Now,	  he	  saw	  himself	  as	  an	  intermediary	  between	  his	  “zone”	  
and	  upper-­‐level	  party-­‐leadership	  not	  only	  to	  channel	  demands	  but	  also	  news	  to	  the	  upper	  levels:	  
Shakhā,	  prashakhā,	  they	  are	  all	  under	  me.	  I	  am	  like	  a	  bridge.	  I	  [know	  and]	  convey	  what	  is	  
happening	  at	  the	  grassroots,	  so	  the	  sub-­‐division	  will	  listen,	  central	  committee	  will	  listen.	  
Then	  according	  to	  that	  we	  react.	  And	  if	  this	  linkage	  is	  always	  there	  we	  [GJM]	  will	  always	  go	  
ahead.	  (interview,	  10.4.2012)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  The	  mahākumā	  committee	  is	  also	  important	  for	  maintaining	  the	  party	  organisation.	  New	  shakhās	  need	  its	  
approval	  and	  are	  answerable	  to	  the	  committee,	  which	  also	  facilitates	  the	  speedy	  transmission	  of	  reports	  to	  the	  
central	  leadership,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  organisation	  also	  works	  as	  a	  surveillance	  tool.	  




Picture	  7:	  Corruption	  network	  as	  described	  by	  a	  GJM	  activist.	  Percentages	  are	  subject	  to	  change	  depending	  on	  
the	  overall	  size	  of	  a	  project	  
	  
Yet,	  not	  everybody	  has	  to	  proceed	  along	  this	  arduous	  process	  following	  the	  chains	  of	  command.	  
Those	  with	  good	  relations	  can	  directly	  apply	  to	  the	  president.	  The	  possibility	  to	  jump	  the	  established	  
chains	  of	  command	  underlines	  the	  presidential	  form	  of	  this	  patronage	  system.	  The	  centrality	  of	  and	  
strong	  dependency	  on	  the	  party	  president	  in	  this	  hierarchical	  system	  invests	  him	  with	  the	  ultimate	  
authority	  to	  decide	  on	  project	  applications	  and	  contract	  distribution.	  	  
Importantly,	  all	  local	  GJM	  activists	  believed	  that	  without	  the	  approval	  and	  “recommendation”	  of	  the	  
GJM	  top-­‐leadership	  their	  formal	  applications	  to	  the	  respective	  state	  departments	  or	  the	  DGHC	  would	  
never	  succeed.	  In	  their	  and	  also	  in	  rival’s	  opinion	  opposition	  parties	  clearly	  lacked	  the	  power	  to	  
channel	  funds	  and	  succeed	  with	  applicationsThe	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  the	  GJM	  is	  also	  utilised	  for	  
accessing	  non-­‐DGHC	  projects,	  such	  as	  larger	  State-­‐level	  schemes.	  Here	  activists	  act	  as	  sub-­‐
contractors.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  along	  the	  Pradhan	  Mantri	  Gram	  Sadak	  Yojana	  (PMGSY),	  a	  
centrally	  funded	  and	  State	  approved	  scheme	  for	  road	  construction	  in	  remote	  areas.	  Shakhā	  members	  
explained	  that	  –	  after	  a	  formal	  tender	  –	  initially	  the	  main	  contract	  is	  given	  to	  a	  wealthy	  contractor	  
with	  State-­‐level	  permit,	  who	  is	  not	  necessarily	  involved	  with	  the	  regional	  ruling	  party.	  To	  guarantee	  a	  
smooth	  implementation	  of	  the	  project	  (and	  to	  avoid	  any	  disturbance	  by	  activists	  of	  the	  ruling	  party),	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however,	  this	  contractor	  must	  pay	  off	  the	  ruling	  party	  –	  thus	  the	  GJM	  –	  who	  then	  demands	  a	  
distribution	  of	  sub-­‐contracts	  to	  local	  party	  units	  and	  frontal	  organisations,	  mainly	  the	  Yuva	  Morcha	  
and	  Nari	  Morcha,	  who	  act	  as	  “petty	  contractors”	  [Engl.].	  From	  each	  of	  these	  sub-­‐contracts	  the	  party	  
workers	  can	  cut	  some	  profits	  while	  the	  leaders	  can	  take	  credit	  for	  bringing	  a	  road	  to	  the	  area.	  
“Recommendation”,	  approval,	  and	  cost-­‐estimate	  
Once,	  a	  DGHC	  project	  application	  has	  been	  supported	  by	  the	  various	  intermediary	  party	  leaders	  and	  
reached	  the	  president,	  he	  has	  the	  power	  to	  “recommend”	  (interview,	  7.7.2012)	  it	  to	  the	  respective	  
DGHC	  department.	  A	  gram	  panchayat	  secretary	  mentioned	  that	  the	  state-­‐administered	  institution	  
follows	  such	  recommendations	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  elected	  district-­‐level	  bodies	  (interview,	  
15.6.2012):	  
There	  is	  no	  elected	  DGHC	  house	  [...].	  The	  government	  thinks	  that	  there	  are	  people	  behind	  
him	  [Bimal	  Gurung]	  [...].	  The	  government	  takes	  his	  personal	  voice	  as	  public	  voice.	  He	  makes	  
the	  policy	  and	  the	  government	  implements.	  
GJM	  activist	  Sachin	  also	  pointed	  at	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  engineers,	  who	  estimate	  the	  cost	  of	  
projects.	  According	  to	  him,	  the	  engineers	  “overestimate”	  the	  overhead	  budget	  of	  the	  future	  project	  
and	  sign	  the	  approval	  after	  it	  has	  been	  completed	  (regardless	  of	  the	  actual	  quality)	  in	  exchange	  for	  
receiving	  their	  own	  cut	  (a	  practice	  well-­‐known	  over	  India).	  He	  complained	  that	  starting	  from	  
providing	  “good	  food”	  to	  the	  arrangement	  of	  “girls”	  everything	  had	  to	  be	  provided	  to	  the	  engineers	  
in	  order	  to	  keep	  them	  happy	  during	  their	  field	  visits.	  
Tenders,	  work	  orders,	  and	  contractors	  
Although	  all	  approved	  projects	  are	  publicly	  tendered,	  Sachin	  and	  other	  insiders	  claimed	  that	  these	  
tenders	  were	  manipulated	  by	  the	  administration,	  which	  adhered	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  recommendations	  on	  
the	  contractors.	  In	  small-­‐scale	  projects	  usually	  groups	  of	  GJM-­‐activists	  (mostly	  the	  applicants)	  
became	  contractors.	  Larger	  scale	  contracts,	  which	  demand	  a	  larger	  initial	  capital	  investment	  were	  
given	  to	  full-­‐time	  contractors	  (who	  were	  fast	  enough	  to	  switch	  sides	  from	  GNLF	  to	  GJM).	  Another	  
insider	  shared	  that	  in	  turn	  for	  their	  financial	  support	  during	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  extensive	  travels	  and	  
“welfare	  campaigns”	  in	  Darjeeling,	  they	  get	  their	  bids/tenders	  accepted	  for	  the	  development	  
projects,	  which	  the	  party	  president	  announces	  during	  these	  stays153.	  He	  shared	  that	  in	  the	  initial	  
phases	  of	  the	  GJM,	  hundreds	  of	  such	  contractors	  came	  and	  pledged	  loyalty	  to	  Bimal	  Gurung	  (proven	  
through	  donations).	  This	  suggests	  their	  importance	  in	  the	  organisation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Such	  stays	  include	  the	  expenses	  for	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  company	  of	  GLPs	  and	  other	  party	  activists	  (mainly	  food	  
and	  transport).	  The	  sum	  can	  amount	  to	  several	  lakhs	  of	  rupees.	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Sachin	  further	  explained	  that	  once	  everything	  was	  settled	  the	  applicant	  receives	  a	  “work	  order”	  and	  
can	  start	  with	  the	  project.	  He	  and	  other	  GJM-­‐workers	  claimed	  that	  of	  every	  budget	  a	  certain	  amount	  
of	  percentages	  is	  distributed	  within	  the	  party,	  including	  the	  president	  (see	  Picture	  7).	  Also	  the	  various	  
frontal	  organisations	  receive	  their	  share.	  After	  project	  completion	  the	  applicants	  follow	  the	  de	  jure	  
path	  and	  demand	  reimbursement	  for	  their	  investment	  by	  showing	  the	  bills	  to	  the	  DGHC	  or	  respective	  
state	  departments.	  	  
Enforcement	  through	  intimidation	  
Critics	  claim	  that	  the	  resource	  monopoly	  was	  also	  enforced	  by	  the	  use	  of	  muscle	  power	  in	  form	  of	  
intimidation	  and	  threats.	  This	  happens	  usually	  when	  GJM	  activists	  feel	  that	  they	  did	  not	  receive	  their	  
fair	  cut	  from	  a	  project.	  A	  friend	  recalled	  an	  incident	  when	  a	  non-­‐GJM	  member	  (with	  personal	  
relations	  to	  the	  respective	  state	  department)	  had	  been	  granted	  a	  small	  contract	  in	  his	  village.	  Local	  
GJM	  members	  had	  “disturbed”	  the	  implementation	  by	  hindering	  contract	  workers	  from	  attending	  
the	  work	  side,	  and	  threatened	  to	  use	  physical	  violence	  against	  the	  contractor,	  unless	  they	  received	  a	  
share	  of	  the	  overhead	  expense.	  Project	  implementation	  can	  also	  be	  disturbed	  when	  larger	  scale	  
contract	  works	  with	  higher	  expenses	  make	  it	  necessary	  to	  involve	  State	  approved,	  non-­‐local	  
contractors.	  These	  might	  be	  disturbed	  if	  local	  activists	  feel	  that	  they	  did	  not	  receive	  their	  fair	  share.	  
To	  avoid	  this,	  upper	  level	  leaders	  usually	  split	  bigger	  contracts	  into	  “petty	  contracts”,	  which	  are	  then	  
given	  to	  local	  party-­‐units.	  	  
In	  sum,	  these	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  while	  DGHC	  projects	  are	  seemingly	  applied	  for	  and	  channelled	  
through	  the	  official	  or	  de	  jure	  procedures,	  the	  actual	  decision	  on	  the	  distribution	  and	  choice	  of	  
contractors	  lies	  with	  the	  GJM	  leadership	  only,	  pointing	  at	  their	  monopolisation	  of	  resources.	  
Apparently,	  these	  procedures	  were	  accepted	  by	  the	  State	  government.	  All	  this	  happened	  between	  
2007	  and	  2012	  when	  the	  party	  was	  not	  formally	  elected	  as	  a	  representative	  on	  the	  district	  level	  or	  
for	  the	  DGHC.	  
Inner-­‐party	  competition	  	  
Accounts	  from	  local	  and	  medium-­‐level	  leaders	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  harsh	  competition	  for	  the	  
scarce	  funds.	  Both,	  local	  activists	  and	  zonal	  presidents	  (after	  the	  GTA	  establishment	  the	  sabhashāds)	  
expressed	  the	  need	  to	  prove	  their	  loyalty	  and	  obedience	  to	  the	  party	  and	  the	  president	  to	  make	  
approvals	  more	  likely,	  a	  behaviour	  known	  (and	  publicly	  disapproved)	  as	  chamchāgirī	  (see	  Chapter	  
5)154.	  When	  in	  2013,	  after	  the	  GTA	  elections	  some	  former	  party-­‐workers	  challenged	  Pravesh,	  the	  GTA	  
councillor,	  by	  placing	  TMC	  flags	  visibly	  at	  the	  road	  side	  he	  rushed	  to	  the	  side	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Creeping,	  bootlicking	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rebels.	  He	  explained	  that	  his	  constituency	  must	  remain	  free	  from	  rival	  party’s	  visible	  activities	  as	  it	  
would	  otherwise	  get	  a	  “bad	  name.”	  He	  feared	  this	  would	  risk	  exclusion	  from	  GTA	  funds155.	  He	  
interpreted	  such	  defections	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “bargaining	  politics”	  whereby	  dissatisfied	  party	  workers	  
exerted	  pressure	  on	  him	  to	  provide	  more.	  When	  one	  young	  GJM	  activist	  offered	  to	  “remove”	  the	  
TMC	  flags,	  an	  action	  which	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  intimidation	  and	  risk	  a	  police	  case,	  he,	  however,	  
declined.	  In	  a	  personal	  conversation	  later,	  Pravesh	  expressed	  his	  personal	  dislike	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  
violence	  but	  also	  sadly	  admitted	  that	  he	  had	  to	  “reward”	  those	  who	  used	  violence,	  “because	  they	  
sacrificed	  something”	  (i.e.	  a	  police	  case	  or	  arrest).	  This	  suggests	  that	  ironically	  the	  existence	  of	  
opposition	  parties	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  activists	  to	  prove	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  GJM,	  as	  they	  
believe	  that	  intimidation	  of	  these	  increases	  their	  chances	  for	  benefits	  through	  the	  GJM	  patronage	  
system.	  Thus,	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  is	  not	  only	  proven	  by	  regular	  participation	  in	  party	  events	  but	  also	  
by	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  party	  rivals.	  	  
The	  state	  –	  the	  enemy?	  
Although	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  organisational	  structure	  explains	  how	  developmental	  
resources	  are	  channelled	  within	  the	  party-­‐organisation,	  ultimately	  the	  “recommendations”	  of	  the	  
GJM	  president	  could	  not	  succeed	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  state	  administration,which	  was	  de	  jure	  
in	  charge	  of	  the	  DGHC	  from	  2008	  to	  2012.	  	  
Pravesh	  underlined	  that	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  he	  had	  to	  work	  “hand-­‐in-­‐hand”	  with	  the	  local	  
administration,	  including	  the	  Block	  Development	  Office	  (BDO).	  A	  gram	  panchayat	  secretary	  aptly	  
stated	  that	  	  
Only	  weak	  persons	  retain	  their	  posts	  at	  the	  department	  [...].	  They	  say:	  whatever	  
recommendation	  the	  party	  gives	  we	  do	  so.	  Because	  later	  they	  need	  to	  cooperate	  with	  these	  
political	  people.	  (interview,	  15.6.2012)	  
Adherence	  to	  GJM-­‐orders	  also	  results	  from	  fear	  as	  he	  continued:	  
Administration	  workers	  from	  outside	  are	  not	  afraid,	  they	  [GJM]	  don’t	  know	  where	  their	  
houses	  are.	  But	  for	  local	  people	  it	  is	  difficult.	  At	  times	  even	  if	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  we	  have	  to	  
agree	  to	  what	  the	  party	  says.	  There	  is	  a	  risk	  factor.	  
Further,	  an	  insider	  recalled	  how	  in	  2008	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  secretly	  offered	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
the	  authority	  to	  take	  decisions	  on	  the	  utilisation	  of	  the	  DGHC	  and	  other	  funds,	  particularly	  after	  the	  
cyclone	  Aila	  caused	  large	  devastations	  in	  the	  hills	  in	  May	  2009.	  He	  claimed	  that	  although	  initially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Such	  considerations	  lead	  to	  violent	  clashes	  at	  times.	  When	  in	  May	  2013,	  GNLF	  activists	  attempted	  to	  stage	  a	  
rally	  at	  Soureni,	  they	  were	  allegedly	  attacked	  by	  GJM	  goondas	  with	  stones	  and	  weapons.	  Bimal	  Gurung	  had	  
planned	  to	  visit	  the	  place	  at	  the	  same	  day,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  local	  councillor	  was	  under	  pressure	  to	  keep	  the	  
place	  free	  of	  GNLF	  activities	  and	  to	  prove	  his	  “loyalty”	  (see	  case	  study	  in	  Chapter	  7).	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refusing	  such	  offers,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  soon	  enough	  started	  to	  enjoy	  the	  authority	  the	  government	  was	  
investing	  him	  with,	  e.g.	  by	  engaging	  in	  district-­‐wide	  welfare	  campaigns,	  where	  he	  distributed	  
developmental	  resources.	  This	  account	  suggests	  that	  the	  State	  government	  is	  not	  only	  a	  passive	  
“price-­‐producer”	  (de	  Wit	  1996)	  in	  the	  Morcha’s	  machine	  politics	  but	  itself	  plays	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  
corruption	  network	  and	  directly	  involves	  in	  regional	  elite-­‐construction.	  This	  also	  applies	  to	  some	  
members	  of	  the	  local	  administration,	  a	  topic	  I	  address	  further	  below.	  	  
The	  GJM’s	  reliance	  on	  State	  resources,	  however,	  causes	  a	  serious	  trade-­‐off	  for	  the	  party,	  which	  
becomes	  apparent	  in	  contradictory	  statements	  of	  top-­‐level	  leaders.	  Initially,	  the	  Morcha	  denied	  any	  
involvement	  with	  the	  DGHC	  because	  this	  might	  have	  raised	  doubts	  about	  its	  hobnobbing	  with	  the	  
very	  government	  that	  they	  officially	  challenged	  by	  demanding	  Gorkhaland.	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  and	  other	  
central	  leaders’	  denial	  of	  their	  ultimate	  authority	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  funds	  by	  claiming	  that	  they	  
would	  only	  “recommend”	  while	  the	  final	  decision	  was	  with	  the	  administrator	  of	  the	  DGHC,	  reflects	  
this.	  In	  a	  speech	  in	  June	  2012156,	  Gurung	  even	  openly	  called	  upon	  his	  followers	  to	  stop	  utilising	  
developmental	  funds	  and	  instead	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  struggle	  for	  Gorkhaland:	  “We	  must	  not	  run	  
after	  schemes...we	  must	  make	  this	  final	  fight	  [for	  Gorkhaland]	  a	  success”	  (speech,	  6.6.2012).	  This	  
statement	  clearly	  expresses	  his	  difficulties	  to	  live	  up	  to	  expectations	  of	  factual	  deliveries	  in	  terms	  of	  
development	  and	  contracts,	  while	  continuing	  the	  programmatic	  struggle	  for	  autonomy.	  This	  
juxtaposition	  of	  developmental	  and	  statehood	  demands	  is	  underlined	  by	  leaders’	  attempts	  to	  
maintain	  their	  reputation	  as	  capable	  deliverers	  of	  resources.	  Thus,	  contrary	  to	  above	  claims,	  Gurung	  
regularly	  underlined	  his	  authority	  to	  dispose	  of	  developmental	  resources	  in	  public	  speeches.	  For	  
instance,	  responding	  to	  the	  CPRM’s	  critique	  of	  his	  distribution	  of	  development	  projects,	  in	  the	  same	  
speech	  he	  claimed:	  “Bimal	  Gurung	  does	  not	  need	  permission,	  he	  orders”	  (ibid.).	  In	  the	  long	  run	  such	  
“double-­‐dealing”	  (cf.	  Jeffrey	  2010,	  135)	  is	  not	  successful,	  as	  I	  show	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  second	  example	  of	  state	  capture,	  i.e.	  at	  the	  local	  gram	  panchayat	  and	  ward-­‐levels.	  
This	  not	  only	  reveals	  the	  GJM’s	  role	  in	  channelling	  or	  blocking	  people’s	  access	  to	  the	  developmental	  
state	  but	  also	  underlines	  the	  role	  of	  leaders’	  individual	  interests.	  
6.3.3 Personal	  aggrandisement?	  The	  MGNREGS	  
Besides	  the	  DGHC	  and	  district-­‐level	  departments	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  are	  an	  important	  
developmental	  institution.	  These	  locally	  elected	  developmental	  bodies	  receive	  funds	  from	  the	  central	  
and	  State	  governments	  for	  development	  projects	  and	  are	  powerful	  institutions	  at	  the	  grassroots	  
level.	  Every	  five	  years	  ward	  members	  are	  elected.	  These	  form	  the	  gramsabha	  which	  is	  headed	  by	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156Gurung	  held	  this	  speech	  in	  front	  of	  party-­‐activists	  to	  condemn	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Sen	  committee	  
and	  threaten	  the	  State	  government	  with	  a	  revival	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  (see	  Chapters	  1	  and	  5).	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pradhan.	  In	  the	  three-­‐tier	  panchayat	  system	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  panchayat	  
samiti	  at	  the	  block	  level	  and	  in	  the	  zilla	  parishad	  at	  the	  district	  level.	  	  
As	  already	  described	  in	  Chapter	  1	  the	  panchayat	  system	  in	  Darjeeling	  follows	  rather	  exceptional	  
rules.	  Following	  the	  73rd	  Constitution	  Amendment	  Act	  (1992)	  the	  three-­‐tier	  system	  was	  reduced	  to	  
an	  effective	  one-­‐tier	  system	  leaving	  only	  the	  local	  gram	  panchayats	  as	  elected	  functioning	  bodies.	  
While	  the	  district	  level	  zilla	  parishad	  was	  completely	  dissolved,	  the	  medium-­‐level	  blocks	  lacked	  
elected	  counterparts	  of	  panchayat	  samitis	  and	  were	  represented	  by	  the	  state	  administrative	  Block	  
Development	  Officer	  (BDO)	  only.	  When	  the	  elected	  members	  of	  the	  gramsabhas	  resigned	  in	  2008,	  
the	  gram	  panchayats	  were	  administered	  by	  government	  appointed	  “secretaries	  in	  charge”157.	  
Instead	  of	  implementing	  developmental	  programmes,	  their	  function	  was	  now	  largely	  reduced	  to	  the	  
issuing	  of	  documents	  (such	  as	  certificates	  of	  birth,	  death,	  marriage,	  etc),	  or	  supporting	  applications	  
to	  the	  BDO	  (such	  as	  Scheduled	  Tribes	  (ST)	  certificates	  or	  Below	  Poverty	  Line	  (BPL)	  cards).	  The	  only	  
large-­‐scale	  developmental	  scheme	  that	  continued	  to	  function	  was	  the	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  National	  
Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Scheme	  (MGNREGS,	  following	  NREGS),	  or	  “the	  100-­‐days	  work	  
scheme”,	  issued	  by	  the	  central	  government.	  	  
Many	  accounts	  of	  villagers	  suggested	  that	  there	  was	  a	  range	  of	  persons,	  who	  acted	  as	  supportive	  
intermediaries	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  for	  issuing	  certificates.	  These	  included	  also	  
non-­‐	  GJM-­‐activists.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  the	  channelling	  of	  access	  to	  development	  and	  welfare	  funds	  or	  
government	  jobs	  (e.g.	  teacher)	  was	  perceived	  as	  an	  exclusive	  realm	  of	  local	  GJM	  groups	  and	  leaders	  
in	  most	  places	  I	  studied.	  I	  also	  often	  came	  across	  allegations	  claiming	  that	  welfare	  schemes	  such	  as	  
the	  Indira	  Awaz	  Yojana	  (a	  housing	  scheme)158,	  the	  EWS-­‐schemes	  (benefits	  for	  the	  economically	  
weaker	  section),	  the	  distribution	  of	  BPL	  cards,	  or	  disaster	  relief	  were	  controlled	  by	  and	  distributed	  
amongst	  the	  local	  GJM	  activists	  only,	  instead	  of	  being	  granted	  to	  “genuine”	  and	  needy	  persons.	  Such	  
locally	  implemented	  schemes	  provided	  an	  apt	  entrance	  point	  to	  study	  the	  functioning	  of	  political	  
patronage	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  It	  also	  allowed	  assessing	  
the	  effects	  this	  has	  on	  perceptions	  of	  leaders	  and	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  
Drawing	  on	  a	  detailed	  case-­‐study	  of	  the	  NREGS,	  I	  now	  narrate	  the	  story	  of	  how	  a	  group	  of	  local	  GJM	  
leaders	  captured	  the	  scheme	  and	  the	  effects	  this	  had	  on	  their	  public	  authority	  in	  the	  concerned	  
village.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157Between	  2008	  and	  2012	  these	  local	  bodies	  officially	  functioned	  under	  the	  District	  Magistrate,	  since	  August	  
2012	  they	  are	  under	  the	  direct	  purview	  of	  the	  GTA.	  
158	  The	  MLAs	  (thus	  GJM	  leaders)	  select	  the	  beneficiaries	  for	  this	  scheme.	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MGNREGS:	  Official	  rules	  and	  informal	  implementation	  	  
According	  to	  the	  MGNREG-­‐Act	  (Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  2008),	  the	  scheme	  aims	  at	  providing	  a	  
maximum	  of	  100	  days	  employment	  a	  year	  for	  unemployed	  persons,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
enhancing	  small	  scale	  development	  through	  cash-­‐for-­‐work	  projects,	  e.g.	  road	  construction,	  or	  small	  
scale	  water	  schemes.	  	  
People	  willing	  to	  work	  under	  the	  scheme	  apply	  for	  a	  job	  card	  and	  a	  pass	  book.	  Both	  documents	  must	  
remain	  with	  the	  worker.	  To	  prioritise	  projects	  proposed	  by	  elected	  ward-­‐members,	  the	  gram	  sabha	  
designs	  an	  “annual	  action	  plan”.	  This	  plan	  is	  then	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  panchayat	  samiti	  (at	  block	  
level)	  and	  the	  zilla	  parishad	  (at	  the	  district	  level).	  Once	  the	  projects	  are	  approved,	  ward	  wise	  NREGS-­‐
committees	  (including	  party	  representatives)	  are	  formed.	  For	  each	  project	  small	  groups	  of	  job	  card-­‐
holders	  (usually	  10	  to	  15	  persons)	  are	  formed.	  These	  are	  led	  by	  a	  jointly	  chosen	  supervisor,	  who	  
registers	  the	  utilisation	  of	  construction	  materials	  and	  documents	  work	  attendance	  in	  the	  individual	  
job	  cards	  and	  muster-­‐rolls	  (MRs).	  The	  MRs	  are	  submitted	  to	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  and	  BDO	  to	  request	  
for	  the	  final	  payment,	  which	  workers	  receive	  via	  the	  local	  post	  office	  by	  showing	  their	  pass	  books.	  As	  
part	  of	  horizontal	  accountability	  measures,	  a	  vigilance	  and	  monitoring	  committee	  consisting	  of	  
respected	  community	  members	  is	  to	  cross-­‐check	  the	  processes	  to	  avoid	  the	  utilisation	  of	  fake	  job	  
cards	  (e.g.	  of	  dead	  persons),	  the	  misuse	  of	  material,	  the	  faking	  of	  other	  documents,	  or	  other	  
irregularities	  (Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  2008).	  So	  far	  the	  official	  rules.	  
Equipped	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  these	  official	  NREGS	  rules,	  I	  began	  to	  compare	  the	  actual	  
implementation	  of	  the	  scheme.	  I	  was	  astonished	  to	  see	  how	  much	  the	  actual	  implementation	  
diverged	  from	  the	  guidelines	  and	  the	  Act.	  Indeed,	  against	  the	  lack	  of	  elected	  local	  bodies	  in	  
Darjeeling	  those	  involved	  in	  NREGS	  developed	  some	  creativity	  in	  implementing	  the	  scheme.	  This	  
became	  apparent	  in	  the	  variety	  of	  informal	  rules	  regulating	  the	  processes	  at	  the	  ward	  levels.	  I	  
studied	  the	  NREGS	  in	  five	  different	  places	  (all	  of	  them	  tea	  estates):	  Four	  of	  these	  villages/wards	  had	  a	  
clear	  majority	  party	  (two	  of	  them	  GJM,	  two	  of	  them	  CPRM),	  whereas	  one	  was	  mixed	  with	  the	  GJM	  
being	  in	  majority	  but	  the	  CPRM	  still	  had	  considerable	  numbers.	  I	  first	  describe	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  
NREGS	  by	  the	  single-­‐dominating	  GJM	  party	  in	  Joubari*	  village	  which	  represents	  a	  “worst-­‐case”	  
scenario,	  before	  comparing	  it	  with	  other	  cases.	  	  
Capturing	  the	  NREGS	  in	  Joubari*	  
The	  bumpy	  ride	  along	  a	  potholed	  path	  took	  me	  from	  the	  main	  road	  down	  along	  the	  slope	  to	  Joubari	  
tea	  plantation.	  Situated	  at	  the	  dead	  end	  of	  the	  road	  the	  village	  appeared	  to	  be	  pretty	  remote,	  with	  
only	  three	  jeeps	  plying	  to	  the	  main	  road	  and	  the	  nearest	  bazaar	  in	  the	  morning.	  Most	  plantation	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workers	  hardly	  ever	  travelled	  there	  due	  to	  the	  rather	  expensive	  fares159.	  Although	  one	  ward	  of	  the	  
tea	  estate	  had	  a	  considerable	  presence	  of	  CPRM	  followers,	  the	  ward	  where	  I	  studied	  the	  NREGS	  was	  
solely	  dominated	  by	  the	  GJM,	  represented	  by	  a	  core-­‐group	  of	  seven	  to	  eight	  male	  party-­‐workers,	  
amongst	  them	  a	  GJM	  central	  committee	  member.	  Although	  people	  usually	  refrained	  from	  talking	  
about	  the	  “party”	  or	  “politics”,	  when	  I	  first	  came	  to	  the	  village	  the	  NREGS	  was	  a	  recurrent	  subject	  of	  
heated	  discussions.	  Apparently,	  members	  of	  the	  GJM	  group,	  who	  had	  organised	  the	  scheme	  and	  
chosen	  the	  supervisors	  for	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years,	  had	  not	  paid	  salaries	  to	  all	  job	  card	  holders	  
working	  under	  the	  NREGS	  but	  instead	  kept	  the	  money	  for	  themselves.	  This	  clearly	  outmatched	  my	  
observations	  from	  other	  GJM-­‐dominated	  villages,	  where	  workers	  had	  not	  received	  their	  full	  salary.	  
When	  some	  of	  the	  victims	  complained,	  the	  local	  “monitoring”	  committee	  called	  an	  indoor-­‐meeting	  
but	  did	  not	  decide	  to	  take	  action	  against	  the	  supervisors	  or	  arrange	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  victims.	  
Apparently,	  a	  local	  GJM	  leader	  was	  himself	  a	  member	  of	  the	  committee.	  One	  elder	  non-­‐GJM	  activist	  
of	  the	  committee	  later	  told	  me	  that	  such	  things	  needed	  to	  be	  settled	  (milāune)	  in	  the	  village,	  as	  
otherwise	  the	  BDO	  would	  punish	  them	  by	  withholding	  schemes.	  He	  also	  stressed	  that	  the	  
withholding	  of	  salaries	  was	  nothing	  party-­‐related	  but	  a	  “private	  and	  personal”	  (vyakti)	  issue.	  
Amongst	  the	  12	  victims	  were	  also	  a	  few	  persons	  close	  to	  the	  Darjeeling	  Congress	  party,	  who	  –	  inspite	  
of	  apparent	  threats	  of	  the	  village	  GJM	  -­‐	  took	  the	  initiative	  to	  complain	  to	  the	  BDO	  after	  no	  other	  
action	  was	  taken.	  Their	  complaints,	  however,	  remained	  without	  any	  avail.	  An	  insider,	  who	  had	  been	  
involved	  with	  the	  GJM	  explained	  that	  instead	  of	  sacking	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  secretary	  or	  filing	  cases	  
against	  the	  supervisors,	  the	  approached	  Congress	  leader	  –	  who	  happened	  to	  be	  the	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  of	  
the	  concerned	  gram	  panchayat-­‐secretary	  –	  mediated	  between	  both	  sides.	  Eventually	  the	  secretary	  
promised	  some	  extra	  work	  in	  future	  to	  the	  victims	  to	  settle	  the	  case.	  One	  of	  the	  accused	  supervisors	  
eventually	  gave	  some	  (but	  not	  all)	  money	  to	  some	  of	  the	  victims.	  	  
Accounts	  of	  villagers	  and	  insiders	  pointed	  at	  a	  corruption	  network	  behind	  this,	  including	  the	  
supervisors,	  the	  GJM	  leaders,	  and	  the	  gram	  panchayat-­‐secretary.	  I	  cross-­‐checked	  these	  accounts	  
with	  the	  MRs,	  which	  are	  publicly	  accessible	  from	  the	  website	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  
(Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  2013a)	  and	  display	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  names	  of	  NREGS	  
participants,	  their	  work	  attendance,	  and	  payment.	  	  
Together,	  these	  accounts	  give	  the	  following	  impression	  on	  the	  NREGS	  implementation	  in	  the	  
respective	  village.	  The	  first	  step	  of	  NREGS	  capture	  includes	  the	  proposal	  of	  projects	  for	  the	  village,	  
which	  –	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  elected	  representatives	  –	  are	  brought	  forward	  by	  the	  GJM	  group.	  In	  
compliance	  with	  the	  gram	  panchayat-­‐secretary	  the	  same	  group	  then	  nominates	  supervisors	  for	  the	  
approved	  schemes.	  Instead	  of	  collecting	  job	  card	  holders’	  work	  requests	  at	  the	  gram	  panchayat,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  A	  trip	  to	  the	  main	  road	  and	  back	  would	  already	  eat	  up	  their	  daily	  salaries	  of	  90	  INR.	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party	  workers,	  who	  already	  had	  ‘collected’	  the	  job	  cards	  and	  pass-­‐books	  from	  their	  holders,	  provide	  
lists	  of	  “workers”	  to	  the	  gram	  panchayat.	  Many	  villagers	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  heard	  about	  open	  
registration	  processes	  and	  thereby	  remained	  excluded	  from	  the	  scheme.	  They	  also	  did	  not	  know	  
where	  their	  job	  cards	  or	  pass	  books	  were.	  Once	  the	  work	  started	  the	  supervisors	  filled	  in	  the	  MRs.	  
Cross-­‐checking	  these	  rolls	  with	  friends	  from	  the	  village	  revealed	  that	  about	  half	  of	  the	  people	  
mentioned	  were	  either	  dead	  or	  had	  migrated	  to	  other	  places.	  Other	  persons	  mentioned	  on	  the	  MRs	  
did	  not	  even	  know	  that	  their	  names	  were	  written	  there	  and	  had	  never	  received	  any	  payment.	  Still,	  
the	  supervisors	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  pass-­‐books	  had	  not	  only	  collected	  the	  “salary”	  for	  these	  “fake”	  
persons	  but	  also	  for	  those	  who	  had	  indeed	  worked	  from	  the	  post	  office.	  The	  officer	  at	  the	  post-­‐office	  
happened	  to	  be	  a	  close	  relative	  of	  one	  of	  the	  GJM	  leaders.	  Accounts	  of	  job	  card	  holders	  suggest	  that	  
due	  to	  intimidation	  from	  the	  group	  they	  feared	  to	  complain	  when	  not	  receiving	  their	  expected	  
salaries.	  	  
When	  I	  returned	  to	  the	  village	  one	  year	  later,	  I	  questioned	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  secretary	  about	  these	  
(apparently	  continuing)	  irregularities.	  Denying	  any	  involvement	  or	  responsibility	  he	  instead	  claimed	  
that	  such	  “things”	  took	  place	  between	  the	  supervisors	  and	  the	  post-­‐office.	  He	  also	  pointed	  at	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  the	  “social	  audit	  committee”	  for	  securing	  a	  proper	  implementation	  of	  the	  scheme,	  
but	  I	  could	  not	  find	  any	  supporting	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  committee	  independent	  from	  
the	  GJM.	  In	  2013,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  Right-­‐to-­‐Information	  (RTI)160	  request	  (initiated	  by	  the	  meanwhile	  
established	  Trinamool	  Congress)	  the	  concerned	  BDO	  denied	  any	  irregularities	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  NREGS,	  ensuring	  that	  supervisors	  were	  chosen	  by	  beneficiary	  committees	  and	  social	  audits	  were	  
held	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  scheme	  (letter	  of	  respective	  BDO	  to	  the	  District	  Magistrate,	  
May	  2013)161.	  Yet,	  only	  six	  months	  later,	  when	  members	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  local	  GNLF	  unit	  
pressed	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  monitoring	  committee	  and	  threatened	  to	  bring	  the	  continuing	  
corruption	  charges	  forward	  to	  the	  BDO,	  the	  gram	  panchayat-­‐secretary	  finally	  gave	  in.	  Meanwhile,	  
the	  TMC	  had	  made	  an	  entrance	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  and	  established	  party	  units.	  In	  this	  process	  before	  
the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections,	  the	  party	  leading	  the	  State	  government	  had	  apparently	  tightened	  the	  
grip	  on	  the	  district	  administration.	  This	  made	  the	  panchayat-­‐secretary	  more	  apprehensive	  of	  possible	  
action	  by	  the	  (state-­‐appointed)	  BDO.	  Eventually,	  in	  a	  public	  village	  meeting	  he	  threatened	  to	  file	  a	  
complaint	  with	  the	  police	  (or	  First	  Information	  Report,	  FIR)	  against	  the	  supervisors	  if	  they	  continued	  
like	  before.	  In	  the	  same	  meeting	  the	  supervisors	  were	  replaced	  by	  persons	  whom	  the	  new	  GNLF-­‐
dominated	  monitoring	  committee	  regarded	  as	  more	  honest.	  After	  a	  few	  days	  the	  hoarded	  job-­‐cards	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  RTIs	  entitle	  Indian	  citizens	  to	  get	  information	  on	  various	  matters	  of	  interest	  from	  a	  public	  authority	  (i.e.	  
government)	  within	  30	  days.	  RTIs	  are	  based	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Information	  Act	  2005,	  which	  was	  intended	  to	  make	  
the	  government	  and	  administration	  more	  transparent	  and	  accountable	  to	  its	  citizens.	  
161Retrieved	  from	  the	  official	  web-­‐site	  of	  Darjeeling	  district	  (Darjeeling	  District	  Magistrate	  2013)	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and	  pass	  books	  reappeared	  and	  were	  –	  via	  the	  monitoring	  committee	  –	  returned	  to	  their	  respective	  
owners,	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  not	  known	  about	  their	  whereabouts	  for	  years.	  
Accounts	  from	  other	  sites	  
Also	  in	  the	  other	  studied	  villages,	  the	  majority	  party	  clearly	  controlled	  the	  NREGS	  by	  choosing	  the	  
supervisors	  (the	  GJM	  from	  amongst	  their	  cadres	  while	  excluding	  others)162,	  by	  selecting	  projects	  for	  
the	  annual	  action	  plan	  (while	  minority	  party’s	  proposals	  were	  rejected	  by	  the	  gram	  panchayat),	  and	  
by	  controlling	  (or	  even	  providing)	  the	  monitoring	  committee	  (if	  there	  was	  one	  at	  all).	  In	  one	  GJM	  
majority	  hold,	  the	  party	  had	  created	  an	  own	  “NREGS	  committee”	  to	  handle	  all	  these	  issues.	  Also	  in	  
other	  villages	  this	  capture	  happened	  in	  consent	  or	  with	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  
secretaries.	  Like	  the	  Joubari	  secretary,	  also	  they	  clearly	  refused	  to	  take	  any	  responsibility	  for	  what	  
happened	  at	  the	  sub-­‐gram	  panchayat	  ward	  level	  (interviews	  in	  May/June	  2012)	  and	  claimed	  they	  
had	  no	  idea	  of	  people’s	  and	  supervisors’	  party	  affiliation.	  	  
In	  one	  ward	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  secretary	  refused	  to	  hold	  meetings	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  clashes	  between	  
the	  CPRM	  –	  which	  had	  a	  considerable	  strength	  –	  and	  the	  GJM	  activists.	  When	  some	  CPRM	  
representatives	  urged	  him	  to	  hold	  a	  meeting	  at	  the	  ward	  level	  to	  increase	  transparency	  of	  the	  whole	  
NREGS	  process	  by	  providing	  information	  on	  man-­‐days	  and	  material	  cost,	  he	  refused:	  
If	  I	  attended	  a	  meeting	  which	  is	  organised	  by	  you	  [CPRM]...what	  can	  I	  tell	  them	  [GJM]?	  We	  
[government	  employees]	  don’t	  have	  security	  here...	  We	  are	  not	  elected	  representatives,	  we	  
don’t	  have	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  such	  meetings.	  (conversation,	  30.5.2012)	  
This	  did	  not	  only	  express	  his	  fear	  but	  also	  pointed	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  elected	  bodies.	  In	  the	  
respective	  ward,	  inspite	  of	  the	  CPRM’s	  complaints	  and	  their	  attempt	  to	  nominate	  a	  supervisor,	  the	  
exclusive	  GJM-­‐capture	  of	  the	  NREGS	  continued.	  CPRM	  activists	  concluded	  that	  minority	  parties	  
simply	  lack	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  political	  space	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  elected	  institutions.	  In	  the	  few	  clearly	  
CPRM-­‐dominated	  wards,	  the	  panchayat	  left	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  scheme	  to	  the	  CPRM.	  
Main	  differences	  amongst	  the	  cases	  concerned	  were	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  community	  involvement	  via	  the	  
village	  samāj	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  corruption163.	  Unlike	  in	  Joubari,	  in	  other	  party-­‐majority	  villages	  (two	  
CPRM,	  one	  GJM),	  activists	  claimed	  that	  the	  samāj	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  annual	  action	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162In	  one	  case	  the	  GJM	  zonal	  president	  influenced	  the	  choice	  of	  supervisors.	  The	  selection	  itself	  is,	  however,	  a	  
contested	  process	  inside	  the	  local	  party	  units	  and	  can	  cause	  conflicts	  and	  dissatisfaction.	  	  
163In	  addition	  to	  the	  described	  faking	  of	  MRs,	  the	  wrong	  display	  of	  work,	  or	  refusal	  of	  payment	  to	  the	  workers	  
supervisors	  can	  increase	  their	  profit	  by	  decreasing	  the	  quality	  of	  work,	  e.g.	  by	  using	  minor	  construction	  
materials	  and	  taking	  the	  remaining	  material	  for	  private	  constructions	  or	  sale.	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plan	  or	  in	  monitoring164.	  This,	  however,	  only	  seemed	  to	  work	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  party	  
majority,	  as	  one	  local	  GJM	  leader	  explained	  because	  all	  members	  of	  the	  samāj	  are	  with	  the	  party	  
anyway”	  (read:	  the	  entire	  village	  community	  supported	  the	  GJM).	  When	  the	  samāj	  consisted	  of	  
members	  with	  differing	  party	  affiliation	  –	  as	  in	  mixed	  party-­‐villages	  –	  two	  gram	  panchayat	  
secretaries	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  reason	  of	  not	  involving	  it	  in	  NREGS	  as	  conflicts	  could	  arise	  (and	  thereby	  
excluded	  minority	  members).	  In	  all	  cases,	  however,	  the	  final	  decision	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  supervisors	  
and	  projects	  was	  with	  the	  respective	  majority	  party.	  	  
Besides	  capturing	  the	  NREGA	  at	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  level	  some	  respondents	  alleged	  that	  local	  GJM	  
leaders	  also	  monopolised	  the	  access	  to	  other	  developmental	  and	  welfare	  schemes.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
different	  villages,	  victims	  of	  an	  earthquake	  in	  2011	  claimed	  that	  –	  although	  their	  houses	  had	  been	  
severely	  damaged	  –	  only	  those	  “close	  to	  the	  party”	  had	  received	  the	  State-­‐funded	  disaster	  relief.	  
Indeed,	  one	  GJM	  youth	  leader	  stressed	  that	  local	  party	  workers	  supported	  the	  panchayat	  with	  
collecting	  data	  and	  compiling	  lists	  of	  “eligible”	  fund	  receivers.	  In	  another	  village,	  complaints	  of	  CPRM	  
activists	  to	  the	  BDO	  for	  what	  they	  regarded	  as	  “fake	  lists”	  of	  victims	  caused	  a	  re-­‐inquiry	  by	  BDO.	  
Other	  incidences	  of	  alleged	  exclusive	  resource	  monopolisation	  concern	  the	  distribution	  of	  BPL	  cards.	  
These	  are	  provided	  to	  citizens	  designated	  “poor”	  according	  to	  census-­‐information.	  Criteria	  include	  
size	  of	  land-­‐holding,	  type	  of	  house,	  or	  ownership	  of	  consumer	  durables	  such	  as	  a	  TV	  (Ram,	  Mohanty,	  
and	  Ram	  2009).	  An	  insider	  alleged	  that	  in	  Joubari	  village,	  the	  census	  questionnaires	  from	  2011	  had	  
ended	  up	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  local	  GJM	  leaders	  before	  being	  forwarded	  to	  the	  gram	  panchayat	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  same	  corruption	  network	  was	  at	  play,	  which	  also	  restricted	  access	  to	  the	  NREGS.	  
This	  way	  the	  leaders	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  manipulate	  the	  questionnaires	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  certain	  
persons	  become	  “eligible”	  under	  the	  BPL-­‐scheme.	  	  
	  
6.4 Reactions	  and	  effects	  of	  state	  capture	  
As	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  6.2,	  various	  authors	  (Greene	  2010;	  Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010)	  regard	  resource	  
monopolies	  and	  political	  patronage	  as	  effective	  means	  to	  maintain	  a	  party’s	  mobilising	  function.	  
They	  also	  underlined	  that	  exclusive	  state	  capture	  through	  a	  dominant	  political	  party	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  
“punishment	  regime”	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010,	  128),	  where	  loyal	  followers	  are	  rewarded	  through	  
access	  to	  patronage	  while	  rivals	  are	  excluded.	  Political	  support	  is	  bought	  and	  enforced	  to	  help	  
incumbents/rulers	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Although	  the	  samāj	  was	  generally	  seen	  as	  “non-­‐political”	  (see	  Chapter	  1),	  in	  Joubari	  elder	  samāj	  
representatives	  criticised	  the	  increasing	  influence	  of	  the	  GJM	  in	  this	  social	  domain.	  In	  another	  village,	  Nari	  
Morcha	  members	  replaced	  traditional	  samāj	  functions	  by	  involving	  in	  domestic	  disputes.	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To	  estimate	  in	  how	  far	  the	  GJM’s	  practices	  indeed	  tied	  activists	  and	  followers	  to	  the	  party,	  I	  now	  
review	  reactions	  of	  active	  party-­‐workers,	  rivals,	  and	  (passive)	  followers,	  and	  their	  perceptions	  and	  
evaluations	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  patronage.	  Importantly,	  the	  above	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
GJM’s	  announcement	  of	  a	  “new	  dawn”	  in	  Darjeeling	  (Chapter	  1),	  its	  practices	  of	  state	  capture	  and	  
corruption,	  and	  the	  utilisation	  of	  political	  patronage	  very	  much	  resemble	  the	  previous	  GNLF’s	  
practices.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  why	  people	  (again)	  accepted	  such	  practices,	  which	  many	  of	  
them	  had	  condemned	  previously.	  
6.4.1 Activists	  
Accounts	  of	  party	  workers	  suggest	  that	  they	  imagine	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  contracts	  and	  
development.	  Mainly	  young	  unemployed	  men	  (especially	  from	  the	  Yuva	  Morcha)	  pinned	  their	  hopes	  
for	  economic	  betterment	  (in	  form	  of	  resources	  such	  as	  economic	  benefits,	  contracts,	  welfare,	  jobs,	  or	  
money)	  on	  the	  party.	  When	  I	  asked	  local	  GJM-­‐activists	  how	  they	  gained	  access	  to	  development	  
projects	  they	  stressed	  that	  one	  must	  involve	  the	  GJM,	  claiming	  that	  “all	  development	  goes	  through	  
the	  party”.	  Thereby	  they	  not	  only	  referred	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  application	  process	  but	  also	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  non-­‐party	  members	  from	  developmental	  benefits.	  Also	  Sachin	  and	  Nirman,	  the	  GJM	  
activists	  from	  the	  previous	  case-­‐study,	  admitted	  that	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  peace	  puja	  was	  largely	  
motivated	  by	  their	  anticipation	  of	  economic	  rewards,	  even	  though	  they	  despised	  disturbing	  the	  
scheduled	  GNLF	  event.	  This	  again	  indicates	  that	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  means	  in	  the	  
inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  scarce	  resources.	  Such	  belief	  in	  the	  party’s	  ability	  to	  provide	  is	  also	  kept	  
alive	  through	  regular	  reports	  on	  its	  developmental	  activities	  in	  the	  local	  newspapers.	  	  
If	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  party’s	  ability	  or	  leaders’	  willingness	  to	  provide	  declines,	  however,	  former	  activists	  
might	  change	  the	  party,	  which	  threatens	  the	  mobilising	  function	  of	  the	  GJM.	  Such	  accounts	  suggest	  
that	  material	  considerations	  more	  than	  programmatic	  appeal	  influence	  their	  choice	  of	  a	  party	  (see	  
Chapter	  8).	  
6.4.2 Rivals	  
In	  contrast	  to	  active	  GJM-­‐followers,	  who	  expect	  rewards	  through	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  GJM,	  
members	  of	  rival	  parties	  claimed	  to	  be	  “politically	  victimised”	  through	  the	  exclusive	  nature	  of	  the	  
GJM’s	  patronage.	  Local	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPRM	  from	  a	  communist	  strong-­‐hold	  for	  instance	  claimed	  that	  
neither	  their	  applications	  to	  the	  DGHC	  were	  ever	  approved,	  nor	  did	  their	  members	  succeed	  in	  
interviews	  for	  government	  jobs.	  In	  their	  perception,	  the	  GJM	  monopolised	  the	  developmental	  
apparatus	  of	  the	  district	  to	  starve	  them	  of	  projects	  and	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  were	  not	  
able	  to	  work	  for	  their	  communities.	  When	  Bimal	  Gurung	  entered	  one	  of	  the	  CPRM	  strongholds	  in	  
May	  2012,	  angry	  local	  activists	  blamed	  him	  for	  distributing	  benefits	  (including	  money	  and	  rice	  grains)	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exclusively	  to	  those	  who	  joined	  the	  GJM.	  Such	  allegations	  point	  at	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  “punishment	  
regime”,	  namely	  the	  exclusion	  from	  state	  benefits	  due	  to	  political	  affiliations,	  which	  makes	  
patronage	  a	  means	  of	  soft	  repression.	  But	  while	  CPRM-­‐members	  were	  outraged	  about	  the	  GJM’s	  
perceived	  partisan	  developmental	  practices,	  their	  biggest	  critique	  blamed	  the	  GJM	  for	  “selling	  
Gorkhaland”	  for	  money	  and	  personal	  aggrandisement	  provided	  by	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State	  
government	  (see	  Chapters	  5	  and	  8).	  
6.4.3 Followers	  
Followers	  or	  passive	  supporters	  from	  tea	  plantations	  were	  confronted	  with	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  
monopoly	  mainly	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  especially	  through	  the	  NREGS	  scheme.	  Surprisingly,	  at	  all	  studied	  
sites	  their	  reactions	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  developmental	  practices	  were	  mixed,	  reflecting	  differing	  degrees	  of	  
information	  on	  the	  NREGS	  (and	  other	  schemes)	  and	  their	  entitlements.	  Some	  praised	  the	  GJM	  for	  
“searching	  and	  bringing”	  the	  100-­‐days-­‐work	  scheme,	  even	  in	  the	  Joubari	  case.	  Some	  even	  believed	  
that	  the	  money	  distributed	  came	  from	  the	  party	  while	  others	  knew	  that	  it	  came	  from	  the	  
government.	  In	  this	  context,	  some	  praised	  the	  GJM	  for	  its	  distribution	  of	  development	  or	  its	  support	  
in	  financial	  crises.	  	  
Against	  this	  backdrop	  many	  persons	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  object	  to	  give	  donations	  for	  the	  party’s	  “fighting	  
fund”,	  which	  the	  GJM	  claimed	  to	  use	  for	  the	  expenses	  entailed	  by	  organising	  funds	  and	  schemes	  
(such	  as	  jeep	  fares	  to	  visit	  state	  departments).	  Although	  some	  women	  unmasked	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  
distribution	  of	  development	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  garner	  votes	  in	  the	  next	  elections,	  they	  expressed	  their	  
gladness	  about	  receiving	  some	  attention.	  When	  I	  asked	  one	  woman	  whose	  name	  had	  been	  
mentioned	  on	  a	  NREGS	  Muster	  Roll	  whether	  she	  had	  received	  the	  payment	  for	  the	  project,	  she	  said	  
surprisingly	  that	  she	  did	  not	  even	  know	  that	  her	  name	  had	  been	  mentioned.	  Instead	  of	  being	  
outraged,	  however,	  she	  rather	  seemed	  unsettled.	  She	  never	  openly	  complained	  about	  the	  scam.	  	  
But	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  instances	  of	  betrayal	  and	  exploitation	  of	  workers	  also	  raised	  critique	  
amongst	  the	  supposed	  beneficiaries	  and	  spoiled	  the	  GJM	  workers’	  reputation	  as	  benevolent	  social	  
workers.	  Regularly,	  in	  conversations	  leaders	  were	  accused	  for	  selfishness,	  for	  ignoring	  village	  needs,	  
and	  for	  not	  caring	  about	  others.	  In	  all	  studied	  cases,	  research	  respondents	  morally	  disapproved	  of	  
such	  practices	  as	  ghoṭālā	  (cozenage,	  scam)	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Also	  the	  term	  peṭko	  vikās	  (literally:	  
development	  of	  the	  stomach)	  has	  become	  an	  ironic	  popular	  idiom	  to	  describe	  such	  leaders,	  who	  
became	  “fat”	  after	  “eating”	  from	  public	  funds	  while	  real	  development	  was	  stalled.	  
But	  despite	  such	  dissatisfaction,	  hardly	  anybody	  dared	  to	  openly	  oppose	  the	  ruling	  party.	  Kundan,	  
who	  runs	  a	  small	  shop	  in	  a	  road-­‐side	  village	  explained	  the	  public	  silence	  as	  follows:	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The	  poorest	  stay	  [with	  the	  GJM]	  out	  of	  fear	  (ḍarle)	  or	  because	  they	  need	  support	  with	  
applications	  at	  government	  offices.	  The	  better	  off	  stay	  out	  of	  compulsion	  (karle),	  to	  retain	  
their	  jobs	  or	  get	  contracts.	  Others	  stay	  to	  gain	  more	  power	  and	  money	  (raharle,	  out	  of	  
appetite/motivation).	  
In	  his	  opinion,	  both	  –	  the	  fear	  of	  victimisation	  which	  expressed	  a	  perceived	  dependence	  on	  the	  GJM,	  
as	  well	  as	  instrumental	  considerations	  of	  those,	  who	  want	  to	  gain	  by	  showing	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  –	  
explained	  the	  passive	  compliance	  and	  active	  support	  to	  the	  party.	  Indeed,	  several	  times	  respondents	  
expressed	  their	  fears	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  (e.g.	  as	  teachers),	  when	  openly	  criticising	  the	  GJM.	  A	  victim	  
of	  the	  NREGS	  corruption	  case	  in	  Joubari	  shared	  that	  he	  had	  been	  personally	  intimidated	  by	  a	  local	  
GJM-­‐group	  member.	  	  
Often,	  when	  I	  asked	  critical	  respondents	  why	  they	  did	  not	  openly	  oppose	  local	  GJM	  leaders,	  they	  
claimed	  that	  such	  critique	  would	  reach	  the	  “upper”	  party-­‐levels	  (māthi	  pugchha),	  which	  suggested	  
that	  they	  feared	  the	  party-­‐hierarchical	  organisation	  as	  an	  effective	  surveillance	  tool	  (see	  Chapter	  
7)165.	  In	  the	  same	  context,	  respondents	  claimed	  that	  “staying	  with	  the	  ‘majority’	  [Engl.]”	  would	  be	  
safe	  and	  expressed	  apprehensions	  of	  multi-­‐party	  villages,	  reflecting	  their	  memories	  of	  the	  violent	  
inter-­‐party	  atrocities	  committed	  during	  chhyāsī	  (’86)	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Such	  accounts	  not	  only	  
underline	  people’s	  perceived	  dependencies	  on	  the	  party	  but	  also	  point	  at	  the	  repressive	  function	  of	  
patronage.	  The	  outcome	  is	  a	  social	  silence,	  which	  further	  facilitates	  the	  corrupt	  practices	  of	  local	  GJM	  
leaders,	  often	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  local	  administration.	  
Being	  a	  recurrent	  object	  of	  misuse	  and	  corruption,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  rival	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  
CPRM	  or	  TMC	  try	  to	  gain	  ground	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  by	  criticising	  the	  lapse	  in	  implementation	  of	  
developmental	  schemes,	  e.g.	  by	  planting	  posters,	  sending	  delegations	  and	  written	  inquiries	  to	  BDOs,	  
staging	  demonstrations166,	  or	  filing	  RTIs.	  This	  renders	  especially	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  NREGS	  not	  only	  a	  
strategy	  for	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  maintain	  loyalty	  amongst	  its	  activists.	  It	  also	  provides	  an	  entrance	  
point	  for	  rival	  parties	  to	  challenge	  the	  political	  dominance	  of	  the	  GJM,	  rendering	  it	  a	  highly	  politicised	  
institution.	  Paradoxically,	  inspite	  of	  all	  these	  irregularities,	  the	  national	  Ministry	  for	  Rural	  
Development	  awarded	  Darjeeling	  district	  for	  “leadership	  in	  improving	  MGNREGA	  implementation”	  in	  
January	  2013	  (Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  2013b).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  This	  fits	  to	  Way	  and	  Levitsky’s	  (2006)	  understanding	  of	  coercion	  (i.e.	  repression)	  as	  rooted	  in	  “scope”	  and	  
“cohesion”.	  Scope	  describes	  the	  incumbent’s	  effective	  reach	  over	  territory	  and	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  economic	  
power.	  Cohesion	  refers	  to	  the	  level	  of	  compliance	  within	  the	  ruling	  apparatus.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  GJM’s	  fine-­‐
grained	  party	  network	  based	  on	  political	  patronage	  and	  resource	  monopolies	  provides	  both,	  scope	  and	  
cohesion,	  and	  strengthens	  the	  coercive	  element	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  rule.	  	  
166The	  TMCs	  activities	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  campaign	  started	  by	  the	  CM	  Mamata	  Banerjee,	  who	  
regularly	  publicly	  announces	  that	  she	  wants	  to	  bring	  “development,	  peace,	  and	  democracy”	  to	  Darjeeling	  hills,	  
and	  that	  she	  “wants	  to	  see	  Darjeeling	  smile”	  (The	  Hindu,	  2.7.2012;	  The	  Hindu,	  14.7.2012;	  The	  Hindu,	  13.3.2013)	  
(see	  Chapter	  8).	  




The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  over	  the	  developmental	  state	  
as	  a	  means	  to	  sustain	  the	  GJM’s	  mobilising	  function.	  I	  analysed	  this	  in	  the	  context	  where	  the	  GJM’s	  
perceived	  rollback	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda	  had	  entailed	  a	  loss	  of	  normative	  legitimacy	  and	  forced	  
the	  party	  to	  complement	  its	  normative	  appeal	  through	  other	  means.	  The	  analysis	  found	  that	  that	  
patronage	  –	  channelled	  along	  the	  hierarchical	  party	  organisation	  –	  played	  indeed	  a	  key	  role	  to	  
maintain	  the	  organisation.	  The	  mobilising	  function	  of	  the	  GJM	  is	  kept	  alive	  through	  its	  supporters’	  
belief	  in	  leaders’	  capability	  to	  access	  scarce	  resources	  and	  on	  their	  trust	  in	  leaders’	  willingness	  to	  
distribute	  these.	  Their	  perception	  that	  “all	  development	  goes	  through	  the	  party”	  expresses	  their	  
expectation	  to	  benefit	  by	  being	  part	  of	  the	  (party)	  organisation.	  Also	  rivals	  perceived	  the	  GJM	  as	  the	  
only	  option	  to	  access	  state	  resources,	  which	  underlined	  its	  authority.	  GJM	  supporters	  underline	  their	  
loyalty	  by	  participating	  in	  party	  events	  or	  placing	  flags	  visibly	  at	  their	  houses.	  Like	  in	  a	  “patronage	  
democracy”	  (Chandra	  2003),	  they	  invest	  in	  a	  (political)	  identity	  to	  access	  scarce	  resources.	  Activists	  
also	  underline	  their	  commitment	  by	  employing	  “muscle	  power”	  (here:	  the	  intimidation	  and	  violent	  
oppression	  of	  rivals)	  for	  securing	  their	  access	  to	  resources	  in	  the	  inner-­‐party	  competition.	  The	  party	  
becomes	  a	  business	  and	  supporters	  form	  a	  “transactional	  group”	  (Bailey	  1969,	  75).	  	  
The	  GJM	  established	  a	  range	  of	  informal	  rules	  for	  the	  appropriation	  and	  distribution	  of	  resources.	  It	  
invested	  the	  ultimate	  authority	  with	  the	  party	  president,	  underlining	  the	  presidential	  form	  of	  the	  
patronage	  system.	  In	  a	  clear	  display	  of	  “punishment	  regime”	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010,	  128),	  both	  
supporters	  and	  rivals	  perceive	  only	  those	  who	  are	  loyal	  to	  (or	  useful	  for)	  the	  party	  as	  eligible	  for	  
rewards	  while	  rivals	  are	  excluded.	  The	  bureaucracy	  of	  political	  patronage	  sustains	  soft	  repression.	  
Such	  exclusion	  is	  enforced	  through	  the	  use	  or	  threat	  of	  violence	  and	  people’s	  fear	  of	  being	  
victimised.	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  often	  poor	  socio-­‐economic	  background	  of	  plantation	  
workers,	  the	  wide-­‐spread	  unemployment	  and	  violent	  memories	  of	  chhyāsī	  (’86),	  this	  ultimately	  
contributes	  to	  a	  culture	  of	  silence.	  The	  lack	  of	  accountability	  mechanisms	  at	  district	  and	  local	  levels	  
and	  the	  lack	  of	  elected	  bodies	  enhances	  these	  limitations	  of	  political	  space	  (cf.	  Bardhan	  and	  
Mookherjee	  2006).	  Ultimately,	  this	  not	  only	  stabilises	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  monopoly	  but	  also	  allows	  
local	  leaders	  to	  utilise	  the	  resources	  for	  private	  gains.	  Although	  rival	  parties’	  complaints	  open	  up	  little	  
spaces	  for	  voicing	  discontent	  these	  usually	  remain	  confined	  to	  the	  local	  newspapers.	  	  
The	  whole	  system	  of	  dependencies	  and	  political	  patronage	  is	  institutionalised	  through	  the	  
autonomous	  council	  (DGHC),	  and	  other	  developmental	  schemes,	  mainly	  the	  NREGS.	  Accounts	  of	  GJM	  
leaders	  and	  local	  bureaucrats	  suggest	  that	  they	  form	  corruption	  networks	  in	  cooperation	  with	  
contractors.	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The	  patronage	  system	  only	  received	  some	  cracks	  after	  opposition	  parties	  gained	  more	  strength	  in	  
Darjeeling	  after	  2012.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Joubari	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  GNLF-­‐dominated	  monitoring	  
committee	  constricted	  the	  GJM’s	  appointment	  of	  NREGS	  supervisors.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  State-­‐
ruling	  TMC’s	  attempts	  to	  make	  administrators	  (including	  the	  BDOs)	  more	  accountable	  towards	  the	  
government	  (see	  Chapter	  8)	  increased	  fears	  amongst	  gram	  panchayat	  secretaries.	  This	  underlines	  
the	  importance	  of	  opposition	  parties	  at	  the	  local	  level	  as	  a	  way	  to	  create	  local	  accountability	  
structures	  (cf.	  Bardhan	  and	  Mookherjee	  2006;	  Sadanandan	  2012).	  Another	  source	  of	  concern	  for	  
GJM	  leaders	  are	  public	  perceptions	  of	  their	  “selfish”	  behaviour	  and	  involvement	  in	  too	  much	  ghoṭālā.	  
These	  perceptions	  suggest	  that	  leaders’	  are	  either	  not	  capable	  or	  willing	  to	  “deliver”	  leading	  to	  a	  loss	  
of	  legitimacy	  (Wenner	  2014).	  This	  diminishes	  the	  mobilising	  function	  of	  the	  party,	  a	  case	  I	  discuss	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
Another	  weakness	  of	  the	  system	  is	  its	  vulnerability	  to	  a	  stop	  the	  external	  resource	  flow	  necessary	  to	  
sustain	  its	  patronage	  system	  (Burnell	  2006,	  553;Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002,	  7;	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
The	  Morcha’s	  dependence	  on	  regular	  resource	  supplies	  through	  the	  State	  government	  ultimately	  
causes	  a	  serious	  trade-­‐off	  for	  the	  party,	  as	  its	  need	  to	  act	  as	  a	  responsible	  political	  party	  to	  ensure	  a	  
regular	  supply	  of	  financial	  support	  to	  the	  autonomous	  councils	  stands	  at	  odds	  with	  its	  need	  to	  
continue	  with	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  as	  a	  radical	  movement	  leader.	  This	  inherent	  conflict,	  which	  
brings	  the	  Morcha’s	  normative	  and	  factual	  bases	  of	  legitimacy	  into	  conflict	  results	  in	  the	  above	  
displayed	  “double-­‐dealing”	  (cf.	  Jeffrey	  2010,	  135)	  of	  the	  party.	  This	  underlines,	  that	  pillars	  of	  
authoritarian	  rule	  are	  not	  always	  complementing	  and	  reinforcing	  each	  other,	  as	  claimed	  by	  
Gerschewski	  (2014)	  but	  can	  also	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other.	  
The	  discussion	  above	  suggested	  that	  to	  sustain	  the	  supply	  with	  (state)	  resources	  the	  Morcha	  must	  
oppress	  dissent	  so	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  the	  sole	  voice	  of	  the	  statehood	  agitation	  towards	  the	  
government.	  In	  this	  reading,	  violence	  against	  rivals	  is	  not	  a	  spontaneous	  outbreak	  of	  public	  anger	  but	  
a	  calculated	  means	  to	  access	  resources.	  Such	  hard	  repression	  has	  not	  only	  effects	  on	  the	  possibility	  
of	  a	  socially	  inclusive	  statehood	  movement.	  It	  also	  stands	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  party’s	  proclamation	  of	  a	  
“democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  Gandhian”	  movement.	  Instead	  of	  living	  up	  to	  public	  aspirations	  of	  
liberation	  from	  exploitation,	  development,	  and	  hopes	  for	  a	  strong	  and	  united	  movement,	  such	  
practices	  increase	  social	  and	  political	  cleavages	  between	  a	  small	  elite	  of	  political	  entrepreneurs	  and	  
the	  masses.	  The	  following	  chapter	  analyses	  how	  the	  GJM	  attempts	  to	  solve	  this	  contradiction	  and	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The	  foregoing	  chapter	  explored	  the	  role	  of	  political	  patronage	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  resource	  
monopolies	  as	  a	  means	  of	  the	  GJM	  to	  maintain	  its	  mobilising	  function.	  I	  showed	  how	  through	  the	  
principles	  of	  reward	  (for	  loyal	  supporters)	  and	  punishment	  (of	  rivals)	  such	  patronage	  also	  becomes	  a	  
means	  of	  soft	  repression,	  which	  contributes	  to	  a	  silence	  amongst	  the	  ruled.	  This	  chapter	  turns	  to	  one	  
more	  strategy,	  which	  studies	  on	  authoritarian	  regimes	  identified	  as	  important	  for	  incumbents	  to	  stay	  
in	  power:	  the	  use	  and	  experience	  of	  hard	  repression	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  I	  will	  show	  how	  this	  strategy	  
functions	  as	  a	  second	  element	  in	  Darjeeling’s	  silencing-­‐politics.	  	  
	  
7.1 Stones	  on	  the	  GNLF	  
When	  in	  early	  May	  2013,	  several	  GNLF	  activists	  –	  amongst	  them	  women	  and	  children	  –	  were	  
travelling	  to	  Soureni	  (a	  small	  bazaar	  close	  to	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  birth	  place,	  see	  Map,	  p.	  xxi)	  to	  open	  a	  
new	  party	  office	  –	  as	  they	  say	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  administration	  -­‐	  ,	  they	  ended	  up	  in	  a	  violent	  
clash	  with	  some	  GJM	  activists	  leaving	  several	  people	  injured.	  GNLF	  leader	  Shusma*	  was	  amongst	  the	  
victims.	  When	  we	  spoke,	  her	  hand	  was	  still	  bandaged.	  She	  recollected	  the	  events:	  	  
When	  we	  went	  to	  Soureni	  some	  men	  were	  sitting	  on	  the	  road...and	  others	  were	  standing	  on	  the	  
roofs	  of	  the	  houses,	  throwing	  big	  stones	  from	  above.	  The	  place’s	  GTA	  sabhashād	  was	  also	  there	  
and	  assembled	  all	  these	  keṭāharu	  (young	  men).	  We	  were	  down	  on	  the	  road	  [and]	  I	  told	  them:	  
‘Don’t	  destroy	  your	  own	  future	  for	  500	  or	  100	  rupees.	  Listen	  to	  what	  we	  have	  to	  say	  and	  if	  you	  
don’t	  like	  it	  just	  leave	  [...].	  We	  don’t	  do	  such	  things	  to	  you.’	  [...]	  The	  police,	  seven	  or	  eight	  men,	  
were	  also	  afraid	  of	  them.	  And	  then	  we	  were	  already	  attacked,	  the	  police	  had	  to	  go	  aside...	  We	  
also	  had	  many	  keṭāharu	  [...].	  We	  picked	  up	  the	  stones	  from	  the	  road.	  They	  showed	  us	  knives,	  
rods,	  khukurīs	  [...].	  So	  ours	  threw	  the	  stones	  back	  at	  them	  [...].	  In	  Darjeeling	  it	  is	  so	  difficult,	  how	  
can	  you	  do	  an	  agitation	  (āndolaṇ)	  when	  the	  own	  brothers	  don't	  recognise	  each	  other?	  
Conversely,	  the	  GJM	  blamed	  the	  GNLF	  for	  initiating	  the	  violence,	  and	  alleged	  them	  for	  “destabilising	  
the	  region”	  (Roshan	  Giri,	  cited	  in:	  The	  Hindu,	  6.5.2013).	  After	  the	  clash	  the	  GJM	  called	  a	  one-­‐day	  
strike	  in	  the	  hills.	  Threatening	  an	  indefinite	  strike,	  the	  GJM	  pressed	  for	  the	  arrest	  of	  involved	  GNLF	  
supporters	  in	  the	  clash	  and	  an	  immediate	  transfer	  of	  the	  respective	  police	  officer-­‐in-­‐charge,	  saying	  
that	  he	  had	  “acted	  in	  a	  partisan	  manner”	  (ibid.).	  After	  the	  arrest	  of	  eight	  GNLF	  supporters	  (and	  24	  
GJM	  supporters)	  and	  a	  promised	  inquiry	  into	  the	  role	  of	  the	  police	  officer-­‐in-­‐charge,	  the	  GJM	  
refrained	  from	  calling	  the	  strike,	  citing	  the	  scheduled	  visit	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  (CM)	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	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the	  coming	  week	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  “keep	  the	  hills	  peaceful”	  (Roshan	  Giri,	  cited	  in:	  TT,	  7.5.2013).	  
Apparently,	  the	  CM	  had	  asked	  the	  GJM	  to	  refrain	  from	  the	  strike	  (ibid.)167.	  
Incidents	  like	  this	  seem	  to	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  proclamation	  of	  a	  “democratic,	  non-­‐
violent,	  and	  Gandhian”	  agitation.	  In	  2008,	  at	  a	  huge	  public	  meeting	  in	  Siliguri	  Bimal	  Gurung	  had	  
announced:	  “The	  age	  of	  gun	  and	  khukurī	  is	  gone	  [...].	  Now	  it	  is	  the	  age	  of	  the	  pen	  [...].	  We	  will	  work	  
according	  to	  democratic	  principles”	  (speech,	  7.5.2008).	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  party-­‐leaders	  
would	  regularly	  perform	  Gandhi-­‐puja	  at	  the	  start	  of	  public	  meetings	  to	  reinstate	  this	  image.	  Usually,	  
a	  big	  picture	  of	  Gandhi	  is	  displayed	  at	  the	  side	  of	  the	  stage,	  and	  top-­‐level	  leaders	  wave	  incense	  sticks	  
in	  front	  of	  the	  picture,	  taking	  a	  subservient	  position	  and	  bowing	  down.	  The	  whole	  exercise	  is	  
accompanied	  by	  sounds	  of	  holy	  Hindu	  chants168.	  As	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  such	  proclamation	  of	  “non-­‐
violence”	  and	  “democracy”	  had	  helped	  Gurung	  to	  distinguish	  himself	  from	  Ghisingh	  and	  the	  violent	  
agitation	  of	  ’86,	  increasing	  his	  appeal	  to	  the	  masses.	  
Yet,	  the	  GJM’s	  proclamations	  of	  “democracy”	  and	  “non-­‐violence”	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  public	  
allegations	  of	  violent	  oppression.	  Such	  accusations	  do	  not	  only	  include	  the	  alleged	  hindering	  of	  
oppositions’	  public	  meetings	  or	  stopping	  opponents	  from	  filing	  nominations	  for	  elections169.	  Critiques	  
also	  blame	  the	  GJM	  for	  torching	  party	  rival’s	  properties,	  beating	  them	  up,	  and	  even	  killing	  them.	  The	  
shocking	  climax	  of	  such	  open	  and	  highly	  visible	  form	  of	  repression	  was	  the	  public	  slaughtering	  of	  
Madan	  Tamang,	  the	  well-­‐known	  president	  of	  the	  AIGL,	  at	  a	  public	  place	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  Tamang’s	  
attempts	  to	  hold	  meetings	  at	  the	  usual	  venue	  at	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  in	  the	  town	  had	  been	  spoiled	  several	  
times	  by	  members	  of	  the	  GJM	  Nari	  Morcha,	  who	  staged	  sit-­‐ins	  there.	  He	  then	  decided	  to	  hold	  a	  
meeting	  at	  Club	  Site,	  a	  public	  place	  close	  to	  the	  tourist	  location	  Chowrasta,	  inspite	  of	  threats	  and	  
warnings.	  	  
This	  happened	  shortly	  after	  the	  GJM	  had	  agreed	  to	  negotiations	  on	  an	  interim-­‐council	  in	  March	  2010.	  
Although	  Morcha	  leader	  Bimal	  Gurung	  rejected	  any	  responsibility,	  various	  accounts	  hold	  that	  in	  the	  
morning	  of	  May	  21,	  2010,	  and	  despite	  the	  presence	  of	  some	  police	  men	  and	  the	  West	  Bengal	  
Governor	  in	  town,	  a	  mob	  of	  GJM	  activists	  started	  throwing	  stones	  at	  Tamang.	  One	  of	  them	  
eventually	  took	  out	  a	  long,	  sharp	  sword	  (patang)	  and	  slaughtered	  him	  in	  front	  of	  the	  public.	  Coloured	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167The	  State	  government	  had	  sent	  two	  platoons	  of	  para-­‐military	  forces	  to	  the	  hills	  to	  maintain	  peace	  and	  order	  
(TT,	  7.5.2013).	  
168	  Inside	  the	  party	  there	  are,	  however,	  voices	  demanding	  a	  more	  violent	  approach.	  Members	  of	  the	  Yuva	  
Morcha	  told	  me	  that	  they	  would	  welcome	  a	  violent	  movement,	  making	  freedom-­‐fighter	  S.C.	  Bose	  an	  idol.	  They	  
also	  voiced	  this	  publicly	  while	  stressing	  the	  need	  to	  “sacrifice”	  (GJM	  meeting,	  14.6.2012).	  One	  member	  shared	  
that	  the	  GLP	  had	  been	  created	  to	  threaten	  the	  State	  government.	  I	  was	  not	  sure	  whether	  such	  proclamations	  
were	  part	  of	  a	  pressure	  strategy	  of	  the	  GJM	  or	  indeed	  indicated	  open	  defections	  from	  the	  “non-­‐violent”	  course.	  	  
169	  In	  July	  2012,	  CPI-­‐M	  leader	  Suman	  Pathak	  was	  hindered	  by	  GJM-­‐activists	  to	  file	  his	  nomination	  for	  the	  GTA	  
elections	  at	  the	  Kuresong	  sub-­‐divisional	  district	  court.	  He	  only	  succeeded	  after	  police-­‐protection	  was	  granted,	  
including	  the	  reservation	  of	  a	  road	  for	  him	  to	  go	  to	  Kuresong	  (Business	  Standard,	  7.7.2012).	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pictures	  of	  the	  injured	  leader	  were	  displayed	  on	  front-­‐pages	  of	  local	  newspapers	  the	  next	  day.	  The	  
main	  accused	  in	  the	  case,	  Nicole	  Tamang,	  mysteriously	  disappeared	  from	  police	  custody.	  When	  
asked	  by	  journalists	  why	  the	  police,	  who	  were	  present	  there,	  did	  not	  interfere,	  the	  Inspector	  General	  
of	  the	  North	  Bengal	  Police	  asked	  the	  journalists	  to	  inquire	  with	  the	  “higher	  authorities”	  (Himalaya	  
Darpan,	  22.05.2010).	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  Tamang	  was	  assassinated	  by	  the	  GJM	  (ibid.)170.	  Often,	  
when	  I	  asked	  persons	  from	  both	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  why	  they	  did	  not	  oppose	  the	  Morcha	  even	  if	  
they	  were	  not	  satisfied,	  they	  referred	  to	  Tamang’s	  murder,	  saying	  “if	  even	  people	  like	  Madan	  
Tamang	  can	  be	  killed,	  and	  the	  culprits	  are	  still	  not	  arrested,	  then	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  people	  like	  us?”	  
This	  underlined	  the	  disciplinary	  function	  of	  this	  killing	  in	  the	  public	  memory.	  	  
Indeed,	  persons	  accused	  in	  murder	  and	  wanted	  by	  the	  police,	  were	  moving	  freely	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
Once,	  I	  even	  met	  one	  of	  them	  for	  an	  interview.	  Upon	  my	  question	  why	  he	  was	  not	  hiding	  a	  local	  GJM	  
leader	  explained	  that	  whenever	  the	  police	  came	  to	  arrest	  him	  he	  got	  a	  warning	  in	  advance	  and	  could	  
hide.	  To	  me,	  the	  warranted	  leader	  did	  not	  appear	  like	  a	  murder-­‐accused	  hiding	  from	  the	  police,	  
eager	  to	  arrest	  him.	  Many	  people	  believe	  that	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  was	  using	  the	  Tamang-­‐
case	  to	  exercise	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  GJM	  leaders,	  whose	  names	  had	  been	  mentioned	  in	  the	  First	  
Information	  Report	  filed	  by	  Tamang’s	  wife	  (including	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  his	  wife	  Aasha	  and	  General	  
Secretary	  Roshan	  Giri).	  
But	  why	  does	  the	  GJM	  apparently	  rely	  on	  such	  forms	  of	  hard	  repression,	  which	  stand	  in	  stark	  
contrast	  to	  its	  proclaimed	  “non-­‐violent”	  ideals?	  What	  role	  does	  hard	  repression	  play	  for	  maintaining	  
support	  for	  the	  party?	  How	  is	  violence	  perceived	  and	  interpreted	  by	  those	  affected?	  	  
This	  study	  already	  outlined	  several	  roles	  and	  uses	  of	  violence	  by	  the	  GJM	  and	  its	  leaders.	  Studies	  on	  
“strongmen”	  in	  South	  Asia	  showed	  that	  the	  open	  display	  of	  physical	  violence	  or	  power	  helps	  leaders	  
to	  gain	  reputations	  as	  able	  deliverers	  for	  their	  communities	  (Hansen	  2001;	  Michelutti	  2010;	  Price	  and	  
Ruud	  2010b;	  Vaishnav	  2012).	  Drawing	  on	  these,	  in	  Chapter	  5	  I	  had	  shown	  how	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  
reputation	  as	  a	  “strongman”	  appealed	  to	  the	  population,	  who	  saw	  in	  him	  a	  capable	  and	  strong	  leader	  
to	  challenge	  Ghisingh.	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  use	  of	  intimidation	  is	  not	  only	  a	  practical	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  Initially,	  the	  investigation	  was	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Criminal	  Investigation	  Department	  (CID).	  In	  
January	  2011,	  on	  a	  direction	  of	  the	  Kolkata	  High	  Court,	  the	  State	  government	  handed	  it	  over	  to	  the	  Central	  
Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  (CBI),	  a	  national	  agency.	  In	  July	  2013,	  doubting	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  CBI,	  Bharati	  
Tamang,	  the	  wife	  of	  Madan	  Tamang,	  sought	  a	  transfer	  of	  the	  case	  to	  a	  Special	  Investigating	  Team	  or	  National	  
Investigation	  Agency,	  and	  has	  moved	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  this	  issue	  (The	  Hindu,	  15.7.2013)	  but	  –	  till	  date	  –	  
without	  any	  avail.	  However,	  following	  a	  directive	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  trial	  court	  has	  been	  shifted	  from	  
Darjeeling	  to	  Kolkata.	  The	  charge	  sheet	  names	  31	  Morcha	  leaders	  and	  activists.	  One	  of	  them	  was	  found	  
murdered	  in	  December	  2011.	  Only	  in	  February	  2013,	  five	  of	  the	  absconding	  accused	  were	  arrested	  by	  the	  CBI	  
(The	  Hindustan	  Times,	  15.02.2013).	  In	  June	  2013,	  13	  accused	  surrenderd,	  followed	  by	  five	  accused	  in	  Sptember	  
2013	  (TT,	  18.6.2013;	  The	  Statesman,	  6.9.2013).	  By	  January	  2014,	  two	  of	  the	  accused	  were	  still	  absconding.	  Of	  
the	  remaining	  27	  accused,	  nine	  got	  bail,	  and	  the	  others	  were	  in	  prison	  in	  Kolkata	  (TT,	  30.01.2014).	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means	  to	  support	  the	  GJM’s	  capture	  of	  developmental	  state	  resources.	  Hard	  repression	  of	  rivals	  also	  
functions	  as	  a	  means	  to	  show	  loyalty	  in	  the	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  the	  access	  to	  party-­‐
channelled	  state	  resources.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  add	  another	  dimension	  of	  violence:	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
performance	  of	  acts	  of	  hard	  repression	  not	  only	  serves	  the	  GJM	  to	  gain	  an	  image	  of	  an	  organisation	  
of	  “strongmen”,	  necessary	  for	  instigating	  fear	  amongst	  the	  population	  of	  Darjeeling.	  I	  contend	  that	  
the	  GJM	  paradoxically	  also	  utilises	  incidences	  of	  inter-­‐party	  violence	  to	  underline	  its	  “democratic”	  
and	  “non-­‐violent”	  approach.	  Proclamations	  of	  “non-­‐violence”	  help	  the	  party	  to	  defame	  rivals	  
involved	  in	  clashes	  and	  –	  through	  (re-­‐)interpretation	  and	  framing	  –	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  defender	  of	  
such	  principles.	  	  
To	  underline	  this	  argument	  I	  draw	  on	  Brass’	  (1997),	  Hansen’s	  (2001),	  and	  Gorringe’s	  (2006a)	  research	  
on	  communal	  riots	  and	  violence	  in	  South	  Asia.	  These	  suggest	  that	  violent	  performances	  and	  framings	  
of	  such	  violent	  events	  are	  an	  element	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  resources	  and	  political	  power.	  In	  the	  words	  
of	  Brass	  (1997,	  6),	  violence	  has	  a	  “functional	  utility”.	  After	  reviewing	  these	  approaches	  in	  Chapter	  
7.2,	  I	  display	  perceptions	  of	  hard	  repression	  amongst	  urban	  and	  rural	  population	  and	  assess	  how	  
such	  practices	  function	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  ruling	  by	  instigating	  fear.	  In	  Chapter	  7.3.2,	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  
GJM	  organises	  hard	  repression.	  In	  Chapter	  7.4	  I	  analyse	  how	  GJM	  leaders	  interpret	  and	  frame	  
incidents	  of	  hard	  repression	  of	  rivals	  in	  order	  to	  underline	  their	  “non-­‐violent	  and	  Gandhian”	  image.	  
The	  conclusion	  outlines	  the	  effects	  of	  hard	  repression	  and	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  only	  partly	  successful	  to	  
maintain	  the	  Morcha’s	  authority.	  
	  
7.2 Violent	  performances,	  interpretations,	  and	  the	  “functional	  utility”	  of	  violence	  
While	  the	  previous	  chapter	  was	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  forms	  of	  “soft	  repression”,	  I	  now	  explore	  
“hard	  repression”	  (Tanneberg	  et	  al	  2013)	  or	  “high-­‐intensity	  coercion”	  (Way	  and	  Levitsky	  2006)	  (see	  
Chapter	  1).	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  hard	  repression	  involves	  an	  element	  of	  public	  performance,	  
which	  demonstrates	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  exerciser	  to	  punish,	  sometimes	  displayed	  in	  a	  “spectacular”	  
way	  (Hansen	  2001,	  65).	  While	  in	  Darjeeling	  spectacular	  incidents	  –	  such	  as	  the	  murder	  of	  Madan	  
Tamang	  or	  disturbance	  of	  rival	  parties’	  meetings	  –	  are	  often	  reported	  in	  the	  media	  and	  involve	  a	  
certain	  degree	  of	  police	  action,	  i.e.	  by	  stopping	  clashes	  or	  arresting	  culprits,	  this	  chapter	  is	  also	  
concerned	  with	  less-­‐spectacular	  instances	  of	  mundane	  every-­‐day	  repression	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  
using	  (physical)	  force	  against	  persons	  or	  property.	  	  
I	  now	  introduce	  two	  approaches	  to	  understand	  the	  utility	  of	  such	  violence	  in	  politics:	  first,	  Hansen’s	  
(2001)	  work	  on	  the	  Shiv	  Sena	  in	  Mumbai,	  which	  points	  at	  the	  performative	  nature	  of	  violence	  as	  an	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open	  display	  of	  force;	  and	  second,	  studies	  on	  the	  interpretation	  and	  framing	  of	  violence	  as	  a	  means	  
in	  the	  struggle	  over	  resources	  and	  legitimacy	  (Brass	  1997;	  Gorringe	  2006a).	  	  
The	  first	  approach	  I	  am	  drawing	  on	  to	  understand	  the	  “functional	  utility”	  of	  violence	  stems	  from	  
Hansen’s	  (2001)	  study	  on	  the	  Shiv	  Sena	  in	  Mumbai.	  The	  Sena	  employs	  violence	  in	  the	  form	  of	  attacks	  
on	  opponents	  and	  sometimes	  murders	  (often	  directed	  against	  Muslims).	  Hansen	  describes	  such	  
violence	  as	  “performative”,	  a	  public	  spectacle,	  aiming	  to	  establish	  the	  Sena	  as	  a	  spectacular,	  public	  
force	  (ibid.	  65).	  At	  the	  same	  time	  violence	  becomes	  a	  popular	  idiom	  and	  a	  means	  to	  recuperate	  
masculinity	  (Hansen	  1996,	  162).	  Through	  its	  appeal	  to	  an	  aggressive	  masculinity,	  the	  Sena	  offers	  
young	  unemployed	  men	  an	  “ideal	  of	  an	  assertive,	  violent	  mode	  of	  being	  urban”	  (Hansen	  2001,	  9),	  
generating	  and	  stabilising	  their	  identities	  as	  sainiks.	  Such	  “performative	  violence”	  is	  one	  major	  
strategy	  for	  the	  Shiv	  Sena	  to	  underline	  their	  authority	  to	  commit	  acts	  of	  violence	  with	  immunity	  and	  
to	  display	  their	  “popular,	  manly	  assertiveness”	  (Hansen	  1996,	  159).	  	  
This	  suggests	  that	  violence	  is	  not	  a	  spontaneous	  outbreak	  of	  uncontrollable	  anger	  but	  rather	  
consciously	  exercised,	  organised	  and	  planned	  (see	  also	  Tambiah	  1997;	  Gorringe	  2006a).	  The	  public	  
murder	  of	  late	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang,	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  the	  GJM,	  is	  a	  horrific	  example	  
of	  such	  “performative	  violence”	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  suggesting	  the	  “immunity”	  of	  the	  accused	  
culprits,	  the	  GJM	  party	  leadership.	  	  
While	  Hansen	  focuses	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  violence	  itself,	  Brass	  (1997)	  studies	  the	  interpretations	  
and	  framings	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  riots.	  In	  his	  study	  on	  communal	  riots	  in	  North	  India	  he	  underlined	  
the	  instrumental	  importance	  of	  the	  interpretation	  and	  framing	  of	  violent	  events	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  
resources	  and	  power.	  Riots,	  he	  claims,	  become	  “communal”	  or	  “ethnic”	  only	  when	  branded	  as	  such	  
by	  politicians,	  victims,	  and	  the	  media.	  Violent	  events	  provide	  leaders	  with	  a	  chance	  to	  identify	  
“convenient	  scapegoats”	  (ibid.	  7)	  and	  alleged	  perpetrators,	  which	  then	  function	  to	  justify	  the	  
exercise	  of	  state	  authority	  to	  confine	  so	  identified	  dangers.	  In	  this	  way,	  interpretations	  of	  violence	  as	  
“communal”	  or	  “ethnic”	  have	  important	  consequences	  for	  state	  policies	  and	  resource	  distribution	  
(ibid.	  5).	  Violent	  events	  become	  instruments	  in	  politicians’	  struggle	  over	  resources	  and	  power,	  riots	  
have	  a	  “functional	  utility”	  (ibid.	  7).	  This	  makes	  struggles	  over	  the	  acceptance	  of	  certain	  versions	  and	  
constructions	  of	  violent	  events	  “inherently	  political”	  (ibid.	  5).	  	  
Such	  an	  understanding	  shifts	  the	  focus	  of	  research	  from	  the	  “causes”	  of	  riots	  to	  the	  interpretations	  in	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  violent	  events	  and	  the	  interpretative	  framework	  in	  which	  these	  are	  contextualised.	  
By	  referring	  to	  these	  frameworks	  local	  incidents	  are	  transformed	  into	  categorical	  events	  (ibid.	  27),	  
such	  as	  expression	  of	  “communal	  hatred”	  or	  of	  the	  “lack	  of	  law	  and	  order”	  due	  to	  a	  corrupt	  police	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and	  state.	  Usually,	  all	  sides	  involved	  blame	  the	  initiation	  of	  violence	  on	  the	  others,	  while	  denying	  
their	  own	  responsibility.	  	  
Similarly,	  Hansen	  (2001)	  describes	  the	  attempts	  of	  the	  Shiv	  Sena	  to	  reject	  any	  responsibility	  for	  
communal	  riots	  and	  instead	  blame	  it	  on	  the	  spontaneous	  and	  uncontrollable	  human	  nature.	  In	  the	  
party’s	  rhetoric,	  violence	  against	  Muslims	  is	  framed	  as	  “retaliation	  against	  perceived	  injustices”,	  
“defence”,	  “spontaneous	  and	  popular”	  and,	  therefore,	  “uncontrollable”.	  The	  Sena	  brands	  it	  as	  a	  
reaction	  of	  ordinary	  people	  to	  underline	  that	  it	  was	  not	  responsible.	  By	  creating	  clear	  and	  sharp	  lines	  
between	  “friends	  and	  foes”	  such	  violence	  is	  also	  perceived	  as	  “purifying”	  (Hansen	  2001,	  65).	  	  
Hugo	  Gorringe’s	  research	  on	  the	  Dalit	  Panther	  Iyyakkam	  (Dalit	  Panther	  Movement)	  in	  Tamil	  Nadu	  
shows	  that	  not	  only	  the	  interpretation	  of	  riots	  is	  contested,	  but	  also	  the	  question	  of	  what	  actually	  
counts	  as	  “violence”	  (Gorringe	  2006a;	  Gorringe	  2006b).	  He	  proposes	  that	  “violence”	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  
universal	  but	  socially	  contested	  and	  ambiguous	  category,	  blurring	  the	  boundaries	  between	  what	  
counts	  as	  “legitimate”	  or	  “illegitimate”	  violence	  (Gorringe	  2006a).	  “Violence	  takes	  many	  forms	  and	  is	  
always	  contested	  and	  invested	  with	  different	  meanings”	  (Gorringe	  2006a,	  134).	  For	  him,	  violence	  not	  
only	  encompasses	  “threats	  and	  dominant	  practices”	  (ibid.	  121),	  physical	  assaults,	  massacres,	  but	  also	  
verbal	  attacks/taunts,	  which	  are	  bound	  up	  with	  fear	  and	  the	  expectation	  of	  physical	  attacks.	  	  
Going	  beyond	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  functional	  usefulness	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  struggle	  over	  
resources	  and	  power,	  Gorringe	  (like	  Hansen	  2001)	  points	  at	  the	  identity-­‐shaping	  effects	  of	  violence.	  
He	  claims	  that	  processes	  of	  identity	  formation	  “feed	  into	  violence	  and	  are	  affected	  by	  it”	  (Gorringe	  
2006b,	  119):	  violence	  forges	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  knits	  groups	  together	  by	  establishing	  clear	  
boundaries	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them”	  (Gorringe	  2006a,	  118).	  In	  this	  way	  it	  shapes	  people’s	  
perceptions	  and	  actions	  and	  thereby	  becomes	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  the	  world	  (ibid.).	  This	  points	  at	  an	  
understanding	  of	  violence,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  the	  actual	  act	  of	  violence	  and	  understands	  it	  as	  
continuous	  with	  normal	  social	  relations	  (see	  also	  Spencer	  2007,	  119)	  and	  as	  embedded	  into	  mundane	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	  situations.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  not	  extraordinary	  but	  becomes	  “part	  of	  a	  common	  currency	  of	  
interaction”	  (Gorringe	  2006a,	  133).	  	  
The	  above	  discussed	  accounts	  stress	  on	  the	  importance	  to	  look	  beyond	  violent	  acts	  themselves,	  and	  
understand	  them	  as	  conscious	  and	  (often)	  planned	  incidents	  in	  a	  broader	  context	  of	  struggle	  over	  
power,	  resources,	  and	  meanings.	  This	  includes	  understanding	  violence	  not	  as	  an	  exceptional	  and	  
isolated	  act	  but	  as	  continuous	  with	  social	  relations.Thus,	  for	  researching	  the	  effects	  of	  violence	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  account	  for	  the	  differing	  interpretations	  of	  violent	  acts.	  Only	  such	  attention	  to	  the	  social	  
meanings	  associated	  with	  and	  interpretations	  of	  violence,	  helps	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  shapes	  
individuals’	  views	  on	  the	  world	  and	  ultimately	  their	  response	  to	  hard	  repression.	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Drawing	  on	  accounts	  of	  victims,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  forms	  of	  hard	  repression	  the	  GJM	  
is	  employing.	  To	  access	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  practices	  on	  the	  GJM’s	  authority	  I	  display	  their	  
interpretations	  and	  how	  they	  affect,	  and	  become	  part	  of	  mundane	  political	  and	  social	  practices	  
(Chapter	  7.3).	  Following	  the	  claim	  that	  violence	  is	  not	  spontaneous	  but	  planned	  (Hansen	  2001;	  Brass	  
1997)	  I	  then	  explore	  how	  the	  GJM	  organises	  hard	  repression	  and	  the	  role	  of	  goondas.	  Chapter	  7.4	  
focuses	  on	  the	  interpretations	  and	  framings	  of	  violent	  events	  (Brass	  1997;	  Gorringe	  2006a).	  Here,	  I	  
analyse	  how	  GJM	  top-­‐level	  leaders	  re-­‐frame	  accusations	  of	  hard	  repression	  to	  invest	  in	  their	  image	  as	  
followers	  of	  “democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  Gandhian”	  principles.	  
	  
7.3 “Fear	  psychosis”	  and	  goondas	  
To	  understand	  the	  utilisation	  and	  effects	  of	  hard	  repression	  in	  Darjeeling	  I	  now	  display	  accounts	  of	  
non-­‐party	  workers	  and	  victims.	  These	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  hard	  repression	  in	  the	  formation	  
and	  sustenance	  of	  a	  “fear	  psychosis”.	  More	  than	  physical	  violence	  itself,	  however,	  the	  threat	  and	  fear	  
of	  it	  shapes	  social	  and	  political	  agencies.	  I	  complement	  these	  accounts	  with	  exploration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
goondas	  in	  maintaining	  the	  GJM’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  “strongman”	  party.	  
7.3.1 Incidents	  and	  perceptions	  of	  violence	  
I	  was	  in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  All	  India	  Gorkha	  League	  (AIGL)	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  and	  talked	  to	  Laxman	  
Pradhan,	  the	  general	  secretary.	  It	  was	  July	  18,	  2011,	  the	  day	  when	  the	  GJM	  signed	  the	  agreement	  on	  
the	  GTA.	  I	  asked	  him	  about	  the	  difficulties	  in	  operating	  a	  minority	  party	  in	  Darjeeling.	  “No	  doubt,	  
everyday	  there	  are	  threat	  letters	  [saying]	  ‘Do	  not	  talk	  too	  much’,	  ‘Do	  not	  talk	  against	  this’,	  ‘Be	  
careful!’	  [...].	  This	  office	  was	  attacked	  three	  times.”	  He	  showed	  me	  some	  deep	  cuts	  probably	  from	  
khukurīs	  in	  the	  steel	  frame	  of	  his	  table	  and	  in	  some	  steel	  furniture.	  “Look,	  all	  this	  was	  cut	  [...],	  the	  
pictures	  of	  our	  leaders,	  the	  furniture,	  the	  TV,	  the	  computer-­‐set,	  [...]	  all	  was	  destroyed.	  There	  is	  no	  
law	  and	  order	  here,	  there	  is	  no	  democracy.	  The	  administration	  is	  not	  ok.”	  	  
Bharati	  Tamang,	  the	  widow	  of	  the	  killed	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang,	  joins	  us:	  “The	  GJM	  accepts	  
the	  GTA	  agreement	  upon	  his	  coffin.”	  While	  hundreds	  of	  GJM	  activists	  celebrated	  the	  day	  of	  the	  GTA	  
agreement,	  the	  mood	  in	  the	  office	  was	  depressive.	  “How	  did	  they	  win	  the	  2011	  assembly	  elections?”	  
I	  asked.	  “The	  GJM	  gave	  money,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  terrorised	  people,	  saying,	  ‘If	  you	  (ta,	  
derogatory)	  won’t	  vote	  for	  us	  you	  will	  not	  stay	  here	  tomorrow”.	  	  
Such	  incidences	  of	  politically	  motivated	  violence	  seem	  common	  in	  Darjeeling.	  They	  do	  not	  only	  
include	  the	  ransacking	  of	  rivals’	  offices	  –	  like	  Laxman	  Pradhan	  showed	  me	  –	  but	  also	  of	  rival	  leaders’	  
private	  property.	  Especially	  during	  the	  takeover	  of	  power	  through	  the	  GJM	  in	  2008	  several	  houses	  of	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GNLF	  leaders	  were	  burned.	  After	  the	  TMC	  began	  to	  intensify	  its	  activities	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  2012,	  
TMC	  activists	  were	  exposed	  to	  physical	  attacks.	  In	  March	  2013,	  several	  TMC	  activists	  in	  Kalimpong	  
were	  attacked	  allegedly	  by	  a	  group	  of	  GJM	  activists,	  whereby	  leader	  Chewan	  Bhutia	  from	  Kalimpong	  
was	  stabbed	  and	  seriously	  injured	  (ToI,	  7.3.2013).	  But	  rival	  leaders	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones,	  who	  
become	  victims	  of	  violence.	  Many	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  recalled	  the	  ransacking	  of	  Glenary’s,	  one	  
of	  the	  town’s	  famous	  heritage	  restaurants,	  allegedly	  by	  GJM	  followers	  after	  its	  owner	  continued	  to	  
openly	  support	  the	  GNLF.	  Another	  unpopular	  story	  regards	  the	  “dress	  code”	  whereby	  the	  GJM	  had	  
directed	  people	  to	  dress	  in	  “traditional	  Nepali	  attire”	  in	  October	  2008.	  Those	  who	  refused	  got	  their	  
faces	  blackened	  by	  Morcha	  activists	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Also	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
Personnel	  (GLP),	  a	  kind	  of	  pseudo-­‐police	  force	  of	  loyal	  GJM	  activists	  formed	  in	  2008,	  was	  seen	  with	  
suspicion.	  	  
The	  fear	  of	  violent	  retaliation	  is	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  people’s	  psyche.	  Owners	  of	  various	  shops	  and	  
restaurans	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  stressed	  that	  they	  usually	  only	  participated	  in	  GJM-­‐called	  bandhs	  
(general	  strikes)	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  their	  shops	  and	  vehicles	  will	  be	  ransacked	  by	  the	  party-­‐picketers.	  
Interestingly,	  town	  dwellers	  blame	  the	  threat	  or	  use	  of	  violence	  mainly	  on	  people	  from	  the	  tea	  
plantations.	  Binita*,	  a	  restaurant	  owner	  explained:	  “When	  there	  is	  a	  bandh-­‐call,	  our	  boys	  from	  the	  
town	  say	  ‘close	  the	  shop’	  but	  they	  don’t	  beat	  up	  people.	  But	  those	  from	  the	  villages	  are	  rowdies,	  
they	  carry	  sticks	  and	  people	  are	  afraid.”	  She	  continued:	  	  
Those	  coming	  from	  down	  there	  (tala),	  those	  from	  the	  kamān-­‐bastī	  (tea	  plantations	  and	  rural	  
villages),	  they	  always	  think	  negatively.	  Their	  mindset	  (vīchār)	  is	  not	  nice.	  They	  don't	  
understand.	  Staying	  in	  the	  villages	  they	  do	  too	  much	  ‘party’	  [Engl.].	  Therefore	  our	  mindset	  
doesn't	  fit.	  These	  people	  destroy	  a	  lot	  here.	  The	  town-­‐boys	  are	  not	  like	  this.	  
Such	  differences	  are	  expressed	  through	  the	  popular	  idiom	  of	  “talako	  keṭāharu”,	  literally	  translated	  as	  
“the	  young	  men	  from	  down”.	  This	  idiom	  reflects	  not	  only	  the	  topographical	  divisions	  between	  the	  
town	  (usually	  up	  on	  the	  hill)	  and	  the	  tea	  plantations	  (on	  the	  slopes	  below	  the	  towns)	  but	  also	  
suggests	  perceived	  differences	  in	  class	  (“upper”	  versus	  “lower”).	  
Some	  of	  my	  urban	  friends	  held	  a	  lack	  of	  education,	  unemployment,	  and	  people’s	  desire	  for	  easy	  ways	  
to	  earn	  money	  as	  the	  causes	  for	  the	  supposed	  inclination	  towards	  violence	  of	  talako	  keṭāharu,	  who	  
came	  up	  to	  the	  town	  and	  act	  as	  goondas	  of	  the	  GJM,	  e.g.	  extracting	  money	  from	  businessmen	  as	  
“donations”171.	  Other	  places	  strongly	  associated	  with	  violence	  are	  the	  previous	  CPI-­‐M	  strongholds	  of	  
the	  1986	  agitation.	  Tea	  plantations	  such	  as	  Chungtung,	  Rangmook,	  or	  Moonda-­‐Basghari,	  which	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  Tukvar	  tea-­‐estate	  on	  the	  northern	  slope	  below	  Darjeeling	  town	  or	  Karbir	  tea-­‐estate	  below	  Kurseong	  town	  
are	  regarded	  as	  particularly	  dangerous.	  Significantly,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  stems	  from	  Tukvar,	  underlining	  his	  muscle-­‐
man	  reputation	  amongst	  the	  town	  people.	  
Silencing	  dissent	  II.	  Hard	  repression	  and	  fear	  
207	  
	  
resisted	  being	  overrun	  by	  the	  GNLF,	  still	  carry	  a	  “dangerous”	  designation	  in	  the	  popular	  
imagination172.	  Such	  popular	  idioms	  and	  imaginations	  of	  a	  geography	  of	  violence	  indicate	  social	  
cleavages	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  population	  in	  Darjeeling.	  However,	  Binita	  was	  not	  afraid	  of	  talako	  
keṭāharu	  only,	  she	  did	  not	  trust	  her	  own	  neighbours	  too.	  When	  we	  spoke	  about	  politics,	  she	  always	  
lowered	  her	  voice	  when	  one	  of	  her	  neighbours	  came,	  fearing	  that	  once	  her	  critique	  reached	  leaders’	  
ears	  she	  might	  be	  punished.	  Several	  times	  she	  warned	  me	  to	  not	  talk	  about	  politics	  to	  everybody.	  
“Peace	  is	  only	  outside	  but	  behind	  the	  curtain	  there	  is	  no	  peace”,	  she	  said.	  Only	  when	  we	  were	  alone,	  
she	  and	  her	  husband	  loudly	  criticised	  the	  ruling	  practices	  of	  the	  GJM.	  	  
In	  both	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  people	  expressed	  their	  fear	  of	  the	  GJM.	  One	  young	  plantation	  worker	  
shared	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  local	  GJM	  leader	  but	  upon	  my	  question	  why	  he	  did	  not	  oppose	  
him,	  he	  pointed	  at	  the	  leader’s	  rowdies:	  “Without	  rowdies	  there	  is	  no	  politics”,	  he	  claimed.	  Another	  
common	  concern	  was	  the	  fear	  of	  “social	  boycott”	  through	  the	  GJM.	  A	  female	  shopkeeper	  from	  a	  
GJM	  strong-­‐hold	  village	  shared:	  “We	  need	  our	  neighbours	  for	  mutual	  help.	  If	  I	  have	  a	  problem	  I	  can	  
ask	  my	  neighbours	  and	  the	  other	  way	  round	  [...].	  The	  party	  will	  tell	  others	  to	  do	  [social	  boycott].	  They	  
can	  even	  kill	  people.”	  Like	  Binita	  and	  many	  others,	  she	  perceived	  the	  GJM’s	  organisational	  network	  
as	  a	  surveillance	  tool:	  “Here	  the	  shakhā,	  prashakhā	  and	  central	  they	  are	  joined	  (joḍieko	  chha).	  
Whatever	  talk	  is	  here	  it	  will	  reach	  up	  (māthi)	  and	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  Therefore	  people	  are	  afraid	  and	  
cannot	  speak.”	  Upon	  my	  question	  why	  they	  did	  not	  join	  another	  party,	  several	  female	  plantation	  
workers	  responded:	  “Mārīhālchha”,	  which	  means	  as	  much	  as	  “You	  will	  be	  killed	  (without	  any	  
question)”,	  or	  “hundaina”	  (this	  is	  not	  possible).	  	  
Another	  common	  way	  to	  express	  fear	  from	  the	  GJM	  is	  reference	  to	  threats	  (dhamkī).	  These	  are	  
usually	  (unspecific)	  verbal	  threats	  spoken	  out	  by	  local	  activists	  or	  leaders	  to	  those	  who	  raise	  critique	  
(e.g.	  at	  corruption),	  such	  as	  “be	  careful”	  or	  “don’t	  try	  to	  be	  clever”.	  In	  anticipation	  of	  punishment	  
(both	  social	  and	  physical)	  or	  victimisation	  most	  respondents	  regarded	  it	  as	  the	  safest	  way	  to	  “stay	  
with	  the	  ‘majority’	  [Engl.]”,	  fearing	  to	  stand	  alone.	  One	  plantation	  worker	  shared:	  “We	  are	  simple	  
people.	  We	  go	  where	  the	  ‘majority’	  is.	  Then	  there	  is	  peace	  –	  we	  don’t	  want	  unrest.”	  Importantly,	  this	  
apparent	  lack	  of	  political	  agency	  became	  visible	  in	  some	  comments,	  which	  suggested	  certain	  
indifference	  when	  it	  came	  to	  party-­‐preferences.	  Some	  people	  claimed	  that:	  “We	  are	  all	  La-­‐la-­‐Mu-­‐
Mo”	  (Mu-­‐Mo	  standing	  for	  Mukti	  Morcha,	  and	  La-­‐la	  a	  suggestion	  of	  “whatever”)	  –	  as	  long	  as	  it	  was	  
the	  majority	  party.	  People	  coped	  with	  this	  situation	  by	  excluding	  discussions	  on	  “politics”	  from	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172Such	  public	  imaginations	  and	  memories	  make	  violence	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  historical-­‐political	  
landscape	  and	  are	  held	  alive	  by	  martyr	  stones	  (usually	  with	  a	  khukurī	  on	  top)	  or	  memorials	  of	  those	  murdered	  
for	  political	  reasons	  (e.g.	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  in	  Kalimpong	  and	  Madan	  Tamang	  in	  Darjeeling).	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conversations,	  as	  this	  might	  cause	  conflicts,	  or	  somebody	  could	  listen.	  Critique	  and	  dissatisfaction	  
with	  the	  regional	  leaders	  were	  kept	  bhitra	  (inside)	  but	  not	  brought	  bāhira	  (to	  the	  outside).	  	  
Also	  one	  journalist	  recounted	  stories	  of	  being	  intimidated	  by	  the	  GJM.	  Yet,	  while	  the	  intimidation	  of	  
the	  print-­‐media	  seems	  to	  be	  rather	  low,	  in	  response	  to	  critical	  reports	  by	  private	  TV	  channels	  from	  
Kalimpong,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  enforced	  a	  shut-­‐down	  of	  these	  in	  Feburary	  2012	  (see	  Chapter	  8	  for	  details).	  
Urban	  dwellers	  expressed	  their	  longing	  for	  peace,	  especially	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  dependence	  of	  
their	  livelihoods	  on	  tourism	  and	  business.	  Binita	  explained:	  “That’s	  why	  the	  GJM	  won	  the	  [2011	  
assembly]	  elections.	  If	  other	  parties	  had	  won,	  this	  would	  have	  caused	  unrest	  and	  conflicts.”	  She	  
added:	  “Peace	  in	  Darjeeling	  will	  only	  prevail	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  money	  coming.”	  A	  young	  teacher	  from	  
a	  GJM-­‐strong-­‐hold	  village	  aptly	  summarised	  such	  apprehensions:	  
How	  many	  things	  we	  cannot	  say	  here,	  there	  is	  not	  that	  same	  kind	  of	  freedom	  here	  like	  in	  
your	  country.	  This	  is	  our	  burden.	  We	  know	  how	  freedom	  should	  be.	  We	  are	  bound.	  If	  we	  talk	  
on	  one	  issue	  then	  they	  start	  oppressing	  us.	  The	  politicians	  here	  are	  bad	  [...].	  Madan	  Tamang	  
was	  killed.	  He	  was	  a	  big	  man	  [...]	  [and]	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  killing	  people	  like	  us.	  (interview,	  
July	  2012)	  
Such	  accounts	  underline	  that	  paying	  lip-­‐service	  to	  the	  ruling	  party	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  induced	  by	  fear	  of	  
repression.	  Accordingly,	  some	  respondents	  felt	  it	  was	  an	  obligation	  to	  take	  part	  in	  GJM	  activities,	  as	  
one	  of	  my	  friends	  claimed,	  even	  if	  this	  includes	  evicting	  activists	  of	  rival	  parties	  (especially	  GNLF)	  
from	  the	  village.	  	  
Such	  statements	  underline	  deeply	  entrenched	  fears	  of	  inter-­‐party	  violence	  (in	  multi-­‐party	  villages)	  
and	  reflect	  shared	  memories	  of	  atrocities	  committed	  during	  the	  ’86-­‐movement.	  The	  fact	  that	  
generally	  whole	  households	  (or	  “houses”,	  ghar	  in	  the	  vernacular)	  join	  a	  certain	  party,	  underlines	  
attempts	  to	  avoid	  political	  conflicts	  within	  families173.	  Significantly,	  however,	  most	  accounts	  on	  
violence	  mentioned	  the	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  rather	  than	  its	  actual	  personal	  experiences	  through	  the	  
GJM.	  It	  is	  mostly	  rumours	  and	  assessments	  of	  the	  probable	  physical	  strength	  of	  the	  ruling	  party,	  
coupled	  with	  spectacular	  incidents	  of	  murders	  or	  burned	  houses	  of	  rivals,	  which	  frame	  what	  some	  in	  
Darjeeling	  call	  a	  “fear	  psychosis”.	  Shyam*,	  a	  long-­‐time	  observer	  of	  Darjeeling	  politics,	  explained:	  
“There	  is	  a	  very	  low	  confidence	  level	  [amongst	  people]	  due	  to	  the	  political	  system	  because	  
everything	  in	  the	  hills	  tends	  to	  be	  politicised.”	  Thus,	  like	  Gorringe	  (2006a)	  claimed,	  the	  fear	  from	  
violence	  becomes	  a	  form	  of	  violence	  itself.	  Such	  fear	  not	  only	  shapes	  individuals’	  political	  agencies	  
but	  also	  affects	  social	  behaviour.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  This	  clearly	  differs	  from	  Alm’s	  (2006)	  study	  on	  a	  Tamil	  Nadu	  village,	  where	  families	  diversified	  their	  political	  
affiliations	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  benefit	  in	  case	  of	  a	  change	  in	  ruling	  party	  (ibid.	  104).	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Although	  neighbours	  are	  regarded	  as	  important	  source	  of	  support	  in	  case	  of	  emergencies	  or	  social	  
events	  (see	  description	  of	  the	  samāj	  in	  Chapter	  1),	  personal	  relations	  with	  neighbours	  are	  
characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  trust.	  Therefore	  “politics”	  or	  ‘party’-­‐ko	  kurā	  (talk	  on	  the	  party)	  is	  usually	  
excluded	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  conversation.	  Often,	  when	  I	  asked	  respondents	  why	  they	  did	  not	  oppose	  the	  
ruling	  party	  inspite	  of	  being	  critical,	  they	  pointed	  at	  a	  lack	  of	  “unity”	  amongst	  individuals.	  Many	  
feared	  that	  even	  if	  they	  agreed	  on	  jointly	  speaking	  up,	  in	  the	  end	  everybody	  would	  draw	  back	  leaving	  
you	  alone/isolated	  (eklai).	  In	  this	  context	  they	  claimed	  that	  “nobody	  wants	  to	  take	  a	  risk”	  (“’risk’	  
[Engl.]	  kosle	  linchha?”	  –“Who	  will	  take	  the	  ‘risk’”?),	  pointing	  at	  the	  fear	  of	  standing	  alone	  against	  the	  
majority	  or	  a	  group	  of	  sworn-­‐in	  leaders	  while	  the	  rest	  remains	  silent.	  	  
Such	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  even	  affects	  those	  better-­‐skilled	  persons,	  who	  migrated	  in	  search	  of	  jobs	  in	  
the	  large	  towns	  of	  the	  plains.	  I	  remember	  a	  conversation	  with	  a	  man	  from	  Darjeeling,	  who	  had	  been	  
living	  with	  his	  family	  in	  Delhi	  for	  several	  years.	  He	  did	  not	  particularly	  like	  staying	  in	  Delhi	  and	  was	  full	  
of	  enthusiasm	  when	  talking	  about	  what	  he	  could	  do	  in	  Darjeeling.	  But	  when	  I	  asked	  him	  why	  
somebody	  like	  him	  with	  a	  good	  education	  and	  good	  ideas	  did	  not	  return	  to	  build	  something	  up	  in	  
Darjeeling,	  he	  explained:	  “Because	  I	  am	  afraid.”	  I	  asked	  him	  “Afraid	  of	  what?”	  He	  took	  a	  second	  to	  
reply,	  and	  then	  said	  very	  seriously:	  “Afraid	  of	  being	  killed”.	  I	  heard	  similar	  statements	  of	  Nepalis	  
travelling	  in	  the	  train	  to	  Darjeeling.	  During	  the	  journey	  they	  were	  criticising	  the	  GJM	  and	  Gurung	  for	  
their	  corrupt	  and	  violent	  rule.	  One	  of	  them,	  who	  was	  employed	  in	  the	  Indian	  Army,	  then	  added:	  
“Once	  we	  are	  there,	  we	  cannot	  talk	  like	  this	  anymore.	  Then	  we	  have	  to	  keep	  shut,	  too.”	  The	  fear,	  it	  
seems,	  is	  tied	  on	  the	  place.	  Upon	  entering	  Darjeeling	  it	  exercises	  its	  power	  and	  makes	  even	  those	  
silent	  who	  earn	  money	  and	  live	  outside.	  Nobody	  wants	  to	  take	  a	  risk.	  
It	  is	  this	  deep	  entrenchment	  of	  fear,	  which	  some	  in	  Darjeeling	  call	  the	  “fear	  psychosis”.	  It	  is	  a	  fear,	  
which	  shapes	  people’s	  identities	  and	  political	  practices	  as	  the	  longing	  for	  security	  suggests	  to	  “stay	  
with	  the	  majority”,	  even	  if	  the	  dominant	  party	  is	  morally	  despised	  off.	  In	  the	  imagination	  and	  
experience	  of	  people,	  violence	  is	  normal	  and	  to	  be	  expected.	  To	  repeat	  the	  words	  of	  Gorringe:	  
violence	  (and	  fear	  of	  it)	  becomes	  “part	  of	  a	  common	  currency	  for	  interaction”	  (Gorringe	  2006a,	  133).	  
Living	  without	  fear	  becomes	  the	  exception	  and	  peace	  an	  instable	  condition,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  
preserved	  by	  silence	  and	  passive	  compliance	  with	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  
7.3.2 Organising	  violence:	  goondas	  
Many	  respondents	  mentioned	  their	  fear	  from	  the	  GJM’s	  goondas.	  I	  now	  explore	  the	  role	  these	  take	  
to	  maintain	  the	  GJM’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  “strongman”	  party	  and	  research	  their	  relations	  to	  party-­‐
leaders.	  The	  description	  is	  based	  on	  my	  own	  observations	  and	  accounts	  of	  party-­‐insiders.	  Although	  I	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spoke	  to	  persons	  identified	  by	  others	  as	  goondas,	  they	  were	  –	  quite	  understandably	  –	  rather	  hesitant	  
to	  speak	  about	  their	  involvement	  in	  violence.	  
Who	  is	  a	  ‘goonda’?	  
In	  South	  Asia,	  the	  term	  goonda	  is	  usually	  used	  for	  criminals,	  rowdies,	  gangsters,	  or	  “muscular	  political	  
leaders”	  (Michelutti	  2010;	  Berenschot	  2011a).	  Berenschot	  defines	  them	  as	  “small-­‐time	  criminals	  [...]	  
who	  rely	  on	  the	  threat	  or	  use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  their	  illegal	  livelihoods”	  (Berenschot	  2011a,	  260).	  In	  
Darjeeling,	  people	  usually	  consider	  a	  goonda	  as	  a	  bored,	  unemployed	  man	  –	  often	  an	  alcoholic	  or	  
drug	  addict	  –	  with	  a	  reputation	  of	  using	  violence	  for	  economic	  and	  private	  gain	  and	  who	  is	  often	  (but	  
not	  always)	  employed	  by	  political	  parties.	  It	  is	  generally	  used	  in	  a	  demeaning	  way	  and	  goondas	  in	  
Darjeeling	  are	  in	  no	  way	  respected	  but	  only	  feared	  individuals.	  
The	  designation	  goonda	  can,	  however,	  be	  misleading	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  different	  types	  of	  persons.	  In	  
Darjeeling	  I	  came	  across	  at	  least	  three	  different	  types	  of	  goondas.	  The	  first	  two	  groups	  are	  loyal	  to	  
the	  ruling	  party	  and	  enter	  a	  patronage	  relation	  with	  its	  leader/s.	  They	  fulfil	  different	  functions,	  some	  
of	  them	  related	  to	  violent	  oppression	  of	  rivals.	  In	  the	  first	  party-­‐loyal	  group	  fall	  those	  who	  are	  full-­‐
time	  employed	  by	  politicians,	  mainly	  as	  bodyguards,	  but	  also	  as	  participants	  in	  pre-­‐planned	  violence.	  
These	  men	  permanently	  accompany	  the	  leader.	  Also	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Personnel	  (GLP)	  (see	  Chapter	  6)	  
is	  often	  considered	  to	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  They	  are	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  party	  for	  money	  and	  
protection	  from	  the	  police.	  	  
The	  second	  party-­‐loyal	  group	  comprises	  those,	  who	  are	  called	  upon	  if	  the	  party	  needs	  to	  present	  its	  
strength	  and	  majority.	  These	  “part-­‐time”	  goondas	  are	  usually	  taken	  from	  the	  unemployed	  youth,	  
many	  of	  them	  assembled	  under	  the	  Yuva	  Morcha.	  They	  might	  also	  include	  alcoholics	  or	  drug	  addicts.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  group	  they	  do	  not	  hold	  a	  reputation	  of	  being	  “strongmen”,	  but	  rather	  function	  
to	  underline	  majority	  strength	  in	  a	  group.	  Following	  the	  discussion	  of	  Chapter	  6,	  which	  underlined	  
that	  violence	  is	  a	  strategic	  means	  in	  the	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  patronage	  benefits,	  it	  makes	  
sense	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  is	  based	  on	  hopes	  of	  benefits	  in	  form	  of	  contracts	  or	  
government	  jobs	  (e.g.	  as	  teachers)	  or	  aspirations	  to	  climb	  up	  in	  the	  party-­‐hierarchy.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  
Bailey,	  they	  form	  a	  “transactional	  group”	  (Bailey	  1969,	  75)	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  This	  underlines	  the	  
patronage	  nature	  of	  the	  party-­‐goonda	  relationship.	  	  
The	  third	  group	  of	  goondas	  consists	  of	  “freelancers”	  –	  criminals	  (murderers,	  extortionists,	  drug-­‐
dealers,	  etc.),	  who	  are	  not	  necessarily	  loyal	  to	  one	  particular	  party	  but	  can	  use	  their	  power	  and	  
reputation	  to	  gain	  from	  different	  parties	  and	  switch	  sides	  easily.	  They	  hold	  reputations	  of	  being	  
dangerous,	  and	  political	  leaders	  try	  to	  get	  close	  to	  them	  or	  to	  appease	  them	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  them	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from	  turning	  against	  them.	  One	  of	  these	  “freelancers”	  shared	  that	  he	  regularly	  went	  to	  meet	  leaders	  
of	  different	  political	  parties	  in	  his	  town	  and	  claimed	  that	  he	  always	  returned	  with	  a	  bunch	  of	  money	  
or	  a	  contract.	  He	  did	  not	  pledge	  loyalty	  to	  one	  particular	  party	  and	  kept	  away	  from	  politics	  while	  
maintaining	  a	  low	  profile.	  	  
Riot	  networks	  
Accounts	  suggest	  that	  the	  GJM	  relies	  heavily	  on	  its	  hierarchical	  organisational	  network	  for	  mobilising	  
its	  “muscle”-­‐power.	  Such	  networks	  resemble	  in	  some	  ways	  the	  “riot-­‐systems”,	  which	  Paul	  Brass	  
identified	  when	  studying	  communal	  riots	  in	  North	  India.	  He	  found	  that	  riots	  are	  undertaken	  by	  
“specialists”,	  who	  form	  “institutionalised	  riot-­‐systems”	  (Brass	  1997,	  9).	  Riot	  actors	  are	  drawn	  from	  
different	  pools	  of	  persons,	  who	  cover	  different	  roles,	  “including	  provocateurs,	  monitors,	  informers,	  
“riot	  captains	  and	  thugs,”	  provisioners	  of	  transport	  and	  liquor,	  criminals,	  bomb	  manufacturers,	  
journalists	  and	  pamphleteers,	  graffiti	  writers,	  and	  distributors	  and	  plasterers	  of	  scurrilous	  posters”	  
(ibid.	  16).	  Mobilisation	  of	  these	  “specialists”	  is	  done	  along	  networks	  (ibid.	  16).	  
Also	  the	  Morcha	  seems	  to	  involve	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  actors	  for	  organising	  inter-­‐party	  clashes.	  Important	  
actors	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  jeep-­‐drivers	  (many	  of	  whom	  are	  member	  of	  the	  Joint	  Action	  Transport	  
Committee,	  a	  frontal	  organisation	  of	  GJM),	  who	  bring	  activists	  to	  the	  respective	  venues;	  medium	  or	  
upper-­‐level	  leaders	  (who	  allegedly	  provide	  alcohol	  to	  the	  activists);	  and	  the	  activists	  turned	  goondas	  
themselves.	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  mass-­‐support	  for	  actively	  disturbing	  the	  rivals’	  
meetings	  is	  mainly	  mobilised	  from	  the	  “part-­‐time”	  goonda	  group,	  which	  is	  strong	  in	  numbers.	  Many	  
people	  also	  believe	  that	  such	  events	  are	  largely	  sponsored	  by	  the	  full-­‐time	  employed	  GLP.	  Accounts	  
of	  witnesses	  of	  these	  events	  suggest	  that	  the	  Morcha	  mobilises	  unknown	  non-­‐locals	  for	  exercising	  
physical	  violence	  (by	  burning	  houses,	  disturbing	  meetings,	  etc.)	  to	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  victims	  
to	  identify	  them	  when	  filing	  police	  cases.	  Members	  of	  this	  group	  also	  help	  enforcing	  bandhs	  as	  
picketers	  (although	  this	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  male	  activity).	  	  
But	  are	  the	  GJM-­‐leaders	  also	  goondas	  themselves?	  The	  insights	  I	  gained	  suggest	  that	  most	  GJM	  
councillors,	  top-­‐	  and	  second-­‐rank	  leaders	  are	  no	  goondas	  but	  employ	  them	  (except	  for	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  
who	  holds	  a	  strongman	  reputation).	  This	  differs	  from	  the	  GNLF,	  whose	  leadership	  had	  consisted	  of	  
GNLF-­‐veterans	  of	  the	  ’86-­‐movement,	  who	  themselves	  held	  strongman	  reputations	  (Niraj	  Lama,	  
interview,	  14.5.2013)	  led	  by	  Ghising	  as	  a	  non-­‐goonda.	  This	  suggests	  a	  GJM	  policy,	  which	  discourages	  
goondas	  from	  becoming	  higher-­‐level	  leaders	  themselves.	  One	  respondent	  assumed	  that	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  probably	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  risking	  being	  toppled	  by	  another	  strongman.	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All	  ‘goondas’?	  Defying	  orders	  to	  use	  violence	  
Although	  the	  discussion	  above	  underlines	  the	  repressive	  approach	  of	  the	  GJM,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  
denounce	  all	  GJM	  members	  as	  goondas	  and	  oppressors.	  Instead,	  many	  activists	  claimed	  that	  they	  
would	  not	  like	  instances	  of	  violent	  oppression	  of	  rival	  parties,	  sometimes	  by	  taking	  reference	  to	  their	  
religion	  (as	  Buddhists	  or	  Christians).	  In	  one	  case	  for	  example,	  a	  local	  leader	  had	  even	  refused	  to	  carry	  
out	  an	  order	  from	  above	  (māthi”)	  (without	  mentioning	  the	  exact	  source	  of	  the	  order)	  telling	  him	  to	  
burn	  down	  the	  house	  of	  a	  local	  GNLF	  leader.	  Instead,	  he	  pretended	  that	  there	  was	  too	  heavy	  police	  
presence	  in	  the	  village	  and	  thereby	  could	  avoid	  the	  GNLF	  leaders’	  house	  being	  burned.	  Later,	  he	  
suspected	  that	  he	  lost	  out	  on	  developmental	  contracts	  from	  the	  GJM	  because	  of	  this	  unwillingness	  to	  
use	  physical	  violence	  against	  rivals.	  Still,	  he	  stayed	  with	  the	  party	  hoping	  to	  gain	  some	  benefits,	  until	  
he	  eventually	  resigned	  in	  2013.	  	  
	  
7.4 Violence	  in	  the	  Morcha’s	  “democracy”.	  Framings	  and	  interpretations	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  GJM	  leadership	  handles	  allegations	  of	  inter-­‐party	  violence	  –	  
e.g.	  instigated	  through	  the	  goondas	  described	  above	  –	  and	  how	  such	  incidences	  ultimately	  serve	  
them	  to	  maintain	  their	  image	  as	  “Gandhian”	  leaders.	  Hansen	  (2001),	  Brass	  (1997),	  and	  Gorringe	  
(2006b;	  2006a)	  pointed	  at	  the	  performative	  character	  of	  violent	  events	  and	  their	  utilisation	  through	  
(re-­‐)interpretation.	  In	  discussing	  the	  contradictions	  between	  the	  Morcha’s	  rhetoric	  and	  its	  actual	  
conduct,	  I	  first	  draw	  on	  Gorringe,	  who	  showed	  that	  the	  meanings	  of	  “violence”	  themselves	  are	  
contested.	  Here,	  I	  explore	  what	  “non-­‐violence”	  and	  “democracy”	  actually	  mean	  to	  the	  GJM	  and	  its	  
leaders.	  Following	  Brass’	  and	  Hansen’s	  stress	  on	  the	  interpretations	  and	  framings	  of	  violent	  events,	  I	  
then	  show	  how	  GJM	  leaders	  try	  to	  frame	  violence	  against	  party	  rivals	  in	  a	  way	  that	  serves	  them	  to	  
maintain	  their	  image	  as	  “democratic”.	  
7.4.1 “Democratic,	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  Gandhian”	  
When	  I	  asked	  Bimal	  Gurung	  what	  a	  “democratic	  movement”	  (gaṇatantrik	  āndolaṇ)	  actually	  means,	  
he	  explained:	  	  
Democratic	  means	  that	  people	  are	  given	  to	  speak	  in	  a	  free	  manner,	  to	  walk	  in	  an	  open	  manner,	  
to	  put	  visions	  in	  an	  open	  manner	  [khullā	  prakārle]	  [...].	  Before	  our	  party	  was	  established	  people's	  
throat	  was	  cut,	  they	  were	  shot.	  [...]	  We	  want	  democracy,	  this	  Gorkhaland	  we	  want	  to	  give.	  May	  
people	  be	  able	  to	  talk/speak,	  may	  they	  be	  able	  to	  do	  everything...ask	  and	  inquire.	  (interview,	  
7.7.2012)	  
He	  clearly	  understood	  “democracy”	  and	  “non-­‐violence”	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  violent	  movement	  of	  ‘86:	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Whom	  did	  we	  kill	  since	  we	  started	  our	  movement?	  Whose	  house	  did	  we	  set	  afire?	  In	  an	  18	  
months	  movement	  [1986-­‐1988]	  1200	  persons	  died...	  Today	  we	  gave	  the	  right	  to	  talk	  to	  
everybody.	  Say	  –	  is	  this	  not	  democratic?	  (ibid.)	  
Interestingly,	  Gurung	  also	  claimed	  not	  to	  be	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  single-­‐party	  rule,	  as	  there	  was	  “a	  need	  for	  
checks”	  and	  critical	  responses	  to	  the	  party’s	  strategy	  (ibid.).	  
Also	  other	  accounts	  of	  GJM	  leaders	  suggest	  a	  similar	  understanding	  of	  “democracy”	  and	  “non-­‐
violence”	  as	  formulated	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  violence	  during	  the	  GNLF-­‐led	  1986-­‐movement.	  As	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  violence	  at	  that	  time	  was	  not	  only	  directed	  against	  the	  state	  and	  its	  executive	  
(police,	  CRPF)	  but	  also	  against	  those,	  who	  refused	  to	  support	  the	  agitation	  (mainly	  CPI-­‐M	  
supporters).	  	  
Activists	  of	  the	  women’s	  wing	  (Nari	  Morcha)	  saw	  themselves	  in	  a	  special	  role	  to	  ensure	  “non-­‐
violence”.	  In	  interviews	  they	  underlined	  that	  they	  as	  women	  (unlike	  men)	  were	  incapable	  of	  using	  
violence	  as	  happened	  during	  the	  movement	  of	  ‘86.	  Thus	  these	  activists	  related	  their	  gender	  to	  the	  
party’s	  non-­‐violent	  approach,	  opposed	  to	  an	  inclination	  to	  physical	  violence	  as	  predicted	  by	  
masculinity.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Nari	  Morcha	  activists	  have	  been	  instrumental	  in	  gheraus	  of	  state	  
offices	  or	  rival	  leaders’	  houses	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  This	  suggests	  an	  understanding	  of	  violence	  in	  terms	  of	  
physical	  violence,	  only.	  Indeed,	  most	  of	  the	  interviewed	  (male	  and	  female)	  activists	  regarded	  gheraus	  
or	  “social	  boycotts”	  as	  non-­‐violent.	  	  
The	  displayed	  accounts	  clearly	  underline	  the	  attempt	  of	  GJM	  leaders	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  from	  
the	  GNLF	  and	  reassure	  the	  “non-­‐violent”	  path	  of	  the	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  But	  how	  do	  they	  
respond	  to	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  between	  such	  claims	  and	  recurrent	  incidences	  of	  hard	  
repression	  against	  rivals	  and	  the	  public	  fear?	  
7.4.2 Framing	  violence	  as	  “non-­‐violence”	  
Brass	  (1997)	  regards	  the	  contestations	  about	  the	  interpretation	  of	  violent	  events	  as	  a	  means	  in	  the	  
struggle	  over	  reputations	  and	  resources.	  To	  explore	  how	  the	  GJM	  leaders	  explained	  and	  interpreted	  
inter-­‐party	  clashes	  and	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  such	  framings	  on	  their	  authority,	  I	  again	  draw	  on	  the	  
case	  study	  of	  the	  peace	  puja	  already	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  A	  pick-­‐up	  truck	  carrying	  GNLF	  activists	  
had	  forcefully	  been	  stopped	  by	  some	  GJM	  activists	  from	  reaching	  a	  venue	  for	  a	  scheduled	  party-­‐
meeting.	  The	  discussion	  is	  complemented	  by	  accounts	  of	  leaders	  in	  newspapers	  and	  interviews,	  
including	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  Harka	  Bahadur	  Chettri	  (GJM	  spokesperson	  and	  since	  2011,	  an	  MLA),	  and	  
other	  central	  committee	  members.	  
	  




After	  having	  witnessed	  the	  forceful	  stopping	  of	  the	  GNLF	  pick-­‐up	  by	  a	  mob	  of	  men	  in	  Bagargaun*,	  I	  
returned	  to	  the	  peace	  puja	  venue,	  where	  the	  holy	  Hindu	  chants	  were	  still	  being	  played.	  When	  I	  asked	  
a	  sub-­‐divisional	  GJM	  leader	  about	  the	  clash,	  he	  angrily	  criticised	  the	  administration’s	  “undemocratic”	  
decision	  not	  to	  grant	  permission	  for	  a	  GJM	  meeting	  while	  “supporting	  opposition	  leaders”,	  who	  only	  
wanted	  to	  create	  unrest	  (ashantī):	  	  
The	  GJM	  is	  doing	  a	  peace	  puja	  here	  to	  avoid	  unrest,	  to	  create	  peace	  in	  this	  area	  [...].	  The	  
GNLF	  came	  to	  disturb	  the	  peace	  puja	  and	  to	  place	  their	  flag	  here.	  We	  are	  peaceful	  but	  they	  
come	  to	  create	  violence.	  
Ironically,	  when	  I	  asked	  him	  how	  “democratic”	  the	  GJM	  was,	  he	  claimed	  that	  everybody	  could	  hold	  a	  
meeting	  openly	  as	  long	  as	  they	  got	  permission	  from	  the	  administration,	  but	  added:	  “But	  the	  GNLF’s	  
attempts	  to	  disturb	  the	  peace	  puja	  are	  not	  democratic.”	  	  
Also	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  whom	  I	  met	  for	  an	  interview	  a	  few	  weeks	  later,	  initially	  denied	  having	  disturbed	  
the	  GNLF’s	  meeting,	  claiming:	  “Āre	  [exclamation	  of	  surprise],	  we	  never	  disturb	  a	  meeting	  of	  any	  
party.	  One	  can	  run	  a	  party,	  one	  can	  speak	  openly.”	  On	  my	  insistence,	  however,	  he	  eventually	  tried	  to	  
justify	  the	  GJM’s	  puja	  by	  proclaiming	  the	  GJM’s	  peaceful	  intentions	  while	  underlining	  the	  party’s	  
power	  over	  the	  place.	  It	  is	  worth	  displaying	  excerpts	  from	  this	  interview	  at	  length:	  
Gurung:	  	   A	  [party,	  author]	  meeting	  [...]	  was	  not	  done	  [...].	  A	  puja	  can	  be	  done	  
everywhere.	  I	  can	  also	  put	  a	  mandir	  [temple]	  here.	  
Author:	  	   But	  you	  did	  the	  puja	  at	  the	  same	  venue	  [like	  the	  GNLF],	  yes	  or	  no?	  	  
Gurung:	  	   [...]	  Who	  can	  stop	  people	  doing	  a	  puja?	  [...]	  
Author:	  	   Members	  of	  the	  central	  committee	  and	  the	  Yuva	  Morcha	  were	  also	  present	  
at	  the	  puja	  [...].	  
Gurung:	  	   Everybody	  can	  go	  to	  a	  puja	  [...].	  
Author:	  	   And	  why	  didn't	  you	  let	  the	  GNLF	  celebrate	  the	  foundation	  day?	  	  
Gurung:	  	  	   Go	  and	  ask	  the	  GNLF:	  ‘Why	  are	  you	  creating	  unrest	  in	  such	  a	  way	  today?’[...]	  
The	  persons	  going	  to	  that	  place	  wanting	  unrest	  [...]	  this	  is	  only	  at	  Bengal's	  
direction	  [ishārā].	  
Author:	  	   Who	  created	  unrest?	  	  
Gurung:	  	   GNLF	  is	  creating	  it	  by	  staging	  a	  meeting	  there.	  There	  are	  no	  people	  for	  
staging	  such	  meetings	  in	  Darjeeling.	  People	  are	  told	  bad	  things	  (bekārko	  
kurā).	  Today	  these	  persons	  were	  evicted	  from	  the	  hills	  [...].	  This	  means:	  this	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person	  has	  nothing.	  So	  why	  is	  he	  disturbing?	  And	  instead	  of	  fighting	  isn't	  it	  
nice	  to	  do	  a	  puja?	  [...]	  
Author:	  	   So	  this	  means	  you	  wanted	  to	  stop	  their	  meeting?	  	  
Gurung:	  	   Puja...we	  didn't	  want	  to	  stop	  their	  meeting	  [...].	  
Author:	  	  	   And	  couldn't	  you	  have	  done	  your	  puja	  at	  another	  place?	  	  
Gurung:	  	   [...]	  In	  our	  area	  we	  can	  do	  a	  puja	  everywhere.	  [...]	  We	  gather	  wherever	  there	  
is	  a	  big	  ground	  [...].	  After	  so	  many	  years	  of	  politics	  people	  were	  not	  allowed	  
to	  say	  anything...see...The	  [DGHC]	  councillor	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  was	  murdered	  
after	  using	  the	  word	  of	  Gorkhaland	  [...].	  Are	  these	  GNLF	  people	  democratic?	  
Why	  did	  C.K.	  Pradhan	  die?	  This	  needs	  to	  be	  asked.	  (interview,	  7.7.2012)	  	  
Such	  accounts	  clearly	  underline	  the	  GJM	  leaders’	  attempts	  to	  reject	  any	  responsibility	  for	  violence	  
against	  rivals.	  Instead	  they	  blamed	  the	  rivals	  and	  the	  administration.	  By	  stressing	  on	  the	  puja	  Gurung	  
did	  not	  only	  try	  to	  depoliticise	  the	  whole	  event	  but	  also	  to	  underline	  the	  “peaceful”	  intentions	  of	  the	  
GJM,	  which	  did	  not	  plan	  the	  event	  as	  “violent”	  repression	  of	  the	  GNLF.	  Eventually,	  however,	  Gurung	  
indirectly	  admitted	  that	  the	  GNLF	  should	  be	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  meetings	  as	  they	  themselves	  
had	  allegedly	  oppressed	  or	  even	  killed	  rivals	  and	  those	  demanding	  Gorkhaland.	  	  
Another	  instance,	  where	  the	  GNLF	  and	  the	  police	  were	  blamed	  for	  violence	  was	  the	  already	  
discussed	  (Chapter	  7.1)	  inter-­‐party	  clash	  at	  Soureni	  in	  May	  2013.	  While	  the	  GNLF	  accused	  the	  GJM	  of	  
attacking,	  the	  GJM	  blamed	  the	  GNLF	  for	  initiating	  the	  violence,	  and	  alleged	  them	  for	  “destabilising	  
the	  region”	  (Roshan	  Giri,	  cited	  in:	  The	  Hindu,	  6.5.2013).	  Roshan	  Giri,	  the	  general	  secretary,	  claimed:	  
GJM	  president	  Bimal	  Gurung	  [...]	  was	  scheduled	  to	  visit	  Soureni	  to	  review	  the	  progress	  of	  
development	  activities	  there.	  But	  GNLF	  activists	  tried	  to	  disrupt	  his	  visit	  and	  suddenly	  staged	  
a	  rally	  without	  prior	  police	  permission	  [...].	  Instead	  of	  taking	  any	  action	  against	  them,	  the	  
police	  lathicharged	  GJM	  leaders	  and	  party	  workers.	  (ibid.)	  
This	  way,	  the	  GJM	  leaders	  not	  only	  used	  the	  Soureni	  incidence	  and	  the	  peace	  puja	  to	  discredit	  the	  
GNLF	  by	  accusing	  it	  of	  initiating	  violence	  and	  acting	  against	  the	  law,	  but	  also	  helped	  the	  GJM	  to	  
project	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  as	  biased	  and	  “undemocratic”	  and	  making	  the	  GJM	  appear	  as	  
an	  innocent	  and	  oppressed	  victim.	  Such	  accusations	  complement	  GJM	  leaders’	  critique	  at	  the	  
government	  for	  sometimes	  refusing	  permission	  for	  public	  meetings174.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  Such	  permissions	  have	  especially	  been	  denied	  for	  meetings	  in	  the	  Dooars	  and	  Terai	  (officially	  to	  prevent	  
communal	  riots	  between	  anti-­‐Gorkhaland	  people	  and	  Nepalis)	  and	  also	  in	  the	  hills,	  usually,	  when	  another	  party	  
had	  been	  granted	  permission	  to	  hold	  a	  meeting	  at	  the	  same	  venue.	  For	  instance,	  when	  in	  April	  2012	  the	  GJM	  
had	  tried	  to	  stage	  a	  meeting	  in	  the	  Dooars	  to	  press	  for	  the	  areal	  inclusion	  of	  some	  mouzas	  in	  the	  new	  GTA	  
despite	  being	  denied	  permission	  it	  had	  resulted	  in	  clashes	  and	  police	  action	  against	  activists	  the	  party	  
organised	  a	  protest-­‐rally	  in	  Darjeeling	  town,	  while	  condemning	  the	  government	  for	  its	  “undemocratic”	  
methods.	  
Silencing	  dissent	  II.	  Hard	  repression	  and	  fear	  
216	  
	  
Another	  strategy	  to	  handle	  accusations	  of	  violence	  is	  denial	  of	  the	  central	  party-­‐leadership’s	  
responsibility.	  According	  to	  a	  central	  committee	  member,	  the	  party	  leaders	  did	  not	  like	  “jhagaḍā”	  
(quarrels,	  fights)	  as	  it	  was	  bad	  for	  the	  party.	  He	  claimed	  that	  accusations	  of	  violence	  were	  invented	  
by	  rivals	  to	  give	  the	  GJM	  a	  bad	  name.	  He	  claimed	  that	  the	  central	  leadership	  even	  sent	  respected	  
central	  committee	  members	  to	  appease	  violent	  situations.	  When	  confronted	  with	  my	  observations	  
from	  the	  peace	  puja,	  and	  the	  Soureni	  case,	  he	  eventually	  admitted	  that	  “young	  people	  cannot	  be	  
controlled	  [...].There	  are	  always	  clashes	  in	  politics,	  not	  only	  in	  Darjeeling”	  (interview,	  13.6.2013).	  Also	  
another	  central	  committee	  member	  (being	  an	  accused	  in	  the	  Tamang	  murder	  case)	  stressed	  that	  the	  
central	  leadership	  would	  not	  sanction	  violent	  party-­‐activities	  and	  claimed	  that	  “Bimal	  Gurung	  doesn’t	  
know	  everything”	  (interview,	  9.6.2012),	  indirectly	  implying	  that	  local	  leaders	  disturbed	  rivals	  without	  
the	  president’s	  knowledge.	  Both	  accounts	  underline	  that	  –	  even	  if	  violence	  was	  exercised	  by	  party-­‐
members	  –	  the	  central	  leadership	  was	  not	  to	  blame.	  	  
Another	  way	  to	  deny	  accusations	  of	  politically	  motivated	  violence	  is	  describing	  them	  as	  “personal	  
conflicts”	  and	  thereby	  depoliticising	  them.	  It	  indeed	  makes	  sense	  to	  believe	  that	  sometimes	  local	  
fights	  between	  individuals	  or	  smaller	  groups,	  which	  arise	  from	  personal	  conflicts	  (often	  fuelled	  by	  
alcohol)	  are	  prone	  to	  be	  politicised	  (i.e.	  being	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  party-­‐politics)	  by	  the	  media	  or	  
higher-­‐ranking	  leaders.	  But	  I	  also	  came	  across	  an	  opposite	  case.	  Here,	  a	  young	  GJM	  activist	  offered	  a	  
GTA	  councillor	  to	  remove	  rivals’	  TMC-­‐flags	  and	  “make	  it	  a	  personal	  issue”.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  
active	  “personalisation”/”privatisation”	  of	  political	  issues	  (thus	  their	  depoliticisation)	  can	  function	  as	  
a	  strategy	  to	  keep	  certain	  politicians	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  criminal	  persecution.	  
Justifying	  violence	  
In	  a	  few	  instances,	  when	  confronted	  with	  evidence	  of	  repression,	  leaders	  tried	  to	  legitimise	  violence	  
instead	  of	  denying	  it.	  In	  late	  January	  2011,	  when	  I	  confronted	  Harka	  Bahadur	  Chettri	  (then	  GJM	  
spokesperson)	  about	  people’s	  fear	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  during	  a	  recent	  bandh,	  he	  justified	  it	  with	  the	  
need	  for	  unity	  in	  a	  movement:	  
This	  [people	  afraid	  of	  speaking	  out]	  is	  the	  most	  undesirable	  thing.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  you	  
should	  not	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  until	  and	  unless	  you	  have	  complete	  control…that’s	  
politics,	  in	  politics	  that	  is	  a	  bad	  thing	  [...].	  Dissenting	  voices	  are	  always	  welcome	  in	  politics,	  
without	  that	  the	  democracy	  cannot	  be.	  But,	  in	  a	  movement,	  if	  you	  have	  too	  much	  of	  
dissenting	  voices,	  it	  will	  head	  nowhere.”	  (interview,	  7.2.2011)	  
Also	  a	  GJM	  core	  committee	  member,	  whom	  I	  interviewed	  in	  2012,	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  “unity”	  in	  
the	  movement	  (āndolaṇ)	  to	  be	  successful,	  indirectly	  implying	  that	  all	  dissenters	  should	  work	  under	  
the	  GJM-­‐umbrella.	  Both	  accounts	  try	  to	  justify	  violence	  with	  the	  need	  of	  a	  unified	  “movement”	  
(āndolaṇ)	  as	  different	  from	  a	  contentious	  multi-­‐party	  politics.	  Thus,	  the	  leaders’	  reference	  to	  the	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Gorkhaland	  “movement”	  (āndolaṇ)	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  justify	  their	  use	  of	  hard	  repression175.	  The	  leader	  
then	  made	  excuses	  about	  the	  action	  taken	  against	  the	  GNLF	  by	  pointing	  at	  their	  miserable	  
performance	  during	  their	  rule	  and	  alleged	  them	  of	  receiving	  money	  from	  the	  TMC,	  suggesting	  that	  –	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  peace	  puja	  –	  they	  had	  no	  right	  to	  celebrate	  their	  foundation	  day.	  Also	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  regularly	  blamed	  the	  CPRM	  for	  its	  violent	  background	  in	  the	  agitation	  of	  ’86	  while	  accusing	  
its	  leaders	  (then	  CPI-­‐M)	  responsible	  for	  not	  stopping	  bloodshed.	  Denying	  rivals	  the	  right	  to	  complain	  
seems	  a	  common	  strategy	  to	  justify	  such	  actions,	  which	  works	  as	  a	  means	  to	  keep	  the	  place	  free	  of	  
such	  “bad”	  party-­‐activities.	  By	  drawing	  such	  sharp	  divisions	  between	  the	  “rightful”	  GJM	  and	  
“despiceable”	  opponents,	  the	  GJM’s	  strategy	  resembles	  the	  Shiv	  Sena’s	  attempts	  to	  “purify”	  place	  
(Hansen	  2001).	  
A	  last	  instance	  of	  justification	  of	  hard	  repression	  I	  came	  across	  was	  framing	  it	  in	  a	  pedagogical	  way.	  
After	  I	  switched	  off	  my	  recording	  machine,	  a	  GJM	  leader	  explained	  the	  need	  to	  use	  violence:	  “If	  a	  
small	  child	  doesn’t	  learn,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  give	  miṭhāī	  (sweets)	  but	  you	  must	  beat	  it	  with	  a	  stick.	  
This	  is	  in	  our	  blood,	  otherwise	  people	  won’t	  understand.”	  	  
Such	  attempts	  for	  justification	  also	  concern	  soft	  repression	  such	  as	  “social	  boycott”.	  Urmila	  Rumba,	  a	  
leader	  of	  the	  Nari	  Morcha	  (and	  later	  GTA	  councillor),	  acknowledged	  that	  social	  boycott	  could	  be	  a	  
form	  of	  violence	  in	  certain	  cases.	  She	  then	  justified	  that	  this	  measure	  was	  rather	  used	  to	  avoid	  
“peace-­‐break”	  by	  securing	  that	  certain	  persons	  are	  left	  alone,	  i.e.	  not	  disturbed	  or	  challenged	  by	  
others.	  In	  contrast,	  she	  claimed	  that	  cases	  of	  total	  social	  isolation	  (including	  refusal	  of	  water,	  
transportation,	  etc.)	  stemmed	  from	  personal	  conflicts,	  which	  were	  “given	  the	  name	  of	  the	  party.	  But	  
I	  don’t	  know	  about	  this”	  (interview,	  3.4.2012).	  
	  
7.5 Conclusion	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  hard	  repression	  of	  party	  rivals	  as	  a	  strategy	  in	  
sustaining	  the	  GJM’s	  majority	  support.	  It	  complements	  Chapter	  6,	  which	  identified	  patronage	  and	  the	  
establishment	  of	  resource	  monopolies	  as	  one	  strategy	  to	  maintain	  the	  Morcha’s	  mobilising	  function	  
after	  its	  perceived	  compromise	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  the	  entailed	  loss	  of	  normative	  
legitimacy.	  To	  approach	  these	  issues	  I	  followed	  Brass’	  (1997)	  proposal	  of	  the	  “functional	  utility”	  of	  
violence	  as	  a	  means	  to	  access	  resources,	  Hansen’s	  (2001)	  emphasis	  on	  violent	  performances	  and	  
reputations,	  and	  Gorringe’s	  (2006a,	  b)	  elaborations	  on	  the	  differing	  interpretations	  of	  violence	  and	  
its	  relation	  to	  identity-­‐formations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  This	  resembles	  Geschewski’s	  (2014,	  28)	  claim	  that	  ideology	  can	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  hard	  repression.	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The	  discussed	  case	  studies	  and	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  the	  GJM	  uses	  hard	  repression	  to	  render	  rival	  
parties	  and	  opponents	  invisible.	  Goondas	  are	  instrumental	  in	  intimidating	  rivals	  and	  give	  the	  GJM	  the	  
image	  of	  a	  “strongman”	  party,	  reflected	  in	  public	  fear	  of	  intimidation	  and	  victimisation.	  This	  fear	  is	  
not	  only	  sustained	  through	  rumours	  and	  actual	  incidences	  of	  violence	  but	  is	  deeply	  grounded	  in	  
experiences	  of	  violence	  during	  the	  movement	  of	  ’86.	  Together,	  this	  creates	  a	  “fear	  psychosis”	  as	  
defining	  property	  of	  people’s	  identities,	  which	  translates	  into	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  interactions	  and	  
political	  practice.	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  hard	  and	  soft	  repression	  form	  the	  bases	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  
silencing,	  which	  aims	  at	  bringing	  the	  population	  behind	  the	  GJM	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
agitation.	  They	  help	  ensuring	  the	  Morcha	  the	  place	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  making	  it	  
the	  sole	  State-­‐recognised	  representative	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  underline	  their	  usefulness	  in	  
accessing	  resources.	  	  
The	  hard	  repression	  of	  rivals	  serves	  the	  Morcha	  not	  only	  to	  underline	  its	  image	  as	  a	  “strongmen”	  
party,	  reputed	  to	  use	  physical	  violence	  against	  defectors	  and	  spreading	  fear	  amongst	  the	  population.	  
Paradoxcially,	  party-­‐leaders	  also	  try	  to	  utilise	  such	  events	  to	  underline	  their	  proclaimed	  “Gandhian”	  
and	  “non-­‐violent”	  approach.	  Leaders	  attempt	  to	  utilise	  instances	  of	  inter-­‐party	  clashes	  to	  design	  
images	  of	  victims,	  oppressed	  by	  an	  “undemocratic”	  State	  government,	  and	  of	  peace-­‐keepers,	  who	  
make	  sure	  that	  “bad”	  elements	  in	  form	  of	  opposition	  parties	  do	  not	  create	  a	  base	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
These	  rival	  parties,	  they	  claim,	  had	  lost	  any	  right	  to	  exist	  due	  to	  their	  previous	  involvement	  in	  
corruption	  and	  violence	  against	  Gorkhaland	  lovers.	  The	  responsibility	  for	  clashes	  is	  entirely	  blamed	  
on	  these	  rivals,	  whose	  attempts	  to	  hold	  meetings	  are	  construed	  as	  directed	  against	  the	  principles	  of	  
democracy	  and	  non-­‐violence.	  Violence	  thus	  does	  not	  only	  serve	  the	  Morcha	  to	  discredit	  rivals	  by	  
portraying	  them	  as	  “violent”	  and	  “undemocratic”	  but	  also	  to	  invest	  itself	  with	  the	  image	  of	  defenders	  
of	  “peace”	  and	  “democracy”,	  keeping	  alive	  the	  Gandhian	  myth.	  In	  this	  sense,	  non-­‐violence	  serves	  as	  
a	  grand	  story-­‐line	  for	  the	  GJM	  helping	  it	  to	  defame	  rivals	  while	  presenting	  itself	  in	  a	  glorious	  light.	  
This	  underlines	  Brass’	  and	  Gorringe’s	  arguments	  on	  the	  variety	  of	  meanings	  associated	  with	  violent	  
events	  and	  the	  role	  of	  (re-­‐)interpretations	  to	  gain	  reputations	  as	  means	  in	  the	  access	  to	  
resources.When	  I	  told	  her	  about	  such	  contradictory	  stories,	  one	  friend	  in	  Darjeeling	  aptly	  
commented:	  “Here	  ‘truth’	  depends	  on	  how	  strong	  the	  army	  is.	  Legitimising	  it	  lies	  in	  the	  most	  violent	  
hands.”	  Contradictions,	  it	  seems,	  are	  part	  of	  the	  political	  game	  itself.	  	  
But	  violence	  does	  not	  only	  have	  a	  functional	  utility	  for	  the	  GJM.	  Allegations	  of	  rivals	  hold	  that	  also	  
the	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government	  was	  using	  criminal	  cases	  against	  the	  GJM	  leaders	  to	  control	  the	  
party.	  This	  not	  only	  concerns	  the	  arrest	  of	  more	  than	  1,200	  GJM	  activists	  and	  leaders	  during	  the	  
August	  2013	  revival	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  (see	  Chapter	  1)	  but	  also	  the	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  
case.	  For	  instance	  in	  January	  2013,	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  was	  confronted	  with	  GJM	  followers	  shouting	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Gorkhaland-­‐slogans	  during	  a	  public	  function	  at	  Chowrasta;	  the	  same	  afternoon	  she	  invited	  Bharati	  
Tamang	  (widow	  of	  late	  Madan	  Tamang)	  to	  Kolkata	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  murder	  cases’	  progress	  (see	  
Chapter	  8).	  Many	  in	  Darjeeling	  believe	  that	  the	  State	  government	  utilises	  the	  murder	  case	  as	  a	  means	  
of	  pressure	  against	  the	  GJM	  leaders	  whose	  names	  figure	  in	  the	  FIR.	  Thus,	  whenever	  the	  GJM	  poses	  
demands	  on	  the	  State	  government,	  the	  CM	  could	  threaten	  them	  with	  providing	  evidence	  on	  the	  case	  
(e.g.	  secret	  phone	  tapings	  of	  GJM	  leaders)	  to	  the	  inquiring	  agency,	  the	  Central	  Bureau	  of	  
Investigation	  (CBI),	  which	  overtook	  the	  inquiry	  in	  January	  2011.	  This	  suggests	  a	  dependency	  of	  the	  
GJM	  on	  the	  government	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  resource	  flows	  (see	  Chapter	  6)	  but	  also	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  the	  protection	  from	  criminal	  persecution	  of	  its	  leaders	  and	  activists.	  
Yet,	  the	  GJM’s	  attempts	  to	  frame	  and	  (re-­‐)interpret	  hard	  repression	  against	  rivals	  are	  only	  partly	  
successful.	  Accounts	  of	  non-­‐party	  workers	  suggest	  that	  they	  lost	  faith	  in	  the	  party’s	  Gandhian	  image	  
and	  instead	  regarded	  it	  as	  a	  party	  using	  violence	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  Instead	  of	  garnering	  respect	  
through	  strongman	  tactics	  (cf.	  Michelutti	  2010)	  violence	  becomes	  an	  entrance	  point	  for	  public	  
critique.	  This	  complements	  observations	  from	  studies	  on	  competitive	  authoritarianism,	  which	  found	  
that	  hard	  repression	  was	  not	  a	  useful	  means	  to	  sustain	  authority	  as	  it	  was	  too	  costly	  and	  weakened	  
the	  legitimising	  bases	  of	  a	  ruler	  (Tanneberg,	  Stefes,	  and	  Merkel	  2013;	  Gerschewski	  2014).	  Thus,	  the	  
Morcha’s	  attempts	  to	  frame	  and	  interpret	  violence	  have	  not	  succeeded	  entirely.	  Rather,	  “non-­‐
violence”	  and	  “democracy”	  function	  as	  a	  myth	  to	  hold	  on	  for	  some	  party-­‐workers	  in	  order	  to	  morally	  
justify	  their	  engagement	  in	  a	  party,	  which	  is	  increasingly	  perceived	  to	  use	  repression	  against	  its	  
proclaimed	  enemies.	  Ultimately,	  instead	  of	  propping	  up	  its	  authority,	  the	  use	  of	  “money”	  and	  
“muscle	  power”	  provided	  an	  entrance	  point	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  critique	  amongst	  the	  population.	  
Such	  public	  critique	  increased	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  in	  July	  2011	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  areal	  struggle	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8.1 Changing	  colours	  in	  Darjeeling	  
When	  I	  first	  travelled	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	  January	  2011,	  the	  whole	  landscape	  had	  been	  painted	  in	  the	  
colours	  of	  the	  GJM.	  Signboards	  and	  posters	  demanding	  Gorkhaland	  were	  painted	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  green-­‐
white-­‐yellow	  and	  its	  flags	  were	  fixed	  to	  most	  houses	  in	  both	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  Signs	  of	  other	  
parties	  were	  almost	  invisible	  in	  public	  spaces.	  Rival	  parties’	  public	  programmes	  such	  as	  meetings	  or	  
demonstrations	  were	  hardly	  ever	  taking	  place	  and	  if	  at	  all,	  then	  it	  was	  not	  at	  the	  political	  centre	  of	  
Darjeeling,	  the	  Chowk	  Bazaar,	  but	  either	  in	  the	  plains	  or	  only	  as	  smaller	  local	  indoor-­‐meetings.	  The	  
hills	  were	  ruled	  by	  the	  GJM.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  had	  explained	  how	  the	  GJM	  and	  Bimal	  Gurung	  ascended	  to	  power	  and	  became	  the	  
leading	  voice	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  in	  Darjeeling	  after	  years	  of	  GNLF’s	  dominance.	  In	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  7,	  I	  explored	  how	  the	  GJM	  maintained	  this	  position	  despite	  being	  increasingly	  
criticised	  for	  compromising	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  how	  it	  limited	  the	  spaces	  for	  other	  political	  
actors	  through	  means	  of	  soft	  and	  hard	  repression.	  I	  identified	  the	  establishment	  of	  developmental	  
resource	  monopolies	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  DGHC	  and	  gram	  panchayats,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  hard	  
repression	  against	  rivals	  and	  defectors	  as	  strategies	  for	  ruling.	  These	  strategies	  were	  contrasted	  with	  
local	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  rule	  which	  displayed	  the	  influence	  the	  party	  had	  on	  
people’s	  daily	  lives.	  These	  were	  expressed	  in	  people’s	  difficulties	  to	  speak	  up	  against	  perceived	  
corruption	  and	  exploitation	  due	  to	  fear	  of	  endangering	  their	  livelihoods	  or	  security.	  In	  this	  context,	  
the	  discussion	  also	  identified	  the	  striving	  for	  benefits	  as	  important	  factor	  influencing	  people’s	  choice	  
of	  political	  parties.	  Such	  factors	  also	  help	  explaining	  why	  the	  GJM	  won	  the	  elections	  to	  the	  new	  
Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA)	  in	  July	  2012.	  	  
An	  insider	  had	  foreseen	  that	  the	  GTA	  would	  cement	  the	  GJM’s	  power	  over	  Darjeeling	  for	  the	  coming	  
years.	  Also	  I	  expected	  the	  new	  council	  to	  regularise	  the	  patronage-­‐	  and	  resource-­‐flows	  within	  the	  
party	  so	  to	  stabilise	  its	  mobilising	  function	  by	  officially	  “legal”	  means	  while	  continuing	  to	  exclude	  
rivals	  from	  those	  developmental	  benefits	  channelled	  through	  the	  new	  council.	  	  
When	  I	  returned	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	  June	  2013	  –	  about	  one	  year	  after	  the	  GTA	  establishment	  –	  however,	  
the	  political	  colours	  in	  the	  hills	  seemed	  to	  change.	  While	  driving	  towards	  the	  hills	  I	  spotted	  green	  
GNLF	  flags	  and	  garlands.	  More	  surprisingly,	  huge	  TMC	  posters	  welcomed	  CM	  Mamata	  Banerjee,	  who	  
had	  recently	  visited	  the	  hills	  (Picture	  8).	  In	  the	  small	  road-­‐side	  village	  Bagargaun*	  one	  electricity	  pole	  
even	  carried	  three	  flags,	  one	  each	  of	  TMC,	  GNLF,	  and	  GJM.	  Further	  up	  in	  the	  hills,	  it	  was	  less	  colourful	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but	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  less	  flags	  all	  together.	  Later,	  when	  I	  met	  Binita*	  in	  her	  small	  restaurant	  in	  
Darjeeling	  town,	  she	  excitedly	  whispered:	  “Miriam,	  have	  you	  heard	  the	  most	  recent	  news?	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  has	  married	  again!	  She	  is	  much	  younger	  than	  him.	  I	  heard	  she	  is	  from	  the	  GLP.”	  She	  seemed	  
to	  enjoy	  telling	  this	  news	  about	  such	  perceived	  morally	  despicable	  conduct	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  big	  man.	  	  
Also	  articles	  in	  the	  local	  newspaper	  regularly	  mentioned	  defections	  from	  the	  GJM	  to	  rival	  parties,	  
illustrated	  with	  pictures	  of	  party-­‐flag-­‐holding	  defectors.	  Meanwhile,	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  in	  July	  
2011,	  other	  regional	  parties	  had	  formed	  a	  new	  alliance,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Task	  Force	  (GTF),	  amongst	  
them	  the	  AIGL,	  CPRM,	  and	  BGP	  carried	  on	  with	  the	  demand	  for	  Gorkhaland	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Also	  the	  
2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  election	  results	  show	  that	  the	  winning	  margin	  of	  the	  GJM	  was	  declining	  in	  contrast	  to	  
previous	  years	  (see	  Table	  1,	  Chapter	  1).	  They	  point	  not	  only	  at	  a	  possible	  come-­‐back	  of	  the	  GNLF	  but	  
also	  show	  a	  new	  political	  organisation,	  the	  Darjeeling	  Dooars	  United	  Development	  Foundation	  
(DDUDF)	  headed	  by	  academic	  M.P.	  Lama,	  in	  the	  hills.	  	  
But	  why	  is	  it	  that	  after	  attaining	  the	  total	  and	  formal	  legal	  control	  over	  the	  GTA	  (and	  the	  associated	  
resources)	  the	  GJM’s	  support	  seemed	  to	  dwindle?	  Why	  would	  people	  join	  minority	  parties?	  Why	  was	  
there	  an	  open	  revival	  of	  the	  GNLF,	  the	  very	  party	  which	  had	  been	  ousted	  from	  the	  hills	  in	  2007/2008	  
and	  since	  largely	  remained	  silent	  and	  invisible?	  Why	  would	  people	  who	  had	  been	  fighting	  for	  
autonomy	  and	  Gorkhaland	  now	  join	  the	  TMC,	  the	  very	  party	  that	  has	  ever	  since	  been	  opposed	  
towards	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  State?	  Could	  these	  defections	  from	  the	  GJM	  be	  an	  indicator	  for	  an	  
increasing	  influence	  of	  the	  State	  government	  in	  the	  region,	  expressed	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  
TMC-­‐units,	  its	  ultimate	  authority	  over	  developmental	  resources	  to	  the	  GTA,	  and	  its	  control	  over	  the	  
police	  apparatus?	  Was	  the	  GJM’s	  attempt	  to	  rule	  through	  “money”	  and	  “muscle”	  not	  successful,	  
anymore?	  Were	  the	  defections	  an	  expression	  of	  sachet	  jantā,	  of	  citizens	  aware	  of	  their	  political	  rights	  
and	  entitlements	  who	  checked	  on	  their	  leaders	  (see	  Chapter	  1)?	  	  
Such	  concerns	  also	  lead	  to	  broader	  questions	  on	  a	  place	  for	  a	  “moral”	  politics	  free	  from	  material	  and	  
transactional	  aspirations,	  the	  rule	  of	  “money”	  and	  “muscle	  power”,	  socio-­‐economic	  dependence	  on	  
patronage,	  clientelism,	  and	  longing	  for	  security.	  Can	  defections	  from	  the	  GJM	  be	  read	  as	  an	  end	  to	  
the	  imposed	  silence?	  	  
Studies	  on	  political	  authority	  claim	  that	  even	  if	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  recognises	  a	  leaders’	  or	  
party’s	  authority,	  there	  are	  always	  groups	  or	  individuals,	  who	  have	  a	  different	  opinion	  and	  challenge	  
the	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  ruler	  (Hardin	  2009;	  Dogan	  2009;	  Lentz	  1998).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  
chapter	  is	  to	  explore	  such	  defections	  and	  open	  challenges	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  GJM	  in	  more	  detail.	  
More	  specifically,	  I	  display	  examples	  where	  the	  “silence”	  –	  or	  the	  public	  refrain	  to	  speak	  up	  against	  
perceived	  injustices	  committed	  by	  the	  Morcha	  –	  is	  broken.	  I	  propose	  that	  such	  breaking	  of	  the	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silence	  is	  a	  form	  of	  resistance.	  This	  includes	  all	  open	  attempts	  to	  challenge	  the	  GJM	  by	  not	  subjecting	  
their	  own	  agency	  to	  the	  party’s	  orders	  even	  if	  enforced	  through	  co-­‐optation	  or	  repression.	  
Understood	  in	  this	  way,	  resistance	  means	  the	  refusal	  to	  being	  bought	  or	  being	  intimidated.	  This	  not	  
only	  includes	  practical	  but	  also	  ideological	  struggles	  in	  form	  of	  public	  propositions	  of	  alternative	  
political	  programmes	  or	  forms	  of	  leadership.	  This	  broad	  definition	  refers	  to	  visible	  and	  “spectacular”	  
(Scott	  1989)	  forms	  of	  resistance	  “which	  pose	  a	  declared	  threat	  to	  powerholders”,	  e.g.	  social	  
movements,	  dissident	  sects,	  political	  opposition	  groups,	  and	  forms	  of	  open	  confrontation	  (ibid.	  
34)176.	  To	  analyse	  such	  forms	  of	  resistance	  this	  chapter	  switches	  the	  main	  focus	  from	  the	  time-­‐span	  
between	  2007	  and	  2011	  to	  the	  period	  after	  the	  GTA	  agreement	  (in	  July	  2011)	  and	  the	  GTA	  
establishment	  in	  August	  2012.	  	  
Although	  the	  GJM	  neither	  attained	  Gorkhaland	  nor	  increased	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  autonomous	  
council	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  DGHC,	  it	  won	  the	  GTA	  elections	  nearly	  uncontested.	  Party	  
president	  Bimal	  Gurung	  became	  the	  new	  de	  jure	  leader	  of	  a	  council	  of	  50	  councillors,	  amongst	  them	  
45	  elected	  GJM	  councillors	  (nearly	  double	  as	  many	  as	  the	  number	  of	  councillors	  in	  the	  previous	  
DGHC	  which	  was	  28).	  Twenty-­‐eight	  of	  them	  won	  their	  constituencies	  uncontested	  although	  they	  
were	  not	  chosen	  amongst	  their	  respective	  regional	  party-­‐workers	  but	  directly	  nominated	  by	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  during	  a	  festive	  party-­‐meeting	  at	  Gymkhana	  in	  Darjeeling	  town,	  which	  resembled	  the	  
announcement	  of	  lottery-­‐winners177.	  The	  remaining	  17	  constituencies	  were	  contested	  by	  the	  TMC,	  
the	  State	  government	  party,	  which	  had	  begun	  to	  increase	  its	  activities	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  since	  2012.	  
Yet,	  nine	  days	  after	  the	  set	  date	  for	  withdrawing	  nominations	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  directed	  her	  
followers	  not	  to	  contest178.	  The	  only	  real	  challenge	  to	  Gurung’s	  authority	  was	  posed	  by	  the	  
independent	  candidateship	  of	  a	  GJM	  leader	  from	  Kalimpong	  sub-­‐division.	  Gurung	  dealt	  with	  him	  by	  
threatening	  to	  refuse	  his	  membership	  in	  the	  GTA	  even	  if	  he	  won	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  164).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  
the	  rebel	  lost.	  The	  procedures	  leading	  to	  the	  “election”	  of	  the	  GTA	  were	  dubious	  (i.e.	  the	  whole	  
exercise	  was	  conducted	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State	  government	  and	  not	  by	  the	  
Indian	  Election	  Commission,	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  strict	  and	  independent	  body).	  However,	  its	  
establishment	  eventually	  ended	  the	  informal	  working	  agreement	  between	  the	  (non-­‐elected)	  GJM	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  Scott	  (1989,	  34)	  contrasted	  these	  with	  “every-­‐day-­‐forms	  of	  resistance”	  which	  happens	  in	  circumstances	  “in	  
which	  open	  defiance	  is	  impossible	  or	  entails	  mortal	  danger”.	  
177	  Initially,	  the	  TMC	  had	  submitted	  nominations	  for	  18	  constituencies,	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  for	  13,	  and	  46	  independent	  
candidates	  filed	  nominations,	  too.	  However,	  19	  independent	  candidates	  were	  rejected,	  and	  by	  July	  12,	  40	  
candidates	  including	  27	  independents	  withdrew	  their	  nominations.	  The	  13	  CPI-­‐M	  candidates	  withdrew	  their	  
nominations	  claiming	  that	  they	  had	  been	  intimidated	  by	  the	  GJM.	  Thus	  the	  GJM	  won	  28	  seats	  of	  the	  45	  
uncontested	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  157).	  	  
178	  Sarkar	  interprets	  this	  move	  to	  design	  “dummy-­‐candidates”	  as	  strategy	  to	  maintain	  amicable	  relationships	  
with	  the	  GJM,	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  TMC	  in	  the	  elections	  “hardly	  yielded	  anything	  for	  the	  return	  
of	  ‘substantial’	  democracy	  in	  the	  hills”	  (Sarkar	  2013,	  163).	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and	  the	  DGHC	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  It	  legalised	  and	  formalised	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  monopoly	  over	  
developmental	  funds.	  	  
Like	  the	  DGHC	  previously,	  the	  GTA	  is	  funded	  by	  the	  central	  and	  State	  government.	  It	  is	  build	  up	  from	  
the	  GTA	  sabhā	  (council;	  consisting	  of	  45	  elected	  and	  5	  Governor	  appointed	  members,	  chairman,	  
deputy	  chairman	  and	  7	  Ex-­‐officio	  members),	  an	  executive	  body	  (chief	  executive,	  deputy	  chief	  
executive,	  and	  14	  executive	  members,	  nominated	  by	  chief	  executive	  from	  amongst	  the	  50	  sabhā-­‐
members),	  and	  a	  principal	  secretary	  selected	  by	  the	  chief	  executive	  from	  amongst	  a	  list	  prepared	  by	  
the	  State	  government.	  	  
Like	  the	  DGHC,	  the	  GTA	  does	  not	  have	  any	  legislative	  powers.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  DGHC,	  the	  GTA	  has	  
more	  councillors/constituencies,	  less	  government	  nominated	  members,	  and	  was	  granted	  some	  more	  
departments,	  including	  the	  tauzi-­‐department,	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  land	  records	  of	  the	  tea	  
plantations.	  Other	  important	  departments	  are	  education,	  agriculture,	  rural	  development,	  and	  
unreserved	  forests.	  Further,	  the	  GTA	  was	  granted	  the	  administrative,	  executive,	  and	  financial	  powers	  
over	  the	  transferred	  subjects.	  The	  council	  was	  also	  promised	  higher	  funding	  including	  central	  
assistance	  of	  200	  crore	  INR	  (2000	  million)	  yearly	  (for	  the	  first	  three	  years)	  (Sarkar	  2012)179.	  The	  slow	  
and	  incomplete	  transfer	  of	  all	  departments	  from	  the	  State	  administration	  to	  the	  GTA,	  however,	  
caused	  regular	  conflicts	  between	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  State	  government.	  	  
To	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  why	  the	  GJM’s	  support	  based	  began	  to	  dwindle	  after	  the	  GTA	  
establishment	  by	  displaying	  forms	  of	  resistance,	  I	  begin	  the	  discussion	  with	  a	  brief	  examination	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  media	  in	  Darjeeling	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  those,	  who	  break	  the	  silence.	  Literature	  on	  
competitive	  authoritarianism	  identifies	  the	  media	  as	  a	  platform	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  opposition	  
(Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002).	  Do	  they	  provide	  a	  space	  for	  voicing	  critique	  against	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  
Darjeeling?	  In	  how	  far	  are	  the	  media	  and	  journalists	  subject	  to	  repression?	  In	  Chapter	  8.2.2	  I	  turn	  to	  
examples,	  where	  groups	  or	  individuals	  openly	  challenged	  or	  spoke	  up	  against	  the	  GJM.	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  
display	  of	  alternative	  imaginations	  of	  ideal-­‐pictures	  of	  leadership	  and	  politics	  as	  promoted	  by	  the	  
AIGL,	  the	  CPRM,	  and	  the	  BGP,	  some	  of	  these	  embodied	  in	  the	  independent	  Lok	  Sabha	  candidateship	  
of	  M.P.	  Lama	  in	  2014.	  I	  suggest	  that	  although	  these	  ideals	  hardly	  succeeded	  in	  bringing	  about	  
changes	  in	  political	  practice,	  they	  keep	  moral	  values	  in	  politics	  alive.	  In	  Chapters	  8.2.3	  to	  8.2.6	  I	  take	  a	  
closer	  look	  at	  three	  opposition	  parties,	  the	  GNLF,	  the	  TMC,	  and	  the	  CPRM,	  each	  displaying	  distinct	  
ways	  of	  resisting	  the	  Morcha,	  and	  I	  analyse	  why	  people	  chose	  to	  follow	  these	  minority	  outfits.	  While	  I	  
identify	  the	  CPRM	  as	  an	  example	  of	  defying	  “money”	  power,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  attempts	  by	  late	  Madan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  During	  the	  financial	  year	  2012-­‐13	  the	  GTA	  received	  550	  million	  INR	  (from	  Core	  Plan	  sector);	  328.4	  million	  
(from	  Rural	  Infrastructure	  Development	  Fund	  sector);	  381.6	  million	  INR	  (Special	  Central	  Assistance),	  and	  again	  
650	  million	  INR	  (Additional	  Central	  Assistance)	  (Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  2013b,	  51).	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Tamang	  to	  hold	  a	  public	  meeting	  inspite	  of	  threats	  to	  his	  live	  as	  an	  example	  of	  defying	  “muscle	  
power”.	  Lastly,	  I	  explore	  the	  example	  of	  ethnic	  associations,	  petitioning	  for	  scheduled	  tribe	  status	  
and	  own	  developmental	  councils,	  as	  an	  alternative	  avenue	  to	  pose	  demands	  on	  the	  state	  outside	  of	  
the	  realm	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  	  
I	  critically	  examine	  these	  examples	  as	  limits	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  through	  reputation,	  
repression,	  and	  patronage.	  I	  ask	  whether	  these	  do	  not	  only	  portray	  attempts	  of	  groups	  to	  provide	  
alternatives	  to	  the	  GJM	  but	  also	  pose	  serious	  challenges	  to	  the	  party’s	  dominance.	  	  
	  
8.2 Spaces	  for	  critique	  and	  forms	  of	  opposition	  
8.2.1 Media	  and	  Facebook	  
Media	  in	  competitive	  authoritarian	  systems	  are	  regarded	  as	  important	  “meeting	  platforms”	  for	  
opposition	  parties	  and	  provide	  a	  means	  to	  criticise	  (Levitsky	  and	  Way	  2002).	  But	  in	  how	  far	  do	  the	  
media	  in	  Darjeeling	  provide	  a	  platform	  for	  critique	  at	  the	  ruling	  party?	  The	  major	  local	  newspaper	  is	  
the	  Nepali-­‐language	  Himalaya	  Darpan,	  which	  is	  published	  daily	  and	  available	  at	  all	  market	  places.	  
There	  are	  two	  or	  three	  other	  vernacular	  newspapers	  but	  their	  geographical	  spread	  is	  less	  and	  they	  
are	  often	  only	  available	  in	  bigger	  towns.	  Besides,	  the	  State-­‐level	  English	  dailies	  The	  Telegraph	  and	  
The	  Statesman	  are	  available	  and	  regularly	  report	  on	  major	  political	  developments	  in	  Darjeeling.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  range	  of	  internet-­‐blogs	  including	  Darjeelingtimes.com	  (which	  contains	  an	  updated	  
collection	  from	  newspaper	  articles	  on	  the	  region	  and	  opinion	  pages).	  Further,	  various	  Facebook	  
groups	  contain	  updated	  news	  or	  opinions	  on	  Darjeeling	  politics.	  The	  discussion	  here	  only	  focuses	  on	  
the	  vernacular	  newspapers	  (mainly	  Himalaya	  Darpan),	  the	  State-­‐level	  The	  Telegraph,	  and	  
Facebook180.	  A	  view	  on	  the	  mentioned	  media	  sources	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  indeed	  provide	  
an	  important	  platform	  for	  the	  opposition.	  Critical	  statements	  by	  GJM’s	  rivals	  (opposition	  members	  
and	  private	  persons)	  are	  regularly	  published,	  although	  mostly	  not	  on	  the	  front-­‐page.	  None	  of	  the	  
opposition	  leaders	  ever	  complained	  about	  a	  lack	  of	  representation	  in	  the	  print-­‐media.	  Some	  
rumours,	  however,	  hold	  that	  GJM	  activists	  sometimes	  try	  to	  stop	  people	  from	  reading	  critical	  
accounts	  by	  buying	  newspapers	  in	  bulk.	  Yet,	  I	  could	  not	  cross-­‐check	  such	  accusations.	  Although	  I	  got	  
the	  impression	  that	  local	  newspapers	  were	  relatively	  uninfluenced	  by	  the	  GJM,	  in	  one	  instance	  I	  
witnessed	  how	  a	  Himalayan	  Darpan	  journalist	  requested	  a	  GTA	  councillor	  to	  help	  his	  wife	  get	  a	  
position	  as	  a	  teacher.	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  I	  did	  not	  conduct	  a	  detailed	  media	  analysis	  of	  these	  and	  my	  statements	  are	  based	  on	  rather	  general	  
observations	  as	  a	  regular	  reader	  of	  these	  media.	  




Although	  the	  councillor	  politely	  refused	  to	  help	  him	  this	  incident	  left	  me	  puzzled	  about	  the	  
independence	  of	  the	  concerned	  reporter.	  Further,	  upon	  my	  questions,	  another	  journalist	  claimed	  
that	  he	  regularly	  received	  threats	  from	  GJM-­‐workers,	  telling	  him	  to	  “take	  care”	  or	  “to	  be	  careful”,	  but	  
he	  saw	  this	  as	  part	  of	  his	  job.	  The	  journalist	  coped	  with	  the	  situation	  by	  trying	  to	  write	  in	  a	  
“balanced”	  way	  by	  giving	  coverage	  to	  all	  sides	  of	  stories.	  	  
The	  seemingly	  little	  intimidation	  to	  the	  print	  media	  from	  the	  GJM	  might	  stem	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
these	  hardly	  reach	  the	  rural	  areas,	  and	  are	  read	  by	  a	  faction	  of	  the	  population	  there,	  only.	  This	  
renders	  them	  quite	  ineffective	  in	  terms	  of	  opinion-­‐making	  of	  the	  masses.	  This	  is	  different	  with	  the	  
local	  cable	  TV	  channels,	  which	  are	  run	  by	  private	  companies	  and	  are	  viewed	  by	  many	  people.	  These	  
are	  mainly	  used	  by	  the	  GJM	  to	  disseminate	  news	  and	  interviews	  with	  leaders.	  They	  otherwise	  remain	  
“unpolitical”	  but	  hardly	  ever	  report	  on	  rival	  parties’	  activities.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  as	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
apparently	  went	  down	  heavily	  on	  five	  local	  cable	  TV	  channels	  of	  Kalimpong	  in	  February	  2012,	  
allegedly	  because	  they	  were	  broadcasting	  anti-­‐GJM	  statements	  (KalimNews	  2012).	  Gurung	  was	  
accused	  of	  threatening	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  network	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  stations	  were	  run	  illegally	  
(ibid.).	  Gurung	  also	  criticised	  Facebook,	  which	  attained	  increasing	  importance	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  public	  
critique	  at	  the	  GJM.	  While	  only	  a	  few	  newspapers	  reach	  the	  rural	  areas	  (usually	  when	  a	  jeep	  driver	  
brings	  one	  upon	  request),	  the	  spread	  of	  smart	  phones	  allows	  many	  persons	  to	  easily	  access	  the	  











Picture	  8:	  A	  poster	  reading	  “Sunrise	  in	  Darjeeling,	  Welcome	  
Mamata	  Banerjee”	  welcomes	  the	  CM	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  
The	  CM	  and	  GJM	  leader	  Bimal	  Gurung	  smile	  in	  front	  of	  the	  
Kanchenjunga	  mountain.	  The	  friendliness	  did	  not	  prevail:	  in	  
August	  the	  GJM	  switched	  back	  into	  its	  “movement”-­‐mode	  
and	  initiated	  its	  month-­‐long	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  
Picture	  taken	  by	  author	  in	  June	  2013.	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He	  said	  that	  the	  youth	  now	  did	  careless	  critical	  comments	  on	  Facebook	  instead	  of	  using	  it	  for	  
good	  things.	  ‘Nowadays	  our	  people	  do	  backbiting	  on	  Bimal	  Gurung	  [...].	  This	  is	  completely	  
bad	  work.	  [...]	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  lies	  are	  not	  welcome’,	  he	  said.	  
Eventually,	  before	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  Gurung	  opened	  his	  official	  Facebook	  account	  and	  
since	  then	  regularly	  posts	  news	  mainly	  on	  his	  political	  and	  developmental	  activities	  as	  elected	  GTA	  
chief	  and	  about	  political	  meetings.	  Most	  of	  these	  posts	  are	  written	  in	  English	  (although	  Gurung	  is	  said	  
to	  have	  difficulty	  in	  speaking	  English)	  and	  illustrated	  with	  pictures	  of	  the	  leader	  amongst	  the	  masses.	  
It	  is	  striking	  that	  there	  are	  hardly	  any	  “critical”	  comments	  on	  his	  Facebook	  page	  and	  some	  believe	  
that	  such	  comments	  are	  regularly	  deleted	  by	  a	  GJM	  editorial	  team.	  Despite	  such	  limitations	  I	  had	  the	  
impression	  that	  –	  albeit	  not	  very	  prominently	  –	  critical	  reporting	  is	  done	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  particularly	  
Facebook	  and	  vernacular	  media	  provide	  an	  important	  platform	  to	  voice	  critique	  of	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  
8.2.2 	  Ideal	  pictures	  of	  leadership	  and	  politics	  
A	  recurrent	  topic	  of	  rival	  parties’	  open	  critique	  of	  the	  Morcha	  concerns	  the	  question	  of	  “good”	  
leadership.	  Often,	  rivals	  construct	  ideal	  images	  of	  leaders	  in	  contrast	  to	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  As	  discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  5,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  was	  increasingly	  criticised	  as	  he	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  people’s	  moral	  and	  
material	  expectations.	  Although	  he	  invested	  in	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  genuine,	  capable,	  and	  generous	  
leader,	  he	  was	  increasingly	  perceived	  as	  selfish	  and	  dishonest	  about	  the	  statehood	  agenda.	  Such	  
critique	  of	  the	  leader	  also	  provided	  an	  entrance	  point	  for	  rival	  parties	  to	  challenge	  him,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
struggle	  over	  his	  reputation	  fought	  in	  the	  newspapers	  and	  occasional	  public	  meetings.	  But	  rivals	  do	  
not	  only	  criticise	  Gurung,	  they	  also	  promote	  standards	  for	  “good”	  leadership.	  One	  of	  the	  prominent	  
figures	  opposition	  leaders	  stylised	  as	  a	  “good”	  leader	  is	  late	  Madan	  Tamang.	  On	  May	  21,	  2012	  at	  a	  
public	  memorial	  meeting	  two	  years	  after	  his	  murder,	  organised	  by	  the	  AIGL	  and	  attended	  by	  
representatives	  of	  the	  CPRM,	  BGP,	  CPI-­‐M,	  and	  the	  Gorkha	  National	  Congress,	  speakers	  praised	  
Tamang’s	  qualities:	  
Madan	  Tamang	  never	  lied.	  He	  never	  suppressed	  people,	  he	  was	  never	  unjust	  to	  anybody	  […].	  
Madan	  Tamang	  never	  taught	  to	  kill	  people,	  he	  did	  not	  teach	  to	  bulldoze	  any	  other	  party	  office.	  
He	  never	  taught	  to	  conspire	  against	  any	  other	  party	  leader	  […].	  He	  always	  did	  issue-­‐based	  politics	  
[…].	  He	  never	  compromised	  on	  any	  issue	  […].	  Madan	  Tamang	  never	  did	  politics	  for	  the	  chaukī	  
(post/chair,	  power).	  (Pratab	  Khatee,	  AIGL)	  
The	  speeches	  at	  the	  public	  meeting	  were	  sparked	  with	  references	  to	  “democracy”	  (gaṇatantra).	  Tara	  
Muni	  Rai	  (CPRM)	  described	  Tamang	  as	  “responsible,	  honest,	  and	  thoughtful”	  leader,	  who	  died	  for	  
“democracy”	  and	  “did	  not	  surrender”,	  and	  continued:	  “We	  don’t	  want	  a	  dictatorship	  here,	  everyone	  
should	  get	  the	  right	  to	  expression	  and	  free	  decision	  […].	  There	  should	  not	  be	  a	  supremacy	  of	  muscle.	  
Everybody’s	  voice	  should	  be	  heard.”	  Another	  speaker	  added:	  “In	  a	  democracy	  I	  have	  to	  grasp	  the	  flag	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which	  I	  like.	  In	  a	  democracy,	  I	  have	  to	  eat	  what	  I	  like,	  and	  wear	  what	  I	  like.”	  Unanimously	  the	  
speakers	  criticised	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  for	  not	  enforcing	  “law	  and	  order”	  in	  Darjeeling,	  
alleging	  that	  “Darjeeling	  has	  a	  different	  law”	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Bengal	  (speech,	  P.	  Khatee).	  Another	  
speaker	  directly	  called	  upon	  CM	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  to	  “give	  a	  decent	  society,	  where	  there	  is	  the	  rule	  
of	  law;	  where	  people	  walk	  freely.”	  	  
Tamang	  himself	  had	  accused	  the	  (then	  CPI-­‐M	  led)	  State	  government	  for	  allowing	  the	  GJM	  to	  disturb	  
AIGL’s	  attempted	  meeting.	  In	  his	  critique,	  Tamang	  also	  directly	  pointed	  at	  the	  problematic	  conflation	  
of	  party	  politics	  and	  movement	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  Accusing	  the	  GJM	  leadership	  for	  “selling”	  the	  
statehood	  demand	  and	  running	  after	  the	  money,	  he	  had	  demanded	  “collective	  leadership”	  to	  make	  
sure	  that	  no	  leader	  can	  be	  “bought”	  by	  the	  State	  government	  to	  divert	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  
(Tamang	  2010,	  YouTube),	  a	  demand	  reiterated	  by	  Pratab	  Khatee	  at	  the	  public	  meeting.	  At	  the	  same	  
time	  Tamang	  had	  demanded	  a	  more	  inclusive	  and	  transparent	  “movement”	  by	  pointing	  at	  the	  fact	  
that	  it	  had	  been	  captured	  by	  political	  parties	  instead	  of	  being	  a	  “people’s	  movement”	  (Tamang	  2010,	  
YouTube):	  
This	  is	  not	  Ghisingh’s	  movement	  (āndolaṇ),	  this	  is	  not	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  movement	  […].	  This	  is	  
the	  movement	  of	  all	  people	  living	  in	  the	  hills	  […].	  All	  people	  have	  the	  right	  in	  that	  movement	  
to	  know	  the	  truth	  […].	  The	  movement	  should	  include	  all	  people’s	  thoughts.	  (ibid.)	  
Similar	  leadership	  qualities	  were	  also	  demanded	  by	  the	  BGP.	  At	  an	  indoor-­‐meeting	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  
in	  June	  2013,	  BGP	  leader	  Munis	  Tamang	  demanded	  a	  new	  type	  of	  leadership	  to	  bring	  the	  statehood	  
demand	  forward.	  Leaders	  should	  be	  “people-­‐like-­‐us”	  and	  have	  four	  qualities:	  they	  should	  be	  svachha	  
(clean,	  pure,	  here:	  not	  a	  criminal),	  shikṣit	  (educated,	  aware),	  shakchham	  (able)	  and	  shamarpit	  
(dedicated).	  Such	  leaders	  should	  be	  made	  centres	  of	  influence	  at	  different	  localities.	  Tamang	  saw	  
them	  as	  a	  means	  to	  break	  the	  “netā-­‐jantā”	  (leader-­‐follower)	  	  model	  where	  people	  were	  treated	  “like	  
a	  commodity”,	  and	  added	  “we	  cannot	  do	  ‘muscle’	  or	  ‘money	  politics’	  but	  we	  can	  do	  credible	  politics	  
[Engl].”	  Munis	  Tamang’s	  elaborations	  were	  later	  published	  in	  Himalaya	  Darpan.	  Members	  of	  the	  GTF	  
saw	  such	  values	  embodied	  in	  M.P.	  Lama,	  the	  former	  vice-­‐chancellor	  of	  Sikkim	  University,	  whom	  they	  
supported	  as	  independent	  candidate	  in	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections.	  Lama	  demanded	  development	  
and	  statehood	  for	  Darjeeling/Dooars,	  while	  his	  DDUDF	  claimed	  to	  propose	  a	  non-­‐political	  and	  more	  
inclusive	  alternative	  to	  the	  established	  Darjeeling	  parties.	  
But	  although	  both	  the	  AIGL	  and	  BGP	  meetings	  underline	  moral	  images	  of	  “good”	  leaders	  as	  opposed	  
to	  the	  defamed	  GJM-­‐leaders,	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  they	  reach	  the	  masses	  or	  appeal	  to	  them.	  
The	  AIGL	  meeting	  was	  attended	  by	  a	  few	  dozen	  people	  and	  the	  BGP’s	  indoor-­‐meeting	  was	  attended	  
by	  about	  16	  people,	  most	  of	  them	  were	  elderly	  (and	  only	  two	  of	  them	  were	  women).	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How	  applicable	  and	  attractive	  are	  such	  ideal	  pictures	  of	  leaders	  and	  leadership	  to	  the	  Darjeeling	  
masses?	  Although	  many	  of	  these	  moral	  values	  certainly	  appeal	  to	  many	  persons	  (see	  Chapter	  5),	  the	  
question	  remains	  how	  many	  voters	  are	  independent	  and	  brave	  enough	  to	  actively	  defy	  the	  climate	  of	  
silence	  and	  follow	  a	  leader	  whose	  authority	  is	  not	  based	  on	  money-­‐	  and/or	  muscle-­‐power,	  who	  
cannot	  distribute	  resources	  or	  provide	  security	  if	  faced	  with	  threats	  for	  engaging	  in	  a	  rival	  party.	  Does	  
“credible	  politics”	  as	  promoted	  by	  Munis	  Tamang	  have	  a	  space	  in	  Darjeeling?	  M.P.	  Lama	  was	  
promoted	  as	  such	  a	  credible	  leader.	  Supported	  by	  the	  GTF,	  he	  garnered	  about	  49,000	  votes	  during	  
the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  mostly	  from	  urban	  areas.	  He	  did	  not	  have	  a	  chance	  against	  the	  GJM	  
(209,017	  votes),	  and	  not	  even	  against	  the	  GNLF/TMC	  combine	  (86,271	  votes).	  Whether	  his	  loss	  stems	  
from	  a	  lack	  of	  organisational	  strength	  at	  the	  grassroots	  (his	  public	  appearances	  were	  concentrated	  
on	  bazaar	  places	  along	  the	  main	  roads),	  lack	  of	  recognition	  amongst	  the	  majority	  of	  voters,	  or	  the	  
little	  appeal	  of	  a	  leader	  lacking	  the	  means	  of	  money	  and	  muscle,	  remains	  an	  open	  question.	  	  
8.2.3 GNLF:	  Belief	  in	  the	  leader?	  
The	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  Morcha	  did	  not	  only	  become	  visible	  in	  public	  meetings	  of	  the	  
AIGL	  or	  CPRM.	  After	  six	  years	  in	  political	  slumber	  suddenly	  the	  GNLF	  came	  back	  on	  stage.	  While	  the	  
party’s	  foundation	  celebration	  in	  2012	  had	  been	  disturbed	  by	  the	  GJM	  (see	  Chapter	  6),	  in	  2013	  units	  
all	  over	  Darjeeling	  celebrated	  the	  day	  undisturbed.	  The	  party	  also	  began	  to	  reopen	  local	  units	  in	  the	  
hills.	  Not	  even	  the	  clash	  at	  Soureni	  (see	  Chapter	  7)	  in	  May	  2013,	  could	  stop	  the	  GNLF	  from	  regaining	  
ground.	  Surprisingly,	  not	  only	  old	  party	  followers,	  who	  had	  either	  joined	  the	  GJM	  in	  between	  or	  
simply	  remained	  passively	  silent,	  engaged	  with	  the	  GNLF	  again,	  new	  and	  young	  members	  also	  joined	  
the	  outfit.	  	  
I	  attended	  an	  indoor-­‐meeting	  of	  a	  recently	  established	  local	  GNLF	  branch	  at	  Joubari*	  tea	  estate.	  The	  
six	  mainly	  elder	  men	  gave	  me	  a	  leaflet	  on	  the	  6th	  Schedule,	  which	  outlined	  the	  advantages	  of	  making	  
Darjeeling	  “tribal”.	  They	  then	  engaged	  in	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  need	  to	  attain	  Gorkhaland	  (via	  the	  6th	  
Schedule)	  and	  a	  general	  critique	  at	  the	  Morcha	  for	  killing	  educated	  persons	  such	  as	  Madan	  Tamang	  
and	  the	  rule	  through	  fear,	  all	  together	  stressing	  the	  need	  for	  change.	  One	  activist	  recalled	  what	  
Ghisingh	  had	  told	  them:	  “Tomorrow,	  ‘politics’	  [Engl.]	  must	  not	  be	  the	  same.	  There	  need	  to	  be	  new	  
faces,	  new	  thoughts.	  It	  needs	  not	  start	  from	  the	  head	  but	  from	  the	  grassroots.”	  Another	  added	  “only	  
after	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  is	  attained	  we	  will	  start	  ‘politics’	  and	  engage	  in	  different	  parties.	  But	  before	  
you	  play	  football	  you	  need	  to	  build	  a	  ground.”	  	  
I	  wondered,	  in	  how	  far	  this	  would	  bring	  a	  change	  in	  the	  way	  politics	  was	  done	  in	  Darjeeling.	  What	  
became	  clear	  though	  was	  the	  unbroken	  belief	  and	  trust	  in	  Ghisingh	  as	  their	  leader,	  an	  observation,	  
which	  I	  had	  made	  several	  times	  when	  conversing	  with	  GNLF	  followers,	  even	  if	  I	  confronted	  them	  with	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allegations	  of	  his	  corruption	  and	  repression.	  Then	  the	  men	  began	  discussing	  how	  they	  could	  best	  
implement	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  call	  to	  build	  “Village	  Protection	  Cells”	  (VPC)	  in	  their	  place.	  The	  GNLF	  
had	  already	  called	  for	  an	  establishment	  of	  such	  cells	  in	  January	  2011,	  but	  it	  only	  received	  a	  stronger	  
response	  in	  2013	  (TT,	  8.1.2011,	  TT,	  11.6.2013).	  According	  to	  the	  activists,	  the	  VPC’s	  functions	  were	  to	  
stop	  “bad	  activities	  in	  the	  village	  and	  to	  bring	  change”,	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  the	  samāj	  and	  the	  local	  
GNLF	  leaders	  or	  to	  help	  in	  case	  of	  natural	  disasters.	  The	  VPC	  activists	  (men	  between	  19	  and	  35	  years)	  
should	  not	  carry	  weapons	  like	  khukurīs	  but	  only	  be	  equipped	  with	  rods	  (one	  man	  added:	  “The	  police	  
does	  not	  arrest	  you,	  if	  you	  carry	  a	  three-­‐feet	  long	  rod”).	  Further,	  they	  stressed	  that	  members	  of	  the	  
VPCs	  should	  be	  conscious,	  convinced	  of	  the	  GNLF,	  and	  they	  should	  not	  be	  alcoholics	  or	  gamblers.	  The	  
VPCs	  should	  carry	  out	  all	  activities	  as	  “social	  work”	  and	  not	  for	  financial	  remuneration.	  One	  man,	  
however,	  added	  that	  the	  VPCs	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  “village	  police”,	  which	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  6th	  
Schedule.	  Did	  this	  fuel	  hope	  amongst	  activists	  to	  become	  police	  men	  if	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  was	  
established?	  I	  did	  not	  come	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  VPC	  was	  eventually	  established	  in	  that	  village	  but	  
briefly	  after	  the	  meeting,	  the	  GNLF	  succeeded	  in	  holding	  a	  public	  meeting	  close	  to	  Kurseong	  despite	  
attempts	  by	  the	  GJM	  to	  disturb	  it.	  Accounts	  hold	  that	  the	  GNLF	  had	  brought	  its	  own	  force	  of	  rods-­‐	  
wielding	  young	  men,	  creating	  its	  own	  “muscle”.	  	  
At	  that	  time,	  party	  president	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  was	  still	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  plains.	  After	  2008,	  he	  had	  only	  
returned	  to	  Darjeeling	  ahead	  of	  the	  2011	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  elections.	  For	  four	  weeks	  he	  held	  
electoral	  rallies	  also	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  electoral	  code	  of	  conduct.	  After	  a	  
violent	  clash	  between	  GNLF	  and	  GJM	  followers,	  which	  left	  one	  GJM	  supporter	  dead	  and	  burnt	  down	  
houses	  of	  some	  GNLF	  followers,	  Ghisingh	  returned	  to	  his	  exile	  the	  same	  night	  (TT,	  17.5.2011;	  ToI,	  
17.5.2011).	  But	  prior	  to	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  the	  situation	  had	  changed	  and	  political	  spaces	  
in	  the	  hills	  were	  opening	  up.	  This	  was	  signalled	  by	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  public	  “invitation”	  to	  Ghisingh	  by	  
the	  end	  of	  2013.	  Some	  believe	  that	  being	  confronted	  with	  his	  dwindling	  support	  base	  and	  lack	  of	  
ability	  to	  stop	  Ghisingh	  from	  returning,	  Gurung	  simply	  tried	  to	  “save	  his	  face”	  (Chattopadhyay	  2014).	  
Eventually,	  in	  March	  2014,	  Ghisingh	  returned	  to	  his	  house	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  Observed	  by	  the	  
media,	  an	  obviously	  weak	  and	  aged	  party-­‐president	  stood	  on	  the	  balcony	  to	  greet	  the	  few	  hundred	  
followers,	  which	  had	  gathered.	  The	  large	  public	  meeting	  ahead	  of	  the	  elections	  at	  Darjeeling	  Chowk	  
Bazaar	  (which	  was	  attended	  by	  Ghisingh)	  signalled	  that	  the	  green	  flags	  were	  ultimately	  back	  in	  the	  
hills	  (ToI,	  11.4.2014).	  Significantly,	  the	  GNLF	  entered	  into	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  TMC	  for	  the	  Lok	  Sabha	  
elections;	  Ghisingh	  himself	  did	  not	  go	  to	  cast	  his	  vote	  officially	  due	  to	  health	  reasons.	  The	  Morcha	  
was	  neither	  able	  to	  stop	  Ghisingh	  from	  reclaiming	  his	  old	  home	  nor	  to	  oust	  him	  after	  the	  elections.	  It	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remains	  an	  open	  question,	  however,	  what	  the	  GNLF	  will	  do	  once	  its	  aged	  leader	  Ghisingh	  as	  the	  
central	  figure	  keeping	  the	  organisation	  together	  is	  not	  able	  to	  lead	  the	  party	  anymore181.	  	  
8.2.4 TMC:	  “Bargaining	  politics”?	  
Chapter	  6	  underlined	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  “resource	  monopolies”	  and	  the	  associated	  regular	  
distribution	  of	  benefits	  through	  the	  party	  sustained	  its	  mobilising	  function.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  lead	  
to	  a	  harsh	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  about	  the	  scarce	  funds	  and	  to	  what	  a	  sabhashād	  called	  a	  
“bargaining	  politics”	  (Chapter	  6).	  This	  seems	  to	  have	  increased	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  GTA	  
where	  the	  47	  GJM	  sabhashāds	  struggle	  for	  the	  party	  president’s	  (alias	  GTA	  chief’s)	  favour	  to	  get	  
projects	  sanctioned	  for	  their	  constituencies.	  This	  section	  attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  defections	  to	  the	  
TMC	  with	  reference	  to	  Karateke’s	  (2005)	  concept	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  sites	  of	  legitimacy	  (as	  
introduced	  in	  Chapter	  1).	  If	  leaders	  cannot	  supply	  what	  followers	  demand	  the	  latter	  are	  prone	  to	  
switch	  their	  political	  affiliation.	  This	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  inner-­‐party	  competition	  for	  scarce	  resources.	  I	  
illustrate	  this	  proposal	  along	  two	  examples.	  
The	  leaders’	  problems	  to	  live	  up	  to	  their	  followers’	  demands	  became	  apparent	  in	  June	  2013,	  when	  I	  
accompanied	  Pravesh*	  –	  a	  GTA	  councillor,	  who	  was	  struggling	  with	  upcoming	  TMC	  units	  in	  his	  
constituency	  –	  to	  two	  meetings	  with	  GJM	  defectors.	  The	  groups	  of	  around	  15	  to	  20	  mostly	  young	  
men	  voiced	  concerns	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  developmental	  benefits.	  While	  the	  councillor	  was	  
stressing	  on	  what	  he	  had	  already	  done	  for	  the	  constituency,	  including	  road	  constructions	  and	  placed	  
emphasis	  on	  achieving	  community	  benefits	  (as	  opposed	  to	  individual	  benefits),	  one	  defector	  angrily	  
asked	  the	  councillor:	  “What	  does	  the	  GTA	  give	  to	  us?”	  Others	  expressed	  their	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  
work	  of	  the	  GJM	  affiliated	  tea	  workers’	  union	  or	  for	  not	  receiving	  news	  on	  party-­‐activities.	  Such	  
accounts	  expressed	  their	  dissatisfaction	  particularly	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  GTA.	  They	  felt	  
they	  did	  not	  get	  what	  they	  had	  expected	  despite	  their	  year-­‐long	  engagement	  for	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
movement.	  Their	  critique	  suggests	  that	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  movement	  itself	  might	  have	  been	  
motivated	  by	  the	  expectation	  of	  individual	  rewards	  through	  the	  GJM.	  The	  councillor	  then	  promised	  
to	  organise	  more	  developmental	  schemes	  or	  to	  invite	  Bimal	  Gurung	  to	  visit	  the	  place	  (following	  the	  
popular	  coinage	  “where	  the	  president	  goes	  development	  comes”)	  but	  stressed	  that	  he	  needed	  their	  
support	  to	  do	  so.	  Two	  days	  later,	  one	  of	  the	  GJM	  defector	  groups	  had	  removed	  the	  TMC	  flags	  and	  re-­‐
joined	  the	  GJM,	  suggesting	  that	  their	  “bargaining	  politics”	  (as	  Pravesh	  called	  it)	  had	  been	  successful.	  
The	  other	  flags,	  however,	  remained.	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  Postscriptum:	  Ghisingh	  died	  in	  January	  2015,	  after	  a	  prolonged	  sickness.	  His	  son,	  Man	  Ghising,	  who	  till	  date	  
had	  not	  been	  active	  in	  politics,	  became	  the	  new	  party	  president	  probably	  to	  avoid	  infighting	  amongst	  aspirant	  
leaders.	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In	  2013,	  also	  some	  of	  my	  friends	  from	  Bagargaun,	  who	  had	  previously	  supported	  the	  GJM	  had	  joined	  
the	  TMC.	  For	  them,	  a	  major	  reason	  to	  join	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  West	  Bengal	  was	  their	  perceived	  blatant	  
corruption	  of	  local	  leaders	  and	  the	  inaction	  of	  the	  sub-­‐divisional	  committee	  to	  stop	  this.	  My	  friend	  
proudly	  emphasised	  his	  close	  relations	  to	  Darjeeling	  TMC	  leader	  Rajen	  Mukhia.	  In	  the	  TMC	  he	  saw	  an	  
able	  provider	  of	  development,	  e.g.	  via	  the	  North	  Bengal	  Development	  Department182.	  This	  institution	  
has	  the	  official	  objectives	  to	  “promote	  social,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  advancement”	  of	  six	  northern	  
districts	  in	  West	  Bengal	  (including	  Darjeeling).	  It	  runs	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  State	  Development	  
and	  Planning	  Department	  and	  has	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  developmental	  contracts	  and	  schemes	  outside	  
the	  purview	  of	  the	  GTA	  (Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  2015).	  My	  friend	  was	  also	  hoping	  to	  open	  a	  
ration	  shop.	  “Rajen	  Mukhia	  has	  the	  phone	  number	  of	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  and	  can	  call	  her	  every	  time”,	  
he	  exclaimed.	  Instead	  of	  going	  through	  the	  GTA/GJM	  route,	  he	  thought	  that	  membership	  in	  the	  TMC	  
provided	  him	  with	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  the	  State	  government.	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  police	  was	  now	  
stricter	  and	  would	  listen	  to	  TMC	  members	  instead	  of	  the	  Morcha.	  “Those	  officers	  who	  don’t	  follow	  
the	  TMC’s	  directives	  are	  transferred”,	  he	  explained,	  “Mamata	  Banerjee	  has	  made	  it	  very	  ‘tight’	  for	  
the	  Morcha,	  now”.	  Upon	  my	  question	  whether	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  have	  Gorkhaland	  anymore,	  he	  
claimed:	  “Everybody	  wants	  Gorkhaland.	  But	  right	  now	  I	  do	  not	  see	  a	  way	  for	  it	  to	  come.”	  He	  had	  lost	  
the	  belief	  in	  Gorkhaland,	  and	  instead	  had	  decided	  to	  “take	  some	  benefits	  from	  politics”	  now.	  	  
Also	  some	  former	  GNLF	  members	  joined	  the	  TMC.	  One	  of	  them	  clearly	  named	  security-­‐reasons	  for	  
his	  decision	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  ruling	  party	  would	  be	  better	  protected	  from	  the	  
Morcha’s	  violent	  repression.	  	  
Such	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  decisions	  to	  join	  the	  TMC	  were	  not	  based	  on	  any	  political	  programme	  or	  
ideology.	  For	  many	  it	  was	  simply	  a	  tactic	  to	  exercise	  pressure	  on	  the	  GJM	  to	  deliver	  what	  they	  
believed	  was	  their	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  party’s	  perceived	  wealth.	  Others	  expressed	  their	  believe	  that	  in	  
the	  long	  term	  an	  affiliation	  with	  TMC	  would	  allow	  them	  access	  to	  non-­‐GTA-­‐channelled	  state	  benefits,	  
or	  receiving	  police	  protection	  to	  tackle	  anticipated	  or	  actual	  GJM	  attacks.	  	  
Defections	  express	  not	  only	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  perceived	  ability	  of	  the	  GJM	  to	  “deliver”,	  including	  
“development”	  (or	  contracts)	  and	  Gorkhaland	  but	  also	  perceived	  inequalities	  between	  wealthy	  (and	  
“selfish”)	  leaders	  and	  “poor”	  (and	  exploited)	  masses.	  The	  TMC’s	  slogan	  of	  “democracy,	  peace	  and	  
development”	  provides	  a	  smart	  label	  for	  such	  dissatisfaction.	  Not	  surprisingly	  the	  struggle	  over	  
political	  authority	  in	  Darjeeling	  is	  increasingly	  fought	  as	  a	  struggle	  over	  developmental	  schemes	  in	  
the	  rhetoric	  of	  alleged	  corruption.	  TMC	  members,	  for	  instance,	  regularly	  engage	  in	  campaigns	  
claiming	  more	  transparency	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  welfare	  schemes	  (including	  the	  NREGS).	  Such	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  Parshad”.	  
Limits	  of	  “money“	  and	  “muscle“?	  Breaking	  the	  silence	  
233	  
	  
campaigns	  include	  visits	  to	  the	  Block	  Development	  Officers	  or	  the	  filing	  of	  Right	  to	  Information	  
requests,	  which	  is	  usually	  covered	  in	  the	  media.	  This	  combined	  with	  perceived	  attempts	  of	  the	  
government	  to	  make	  the	  district	  and	  block-­‐administrations	  more	  accountable,	  especially	  before	  the	  
2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections.	  During	  her	  visits	  to	  Darjeeling,	  CM	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  regularly	  proclaimed	  
her	  intent	  to	  make	  a	  “Switzerland”	  out	  of	  Darjeeling,	  underlining	  a	  developmental	  agenda,	  which	  has	  
so	  far,	  however,	  only	  focussed	  on	  tourism	  while	  ignoring	  the	  major	  concerns	  of	  the	  tea	  economy	  (see	  
Chapter	  4).	  	  
Such	  attempts	  to	  establish	  the	  TMC	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  step	  to	  make	  the	  State	  government	  a	  direct	  
contact	  point	  for	  project	  applications	  and	  clearly	  challenges	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  monopoly	  over	  
developmental	  funds.	  The	  State	  government	  needs	  local	  TMC	  units	  as	  a	  means	  to	  check	  on	  the	  GJM	  
and	  is,	  therefore,	  willing	  to	  distribute	  resources.	  Thus,	  joining	  the	  TMC	  puts	  individuals	  into	  a	  position	  
to	  bargain	  with	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  State-­‐ruling	  government	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  As	  an	  effect,	  party	  
affiliations	  become	  more	  fluid	  and	  leaders	  cannot	  be	  sure	  about	  electoral	  support	  anymore.	  
Thus,	  once	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  leader’s	  capacity	  to	  deliver	  vanishes,	  the	  widespread	  party	  follower	  
networks	  constituting	  “transactional	  groups”	  (Bailey	  1969,	  75)	  weaken,	  which	  ultimately	  results	  in	  a	  
loss	  of	  the	  leader’s	  power	  and	  control.	  This	  supports	  a	  finding	  of	  Hachhetu	  (2008)	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  
patronage	  to	  sustain	  a	  political	  party.	  Instead	  of	  strengthening	  a	  leader’s	  authority,	  “[t]he	  more	  a	  
party	  depends	  on	  money	  [...]	  and	  patronage,	  the	  less	  is	  the	  party’s	  capacity	  to	  mobilise	  the	  mass	  of	  
the	  people”	  (ibid.	  172),	  resulting	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  the	  leaders’	  capability	  to	  capture	  the	  state	  in	  the	  longer	  
term.	  In	  Darjeeling,	  the	  perceived	  non-­‐delivery	  of	  leaders	  according	  to	  followers’	  demands	  resulted	  
in	  a	  loss	  of	  the	  leaders’	  factual	  legitimacy.	  The	  decline	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  margin	  in	  the	  2014	  elections	  
might	  be	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  too183.	  Although	  such	  defections	  do	  not	  pose	  a	  general	  critique	  of	  the	  means	  
of	  “money”	  and	  “muscle”,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  instances,	  where	  individuals	  resisted	  being	  bought	  or	  
intimidated.	  I	  discuss	  these	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sub-­‐sections.	  	  
8.2.5 CPRM:	  Defying	  “money”	  power?	  	  
The	  discussion	  above	  suggests	  that	  political	  mobilisation	  in	  Darjeeling	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  
“money”-­‐power	  and	  distribution	  of	  resources	  through	  clientelist	  networks.	  As	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  
Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli’s	  (2010)	  account	  on	  dominant-­‐party	  regimes	  suggests	  that	  only	  those	  parties	  
commanding	  resources	  are	  able	  to	  organise	  mass-­‐support.	  Greene	  (2010)	  claimed	  that	  “resource	  
monopolies	  sustain	  political	  monopolies”	  (ibid.	  808).	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007)	  contend	  that	  
programmatic	  or	  ideological	  bases	  of	  support	  to	  parties	  are	  only	  feasible	  for	  persons	  with	  secure	  
economic	  positions.	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  I	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  the	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However,	  two	  examples	  of	  CPRM	  activities	  suggest	  that	  also	  a	  party	  lacking	  the	  means	  of	  money	  is	  
able	  to	  mobilise	  active	  support.	  The	  first	  example	  is	  the	  party’s	  successful	  celebration	  of	  the	  May	  
Diwas	  (May-­‐day)	  on	  May	  1,	  2012	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  The	  meeting	  was	  held	  at	  Darjeeling	  Chowk	  
Bazaar	  and	  succeeded	  despite	  of	  attempts	  of	  the	  GJM	  to	  spoil	  it	  and	  to	  capture	  the	  venue	  for	  their	  
own	  party-­‐meeting.	  This	  event	  merits	  closer	  attention:	  
Chowk	  Bazaar	  at	  the	  main	  road	  and	  the	  central	  bazaar	  area	  of	  Darjeeling	  town	  has	  been	  the	  site	  for	  
political	  meetings	  and	  public	  speeches	  since	  the	  colonial	  time.	  Previously	  known	  as	  Gundri	  Bazaar	  
(strawmats’	  market),	  at	  weekends	  vendors	  (including	  vegetable	  sellers	  from	  the	  rural	  areas)	  
attracted	  people	  from	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas,	  who	  provided	  speakers	  a	  considerable	  audience.	  The	  
visitors	  then	  carried	  the	  news	  back	  to	  their	  respective	  places.	  The	  designation	  Gitange	  Dada	  for	  the	  
speakers’	  place	  (literally:	  “Singers’	  hill”)	  stems	  from	  that	  time,	  and	  today	  refers	  to	  the	  broad	  balcony	  
at	  the	  municipal	  building,	  where	  speakers	  hold	  their	  speeches.	  Ghisingh	  later	  changed	  the	  name	  to	  
Sumeru	  Manchh	  but	  most	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  still	  know	  it	  as	  Gitange	  Dada.	  Opposite	  to	  the	  balcony,	  
is	  the	  postering	  bhittā	  (poster-­‐wall)	  which	  displays	  messages	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  other	  groups	  
(Picture	  4	  in	  Chapter	  5.2).	  Any	  kind	  of	  political	  agitation	  is	  announced	  here,	  which	  –	  according	  to	  
journalists	  –	  makes	  it	  an	  important	  information	  board.	  Given	  the	  central	  location	  of	  the	  wall,	  
messages	  from	  here	  not	  only	  easily	  spread	  in	  town	  but	  travellers	  from	  the	  passing	  passenger	  vehicles	  
further	  disseminate	  the	  news	  to	  the	  whole	  district.	  	  
The	  centrality	  of	  both,	  the	  postering	  bhittā	  and	  Gitange	  Dada	  make	  the	  place	  a	  much	  contested	  site	  
amongst	  political	  parties.	  Opposition	  parties	  criticise	  not	  only	  that	  their	  posters	  were	  regularly	  torn	  
from	  the	  wall	  by	  GJM	  activists	  but	  also	  that	  their	  meetings	  were	  disturbed	  or	  hindered.	  Against	  this	  
backdrop,	  it	  is	  remarkable	  that	  the	  CPRM	  managed	  to	  enforce	  its	  official	  permission	  to	  use	  the	  site	  
for	  the	  May	  Day	  rally	  despite	  attempts	  of	  the	  Morcha	  activists	  to	  spoil	  it.	  	  
The	  GJM	  affiliated	  JUSLU	  union184	  called	  a	  strike	  in	  Darjeeling	  for	  all	  shops	  to	  remain	  closed	  (a	  CPRM	  
member	  interpreted	  this	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  stop	  people	  from	  going	  to	  the	  bazaar	  for	  shopping	  and	  
accidentally	  listen	  to	  what	  the	  CPRM	  was	  saying).	  CPRM	  activists	  told	  me	  that	  when	  they	  began	  
preparing	  the	  venue,	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  1st	  May,	  by	  placing	  flags	  and	  posters,	  activists	  of	  the	  GJM	  had	  
begun	  to	  post	  their	  own	  flags,	  too.	  When	  I	  reached	  the	  venue	  at	  around	  9	  am,	  a	  few	  hours	  before	  the	  
meeting	  was	  to	  start	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  CPRM	  activists	  were	  to	  arrive,	  the	  atmosphere	  was	  tense.	  
One	  acquainted	  journalist	  warned	  me	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  “clash”,	  while	  pointing	  at	  the	  50	  or	  so	  
men	  lined	  up	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  street.	  “Over	  there	  are	  the	  GJM	  supporters,	  on	  the	  other	  side	  the	  
CPRM	  men.”	  I	  also	  spotted	  two	  GJM	  jeeps	  loaded	  with	  young	  men.	  Some	  police	  was	  on	  the	  road,	  too,	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waiting	  as	  it	  seemed.	  On	  the	  balcony	  of	  another	  municipality	  building	  close	  to	  Gitange	  Dada,	  a	  well-­‐
known	  Nari	  Morcha	  activist	  sat	  with	  her	  arms	  folded	  and	  with	  an	  angry	  expression	  on	  her	  face.	  Not	  
sure	  whether	  the	  meeting	  would	  take	  place	  I	  left	  towards	  the	  train	  station,	  where	  the	  demonstration	  
was	  scheduled	  to	  start.	  And	  indeed,	  shouting	  slogans	  for	  the	  revolution	  and	  equipped	  with	  posters	  
claiming	  Gorkhaland,	  what	  seemed	  like	  thousands	  of	  activists,	  ascended	  the	  winding	  road.	  When	  
they	  reached	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  the	  GJM	  activists	  were	  gone,	  only	  leaving	  their	  flags	  behind,	  strategically	  
placed	  between	  the	  red	  CPRM	  ones.	  The	  CPRM	  activists	  did	  not	  bother	  to	  remove	  them,	  saying	  that	  
they	  were	  not	  using	  the	  same	  “methods”	  like	  the	  GJM.	  And	  so	  it	  happened	  that	  around	  5,000	  (TT,	  
3.1.2012)	  communists	  sang	  “The	  workers	  of	  the	  world	  are	  united”	  (duṇiyāko	  majdur	  ektā	  ho)	  
underneath	  both,	  GJM	  and	  CPRM	  flags.	  	  
But	  while	  the	  class/tea-­‐labour	  questions	  figured	  only	  in	  the	  initial	  speeches	  of	  the	  meeting,	  the	  
agenda	  soon	  focussed	  on	  Gorkhaland	  and	  a	  more	  general	  critique	  at	  the	  GJM’s	  leaders.	  This	  included	  
allegations	  of	  their	  exploitation	  of	  people’s	  emotions	  and	  the	  Gorkhaland	  issue	  for	  personal	  
privileges,	  expressed	  in	  the	  idiom	  of	  “eating”	  and	  “becoming	  fatter	  and	  fatter”	  (speech,	  Govind	  
Chettri;	  see	  Chapter	  6).	  Enos	  Das	  Pradhan	  (BGP)	  opposed	  the	  GJM	  by	  asking	  people	  to	  fight	  their	  
“fear-­‐psychosis”,	  and	  continued:	  
We	  don’t	  need	  a	  Gorkhaland	  amidst	  such	  a	  state	  of	  terror,	  we	  don’t	  need	  a	  corrupted	  
Gorkhaland.	  [...]	  We	  have	  the	  aim	  to	  restructure	  our	  society,	  to	  free	  it	  from	  terror,	  to	  liberate	  
it	  from	  corruption.	  We	  need	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  which	  makes	  society	  move	  more	  
freely,	  and	  it	  will	  be	  a	  civilised	  and	  well-­‐off	  Gorkhaland.	  	  
Such	  proclamations	  not	  only	  complement	  above	  cited	  accounts	  on	  ideal	  leaders	  but	  also	  fill	  the	  idea	  
of	  “Gorkhaland”	  with	  meaning.	  They	  exemplify	  one	  rare	  incidence,	  where	  leaders	  transcend	  the	  
rhetoric	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  “homeland”	  and	  indicate	  what	  kind	  of	  Gorkhaland	  they	  actually	  want.	  
The	  meeting	  continued	  till	  late	  afternoon.	  Later,	  when	  I	  asked	  one	  CPRM	  leader	  how	  they	  had	  
managed	  to	  capture	  the	  venue	  she	  pointed	  at	  the	  big	  number	  of	  activists,	  who	  had	  simply	  
outnumbered	  the	  GJM.	  Significantly,	  the	  CPRM’s	  claim	  to	  the	  venue	  had	  also	  been	  supported	  by	  its	  
own	  voluntary	  force,	  the	  Swayam	  Sevak	  Bahini,	  consisting	  of	  young	  male	  and	  female	  activists185.	  	  
Realising	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  clash	  also	  the	  municipality	  administration	  had	  upheld	  their	  permission	  
for	  the	  meeting	  and	  told	  the	  GJM	  to	  leave.	  After	  the	  CPRM	  had	  succeeded	  with	  holding	  the	  first	  
massive	  public	  meeting	  since	  the	  GJM	  had	  attained	  power	  in	  2007	  (TT,	  3.5.2012),	  the	  Gitange	  Dada	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was	  frequented	  by	  other	  groups	  and	  parties	  too,	  including	  the	  Indigenous	  Lepcha	  Tribal	  Association	  
(ILTA),	  the	  TMC,	  and	  even	  the	  CPI-­‐M.	  
The	  second	  example	  of	  CPRM’s	  resistance	  shows	  how	  activists	  defied	  attempts	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung	  to	  
lure	  them	  into	  his	  party	  by	  distributing	  benefits	  and	  resources.	  After	  the	  CPRM’s	  successful	  May	  
Diwas,	  in	  June	  2012	  Gurung	  	  had	  decided	  to	  pitch	  his	  tents	  in	  the	  Rangmook/Cedars	  tea	  estate	  close	  
to	  the	  town	  Sonada.	  The	  tea	  estate	  is	  home	  to	  CPRM	  president	  R.B.	  Rai,	  who	  lives	  in	  the	  village	  of	  
Chandramandhura	  and	  is	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  “red	  belt”	  of	  Darjeeling,	  where	  the	  communist	  
parties	  still	  have	  a	  certain	  hold	  and	  are	  even	  majority	  in	  some	  villages.	  Accompanied	  by	  some	  GLP	  
activists	  and	  his	  personal	  bodyguards	  (equipped	  with	  AK-­‐47	  rifles)	  Gurung	  –	  who	  resided	  in	  the	  
managers’	  bungalow	  –	  distributed	  money	  to	  selected	  persons	  (usually	  recommended	  by	  the	  local	  
party	  leaders),	  promised	  to	  construct	  houses	  for	  the	  poor,	  roads	  to	  connect	  remote	  villages,	  and	  
community	  halls	  in	  the	  various	  villages	  that	  he	  visited.	  	  
But	  despite	  his	  large	  entourage	  he	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  visit	  Chandramandhura	  considered	  as	  the	  heart	  
of	  CPRM	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Local	  CPRM	  activists	  had	  posted	  guards	  to	  avoid	  any	  “attack”	  on	  their	  base.	  
Although	  there	  was	  no	  open	  confrontation,	  the	  battle	  over	  political	  support	  was	  fought	  in	  the	  local	  
newspapers	  that	  closely	  covered	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  stay.	  Reports	  of	  his	  benevolent	  activities	  and	  CPRM	  
defections	  were	  followed	  by	  CPRM’s	  complaints	  about	  the	  allegedly	  “undemocratic”	  (agaṇatantrik)	  
and	  politicised	  developmental	  practices	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  president	  who	  at	  that	  time	  was	  neither	  elected	  
as	  DGHC	  representative	  nor	  of	  any	  other	  governmental	  department.	  When	  Bimal	  Gurung	  initiated	  a	  
road	  construction,	  the	  CPRM	  complained	  about	  the	  destruction	  of	  thousands	  of	  tea-­‐bushes	  due	  to	  
the	  road	  widening;	  when	  Bimal	  Gurung	  arranged	  for	  rice-­‐distribution	  to	  families,	  the	  CPRM	  
complained	  about	  the	  shadowy	  sources	  of	  the	  rice	  (they	  said	  it	  was	  rice	  meant	  for	  government	  ration	  
shops);	  when	  Bimal	  Gurung	  promised	  a	  community	  hall,	  the	  CPRM	  claimed	  it	  was	  constructed	  in	  a	  
geologically	  sinking	  zone;	  and	  when	  Bimal	  Gurung	  organised	  an	  eye-­‐camp	  for	  the	  population,	  the	  
CPRM	  blamed	  them	  for	  forcing	  people	  to	  join	  the	  GJM	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  treatment.	  But	  CPRM	  
delegations	  and	  complains	  to	  the	  BDO	  and	  the	  District	  Magistrate	  did	  not	  stop	  Bimal	  Gurung	  from	  
continuing	  with	  his	  developmental	  welfare	  programme	  for	  the	  –	  as	  he	  called	  them	  –	  “politically	  
oppressed	  people”	  of	  Rangmuk.	  He	  utilised	  this	  campaign	  to	  invest	  in	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  capable	  
social	  worker,	  who	  liberated	  and	  helped	  the	  deprived	  people	  of	  the	  region	  while	  simultaneously	  
defaming	  the	  local	  CPRM	  leadership	  as	  rich	  exploiters	  opposed	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  development	  (Bimal	  
Gurung,	  speech,	  14.6.2012;	  see	  also	  Chapter	  5).	  Eventually,	  after	  two	  weeks,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  left.	  	  
I	  was	  eager	  to	  learn	  how	  his	  attempts	  and	  distributions	  were	  perceived	  by	  the	  rural	  population,	  
which	  –	  like	  people	  on	  other	  plantations	  –	  was	  surviving	  on	  meagre	  salaries	  from	  plantation	  work	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and	  occasional	  jobs	  or	  engagement	  in	  government	  schemes.	  How	  did	  people	  react	  to	  Gurung’s	  
promises	  and	  performance?	  
When	  I	  visited	  the	  tea	  estate	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  Gurung	  had	  not	  only	  left	  behind	  promises	  of	  
road	  widening,	  house	  construction,	  and	  community	  halls	  but	  also	  an	  upset	  and	  deeply	  divided	  local	  
population.	  When	  I	  discussed	  Gurung’s	  visit	  with	  a	  group	  of	  female	  labourers,	  they	  exchanged	  heated	  
arguments	  about	  the	  “rights”	  and	  “wrongs”	  of	  his	  conduct,	  and	  GJM	  supporters	  blamed	  the	  CPRM	  
supporters	  for	  not	  allowing	  Gurung	  entrance	  to	  their	  village	  so	  that	  they	  went	  empty	  despite	  his	  
campaign.	  
Indeed,	  some	  CPRM	  members	  had	  defected	  to	  the	  GJM,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  decided	  to	  follow	  the	  
party	  which	  was	  able	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  money	  and	  services,	  such	  as	  house	  construction	  or	  
medical	  expenses,	  while	  the	  CPRM	  did	  not	  provide	  employment	  or	  anything	  else.	  One	  elderly	  woman	  
amongst	  the	  defectors	  stressed:	  
We	  don’t	  have	  work,	  we	  don’t	  have	  money.	  We	  stayed	  with	  the	  CPRM	  for	  many	  years	  but	  
didn’t	  get	  any	  employment.	  How	  long	  shall	  we	  wait?	  [Bimal	  Gurung]	  came	  and	  gave	  foot	  
ration,	  a	  roof,	  and	  3,000	  rupees.	  Now	  we	  hope	  that	  he	  will	  organise	  a	  small	  job	  for	  us,	  too.	  
When	  I	  asked	  her	  why	  she	  had	  stayed	  with	  the	  CPRM	  so	  long,	  she	  pointed	  at	  their	  majority	  in	  the	  
village,	  saying:	  “All	  the	  houses	  around	  are	  with	  the	  CPRM.	  Why	  should	  we	  protest	  (birod	  garnū)?”	  
Yet,	  while	  some	  welcomed	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  initiative	  and	  praised	  him	  for	  supporting	  them	  with	  
money	  (he	  gave	  3,000	  INR	  to	  some	  families	  and	  promised	  them	  a	  new	  house),	  organising	  a	  health	  
camp	  and	  bringing	  development	  to	  the	  region,	  and	  thus	  perceived	  him	  as	  a	  leader,	  who	  cares	  for	  the	  
poor	  and	  those	  in	  need,	  others	  refrained	  from	  taking	  material	  benefits.	  For	  instance,	  one	  elderly	  
woman	  abstained	  from	  a	  free	  eye	  operation	  after	  she	  was	  asked	  to	  join	  the	  GJM	  and	  many	  did	  not	  
approach	  Gurung	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  share	  of	  the	  free	  distribution	  of	  rice.	  	  
What	  can	  explain	  this	  refusal,	  i.e.	  that	  not	  everybody	  accepted	  Gurung’s	  offers	  although	  according	  to	  
theory	  a	  poor	  economic	  background	  makes	  people	  prone	  to	  do	  so	  (see	  Chapter	  6)?	  Why	  should	  
people	  stay	  with	  a	  “poor”	  party,	  instead?	  Certainly,	  the	  fact	  that	  CPRM	  president	  R.B.	  Rai	  himself	  
stems	  from	  Chandramandhura	  and	  the	  place’s	  long	  history	  as	  communist	  stronghold,	  explain	  part	  of	  
its	  immunity	  against	  the	  GJM’s	  spoils.	  It	  makes	  also	  sense	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  ideological	  class	  and	  
labour	  agenda,	  which	  is	  promoted	  in	  the	  cadre-­‐based	  party	  helps	  sustaining	  its	  base.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  
GJM,	  membership	  in	  the	  CPRM	  is	  more	  formalised	  and	  cadres	  pass	  through	  a	  more	  institutionalised	  
programme	  of	  ideological	  lessons	  on	  communist	  ideology.	  Only	  those	  with	  longer-­‐term	  political	  
experience	  are	  promoted	  within	  the	  party	  hierarchy.	  Often,	  the	  fathers	  and	  forefathers	  of	  activists	  
had	  been	  members	  of	  the	  communist	  party.	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Some	  of	  the	  local	  followers	  also	  regularly	  underlined	  their	  aspirations	  for	  democracy	  (gaṇatantra),	  
which	  for	  them	  meant	  the	  freedom	  to	  join	  the	  party	  of	  one’s	  own	  preference	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  
hold	  public	  meetings.	  Many	  of	  them	  unmasked	  Gurung’s	  proclaimed	  “welfare”	  activities	  as	  a	  strategy	  
for	  gaining	  political	  support	  for	  the	  coming	  GTA	  elections	  in	  July	  2012.	  Outrageous	  local	  activists	  did	  
not	  only	  blame	  him	  for	  attempting	  to	  destroy	  their	  communist	  base	  in	  the	  hills	  but	  also	  for	  his	  lack	  of	  
legitimacy	  to	  initiate	  any	  kind	  of	  “development”	  as	  he	  was	  not	  an	  elected	  representative	  (i.e.	  of	  the	  
DGHC,	  see	  Chapter	  6)	  and	  for	  ignoring	  local	  needs.	  They	  also	  blamed	  him	  for	  spoiling	  local	  women	  by	  
calling	  them	  for	  dance	  evenings	  and	  for	  preparing	  food	  for	  his	  activists,	  adding	  to	  his	  reputation	  of	  
having	  a	  weakness	  for	  the	  other	  gender.	  They	  believed	  that	  the	  GJM’s	  patronage	  eventually	  resulted	  
in	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  statehood	  demand	  and	  despised	  Bimal	  Gurung	  as	  a	  broker	  (dalāl)	  of	  the	  West	  
Bengal	  government,	  who	  “sold	  the	  soil”	  for	  personal	  gain.	  In	  this	  context,	  some	  even	  claimed	  that	  
they	  did	  not	  want	  “development”	  –	  but	  only	  Gorkhaland.	  Such	  critique	  was	  contrasted	  with	  their	  
own	  leader	  R.B.	  Rai,	  whom	  they	  praised	  for	  his	  moral	  integrity	  and	  decency.	  CPRM	  activists	  claimed	  
they	  would	  sacrifice	  material	  benefits	  and	  “development”	  to	  forward	  the	  struggle	  for	  their	  “identity”	  
embodied	  in	  Gorkhaland.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  (which	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  
by	  Gorkhaland)	  became	  a	  reference	  frame	  to	  justify	  staying	  with	  a	  poor	  party.	  
Such	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  some	  CPRM	  activists	  form	  a	  different	  “moral	  community”	  (cf.	  Lentz	  1998;	  
see	  Chapter	  1.3.1),	  exemplifying	  not	  only	  a	  different	  moral	  base	  for	  evaluating	  leaders’	  conduct	  but	  
also	  living	  according	  to	  such	  principles.	  While	  many	  scholars	  promote	  what	  Spencer	  called	  an	  
“instrumental	  version	  of	  local	  politics”	  (Spencer	  2007,	  136)	  (where	  people	  are	  solely	  guided	  by	  
materialist	  aspirations	  in	  return	  for	  their	  support)	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  of	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  
background	  similar	  to	  the	  GJM	  activists’	  chose	  to	  support	  “poor”	  parties	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  
factors	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  economic	  gain	  influencing	  their	  choice.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  their	  feeling	  that	  
the	  form	  of	  GJM’s	  political	  patronage	  and	  corruption	  are	  ethically	  objectionable	  activities	  but	  mainly	  
their	  trust	  in	  their	  respective	  leaders	  as	  genuine	  promoters	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  	  
When	  I	  revisited	  the	  site	  one	  year	  later,	  the	  tension	  had	  vanished.	  The	  proposed	  “two-­‐lane”	  road	  was	  
constructed	  rather	  as	  a	  “one-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half”	  lane	  road,	  having	  many	  potholes	  and	  being	  covered	  by	  mud	  
due	  to	  lack	  of	  protection	  walls	  at	  its	  side.	  Apparently,	  a	  local	  GJM	  leader	  had	  been	  given	  the	  contract	  
for	  house-­‐construction.	  But	  most	  of	  those	  whom	  Bimal	  Gurung	  had	  promised	  houses	  were	  still	  
waiting	  for	  their	  construction,	  and	  the	  few	  that	  got	  houses	  under	  the	  scheme	  for	  the	  Economically	  
Weaker	  Section	  (EWS)	  had	  to	  accept	  smaller	  ones	  than	  what	  was	  promised.	  Despite	  the	  community	  
halls,	  which	  were	  under	  construction,	  not	  much	  of	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  visit	  seemed	  to	  have	  endured	  
except	  for	  the	  affirmation	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  development	  was	  in	  his	  (and	  only	  his)	  hands.	  A	  rumour	  
had	  it	  that	  the	  man,	  who	  had	  organised	  a	  jeep	  of	  young	  women	  for	  a	  dance	  evening	  during	  Gurung’s	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stay,	  got	  a	  position	  as	  teacher	  in	  a	  government	  school.	  Due	  to	  the	  road	  “broadening”	  some	  thousand	  
tea	  bushes	  had	  been	  destroyed.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  red	  flags	  were	  still	  flying	  over	  Chandramandhura.	  
The	  politics	  of	  “money”	  and	  “muscle”	  had	  apparently	  failed	  to	  capture	  the	  whole	  place.	  	  
But	  inspite	  of	  such	  forms	  of	  resistance,	  the	  CPRM’s	  inability	  to	  expand	  its	  base	  and	  to	  benefit	  from	  
the	  growing	  resentment	  against	  the	  GJM	  makes	  it	  appear	  like	  a	  tiger	  without	  teeth.	  This	  is	  because	  
many	  people	  still	  hold	  the	  previous	  members	  of	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  responsible	  for	  the	  violence	  in	  chhyāsī	  
(’86)	  and	  the	  failure	  to	  attain	  Gorkhaland,	  which	  places	  a	  stigma	  on	  today’s	  CPRM.	  Further,	  instead	  of	  
openly	  and	  directly	  opposing	  the	  GJM	  in	  their	  respective	  villages	  (where	  the	  CPRM	  is	  usually	  in	  
minority),	  their	  protest	  was	  solely	  directed	  at	  the	  administration,	  mainly	  BDOs,	  where	  they	  
complained	  about	  perceived	  corruption	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  local	  schemes.	  This	  made	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  their	  resistance	  dependent	  on	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  district	  administration186.	  Upon	  
my	  question	  why	  they	  were	  not	  more	  active	  in	  their	  respective	  villages,	  usually	  local	  followers	  
referred	  to	  the	  party’s	  strategy	  of	  “wait	  and	  watch”.	  They	  were	  hoping	  that	  those	  dissatisfied	  with	  
the	  GJM’s	  way	  of	  ruling	  would	  join	  their	  party	  on	  their	  own	  initiative.	  The	  lack	  of	  active	  and	  more	  
open	  attempts	  to	  recruit	  new	  followers	  ultimately	  makes	  the	  CPRM	  a	  stagnant	  party	  and	  those	  
dissatisfied	  with	  the	  GJM	  rather	  joined	  the	  GNLF	  or	  the	  TMC.	  
8.2.6 “He	  didn’t	  run”.	  Resistance	  against	  intimidation?	  
While	  the	  above	  examples	  concerned	  collective	  attempts	  of	  resistance,	  the	  case	  of	  Madan	  Tamang	  
presents	  the	  highly	  visible	  struggle	  of	  an	  individual,	  who	  refused	  to	  be	  intimidated,	  and	  the	  
spontaneous	  and	  forceful	  public	  reaction	  beyond	  party-­‐political	  lines	  after	  his	  assassination.	  The	  
brutal	  murder	  of	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  in	  May	  2010	  belongs	  unquestionably	  to	  the	  most	  
shocking	  incidents	  of	  political	  violence	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Despite	  several	  attempts	  of	  
the	  Morcha	  to	  hinder	  the	  scheduled	  AIGL’s	  foundation	  day	  celebration	  at	  Chowk	  Bazaar,	  Tamang	  had	  
defied	  threats	  and	  instead	  begun	  with	  preparations	  to	  the	  AIGL’s	  meeting	  at	  Club	  Site,	  close	  to	  the	  
Planters’	  Club	  and	  the	  Chowrasta	  in	  Darjeeling	  town.	  In	  an	  interview	  recorded	  briefly	  before,	  and	  
which	  was	  published	  on	  YouTube	  after	  his	  death,	  he	  had	  said:	  “They	  attempt	  to	  frighten	  Madan	  
Tamang	  […].	  One	  has	  to	  go	  one	  day.	  Others	  die	  drinking	  raksi	  (local	  liquor).	  But	  don’t	  try	  to	  frighten	  
me.	  You	  cannot	  frighten	  me”	  (Tamang	  2010,	  YouTube).	  In	  an	  interview,	  Bharati	  Tamang,	  his	  wife,	  
recalled	  the	  events	  of	  May	  21,	  2010:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  In	  one	  instance	  local	  CPRM	  followers	  had	  applied	  for	  supervisor	  posts	  in	  the	  NREGS	  to	  a	  gram	  panchayat	  
secretary.	  Saying	  that	  the	  GJM	  was	  in	  majority,	  however,	  he	  refused	  to	  grant	  them	  a	  position,	  making	  their	  
attempts	  futile.	  When	  they	  complained	  to	  the	  BDO	  once	  about	  misallocation	  of	  earthquake	  help	  to	  households,	  
however,	  the	  BDO	  initiated	  a	  re-­‐survey.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  resistance	  is	  very	  much	  
dependent	  on	  the	  respective	  administrators’	  decisions	  and	  actions.	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  and	  “muscle“?	  Breaking	  the	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He	  left	  the	  house	  early	  to	  prepare	  the	  venue	  at	  Club	  Site,	  putting	  tables,	  banners,	  chairs.	  He	  
did	  not	  even	  wake	  me	  up.	  […]	  Around	  9.30	  am	  about	  300	  GJM	  followers	  carrying	  weapons	  
came	  from	  Chowrasta.	  […]	  The	  police	  saw	  them	  and	  ran	  away.	  He	  [Madan	  Tamang]	  was	  
alone	  but	  he	  didn’t	  run.	  Instead	  he	  faced	  them,	  wanted	  to	  remind	  them.	  […]	  Everybody	  ran	  
away	  out	  of	  fear	  but	  he	  didn’t	  run.	  (interview,	  11.6.2013)	  
Eventually,	  one	  man	  took	  out	  a	  long,	  sharp	  sword	  and	  cut	  him.	  Tamang	  might	  simply	  have	  
underestimated	  the	  whole	  situation	  and	  the	  threats.	  But	  his	  murder	  carries	  lots	  of	  symbolism	  not	  
only	  for	  the	  reign	  of	  muscle	  and	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  killing.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  active	  
resistance	  and	  sovereignty.	  Hansen	  and	  Stepputat’s	  (2006)	  take	  on	  sovereignty,	  defined	  as	  the	  
“ability	  to	  kill,	  punish,	  and	  discipline	  with	  impunity”	  (ibid.	  296)	  regards	  the	  authority	  over	  the	  own	  
body	  as	  a	  way	  to	  resist	  the	  power	  of	  the	  sovereign187.	  Certain	  uses	  of	  the	  body,	  e.g.	  in	  hunger-­‐strikes	  
or	  civil	  disobedience,	  where	  humans	  willingly	  submit	  their	  own	  bodies	  to	  be	  damaged	  or	  beaten,	  
render	  “state	  power	  (or	  non-­‐state	  sovereigns)	  both	  excessively	  brutal	  and	  strangely	  impotent	  at	  the	  
same	  time”	  (Hansen	  and	  Stepputat	  2005,	  13).	  The	  human	  body	  becomes	  the	  “site	  upon	  which	  
sovereign	  violence	  [...]	  inscribes	  itself	  and	  encounters	  the	  most	  stubborn	  resistance”	  (ibid.	  11).	  	  
Seen	  from	  this	  perspective,	  maybe	  it	  was	  in	  this	  last	  moment	  when	  Madan	  Tamang	  did	  not	  run	  away	  
that	  he	  defended	  the	  authority	  over	  his	  own	  body,	  sacrificing	  it	  instead	  of	  giving	  in	  to	  the	  threat	  to	  
his	  life.	  He	  allowed	  the	  attackers	  to	  take	  his	  life	  but	  in	  doing	  so	  maintained	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  
his	  own	  fate	  and	  his	  commitment,	  the	  conviction	  that	  what	  he	  was	  doing	  was	  right.	  Maybe	  he	  hoped	  
that	  his	  cause	  would	  live	  on,	  that	  his	  death	  would	  not	  go	  in	  vein.	  Interpreted	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  
moment	  when	  he	  did	  not	  run	  that	  he	  stated	  his	  autonomy	  as	  a	  person	  refusing	  to	  be	  intimidated	  by	  
those	  who	  claim	  power	  over	  others	  and	  their	  bodies.	  An	  amateur	  video	  taken	  by	  a	  tourist	  from	  a	  
hotel	  above	  Club	  Site	  shows	  the	  scene	  after	  the	  assassination	  (philippe	  freedive	  2010,	  Youtube).	  The	  
lifeless	  body	  of	  Tamang	  lies	  alone	  on	  the	  asphalt	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  dark-­‐red	  blood.	  Eventually,	  a	  few	  persons	  
run	  to	  attend	  him	  and	  put	  him	  into	  a	  car,	  which	  brings	  him	  to	  the	  nearest	  hospital.	  But	  it	  was	  already	  
too	  late	  to	  save	  his	  life.	  
The	  news	  of	  the	  gruesome	  murder	  spread	  fast	  and	  within	  an	  hour	  all	  vendors	  in	  Darjeeling	  had	  shut	  
down	  their	  shops	  and	  restaurants	  in	  protest	  against	  the	  killing.	  An	  NDTV	  (national	  news	  channel)	  
reporter	  described	  the	  atmosphere	  as	  tense.	  People	  were	  scared,	  the	  town	  deserted	  except	  for	  some	  
“unidentifiable	  groups”	  which	  gathered	  carrying	  khukurīs.	  The	  West	  Bengal	  Police	  Inspector	  General,	  
NDTV,	  and	  other	  national	  news	  channels	  identified	  GJM	  activists	  as	  the	  culprits	  (Himalayan	  Darpan,	  
22.5.2010).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  In	  this	  reading	  the	  GJM	  enjoys	  some	  sovereignty	  in	  Darjeeling	  as	  the	  party’s	  forms	  of	  punishment	  of	  rivals	  
usually	  went	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  State	  government,	  which	  holds	  the	  legal	  authority	  over	  law	  and	  order,	  and	  the	  
police	  in	  Darjeeling,	  which	  only	  occasionally	  enforces	  its	  power.	  Thus,	  the	  GJM’s	  sovereignty	  is	  ultimately	  
subject	  to	  the	  State	  government.	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The	  funeral	  procession,	  which	  was	  attended	  by	  an	  estimated	  15,000	  persons	  two	  days	  later,	  saw	  an	  
unforeseen	  outbreak	  of	  anger	  amongst	  the	  town	  population.	  Footage	  shows	  thousands	  of	  people	  
gathering	  in	  the	  rain,	  shouting	  slogans	  against	  Bimal	  Gurung	  and	  the	  GJM.	  Cheered	  by	  others,	  some	  
even	  tore	  down	  flags	  and	  posters	  of	  the	  GJM	  and	  its	  president.	  Flanked	  by	  armed	  CRPF	  and	  police	  
personnel,	  the	  vehicle	  carrying	  the	  dead	  body	  of	  Tamang	  slowly	  drove	  through	  the	  streets,	  full	  with	  
white	  Bhuddist	  khadas	  people	  placed	  on	  it	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  respect.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  time	  after	  the	  GJM’s	  
establishment	  that	  people	  openly	  shouted	  slogans	  against	  the	  GJM,	  something	  unthinkable	  three	  
days	  earlier.	  A	  person	  interviewed	  by	  a	  TV	  channel	  describes	  Tamang’s	  murder	  as	  the	  “death	  of	  
democracy”	  in	  Darjeeling,	  adding	  that	  “more	  than	  Gorkhaland,	  I	  feel	  democracy	  is	  important”.	  In	  an	  
interview	  with	  me	  later,	  a	  journalist	  recalled:	  	  
There	  was	  a	  huge	  public	  uproar.	  […]	  I	  could	  feel	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  people	  of	  
Darjeeling	  were	  really	  speaking	  because	  they	  understood	  a	  particular	  situation.	  They	  were	  
protesting	  a	  brutal	  killing	  which	  people	  didn’t	  like.	  So	  that	  was	  the	  only	  situation	  when	  I	  felt	  
that	  people	  spontaneously	  came	  out	  with	  what	  they	  felt	  […].	  When	  he	  was	  killed	  that	  was	  
the	  only	  time	  this	  society	  did	  what	  it	  has	  to	  do:	  to	  work	  independently	  as	  a	  society.	  
(interview,	  2012).	  
Similarly,	  an	  intellectual	  claimed	  that	  the	  “outrage	  was	  large	  enough	  to	  toughen	  people’s	  
consciousness	  and	  make	  human	  beings	  out	  of	  them”,	  but	  then	  added:	  “But	  most	  of	  them	  are	  kind	  of	  
frozen	  in	  a	  stasis	  where	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  pragmatism	  rules.”	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  tense	  atmosphere	  in	  Darjeeling,	  Bimal	  Gurung,	  who	  had	  been	  in	  Kalimpong,	  could	  only	  
return	  under	  police	  protection.	  But	  outrage	  did	  not	  only	  threaten	  the	  GJM.	  Eleven	  top-­‐leaders	  of	  the	  
party,	  including	  three	  central	  committee	  members	  resigned,	  amongst	  them	  were	  intellectuals,	  who	  
had	  been	  instrumental	  in	  framing	  the	  course	  of	  the	  party	  towards	  Delhi	  and	  Kolkata.	  	  
One	  week	  later,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  organised	  a	  massive	  public	  meeting	  at	  North	  Point	  College,	  at	  the	  
northern	  fringe	  of	  Darjeeling	  town,	  close	  to	  his	  home-­‐base	  Tukvar/Singmari.	  At	  the	  meeting,	  which	  
was	  also	  attended	  by	  BJP’s	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  from	  Darjeeling,	  Jaswant	  Singh,	  he	  reinstated	  his	  
authority	  by	  underlining	  his	  dedication	  to	  Gorkhaland.	  He	  also	  threatened	  those,	  who	  dared	  to	  play	  
with	  the	  “fire	  of	  Gorkhaland,	  the	  GJM”	  and	  defamed	  leaders	  of	  the	  CPRM	  (see	  Chapter	  5).	  Things	  
calmed	  down,	  and	  the	  GJM	  continued	  to	  rule.	  The	  murder	  accused	  Nicole	  Tamang	  escaped	  
mysteriously	  from	  the	  CID	  (Crime	  Investigation	  Department,	  on	  State	  level)	  custody;	  from	  the	  other	  
30	  persons	  named	  on	  the	  charge-­‐sheet	  most	  remained	  on	  the	  wanted-­‐list	  for	  years.	  Only	  in	  February	  
2013	  five	  of	  the	  accused	  were	  arrested;	  another	  18	  surrendered	  between	  June	  and	  September	  2013	  
(TT,	  18.6.2013;	  The	  Statesman,	  6.9.2013)	  (see	  Chapter	  7).	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Madan	  Tamang’s	  murder,	  however,	  has	  left	  a	  deep	  scarce	  on	  the	  psyche	  of	  already	  frightened	  
citizens.	  Despite	  the	  huge	  spontaneous	  outcry,	  which	  might	  have	  brought	  Bimal	  Gurung	  to	  fall,	  it	  
seems	  hardly	  anybody	  else	  was	  willing	  to	  risk	  standing	  alone	  against	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  GJM	  and	  
to	  risk	  his	  or	  her	  life.	  But	  inspite	  of	  the	  fear,	  the	  spontaneous	  outrage	  underlines	  that	  aspirations	  for	  
freedom	  of	  opinion	  and	  for	  non-­‐violence	  persist,	  even	  if	  secretly	  and	  hardly	  ever	  voiced	  in	  the	  open.	  
8.2.7 The	  tribal	  revival.	  Alternative	  avenues	  to	  the	  state?188	  
I	  described	  membership	  in	  the	  TMC	  and	  GNLF	  as	  attempts	  to	  negotiate	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  state	  
directly,	  without	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  “representative”	  in	  between.	  Besides	  such	  party-­‐political	  moves,	  
however,	  a	  second	  alternative	  to	  establish	  a	  direct	  contact	  to	  the	  state	  comes	  in	  form	  of	  demands	  for	  
recognition	  as	  scheduled	  tribes	  (ST)	  in	  India	  (see	  Chapter	  3.5.3	  on	  the	  advantages	  of	  this	  status).	  
Middleton	  (2010)	  has	  described	  demands	  for	  ST	  recognition	  in	  Darjeeling	  during	  Ghisingh’s	  reign	  in	  
detail	  and	  discussed	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand.	  What	  is	  remarkable	  about	  this	  
tribal	  avenue	  is	  that	  it	  happens	  not	  only	  outside	  the	  demand	  of	  Gorkhaland	  but	  even	  involves	  an	  
“undoing	  of	  the	  Gorkhas”	  (Middleton	  2013a,	  18),	  the	  very	  identity,	  which	  forms	  one	  main	  aspect	  of	  
the	  “homeland”	  dream	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  He	  identifies	  a	  first	  move	  towards	  this	  tribal	  recognition	  after	  
the	  failure	  of	  the	  GNLF’s	  Gorkhaland	  movement.	  In	  this	  wake,	  he	  argues,	  “many	  of	  the	  individual	  
ethnicities	  that	  comprised	  the	  composite	  Gorkha	  community	  began	  exploring	  alternative	  routes	  to	  
rights	  and	  recognition	  in	  the	  nation-­‐state”	  (Middleton	  2013b,	  15).	  The	  Bhutia,	  Lepcha,	  Sherpa,	  and	  
Yolmo	  are	  already	  recognised	  as	  tribal	  groups	  since	  the	  1950s.	  In	  the	  1990s	  the	  Tamang	  and	  Limbus	  
followed,	  and	  also	  Gurungs	  and	  Rais	  filed	  applications.	  This	  “tribal	  turn”	  (Middleton	  2013b,	  14)	  was	  
intensified	  by	  Ghisingh’s	  6th	  Schedule	  plan,	  which	  was	  feared	  to	  privilege	  tribal	  groups	  over	  others	  
(see	  Chapter	  3).	  This	  resulted	  in	  intensified	  applications	  and	  programmes	  of	  tribal	  associations	  to	  
prove	  that	  groups	  qualified	  as	  tribals	  according	  to	  the	  government’s	  regulations	  (Middleton	  2010).	  
While	  Tamangs	  and	  Limbus	  were	  recognised	  as	  tribals	  in	  2003,	  the	  others’	  applications	  are	  still	  
pending.	  Such	  demands	  for	  ST	  status	  were	  according	  to	  Middleton	  not	  only	  motivated	  by	  expected	  
affirmative	  action	  benefits	  but	  also	  by	  the	  “symbolic	  inclusion	  [...]	  into	  the	  imagined	  community	  of	  
India”	  (Middleton	  2013a,	  15)	  by	  becoming	  scheduled	  tribes	  of	  India.	  This	  suggests	  that	  claiming	  ST	  
status	  became	  another	  means	  (outside	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Gorkhaland)	  to	  address	  the	  “identity	  crisis”.	  
With	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  GJM,	  the	  scrapping	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule,	  and	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
movement	  since	  2007,	  however,	  the	  appeal	  of	  ST	  recognition	  dwindled	  and	  “the	  terms	  of	  identity	  
soon	  switched	  back	  to	  that	  of	  ‘Gorkhas’”	  (ibid.).	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  In	  writing	  this	  section,	  I	  am	  grateful	  for	  comments	  by	  Townsend	  Middleton	  and	  Jenny	  Bentley,	  who	  is	  
currently	  working	  on	  her	  dissertation	  on	  the	  Lepcha	  of	  Darjeeling,	  Sikkim,	  and	  eastern	  Nepal.	  
Limits	  of	  “money“	  and	  “muscle“?	  Breaking	  the	  silence	  
243	  
	  
I	  want	  to	  complement	  Middleton’s	  account	  with	  my	  own	  observations	  on	  the	  tribal	  revival	  under	  the	  
current	  GJM	  rule	  by	  focussing	  on	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  access	  to	  developmental	  resources.	  After	  the	  
GJM’s	  agreement	  on	  the	  GTA	  and	  the	  perceived	  decline	  in	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda,	  tribal	  ethnic	  
associations	  again	  gained	  ground	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  intensified	  their	  demand	  for	  ST-­‐recognition.	  This	  
became	  not	  only	  apparent	  in	  regular	  public	  meetings	  (especially	  the	  Rai-­‐association	  was	  active)	  but	  
also	  through	  spatial	  markers	  such	  as	  flags.	  During	  my	  last	  two	  visits	  to	  Darjeeling	  in	  2013	  and	  
September	  2014,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  houses	  of	  the	  Rai	  were	  carrying	  the	  yellow	  flag	  of	  the	  Rai	  
association,	  displaying	  bow	  and	  arrow	  as	  sign	  for	  their	  identity.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  those	  who	  already	  held	  ST-­‐status	  increased	  their	  demands	  for	  direct	  
developmental	  support	  through	  the	  State	  government.	  Two	  associations,	  the	  All	  India	  Tamang	  
Buddhist	  Association	  (AIBTA),	  and	  the	  Indigenous	  Tribal	  Lepcha	  Association	  (ILTA)	  (as	  part	  of	  the	  
broader	  Lepcha	  Rights’	  Movement)	  with	  headquarters	  in	  Kalimpong	  succeeded	  with	  their	  demands	  
to	  get	  their	  own	  developmental	  boards.	  This	  development	  can	  be	  contextualised	  with	  a	  view	  on	  the	  
deteriorating	  relations	  between	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Chief	  Minister.	  
At	  a	  public	  function	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  on	  29th	  January	  2013	  it	  came	  to	  a	  fall-­‐out	  between	  between	  
the	  Chief	  Minister	  Banerjee	  and	  the	  GJM.	  While	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  addressed	  the	  crowd	  and	  
reiterated	  that	  Darjeeling	  was	  a	  part	  of	  West	  Bengal,	  GJM	  supporters	  began	  shouting	  slogans	  in	  
favour	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  attempts	  to	  appease	  the	  crowd	  failed	  and	  the	  angry	  Chief	  
Minister	  announced	  that	  she	  can	  be	  “rough	  and	  tough”	  (TT,	  30.1.2013).	  	  
Briefly	  after	  this	  in	  February	  2013,	  much	  to	  the	  annoyance	  of	  the	  GJM,	  the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  
passed	  the	  bill	  to	  establish	  the	  “Mayel	  Lyang	  Lepcha	  Developmental	  Board”	  (MLLDB)	  under	  the	  West	  
Bengal	  Societies	  Registration	  Act	  (1961).	  Although	  the	  board	  provides	  a	  non-­‐territorial	  form	  of	  
affirmative	  action	  politics,	  the	  spatial-­‐territorial	  reference	  to	  the	  ancient	  Lepcha	  kingdom	  “Mayel	  
Lyang”	  stated	  the	  Lepcha’s	  claim	  to	  indigenousness	  and	  gave	  their	  apprehensions	  to	  being	  included	  
in	  the	  “Gorkha”	  category	  an	  institutional	  expression	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Besides	  protecting	  and	  
promoting	  “the	  Lepcha	  language,	  tradition	  and	  culture”	  the	  Board	  is	  also	  entitled	  to	  take	  up	  “social	  
welfare-­‐activities”	  (Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  2013a,	  1).	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Board	  are,	  however,	  
not	  elected	  but	  instead	  nominated	  by	  the	  State	  government	  based	  on	  the	  “recommendation	  of	  the	  
largest	  recognised	  society	  or	  organisation	  of	  the	  Lepcha	  community	  of	  West	  Bengal”	  (ibid.	  2),	  making	  
the	  ILTA	  the	  de	  facto	  head	  of	  the	  Board	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  State	  government.	  The	  MLLDB	  
receives	  its	  funding	  directly	  from	  the	  Backward	  Classes	  Welfare	  Department	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  
State.	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Generally,	  the	  GJM	  had	  expressed	  its	  support	  towards	  the	  establishment	  of	  such	  councils	  as	  long	  as	  
they	  came	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  GTA.	  But	  the	  decision	  to	  make	  the	  ILTA	  administratively	  and	  
financially	  independent	  from	  the	  GTA	  led	  to	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  the	  GJM	  and	  the	  ILTA	  
(Jenny	  Bentley,	  personal	  communication).	  To	  oppose	  the	  funding	  of	  the	  Board	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  
the	  GTA	  the	  Morcha	  had	  even	  called	  a	  bandh	  to	  stop	  the	  Lepcha	  from	  celebrating	  the	  CM’s	  
announcement	  in	  February	  2013.	  Only	  after	  a	  hunger-­‐strike	  of	  the	  Lepcha	  that	  lasted	  six	  days,	  the	  
West	  Bengal	  government	  passed	  the	  resolution.	  Significantly	  the	  bill	  was	  implemented	  in	  August	  
2013	  during	  the	  Morcha’s	  reinitiated	  Gorkhaland	  movement.	  After	  the	  central	  government	  had	  
announced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Telangana	  State	  to	  be	  carved	  out	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  in	  July	  2013,	  the	  
GJM	  had	  revived	  its	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland,	  and	  a	  month-­‐long	  bandh	  crippled	  life	  in	  Darjeeling.	  In	  
September	  2013	  the	  ILTA	  invited	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  to	  Darjeeling	  (ToI,	  1.9.2013).	  While	  most	  people	  
remained	  inside	  their	  houses	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “ghar	  bhitra	  jantā”	  (people	  inside	  the	  houses)	  agitation	  of	  
the	  Morcha,	  members	  of	  the	  Lepcha	  community	  welcomed	  the	  CM	  in	  Kalimpong	  and	  conferred	  to	  
her	  the	  honorary	  title	  “Kingchum	  Daarmit”	  (Goddess	  of	  Fortune)	  (The	  Hindustan	  Times,	  3.9.2013)189.	  
In	  July	  2014,	  the	  CM	  announced	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  comparable	  “Tamang	  Welfare	  and	  Cultural	  
Board”,	  announcing	  a	  100	  million	  INR	  grant	  for	  it	  (The	  Hindu,	  18.7.2014).	  
How	  does	  one	  read	  these	  recent	  developments?	  It	  would	  be	  misleading	  to	  understand	  the	  
establishment	  of	  these	  Boards	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  generous	  State	  government	  caring	  for	  scheduled	  
tribes.	  Rather,	  these	  councils	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  of	  the	  TMC	  to	  further	  establish	  its	  base	  in	  
Darjeeling	  hills.	  Although	  the	  council’s	  resources	  are	  limited	  (Bentley,	  personal	  communication)	  its	  
existence	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  GTA	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  attempt	  of	  the	  State	  government	  
(and	  Lepcha-­‐	  and	  Tamang-­‐associations	  alike)	  to	  break	  the	  GJM’s	  resource	  monopoly	  by	  providing	  
members	  of	  the	  communities	  an	  alternate	  way	  to	  access	  resources.	  The	  MLLDB	  and	  the	  Tamang	  
board	  institutionalised	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  these	  communities	  and	  the	  State	  government	  and	  
provided	  a	  means	  for	  the	  TMC	  to	  establish	  clientelist	  relations	  to	  these	  groups.	  This	  ultimately	  
supported	  TMC’s	  attempts	  to	  establish	  its	  base	  further	  in	  the	  hills.	  In	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  elections	  
both	  Lepcha	  and	  Tamang	  associations	  announced	  their	  support	  to	  the	  TMC.	  This	  underlines	  these	  
newly	  evolving	  patronage	  relations.	  	  
But	  in	  how	  far	  do	  such	  attempts	  for	  tribal	  recognition	  as	  alternative	  avenues	  to	  negotiate	  rights	  and	  
resources	  with	  the	  State	  exemplify	  a	  way	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  GJM?	  Can	  they	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  
alternative	  political	  space	  evolving	  outside	  the	  emporium	  of	  Gorkhaland?	  On	  a	  first	  view,	  they	  
certainly	  can,	  because	  they	  provide	  a	  platform	  for	  political	  association	  at	  least	  partly	  outside	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  This	  was	  strictly	  opposed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Darjeeling-­‐based	  All	  India	  Lepcha	  Organisation,	  which	  is	  close	  
to	  the	  Morcha.	  
Limits	  of	  “money“	  and	  “muscle“?	  Breaking	  the	  silence	  
245	  
	  
party-­‐political,	  and	  surely	  outside	  of	  Gorkhaland-­‐realm.	  Tribal	  associations	  manage	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  
direct	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  without	  the	  GJM	  as	  intermediary.	  Tribal	  associations	  (especially	  the	  
Lepcha	  association	  ILTA)	  are	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  against	  the	  GJM’s	  rule	  as	  they	  challenge	  the	  party’s	  
established	  resource	  monopolies	  over	  developmental	  funds.	  Further,	  their	  ability	  to	  mobilise	  their	  
groups	  allows	  them	  to	  chose	  their	  political	  affiliation	  more	  freely.	  Their	  demands	  also	  express	  an	  
agenda	  of	  rights	  and	  recognition,	  of	  citizens	  demanding	  what	  they	  believe	  is	  their	  justified	  
entitlement	  towards	  the	  state.	  Bentley	  also	  found	  indications	  for	  interactions	  between	  the	  Tamang	  
and	  the	  Lepcha,	  which	  run	  along	  the	  TMC	  party-­‐political	  lines.	  
A	  closer	  look	  at	  these	  associations,	  however,	  suggests	  caution	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  alternative	  
avenues	  for	  regional	  political	  practice.	  Middleton	  and	  Shneiderman	  (2008)	  for	  instance	  found	  that	  
ethnic	  associations	  in	  Darjeeling	  exercised	  a	  “cultural	  policing”	  to	  prove	  the	  “tribalness”	  of	  their	  
members	  towards	  the	  government.	  This	  included	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  dress	  code	  and	  the	  curbing	  of	  
Hindu	  festivals,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  more	  politicisation	  and	  the	  limitation	  of	  free	  choices:	  
“Average	  individual	  cultural	  choices	  have	  now	  become	  political	  [...],	  creating	  divides	  within	  both	  
ethnic	  communities	  and	  families”	  (ibid.	  41).	  They	  also	  found	  that	  the	  “cultural	  engineering	  [...]	  is	  shot	  
through	  with	  class	  relations,	  with	  elites	  coaching	  and	  coaxing	  their	  constituents	  into	  the	  proper	  
‘tribal’	  mold,	  the	  results	  being	  power-­‐laden	  alterations	  in	  daily	  life”	  (ibid.).	  Like	  the	  GJM,	  it	  is	  
questionable	  in	  how	  far	  ethnic	  associations	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  representatives	  of	  their	  groups,	  or	  
whether	  their	  leaders	  exploit	  public	  aspirations	  for	  recognition	  and	  rights	  to	  further	  their	  individual	  
interests.	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  relation	  of	  these	  associations	  to	  the	  ruling	  party	  or	  other	  regional	  parties	  is	  not	  as	  
clear-­‐cut	  as	  it	  might	  seem.	  Middleton	  stressed	  that	  the	  associations	  always	  had	  to	  carefully	  negotiate	  
their	  relations	  and	  to	  “cozy-­‐up”	  with	  the	  ruling	  party	  (GNLF/GJM).	  While	  the	  diversity	  of	  associations	  
makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  generalise,	  he	  explained	  that	  many	  of	  their	  members	  were	  members	  of	  political	  
parties,	  too	  (Middleton,	  personal	  communication).	  Anecdotes	  hold	  that	  Bimal	  Gurung	  even	  
prohibited	  meetings	  of	  the	  Rai	  association	  in	  his	  strong-­‐hold	  Tukvar/Singmari	  fearing	  that	  these	  could	  
associate	  with	  CPRM-­‐president	  R.B.	  Rai	  (who	  himself,	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  
association).	  However,	  the	  intermingling	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  associations	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  GJM	  supported	  the	  pending	  applications	  for	  ST-­‐recognition	  in	  the	  GTA	  agreement.	  
Maybe,	  the	  GJM	  has	  realised	  that	  support	  to	  the	  demands	  for	  tribal	  recognition	  is	  the	  safer	  way	  to	  
maintain	  a	  majority	  than	  opposing	  the	  associations,	  particularly	  after	  some	  of	  them	  were	  granted	  
state-­‐sponsored	  development	  boards	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  GTA.	  
It	  thus	  remains	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  the	  “tribal	  revival”	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  can	  count	  as	  a	  
counter-­‐strategy	  of	  parts	  of	  Darjeeling’s	  population	  against	  the	  GJM.	  While	  the	  tribal	  move	  certainly	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benefits	  the	  TMC	  government,	  I	  have	  doubts	  whether	  the	  associations	  would	  attempt	  to	  empower	  
their	  group	  members	  or	  rather	  replicate	  existing	  power-­‐relations	  in	  the	  name	  of	  “tribal”	  recognition.	  
	  
8.3 Conclusion	  
This	  chapter’s	  objective	  was	  to	  explore	  limits	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  money	  and	  muscle	  power,	  and	  to	  display	  
instances,	  where	  groups	  or	  individuals	  broke	  their	  silence	  and	  challenged	  the	  Morcha’s	  authority.	  It	  
showed	  that	  a	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  possibility	  to	  achieve	  Gorkhaland	  and	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  willingness	  and	  
ability	  to	  provide	  tangible	  benefits	  made	  many	  people	  doubt	  their	  affiliation	  to	  the	  dominant	  party.	  
This	  indicates	  that	  both	  the	  loss	  of	  normative	  and	  factual	  legitimacy	  led	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  GJM’s	  
support	  base.	  Critique	  of	  the	  GJM	  had	  already	  increased	  since	  its	  involvement	  in	  negotiations	  on	  an	  
“interim-­‐council”	  after	  March	  2010.	  But	  that	  critique	  began	  to	  come	  out	  into	  the	  open	  only	  after	  the	  
eventual	  agreement	  on	  the	  GTA	  in	  July	  2011,	  and	  the	  actual	  establishment	  of	  the	  new	  council	  in	  
August	  2012.	  This	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  increasing	  activities	  of	  rival	  parties	  since	  2012,	  i.e.	  the	  CPRM’s	  
successful	  claim	  to	  Chowk	  Bazaar	  in	  May	  2012,	  the	  return	  of	  GNLF	  president	  Ghisingh	  to	  Darjeeling	  
hills	  in	  2014,	  and	  the	  increasing	  activities	  of	  the	  TMC.	  As	  I	  demonstrated,	  such	  forms	  of	  opposition	  
are	  based	  on	  differing	  premises.	  
The	  first	  such	  example	  was	  opposition	  parties’	  attempts	  to	  counter	  the	  GJM	  with	  ideal	  pictures	  of	  
leaders	  drawing	  on	  qualities	  of	  trustworthiness	  and	  non-­‐violence.	  Although	  the	  chances	  of	  such	  
leaders	  seem	  small	  to	  attain	  power	  in	  Darjeeling	  under	  the	  prevailing	  conditions,	  such	  ideal	  pictures	  
can	  be	  regarded	  as	  important	  means	  to	  oppose	  the	  Morcha	  in	  the	  imaginary	  realm.	  They	  propose	  a	  
morally	  more-­‐appealing	  alternative	  to	  the	  reign	  of	  GJM	  leaders,	  which	  partly	  reflects	  popular	  
imaginations	  of	  “good”	  leaders	  (compare	  Chapter	  5).	  The	  example	  of	  CPRM	  activists,	  who	  –	  inspite	  of	  
being	  in	  economic	  need	  –	  refused	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  GJM’s	  patronage	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  
indeed	  some	  persons	  who	  evaluate	  morally	  “good”	  conduct	  of	  a	  leader	  and	  a	  party	  higher	  than	  
material	  spoils	  or	  “money	  power”.	  Importantly,	  for	  these	  opposition	  parties	  (AIGL,	  CPRM,	  etc.)	  the	  
demand	  of	  “Gorkhaland”	  and	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  “identity-­‐crisis”	  provide	  the	  anchor	  to	  stick	  to	  
their	  ideals	  even	  if	  this	  means	  refusal	  of	  material	  spoils.	  The	  CPRM	  is	  further	  sustained	  through	  its	  
organisational	  cadre-­‐structure	  and	  its	  class-­‐ideology,	  which	  is	  taught	  in	  local	  circles	  and	  adds	  an	  
ideological	  dimension	  that	  other	  regional	  parties	  in	  Darjeeling	  lack.	  	  
This	  underlines	  the	  limits	  of	  “money	  power”	  and	  suggests	  a	  moral	  orientation	  of	  some	  groups	  in	  
contrast	  to	  an	  “all-­‐pervasive	  instrumentalism	  which	  washes	  away	  party	  manifestoes,	  rhetoric,	  and	  
effective	  implementation	  of	  policies	  in	  an	  unending	  competition	  for	  power,	  status,	  and	  profit”	  (Brass	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1990,	  19).	  Instead,	  perceptions	  of	  moral	  values	  and	  belief	  in	  an	  ideology	  do	  not	  only	  matter	  to	  some	  
people	  but	  also	  influence	  their	  political	  agency.	  Such	  different	  “moral	  communities”	  (cf.	  Lentz	  1998)	  
provide	  an	  important	  counter-­‐balance	  to	  the	  model	  of	  “patronage	  democracy”	  (Chandra	  2003).	  In	  
this	  context,	  the	  huge	  attendance	  at	  the	  CPRM’s	  May	  Day	  celebrations	  in	  2012,	  does	  not	  only	  
underline	  the	  mobilising	  function	  of	  a	  “poor”	  party	  but	  also	  exemplifies	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  public	  
space,	  where	  a	  number	  of	  people	  gather	  to	  express	  their	  own	  will	  and	  to	  collectively	  challenge	  the	  
dominance	  of	  the	  ruling	  party.	  In	  a	  way	  CPRM	  and	  AIGL	  critique	  points	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  perceived	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  Morcha	  after	  its	  perceived	  decline	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  underlines	  the	  
limits	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  “double-­‐dealing”	  (cf.	  Jeffrey	  2010,	  135)	  (i.e.	  as	  promoter	  of	  statehood	  and	  radical	  
challenger	  to	  the	  State	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  as	  a	  channel	  of	  government	  sponsored	  development	  
funds	  on	  the	  other	  hand)	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  Yet,	  neither	  the	  AIGL	  nor	  the	  CPRM	  succeeded	  in	  carrying	  
such	  outrage	  back	  to	  the	  localities	  in	  which	  the	  struggle	  over	  resources	  is	  also	  fought.	  Instead,	  back	  in	  
their	  villages	  the	  activists	  (in	  minority)	  often	  remain	  silent	  and	  do	  not	  dare	  to	  openly	  challenge	  the	  
local	  leaders	  of	  the	  ruling	  party.	  They	  often	  depend	  on	  the	  action	  of	  the	  administration	  in	  supporting	  
their	  critique.	  The	  AIGL’s	  and	  CPRM’s	  inactivity,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  expand	  and	  establish	  local	  
branches,	  clearly	  confines	  their	  challenges	  to	  the	  GJM	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  realm	  and	  has	  relatively	  little	  
effect	  on	  the	  actual	  control	  of	  the	  GJM.	  
Tribal	  associations,	  however,	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  challenging	  the	  Morcha.	  The	  inability	  to	  
stop	  the	  Lepcha	  Rights	  Movement’s	  demands	  for	  a	  developmental	  board	  not	  only	  signalled	  a	  limit	  to	  
the	  GJM’s	  authority	  but	  also	  to	  its	  position	  as	  a	  self-­‐appointed	  representative	  of	  the	  masses	  once	  the	  
government	  recognises	  other	  partners	  for	  negotiations.	  	  
The	  greatest	  practical	  challenge	  to	  the	  GJM	  is,	  however,	  posed	  by	  the	  TMC,	  the	  ruling	  party	  of	  the	  
State	  government,	  which	  increased	  its	  activities	  in	  Darjeeling	  since	  2012.	  This	  growing	  influence	  
becomes	  visible	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  developmental	  boards	  for	  the	  Lepcha	  and	  Tamang	  which	  
provide	  alternative	  means	  for	  these	  groups	  to	  access	  resources	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  GTA	  and	  the	  
GJM	  patronage.	  This	  situation	  was	  accentuated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  two	  years	  after	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  GTA	  not	  all	  departments	  had	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  GTA,	  including	  the	  
important	  department	  of	  public-­‐works,	  which	  remained	  under	  the	  State’s	  authority.	  The	  existence	  of	  
the	  TMC	  provides	  a	  means	  for	  individuals	  to	  “bargain”	  for	  benefits	  with	  both	  the	  State	  government	  
and	  the	  GJM,	  rendering	  political	  affiliations	  in	  Darjeeling	  more	  fluid.	  Accounts	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  
State	  government	  –	  via	  its	  control	  over	  the	  police	  –	  provides	  security	  for	  those	  who	  join	  the	  TMC,	  
thereby	  limiting	  the	  fear	  of	  violent	  repression	  by	  the	  GJM	  or	  its	  “muscle”	  power.	  Against	  this	  
backdrop	  the	  GNLF-­‐TMC	  alliance	  for	  the	  2014	  elections	  is	  not	  surprising	  but	  rather	  suggests	  that	  it	  
was	  Ghisingh’s	  ticket	  back	  to	  the	  hills.	  The	  TMC	  beats	  the	  GJM	  with	  its	  own	  means	  and	  thereby	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  the	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ultimately	  sustains	  the	  reign	  of	  “money”	  and	  “muscle”.	  Ultimately,	  the	  employment	  of	  CRPF	  forces	  
during	  the	  short-­‐term	  statehood	  agitation	  in	  August	  2013	  and	  the	  arrests	  of	  more	  than	  1,200	  
Morcha-­‐activists	  including	  elected	  GTA	  councillors	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  old	  cases	  (see	  Chapter	  1),	  showed	  
that	  indeed	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  can	  be	  “rough	  and	  tough”,	  and	  can	  enforce	  the	  legal	  arm	  if	  needed.	  	  
This	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  ultimately	  the	  State	  government,	  which	  has	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  either	  shrinking	  or	  
expanding	  the	  spaces	  for	  political	  competition	  for	  other	  regional	  actors	  in	  the	  hills.	  It	  shapes	  the	  
conditions	  and	  possibilities	  for	  other	  actors	  to	  raise	  their	  voices.	  Such	  provision	  of	  spaces	  for	  critique	  
seems	  yet	  not	  guided	  by	  concerns	  for	  democracy	  or	  law	  but	  by	  political	  considerations.	  These	  include	  
the	  sharpening	  of	  fractures	  within	  the	  hill	  society,	  both	  in	  party-­‐political	  as	  well	  as	  in	  social	  (i.e.	  
tribal/non-­‐tribal	  groups)	  realms.	  This	  indicates	  that	  much	  of	  the	  “resistance”	  to	  the	  Morcha	  is	  not	  
only	  enabled	  by	  the	  State	  government	  but	  also	  a	  product	  designed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  strategy	  to	  control	  
the	  regional	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  In	  this	  context,	  “democracy”	  becomes	  an	  
expensive	  good	  to	  be	  purchased	  from	  a	  government	  interested	  in	  keeping	  the	  upper	  hand	  over	  a	  
population	  which	  demands	  autonomy.	  	  
Some	  believe	  that	  Madan	  Tamang	  was	  not	  only	  murdered	  by	  GJM	  activists	  but	  that	  the	  then-­‐State	  
government	  secretly	  facilitated	  the	  murder	  to	  gain	  an	  effective	  means	  to	  exercise	  pressure	  on	  the	  
GJM	  whose	  leaders’	  names	  function	  in	  the	  charge	  sheet	  (see	  Chapter	  7).	  Madan	  Tamangs’s	  death	  
made	  the	  power-­‐relations	  in	  Darjeeling	  visible,	  where	  a	  dominant	  party	  gains	  the	  temporary	  status	  of	  
a	  sovereign	  at	  the	  will	  of	  the	  State	  government.	  In	  her	  closing	  words	  to	  the	  AIGL	  Madan	  Tamang	  
memorial	  ceremony	  in	  2012,	  his	  wife	  Bharati	  Tamang	  requested	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  to	  place	  candles	  
in	  their	  doors	  and	  window	  frames	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  remembrance.	  But	  I	  did	  not	  see	  a	  single	  candle	  lit	  in	  
Darjeeling	  town	  that	  night.	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9.1 Statehood	  movements	  and	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
I	  began	  this	  study	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agitation	  with	  reference	  to	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  movements	  
for	  new	  States	  in	  India.	  Studies	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  what	  I	  have	  called	  the	  “decentralisation	  thesis”	  
view	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “spread	  of	  democracy”	  (Kohli	  2001,	  2).	  As	  a	  form	  of	  grassroots	  struggle,	  
they	  challenge	  established	  forms	  of	  politics	  (Kaviraj	  1989)	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  greater	  decentralisation	  that	  
fosters	  greater	  participation	  by	  citizens	  in	  governance,	  including	  easier	  access	  to	  state	  resources.	  	  
Although	  I	  agreed	  to	  the	  contention	  in	  these	  studies	  that	  movements	  are	  related	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	  a	  more	  “aware	  citizenry”,	  which	  is	  placing	  demands	  for	  recognition	  and	  redistribution	  on	  the	  state,	  
my	  insights	  in	  Darjeeling	  led	  me	  to	  challenge	  the	  other	  propositions	  of	  this	  “decentralisation	  thesis”.	  
As	  my	  study	  underlined,	  statehood	  agitation	  here	  is	  entirely	  led	  by	  regional	  political	  parties,	  one	  of	  
which	  attains	  leadership	  while	  marginalising	  the	  others	  by	  breaching	  the	  principles	  of	  substantial	  
democracy.	  Following	  Levitsky	  and	  Way	  (2002),	  I	  termed	  this	  situation	  a	  dominant-­‐party	  or	  
competitive	  authoritarian	  regime.	  
The	  Darjeeling	  case	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  how	  a	  statehood	  movement	  expressed	  in	  the	  language	  of	  
rights,	  freedom	  from	  exploitation	  and	  democracy	  could	  co-­‐exist	  with	  such	  a	  repressive	  dominant	  
party	  regime	  headed	  by	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  leaders	  of	  the	  statehood	  agitation.	  This	  puzzle	  led	  to	  the	  
following	  research	  questions	  (see	  Chapter	  1):	  
• Why	  is	  the	  dominant-­‐party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling	  so	  stable?	  What	  are	  the	  incumbent	  party’s	  
strategies	  for	  ruling?	  What	  are	  the	  limitations	  to	  its	  rule?	  
• How	  are	  such	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  perceived	  and	  evaluated	  by	  the	  ruled?	  Why	  would	  rights-­‐
seeking	  and	  presumably	  “aware	  citizens”	  lend	  support	  to	  a	  party	  whose	  ways	  of	  ruling	  
through	  corruption	  and	  repression	  apparently	  contradict	  such	  aspirations?	  Why	  do	  people	  
not	  follow	  another	  regional	  party	  that	  promotes	  the	  same	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda?	  	  
• What	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  the	  regional	  dominant	  party	  
regime?	  Does	  the	  movement	  help	  to	  sustain	  the	  regime,	  and	  if	  so,	  in	  what	  way?	  	  
My	  study	  pursued	  two	  major	  aims	  while	  seeking	  to	  answer	  these	  questions.	  First,	  it	  sought	  to	  
understand	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  political	  authority	  by	  contrasting	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  with	  
perceptions	  and	  responses	  among	  the	  ruled.	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Second,	  this	  study	  attempted	  to	  critically	  examine	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  statehood	  movement	  
and	  the	  regional	  political	  regime.	  Departing	  from	  studies	  which	  explore	  the	  legal	  and	  administrative	  
outcomes	  of	  statehood	  movements	  (e.g.	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  States,	  concessions	  of	  autonomy)	  
(Chadda	  2002;	  Shah	  2010;	  Adeney	  2002;	  Bhattacharyya	  2005),	  I	  attempted	  to	  research	  the	  political	  
effects	  of	  the	  movement	  on	  the	  region	  for	  which	  autonomy	  is	  sought.	  Answers	  to	  these	  questions	  
contribute	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  not	  only	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  statehood	  movements	  but	  also	  of	  the	  
stability	  of	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  	  
To	  answer	  these	  questions	  this	  study	  made	  a	  major	  proposition	  concerning	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  
“movement”	  and	  “party”.	  Transcending	  clear	  distinctions	  between	  the	  two,	  I	  drew	  on	  Kumar	  (2011)	  
to	  conceptualise	  the	  movement	  as	  a	  “party-­‐political”	  movement,	  and	  on	  Kitschelt	  (2006)	  and	  Basu	  
(2001)	  to	  frame	  the	  GJM	  -­‐	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  Darjeeling	  -­‐	  as	  a	  “movement-­‐party”	  espousing	  a	  dual	  
identity,	  both	  a	  radical	  movement	  and	  an	  accommodative	  political	  party.	  
This	  conceptualisation	  not	  only	  emphasised	  the	  movement’s	  intermingling	  of	  broader	  State	  and	  
national	  level	  politics.	  It	  also	  enabled	  me	  to	  analyse	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  internal	  struggles	  
over	  its	  leadership	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  party-­‐political	  contestations.	  Further,	  questioning	  these	  
labels	  in	  a	  critical	  manner	  allowed	  me	  to	  account	  for	  their	  emic	  meanings,	  i.e.	  explore	  what	  meanings	  
these	  convey	  for	  those	  participating	  in	  the	  “movement”	  or	  affected	  by	  the	  “party”.	  
To	  approach	  the	  conflation	  of	  movement	  and	  party	  politics,	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  
authority	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  statehood	  agitation,	  I	  further	  combined	  two	  distinct	  bodies	  of	  
work:	  (i)	  studies	  on	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regimes	  grounded	  in	  comparative	  politics;	  and	  (ii)	  
anthropological	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  
The	  former	  identifies	  three	  main	  strategies	  for	  explaining	  the	  stability	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes:	  
repression,	  co-­‐optation/patronage,	  and	  legitimacy	  (Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  2012).	  I	  juxtaposed	  these	  
strategies	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  their	  perceptions	  amongst	  the	  ruled.	  Drawing	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  
political	  authority	  as	  a	  dynamic	  and	  socially	  contested	  outcome	  of	  the	  two-­‐sided	  relations	  between	  
rulers	  and	  the	  ruled,	  contingent	  on	  historical,	  socio-­‐economic	  contexts	  (Weber	  1972;	  Straßenberger	  
2013;	  Karateke	  2005),	  I	  argued	  that	  acceptance	  of,	  compliance	  with	  or	  resistance	  to	  a	  ruler	  are	  
dependent	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  this	  two-­‐sided	  relationship.	  Thus	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  an	  incumbent’s	  
rule	  cannot	  be	  explained	  solely	  with	  reference	  to	  his/her	  strategies.	  Rather,	  the	  success	  and	  effects	  
of	  such	  strategies	  depends	  on	  their	  perception	  and	  interpretation	  amongst	  the	  ruled.	  These	  
perceptions	  are	  themselves	  dynamic	  outcomes	  of	  changing	  subjectivities	  including	  the	  degree	  of	  
awareness	  of	  political	  rights.	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Another	  concept	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  authority	  was	  that	  of	  legitimacy.	  Drawing	  on	  
Karateke’s	  (2005)	  framework	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  I	  conceptualised	  it	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  intersection	  
between	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  ruled	  towards	  the	  ruler	  (the	  “demand”	  side)	  and	  the	  ruler’s	  ability	  to	  
live	  up	  to	  these	  by	  providing	  factual	  or	  normative	  goods	  (the	  “supply”	  side)	  (ibid).	  	  
To	  account	  for	  such	  qualitative	  and	  locally	  constructed	  relations,	  I	  complemented	  the	  largely	  
quantitative	  and	  national	  studies	  from	  comparative	  politics	  with	  anthropological	  approaches.	  These	  
qualitative	  local	  approaches	  underlined	  the	  context-­‐specific	  and	  socially	  contested	  conditions	  for	  
ruling	  in	  authoritative	  regimes.	  These	  helped	  me	  to	  better	  account	  for	  the	  different	  views	  and	  
constraints	  of	  the	  ruled	  in	  authoritarian	  systems,	  and	  to	  explain	  dynamic	  changes	  in	  different	  parties’	  
support	  bases.	  	  
Methodologically,	  the	  study	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  qualitative	  and	  constructivist	  paradigm.	  I	  applied	  
multi-­‐sited	  ethnography	  (Marcus	  1995)	  to	  account	  for	  the	  different	  sites	  and	  levels	  of	  the	  
construction	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  to	  juxtapose	  perspectives	  on	  the	  rulers/the	  ruled,	  the	  
movement,	  and	  the	  party.	  This	  multi-­‐level	  approach	  outlined	  the	  role	  of	  higher	  authorities	  in	  the	  
regional	  political	  set-­‐up	  in	  Darjeeling,	  and	  to	  see	  incumbents’	  rule	  as	  embedded	  in	  broader	  State	  and	  
national-­‐level	  structures.	  
This	  study	  explicitly	  focussed	  on	  tea	  plantation	  workers	  and	  residents	  as	  a	  major	  constituency	  of	  
political	  parties.	  Thus,	  while	  many	  studies	  in	  comparative	  politics	  emphasise	  the	  regional	  elites’	  and	  
functional	  groups’	  role	  in	  sustaining	  regimes,	  this	  study	  highlighted	  the	  decisive	  role	  of	  the	  mass	  of	  
the	  ruled,	  whom	  I	  divided	  into	  activists,	  passive	  followers	  and	  rivals.	  	  
I	  shall	  now	  answer	  the	  above	  research	  questions	  by	  synthesising	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  study.	  I	  first	  
address	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  by	  discussing	  the	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  ruled’s	  motives	  of	  compliance.	  I	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  socio-­‐
economic	  context	  that	  shapes	  such	  motives	  (Chapter	  9.2).	  I	  then	  outline	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  rule.	  
This	  includes	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  Darjeeling	  (Chapter	  9.3).	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime	  in	  
Darjeeling	  (Chapter	  9.4).	  Chapter	  9.5	  presents	  the	  overall	  conclusion	  of	  my	  study,	  which	  is	  that	  
statehood	  movements	  can	  be	  an	  important	  element	  in	  sustaining	  authoritarian	  rulers	  and	  are	  thus	  
not	  necessarily	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  achieve	  decentralisation,	  democratisation,	  and	  “justice”.	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9.2 Motives	  for	  compliance	  and	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  
This	  study	  identified	  leaders’	  reputation	  management,	  investment	  in	  the	  normative	  ethno-­‐regional	  
statehood	  agenda	  in	  combination	  with	  political	  patronage	  and	  forms	  of	  repression	  as	  major	  
strategies	  for	  ruling190.	  But	  why	  did	  the	  ruled	  in	  Darjeeling	  comply	  with	  or	  support	  the	  regime,	  and	  
why	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  I	  have	  identified	  apparently	  so	  successful	  in	  
Darjeeling?	  	  
In	  discussing	  these	  issues,	  I	  followed	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  who	  identified	  three	  motives	  based	  on	  
which	  the	  ruled	  comply	  with	  authoritarian	  rulers:	  they	  regard	  them	  as	  rightful;	  they	  benefit	  from	  co-­‐
optation/patronage;	  or	  they	  fear	  sanctions.	  Although	  I	  generally	  agreed	  with	  these,	  I	  argued	  that	  
they	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  context-­‐specific	  and	  not	  as	  uniform	  for	  the	  ruled	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  included	  
asking	  about	  the	  conditions	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  defining	  differing	  perceptions	  of	  “rightfulness”,	  
expectations	  of	  “benefits”	  and	  the	  factors	  framing	  “fear”.	  Paying	  attention	  to	  these	  questions	  
underlines	  my	  claim	  that	  these	  motives	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  specific	  historic	  
and	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions	  that	  shape	  them.	  Accordingly,	  any	  understanding	  of	  the	  success	  or	  
failure	  of	  incumbents’	  strategies	  for	  ruling,	  and	  the	  longevity	  of	  a	  political	  regime	  must	  pay	  attention	  
to	  such	  place-­‐specific	  circumstances.	  
Belief	  in	  rightfulness	  I	  –	  Normative	  legitimacy	  and	  Gorkhaland	  
As	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  belief	  in	  a	  leader’s	  or	  regime’s	  rightfulness	  (or	  legitimacy)	  can	  be	  
generated	  through	  normative/programmatic	  and/or	  factual	  means	  (what	  Karateke	  (2005)	  called	  
“normative”	  or	  “factual	  legitimacy”).	  	  
Regarding	  normative	  legitimacy,	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrated	  the	  strong	  emotional	  and	  ideological	  
appeal	  that	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  statehood	  agenda	  holds	  for	  the	  ruled,	  especially	  for	  tea	  plantation	  
workers	  and	  residents.	  For	  them,	  aspirations	  for	  a	  better	  life,	  improved	  working	  conditions,	  social	  
and	  livelihoods	  security,	  and	  recognition	  as	  Indian	  citizens	  together	  defined	  their	  vision	  of	  
Gorkhaland.	  These	  aspirations	  were	  clearly	  grounded	  in	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  environment,	  
characterised	  by	  harsh	  and	  hierarchical	  working	  conditions,	  and	  perceived	  exploitation.	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  Some	  accounts	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  party	  in	  other	  realms,	  including	  water	  distribution,	  
forestry/timber	  or	  real-­‐estate	  development.	  Further	  exploration	  of	  these	  realms	  might	  have	  underlined	  the	  
economically-­‐material	  aspects	  of	  the	  party’s	  rule	  and	  added	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  interests	  coming	  together	  under	  
the	  heading	  of	  statehood.	  Another	  aspect	  lacking	  in	  the	  study	  is	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  and	  religious	  leaders	  play	  in	  
stabilising	  the	  incumbents’	  dominance	  (see	  report	  by	  Thomas	  Shor	  (2014)).	  One	  last	  aspect	  which	  I	  only	  briefly	  
addressed	  is	  the	  role	  of	  gender	  and	  perceptions	  of	  masculinity	  and	  femininity	  in	  the	  party	  and	  the	  movement.	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The	  strong	  emotional	  and	  utopian	  appeal	  makes	  Gorkhaland	  a	  powerful	  basis	  for	  the	  normative	  
legitimacy	  of	  political	  parties.	  The	  respective	  dominant	  parties	  (i.e.	  GNLF,	  GJM)	  attempt	  to	  
monopolise	  the	  statehood	  idea,	  while	  denying	  rival	  parties	  the	  right	  to	  contend	  for	  the	  cause	  by	  
questioning	  their	  honesty.	  Chapter	  5	  identified	  GJM	  leader	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  self-­‐presentation	  as	  able	  
and	  committed	  contender	  for	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  important	  element	  of	  his	  reputation	  management.	  	  
Yet,	  although	  my	  study	  underlined	  that	  gaining	  normative	  legitimacy	  through	  investing	  into	  the	  
ethno-­‐regional	  statehood	  agenda	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  gaining	  power,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient;	  
rather,	  a	  ruler	  has	  to	  complement	  normative	  appeals	  with	  factual	  deliveries	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  	  
Belief	  in	  rightfulness	  II	  –	  Factual	  legitimacy	  and	  patronage	  
Despite	  the	  normative	  commitment	  of	  party	  followers	  to	  the	  Gorkhaland	  agenda,	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  
underlined	  that	  many	  not	  only	  expected	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  achieve	  statehood	  but	  also	  to	  deliver	  
jobs,	  developmental	  projects,	  contracts,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  financial	  support.	  Chapters	  6	  and	  8	  
underlined	  that	  such	  material	  aspirations	  became	  more	  pronounced	  with	  the	  GJM’s	  perceived	  
rollback	  on	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  autonomous	  council.	  	  
In	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  that	  offers	  few	  opportunities	  for	  people	  to	  improve	  their	  livelihoods,	  the	  
unemployed	  in	  particular	  began	  to	  see	  the	  party	  as	  a	  vehicle	  that	  could	  not	  (only)	  bring	  forward	  the	  
statehood	  agenda.	  They	  (also)	  perceived	  it	  as	  holding	  the	  power	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  
developmental	  goods,	  and	  increasingly	  posed	  demands	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  benefits	  on	  its	  
leaders.	  Thus,	  active	  support	  for	  the	  party	  did	  not	  necessarily	  express	  a	  commitment	  to	  Gorkhaland;	  
Chapter	  6	  showed	  that	  many	  active	  members	  saw	  it	  (also)	  as	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  
of	  the	  developmental	  state	  and	  other	  benefits.	  While	  tea	  workers	  and	  the	  unemployed	  strove	  to	  
improve	  their	  socio-­‐economic	  condition	  and	  class	  status,	  elite	  groups	  (especially	  wealthy	  contractors	  
and	  businessmen)	  wanted	  to	  maintain	  or	  further	  enhance	  their	  status.	  Although	  its	  declining	  
commitment	  to	  the	  statehood	  agenda	  diminished	  the	  GJM’s	  normative	  legitimacy,	  the	  agreement	  on	  
the	  GTA	  held	  the	  promise	  of	  more	  factual	  developmental	  and	  material	  benefits	  for	  those	  close	  to	  the	  
party.	  
Importantly,	  such	  aspirations	  for	  factual	  deliveries	  do	  not	  simply	  reflect	  a	  benefit-­‐maximising	  logic	  of	  
patronage	  receivers.	  Hopes	  for	  factual	  deliveries	  through	  leaders	  are	  also	  grounded	  in	  more	  general	  
concerns	  about	  social	  equality	  and	  a	  fear	  of	  being	  exploited	  by	  leaders.	  They	  reflect	  moral	  values	  that	  
define	  what	  a	  “good”	  leader	  should	  be	  like,	  i.e.	  he/she	  should	  share	  his	  wealth	  and	  offer	  something	  
in	  return	  for	  people’s	  political	  support.	  Bimal	  Gurung	  tried	  to	  cater	  to	  such	  aspirations	  by	  investing	  in	  
a	  reputation	  for	  being	  an	  able	  and	  generous	  “social	  worker”,	  in	  addition	  to	  his	  programmatic	  
commitment	  to	  Gorkhaland.	  To	  be	  able	  to	  deliver	  goods,	  the	  GJM	  established	  resource	  monopolies	  
Conclusion:	  After	  Gorkhaland	  
254	  
	  
via	  its	  control	  over	  the	  DGHC	  (and	  later	  GTA)	  and	  locally	  implemented	  development	  schemes.	  The	  
perceived	  conditional	  delivery	  of	  benefits	  sustained	  the	  belief	  that	  only	  those	  close	  to	  the	  party	  
would	  benefit.	  Thus,	  while	  some	  saw	  their	  material	  demands	  fulfilled,	  others	  underlined	  their	  fear	  
from	  exclusion	  and	  repression	  if	  criticising	  the	  party,	  pointing	  to	  the	  repressive	  function	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  
patronage.	  
The	  importance	  of	  such	  factual	  demands,	  in	  addition	  to	  programmatic	  aspirations	  (i.e.	  normative	  
legitimacy),	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  other	  regional	  parties,	  which	  –	  despite	  promoting	  
Gorkhaland	  –	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  mount	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  either	  Ghisingh	  or	  Gurung.	  	  
Fear	  and	  repression	  
Despite	  the	  GJM’s	  attempts	  to	  generate	  normative	  and	  factual	  legitimacy,	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  showed	  
that	  the	  party	  was	  increasingly	  perceived	  as	  failing	  on	  both	  counts.	  Instead,	  many	  began	  to	  perceive	  
the	  GJM	  as	  an	  exploitive	  party	  led	  by	  “selfish”	  leaders	  who	  cater	  for	  their	  own	  needs	  instead	  of	  
others’.	  Apparently,	  the	  GJM	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  “demand”	  side	  of	  their	  constituents.	  This	  applies	  
to	  both	  the	  senior	  party	  leadership	  and	  to	  local	  activists,	  whom	  many	  blamed	  for	  siphoning	  off	  the	  
benefits	  of	  development	  and	  welfare	  schemes	  intended	  for	  the	  “community”.	  This	  raised	  the	  
question	  of	  why	  a	  majority	  continued	  to	  support	  the	  GJM.	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  role	  of	  fear	  and	  
repression.	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  showed	  that	  many	  persons	  critical	  of	  the	  GJM	  still	  supported	  it	  because	  they	  feared	  
repression	  if	  they	  took	  a	  public	  stand	  against	  the	  majority.	  The	  fear	  of	  being	  excluded	  from	  access	  to	  
state	  resources,	  of	  becoming	  a	  victim	  of	  a	  “social	  boycott”	  in	  such	  a	  close-­‐knit	  interdependent	  
society,	  of	  being	  denied	  union	  support	  at	  the	  tea	  plantation,	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  suffering	  physical	  harm	  
stopped	  most	  people	  from	  voicing	  any	  criticism	  of	  what	  many	  of	  them	  saw	  as	  morally	  objectionable	  
practices	  by	  ruling	  politicians	  in	  Darjeeling.	  	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  apprehensions	  stands	  a	  historical	  fear	  with	  its	  roots	  in	  chhyāsī	  (the	  1986-­‐
agitation).	  The	  horrific	  memories	  of	  this	  civil	  war,	  in	  which	  those	  labelled	  “rivals”	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  
demand	  faced	  physical	  harm	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  GNLF	  activists,	  while	  those	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  demand	  
were	  exposed	  to	  attacks,	  rape	  and	  arson	  by	  state-­‐backed	  rivals,	  still	  generates	  fear	  of	  multiple	  parties	  
in	  villages	  and	  open	  political	  contestations	  to	  this	  day.	  The	  functional	  role	  of	  many	  village	  samāj	  in	  
switching	  political	  affiliations	  as	  a	  whole	  community	  in	  2007/08,	  and	  the	  frequent	  statement	  that	  
“staying	  with	  the	  ‘majority’	  [Engl.]	  is	  safe”,	  confirms	  that	  for	  most	  inhabitants	  of	  Darjeeling	  the	  
“correct”	  political	  affiliation	  is	  a	  question	  of	  survival	  and	  a	  means	  of	  protection	  from	  anticipated	  
harm	  and	  victimisation.	  The	  oft-­‐heard	  statement	  that	  “nobody	  wants	  to	  take	  a	  risk”	  expresses	  this	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fear	  of	  victimisation.	  This	  “fear	  psychosis”	  (as	  some	  in	  Darjeeling	  call	  it)	  shapes	  both	  people’s	  political	  
agencies	  and	  social	  behaviour.	  	  
Chapter	  7	  showed	  that	  this	  fear	  is	  kept	  alive	  not	  only	  through	  spectacular	  performances	  of	  violence,	  
e.g.	  the	  public	  murder	  of	  AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  allegedly	  carried	  out	  by	  GJM	  activists,	  but	  
also	  through	  smaller,	  more	  underhand	  forms	  of	  hard	  repression	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  form	  of	  threats	  to	  those	  
critical	  of	  local	  party	  leaders)	  keep	  the	  fear	  of	  “being	  against	  the	  majority”	  alive.	  Many	  regarded	  the	  
hierarchical	  and	  interconnected	  party	  organisation	  as	  a	  surveillance	  tool	  that	  has	  allowed	  senior	  
leaders	  to	  gain	  information	  about	  possible	  defections	  from	  their	  local	  shakhā	  activists.	  Local	  party	  
leaders	  play	  a	  functional	  role	  in	  this.	  They	  are	  not	  only	  feared	  as	  spies	  transmitting	  the	  news	  of	  
possible	  defectors	  to	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  party,	  but	  also	  regarded	  as	  gatekeepers	  for	  local	  
development	  or	  state	  welfare	  programmes.	  Many	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  these	  persons	  in	  the	  
main	  who	  maintain	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  fear	  among	  the	  (passive)	  followers	  and	  rivals	  locally,	  and	  this	  
underscores	  their	  role	  in	  maintaining	  local	  power	  relations.	  Social	  cleavages	  such	  as	  these	  among	  the	  
ruled	  breed	  a	  lack	  of	  mutual	  trust,	  and	  make	  many	  even	  more	  fearful	  about	  discussing	  the	  “party”	  
and	  “politics”	  with	  each	  other.	  
Such	  historically	  grounded	  apprehensions	  and	  social	  cleavages	  make	  repression	  a	  rather	  “cheap”	  
strategy	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Occasional	  threats	  and	  some	  incidents	  of	  inter-­‐party	  violence	  seemed	  
sufficient	  to	  instigate	  and	  maintain	  such	  fear.	  Furthermore,	  violence	  not	  only	  helped	  the	  GJM	  to	  
enforce	  its	  resource	  monopolies	  (as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  6),	  but	  also	  helped	  the	  GJM	  and	  its	  president	  
to	  generate	  images	  of	  a	  (frightening)	  strongman	  party.	  Chapter	  7	  displayed	  how	  GJM	  leaders	  even	  
tried	  to	  reinterpret	  violent	  events	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  “non-­‐violent”,	  which	  suggests	  that	  
violence	  has	  a	  “functional	  utility”	  (Brass	  1997)	  for	  the	  GJM.	  
Leader	  Bimal	  Gurung	  also	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  a	  strongman	  capable	  of	  using	  his	  “muscle”	  if	  
necessary.	  Thus,	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  reputations	  as	  a	  committed	  fighter	  for	  Gorkhaland	  and	  a	  social	  
worker,	  he	  did	  not	  simply	  cater	  successfully	  for	  moral	  or	  transactional	  aspirations;	  he	  also	  
underscored	  his	  authority	  with	  a	  clear	  reference	  to	  his	  “muscle”.	  These	  reputations	  made	  him	  more	  
attractive	  (and	  frightening)	  than	  other	  regional	  leaders	  who	  demanded	  Gorkhaland.	  
The	  silence	  of	  the	  sachet	  jantā	  
So	  what	  about	  the	  “aware	  person”	  or	  sachet	  jantā?	  My	  study	  showed	  that	  many	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  
do	  aspire	  to	  justice	  and	  improved	  access	  to	  the	  state.	  They	  have	  an	  awareness	  of	  their	  rights	  and	  
entitlements.	  They	  do	  criticise	  their	  own	  leaders	  for	  failing	  to	  live	  up	  to	  moral	  and	  material	  
expectations.	  But	  the	  widespread	  fear	  of	  violence	  and	  repression,	  coupled	  with	  the	  longing	  for	  self-­‐
preservation	  or	  aggrandizement,	  renders	  most	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  sachet	  jantā	  silent.	  They	  are	  sachet	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jantā	  without	  any	  teeth	  and	  without	  a	  united	  voice.	  Keeping	  silent	  and	  “staying	  with	  the	  majority”	  
were	  pragmatic	  strategies,	  which	  most	  believed	  would	  provide	  safety	  in	  a	  context	  prone	  to	  political	  
violence.	  It	  is	  this	  need	  for	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  pragmatism	  that	  governs	  their	  decision	  to	  follow	  the	  
ruling	  party.	  	  
This	  makes	  the	  idiom	  of	  sachet	  jantā	  itself	  an	  ideal	  to	  which	  people	  aspire,	  but	  to	  which	  most	  cannot	  
live	  up	  in	  their	  actual	  political	  and	  social	  practices.	  Like	  Gorkhaland,	  it	  remains	  a	  dream	  without	  
implementation.	  Instead,	  it	  becomes	  a	  label	  for	  politicians	  to	  present	  their	  rule	  as	  based	  on	  the	  
presumed	  and	  proclaimed	  “democratic”	  approval	  of	  a	  critical	  and	  rights-­‐seeking	  citizenry.	  It	  is	  not	  
hard	  to	  claim	  this	  if	  the	  sachet	  jantā	  remain	  silent.	  This	  also	  answers	  the	  question	  as	  to	  why	  the	  
critical	  juncture	  of	  2007/08	  in	  Darjeeling,	  initiated	  by	  the	  succession	  of	  the	  GNLF	  by	  the	  GJM,	  did	  not	  
lead	  to	  general	  regime	  change	  where	  principles	  of	  substantial	  democracy	  are	  followed.	  Analysis	  of	  
the	  GJM’s	  strategies	  for	  ruling	  and	  their	  success	  amongst	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  suggests	  that	  
the	  change	  of	  party	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient	  if	  the	  overall	  conditions	  for	  ruling	  –	  fear,	  socio-­‐economic	  
context,	  social	  cleavages	  –	  do	  not	  change	  too.	  
	  
9.3 Limits	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  rule	  
Although	  the	  GJM’s	  rule	  appeared	  to	  be	  stable	  throughout	  the	  time	  I	  was	  doing	  my	  research,	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  8	  also	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  not	  total	  and	  is	  built	  on	  relatively	  shaky	  foundations.	  While	  
the	  GJM	  managed	  to	  compensate	  for	  losses	  of	  normative	  legitimacy	  with	  factual	  deliveries	  and	  
repression,	  my	  analysis	  revealed	  (in	  contrast	  to	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Gerschewski	  (2014)	  
who	  pointed	  at	  the	  complementary	  nature	  of	  these	  strategies)	  that	  these	  can	  also	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  
each	  other.	  	  
In	  identifying	  the	  limits	  to	  the	  GJM’s	  rule,	  I	  first	  address	  different	  political	  support	  bases	  that	  
constitute	  different	  “moral	  communities”	  (Lentz	  1998,	  62)	  in	  Darjeeling.	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  problems	  
arising	  from	  the	  GJM’s	  attempts	  to	  deliver	  both	  normative	  and	  factual	  goods,	  before	  addressing	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  maintaining	  (or	  limiting)	  the	  GJM’s	  dominance,	  and	  the	  political	  regime	  in	  
Darjeeling	  in	  general.	  
“Moral	  communities”	  -­‐	  Material	  versus	  moral	  concerns	  
Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007)	  and	  others	  (Greene	  2007;	  Gandhi	  and	  Lust-­‐Okar	  2009)	  have	  argued	  
that	  people	  with	  an	  independent	  and	  strong	  economic	  base	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  a	  party	  based	  
on	  its	  manifesto,	  rather	  than	  expectations	  of	  benefits	  for	  them.	  However,	  my	  study	  showed	  that	  the	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socio-­‐economic	  background	  alone	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  explanation	  for	  individuals’	  involvement	  in	  
clientelist	  or	  programmatic	  politics.	  Rather,	  society	  is	  made	  up	  of	  different	  “moral	  communities”	  
(Lentz	  1998),	  which	  evaluate	  leaders’	  conduct	  according	  to	  different	  criteria.	  This	  reinforces	  the	  
observation	  that	  support	  or	  compliance	  to	  a	  ruler	  is	  not	  uniform	  across	  a	  society	  (Hardin	  2009;	  
Burnell	  2006;	  Alfonso,	  Kennedy,	  and	  Escalona	  2004).	  
For	  instance,	  the	  example	  of	  CPRM	  activists	  suggested	  that	  even	  those	  with	  a	  weaker	  economic	  base	  
can	  stick	  to	  a	  programmatic	  politics	  and	  actively	  refuse	  to	  benefit	  from	  material	  spoils.	  They	  believed	  
that	  a	  leader’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  statehood	  cause	  and	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  was	  more	  
important	  than	  benefiting	  from	  patronage	  or	  receiving	  “development”.	  This	  refusal	  makes	  CPRM	  
members	  more	  “immune”	  to	  attempts	  by	  the	  GJM	  to	  win	  their	  support	  by	  distributing	  material	  
benefits.	  
Such	  different	  bases	  of	  evaluation	  were	  also	  embodied	  in	  ideal	  pictures	  of	  morally	  “good”	  leaders	  as	  
promoted	  by	  the	  GJM’s	  rival	  parties.	  Yet	  the	  little	  support	  such	  alternate	  leaders	  receive	  suggests	  
that	  it	  is	  rather	  unlikely	  for	  a	  majority	  guided	  by	  fear	  and	  pragmatic	  needs	  to	  produce	  and	  actively	  
support	  a	  “honest”	  leader	  whose	  rule	  is	  not	  based	  on	  “money”	  or	  “muscle”.	  	  
Trade-­‐offs	  and	  “double-­‐dealing”	  
Even	  authoritarian	  rulers	  cannot	  rule	  entirely	  by	  ignoring	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  constituents.	  My	  study	  
showed	  that	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  ruled	  is	  not	  only	  important	  to	  sustain	  an	  incumbent	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  
electoral	  and	  political	  support.	  Their	  morally	  and	  materially	  based	  demands	  also	  set	  the	  rules	  for	  
leaders’	  conduct,	  and	  cause	  difficulties	  for	  the	  leaders	  to	  live	  up	  to	  both	  these	  demands.	  This	  leads	  to	  
a	  second	  limitation	  of	  the	  GJM’s	  rule,	  which	  is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  juggling	  the	  normative	  and	  factual	  
bases	  of	  its	  legitimacy.	  I	  showed	  above	  that	  the	  GJM’s	  leaders	  were	  under	  pressure	  not	  only	  to	  
promote	  the	  statehood	  demand,	  but	  also	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  development	  front.	  This	  raises	  the	  issue	  
of	  the	  problematic	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  dual	  pressure	  on	  the	  interrelations	  between	  the	  regime-­‐
sustaining	  pillars	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  co-­‐optation/patronage.	  	  
While	  Gerschewski	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  pointed	  to	  the	  complementary	  relations	  between	  the	  two,	  Chapters	  
6	  and	  8	  showed	  that	  leaders’	  need	  to	  deliver	  both	  statehood	  and	  factual	  goods	  entails	  serious	  trade-­‐
offs	  between	  the	  pillars	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  patronage.	  If	  the	  party	  demands	  statehood	  by	  challenging	  
the	  State	  government,	  it	  lives	  up	  to	  normative	  expectations	  of	  its	  constituents	  but	  risks	  halting	  the	  
flow	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  resources	  that	  it	  requires	  to	  be	  able	  to	  distribute	  patronage	  and	  maintain	  its	  
“mobilising	  function”	  (Magaloni	  and	  Kricheli	  2010);	  if	  the	  party	  cosies	  up	  to	  the	  government	  and	  rolls	  
back	  on	  demands	  for	  autonomy	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  steady	  flow	  of	  resources,	  it	  invests	  into	  factual	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legitimacy	  through	  patronage	  but	  compromises	  on	  its	  normative	  legitimacy	  (i.e.	  statehood	  agenda).	  
This	  trade-­‐off	  forces	  the	  party	  to	  engage	  in	  “double-­‐dealing”	  (Jeffrey	  2010,	  135).	  To	  convince	  
supporters	  of	  its	  commitment	  to	  the	  statehood	  agenda,	  the	  GJM	  took	  part	  in	  radical	  “movement”	  
activities;	  to	  secure	  a	  regular	  supply	  of	  patronage	  resources	  the	  party	  had	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  
partner	  who	  was	  open	  to	  negotiations	  with	  the	  government.	  Thus	  the	  GJM’s	  dual	  identity	  (radical-­‐
normative	  movement	  and	  accommodative-­‐distributive	  party	  identities)	  reflect	  this	  double-­‐dealing.	  In	  
the	  longer	  term	  however,	  such	  fluctuations	  make	  the	  party	  appear	  less	  credible	  for	  those	  with	  
aspirations	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  As	  Chapters	  3	  (on	  the	  GNLF)	  and	  8	  underlined,	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  failure	  to	  
balance	  both	  these	  identities	  increased	  the	  risk	  of	  party	  defections	  and	  opened	  up	  space	  for	  the	  
opposition	  to	  gain	  strength.	  
Dependence	  on	  the	  state	  
This	  points	  to	  a	  third	  important	  factor	  that	  possibly	  destabilises	  the	  GJM’s	  rule:	  its	  reliance	  on	  the	  
sufficient	  flow	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  developmental	  resources	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  My	  analysis	  underlined	  
the	  fact	  that	  state	  concessions	  for	  regional	  autonomy	  support	  the	  party’s	  resource	  monopoly	  and	  
thus	  stabilise	  their	  rule.	  	  
The	  government	  also	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  facilitate	  or	  restrict	  attempts	  for	  resistance	  against	  GJM	  rule.	  
This	  is	  because,	  ultimately,	  the	  government	  frames	  the	  legal	  rules	  for	  political	  actors	  in	  Darjeeling	  
(e.g.	  by	  granting	  permission	  for	  public	  meetings,	  or	  controlling	  the	  police/paramilitary	  forces),	  and	  
therefore	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  support	  (or	  limit)	  “resistance”	  to	  the	  dominant	  party.	  	  
Chapter	  8	  underlined	  that	  such	  resistance	  by	  rival	  parties	  or	  associations	  itself	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  
state	  strategy	  for	  controlling	  the	  GJM	  and	  with	  it,	  the	  movement	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  The	  establishment	  
of	  the	  Development	  Boards	  for	  the	  Lepcha	  or	  Tamang,	  for	  instance,	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  means	  of	  
deepening	  fractures	  within	  the	  hill	  society.	  In	  this	  way,	  resistance	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  
attempt	  to	  maintain	  both	  its	  authority	  and	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  West	  Bengal	  State.	  In	  a	  way,	  
the	  State	  government	  outsources	  its	  own	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  ruling	  party,	  whose	  leaders	  rule	  at	  the	  
State’s	  whim.	  Therefore,	  the	  state	  has	  the	  power	  to	  limit	  the	  GJM’s	  dominance;	  but	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  
the	  government	  would	  also	  engage	  in	  creating	  conditions	  for	  a	  regime	  change	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Thus	  
substantial	  resistance	  in	  Darjeeling	  would	  include	  reclaiming	  the	  Darjeeling	  hills	  by	  refusing	  to	  
become	  a	  pawn	  in	  the	  game	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  regional	  ruling	  party.	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9.4 The	  movement	  as	  the	  end	  to	  democracy?	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  last	  of	  my	  research	  questions:	  whether,	  and	  if,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  statehood	  
movement	  contributes	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regime,	  expressed	  in	  the	  dominant-­‐party	  
rule	  of	  the	  GJM.	  Having	  framed	  the	  movement	  as	  “party-­‐political”,	  and	  the	  GJM	  as	  a	  “movement-­‐
party”,	  my	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  the	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  statehood	  movement	  in	  Darjeeling	  
are	  not	  only	  co-­‐existent	  but	  depend	  on	  each	  other.	  In	  other	  words:	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime’s	  
survival	  depends	  strongly	  on	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  statehood	  movement	  and	  its	  broad	  public	  
appeal	  as	  the	  apparent	  solution	  to	  the	  actual	  and	  constructed	  problems	  and	  grievances.	  	  
So	  far	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  ruling	  party	  derives	  its	  normative	  legitimacy	  by	  drawing	  on	  and	  
monopolising	  the	  popular	  Gorkhaland	  agenda.	  Second,	  I	  showed	  that	  the	  state	  sustains	  (and	  thereby	  
controls)	  the	  regional	  political	  elite	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  new	  forceful	  agitation	  for	  statehood.	  This	  is	  
done	  by	  financing	  patronage	  goods	  (via	  the	  autonomous	  council),	  and	  by	  recognising	  it	  as	  the	  sole	  
negotiation	  partner.	  Thus	  the	  GJM’s	  dominance	  is	  also	  sustained	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  commitment	  of	  the	  
government	  to	  creating	  a	  more	  enabling	  and	  “democratic”	  environment.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  this	  
sustains	  the	  competitive	  authoritarian	  regime,	  even	  if	  one	  party	  succeeds	  a	  previously	  ruling	  party	  
(as	  happened	  in	  2007/08)	  and	  revives	  demands	  for	  statehood.	  
I	  now	  discuss	  three	  more	  dimensions	  that	  make	  the	  statehood	  movement	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  
fostering	  more	  substantial	  democracy	  and	  decentralisation.	  First,	  the	  utopian	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  
movement	  foreclose	  alternative	  ways	  of	  representing	  citizens’	  positions	  towards	  the	  state	  by	  
privileging	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  agenda	  over	  others;	  second,	  the	  movement’s	  projection	  of	  the	  state	  as	  
the	  main	  enemy	  obscures	  the	  role	  ruling	  elites	  play	  in	  maintaining	  the	  conditions	  against	  which	  
people	  are	  protesting;	  and	  third,	  instead	  of	  uniting	  the	  population,	  political	  parties’	  attempts	  to	  gain	  
the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  movement	  creates	  divisions	  between	  so-­‐called	  contenders	  and	  rivals	  of	  
statehood.	  I	  detail	  each	  of	  these	  claims	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
Foreclosing	  alternative	  avenues	  to	  the	  state	  	  
In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  showed	  how	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  GNLF	  as	  the	  dominant	  party	  was	  coupled	  with	  
the	  privileging	  of	  ethnic	  identity	  (over	  class)	  in	  people’s	  subjectivities,	  and	  with	  mythmaking	  that	  
Gorkhaland	  would	  be	  a	  remedy	  to	  all	  real	  and	  imagined	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  problems.	  
Chapter	  4	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  myth	  continues	  in	  -­‐	  and	  is	  kept	  alive	  by	  -­‐	  the	  way	  political	  
leaders	  frame	  the	  Gorkhaland	  demand.	  Although	  the	  ruling	  elites	  in	  Darjeeling	  barely	  address	  the	  
issues	  many	  of	  their	  constituents	  found	  important	  (such	  as	  the	  labour	  and	  land	  issues),	  the	  ruled	  still	  
see	  the	  statehood	  movement	  as	  the	  main	  vehicle	  for	  claiming	  rights	  and	  justice	  from	  the	  state.	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In	  Chapter	  4	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  strong	  support	  and	  belief	  in	  the	  Gorkhaland	  vision	  among	  tea	  
plantation	  labourers	  and	  residents	  also	  stems	  from	  a	  conflation	  of	  ethnic	  and	  class	  identities.	  For	  
them,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  issue	  does	  not	  marginalise	  their	  labour	  agenda;	  instead	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  
agenda	  subsumes	  their	  class	  identities.	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  the	  political	  elites	  pay	  to	  such	  
labour	  problems	  and	  the	  priority	  they	  give	  to	  the	  seemingly	  immaterial	  “identity	  crisis”,	  however,	  the	  
all-­‐encompassing	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland	  obscures	  the	  more	  immediate	  problems	  of	  people	  which	  could	  
be	  addressed	  without	  Gorkhaland	  and	  thus	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  dominant	  party.	  This	  includes	  
the	  situation	  on	  the	  tea	  estates,	  or	  development	  and	  environmental	  concerns.	  	  
The	  dominant	  party’s	  forceful	  framing	  of	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  statehood	  agenda	  and	  the	  resulting	  
dominance	  of	  ethnicity	  over	  other	  identities	  (such	  as	  class),	  coupled	  with	  an	  agenda	  to	  silence	  rival	  
voices,	  forecloses	  alternative	  ways	  for	  people	  to	  negotiate	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  state.	  
Obscuring	  the	  role	  of	  ruling	  elites	  
While	  this	  study	  identified	  the	  harmful	  role	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  political	  elites	  play	  in	  maintaining	  the	  
status	  quo,	  the	  Gorkhaland	  rhetoric	  helps	  them	  to	  divert	  attention	  and	  instead	  identify	  a	  Bengali-­‐
dominated	  State	  government	  as	  the	  sole	  and	  main	  enemy	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  ethnic	  group,	  instead	  of	  
addressing	  inequalities.	  The	  Gorkhaland	  imagination	  thus	  obscures	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite	  in	  
maintaining	  the	  very	  conditions	  against	  which	  many	  people	  are	  protesting.	  This	  applies	  to	  both	  
material	  and	  symbolic	  conditions.	  
For	  instance,	  Chapter	  6	  clearly	  demonstrated	  that	  instead	  of	  levelling	  social	  inequalities,	  the	  
dominant	  party	  increased	  these	  via	  its	  exclusive	  patronage;	  ironically,	  the	  continuing	  lack	  of	  
development	  simultaneously	  gives	  the	  same	  leaders	  an	  excuse	  to	  claim	  that	  “only	  a	  separate	  State”	  
would	  address	  people’s	  grievances.	  
Yet	  the	  political	  elites	  foster	  –	  at	  least	  indirectly	  –	  not	  just	  the	  material	  conditions	  behind	  the	  
demand	  for	  Gorkhaland,	  but	  also	  immaterial	  ones.	  These	  include	  the	  so-­‐called	  “identity	  crisis”,	  which	  
the	  rulers	  present	  as	  the	  only	  explanation	  for	  people’s	  experiences	  of	  discrimination	  and	  
stigmatisation	  as	  citizens	  of	  Nepal.	  This	  forecloses	  considerations	  of	  other	  possible	  explanations	  for	  
such	  experiences.	  
However,	  the	  contention	  that	  a	  separate	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  State	  could	  address	  these	  problems	  is	  
questionable.	  The	  Gorkhas	  are	  not	  the	  only	  group	  in	  India	  facing	  constant	  discrimination.	  Various	  
incidents	  in	  towns	  like	  Delhi	  or	  Bangalore	  with	  a	  large	  north-­‐eastern	  population	  underline	  that	  even	  
those	  who	  “have	  their	  own	  State”	  (i.e.	  from	  Megalaya	  or	  Manipur)	  face	  similar	  discrimination	  from	  
other	  “mainland”	  Indians.	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Further,	  I	  propose	  that	  one	  should	  not	  neglect	  the	  possible	  relatedness	  of	  the	  “identity	  crisis”	  to	  
differences	  in	  class	  and	  economic/educational	  status.	  Also	  in	  Darjeeling	  district	  itself,	  tea	  plantations	  
workers	  are	  subjected	  to	  demeaning	  comments	  in	  the	  district’s	  towns.	  The	  idiom	  talako	  keṭāharu	  
(“boys	  from	  down	  there”,	  i.e.	  tea	  plantations,	  see	  Chapter	  7)	  is	  one	  example	  of	  the	  social	  and	  class-­‐
based	  cleavages	  between	  the	  urban	  and	  rural	  populations.	  These	  are	  certainly	  not	  ethnicity-­‐based,	  
but	  stem	  instead	  from	  perceived	  differences	  in	  income,	  class	  and	  behaviour.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  
political	  “identity	  crisis”	  too	  has	  a	  material	  basis,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  very	  people	  who	  refuse	  or	  fail	  to	  
address	  socio-­‐economic	  issues	  seriously	  (e.g.	  by	  reforming	  the	  tea	  economy	  system)	  who	  reproduce	  
it;	  they	  maintain	  the	  very	  class	  divisions	  that	  underpin	  the	  feeling	  of	  discrimination	  and	  inferiority.	  
Read	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  identity	  crisis	  becomes	  not	  a	  crisis	  of	  national	  recognition,	  but	  rather	  a	  crisis	  of	  
political	  misconduct	  and/or	  governmental	  failure,	  exacerbated	  by	  an	  exploitative	  ruling	  elite.	  Neither	  
regional	  autonomy	  (as	  demanded	  by	  the	  CPI-­‐M	  and	  the	  TMC)	  nor	  statehood	  will	  be	  a	  remedy	  for	  this	  
crisis.	  Yet	  as	  long	  as	  people	  believe	  in	  their	  ethnically	  based	  “identity	  crisis”,	  the	  political	  elites	  will	  
have	  a	  reason	  to	  demand	  Gorkhaland	  and	  power.	  	  
Divisions	  instead	  of	  unity	  
A	  final	  point	  that	  underscores	  the	  interrelatedness	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  and	  the	  
authoritarian	  regime	  relates	  to	  its	  effect	  on	  social	  cohesion	  and	  unity.	  Although	  the	  movement	  for	  
Gorkhaland	  as	  such	  has	  great	  potential	  to	  unite	  those	  fighting	  for	  the	  cause,	  the	  Darjeeling	  
experience	  has	  shown	  that	  regional	  parties’	  attempts	  to	  monopolise	  the	  demand	  as	  a	  weapon	  in	  the	  
struggle	  for	  political	  authority	  and	  resources	  has	  caused	  serious	  political	  splits	  in	  the	  population.	  
Instead	  of	  fighting	  alongside	  other	  regional	  parties	  and	  associations	  for	  their	  common	  cause,	  the	  
ruling	  leaders	  attempt	  to	  equate	  Gorkhaland	  with	  the	  ruling	  party.	  In	  this	  logic,	  anyone	  who	  
challenges	  the	  ruling	  party	  is	  stigmatised	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  the	  movement,	  and	  has	  to	  fear	  repression.	  	  
Also,	  the	  more	  recent	  move	  of	  Gorkha	  ethnic	  sub-­‐groups	  to	  strive	  for	  scheduled	  tribe	  recognition	  –	  a	  
move	  clearly	  welcomed	  by	  the	  State	  government	  –	  widens	  such	  divisions	  among	  the	  ruled	  and	  makes	  
it	  more	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  challenge	  the	  ruling	  party	  and	  the	  regime.	  This	  brings	  the	  widespread	  
longing	  for	  a	  strong	  leader	  who	  can	  unite	  people	  back	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  
By	  creating	  divisions	  between	  alleged	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐Gorkhaland	  groups,	  and	  by	  obscuring	  the	  
dominant	  role	  of	  the	  own	  political	  leaders,	  Gorkhaland	  is	  not	  a	  means	  for	  liberation	  but	  becomes	  a	  
means	  of	  continuing	  oppression	  and	  division.	  The	  party	  –	  led	  by	  a	  strong	  and	  seemingly	  trustworthy	  
leader	  –	  captures	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  issue	  so	  that	  those	  who	  support	  the	  statehood	  claim	  follow	  
the	  party.	  This	  party	  –	  drawing	  on	  the	  Gorkhaland	  idea	  –	  continues	  to	  establish	  the	  state	  as	  the	  main	  
enemy	  of	  the	  aware	  citizens,	  while	  concealing	  its	  own	  role	  in	  maintaining	  the	  very	  conditions	  against	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which	  people	  are	  protesting.	  Thus,	  ultimately	  (and	  perversely),	  people’s	  continuing	  support	  for	  the	  
statehood	  claim	  reinstates	  the	  dominant	  party	  regime	  in	  Darjeeling.	  The	  monopolisation	  of	  the	  
movement	  through	  the	  ruling	  party	  becomes	  both	  means	  and	  effect	  of	  its	  dominance.	  This	  
underlines	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  capture	  of	  movements	  by	  political	  parties,	  and	  the	  strong	  conflation	  of	  
party-­‐political	  and	  social-­‐movement	  identities,	  is	  ultimately	  detrimental	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
movement.	  
Towards	  a	  better	  Gorkhaland?	  
The	  discussion	  above	  illustrates	  my	  major	  criticism	  of	  the	  decentralisation	  thesis,	  i.e.	  that	  
movements	  for	  new	  States	  are	  not	  (necessarily)	  a	  vehicle	  for	  achieving	  rights	  for	  those	  at	  the	  
grassroots.	  Although	  the	  movement’s	  rhetoric	  suggests	  that	  these	  are	  expressions	  of	  a	  newly	  aware	  
citizenry,	  which	  is	  demanding	  perceived	  rights	  and	  entitlements	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  
great	  liberating	  -­‐	  and	  even	  revolutionary	  -­‐	  potential	  to	  engender	  an	  issue-­‐based	  programmatic	  
politics,	  so-­‐called	  “grassroots”-­‐movements	  can	  themselves	  become	  a	  means	  for	  those	  who	  claim	  
leadership	  over	  them	  to	  enact	  repression.	  The	  movements’	  potential	  to	  attract	  the	  masses	  makes	  
them	  prone	  to	  capture	  by	  political	  parties.	  In	  Darjeeling,	  this	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dominant	  
party	  regime,	  in	  which	  the	  incumbent	  systematically	  and	  regularly	  violates	  the	  rules	  of	  substantial	  
democracy,	  and	  thereby	  diminishes	  other	  regional	  parties’	  chances	  of	  attaining	  power.	  Thus	  the	  
statehood	  movement	  and	  the	  dominant-­‐party	  regime	  not	  only	  co-­‐exist,	  but	  depend	  on	  each	  other.	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  Gorkhaland	  movement	  has	  been	  taken	  over	  by	  political	  parties	  has	  serious	  
consequences	  for	  its	  future	  course,	  its	  potential	  for	  social	  inclusion/exclusion,	  and	  its	  meanings	  to	  
those	  involved.	  Guided	  by	  pragmatism	  and	  material	  aspirations,	  a	  movement	  brought	  forward	  in	  the	  
language	  of	  “democracy”	  and	  decentralisation	  became	  an	  arena	  for	  acquiring	  and	  fighting	  over	  
material	  resources.	  This	  eventually	  weakened	  the	  movements’	  programmatic	  base,	  as	  paying	  lip-­‐
service	  to	  Gorkhaland	  decayed	  into	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  for	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  “winning	  
coalition”	  of	  a	  party	  that	  continues	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  ethno-­‐regional	  statehood	  agenda	  for	  its	  normative	  
legitimacy.	  Resistance	  can	  only	  be	  expressed	  openly	  by	  those	  willing	  to	  suffer	  political	  victimisation	  
and	  exclusion	  from	  any	  material	  benefits,	  and/or	  accept	  social	  exclusion,	  physical	  harm	  or	  even	  
death.	  	  
Thus	  a	  citizenry	  aware	  of	  its	  rights	  and	  entitlements	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  with	  aspirations	  for	  justice,	  
redistribution	  and	  recognition,	  as	  embodied	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  statehood,	  are	  no	  guarantee,	  on	  
their	  own,	  of	  greater	  local	  democracy	  and	  participation.	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  rights-­‐based	  movement	  
will	  only	  generate	  substantial	  change	  in	  the	  regional	  political	  regime	  if	  people	  recognise	  that	  it	  is	  
their	  own	  chosen	  leaders	  that	  are	  preventing	  them	  from	  attaining	  their	  rights,	  and	  then	  have	  the	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capacity,	  the	  bravery	  and	  the	  security	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  the	  injustices	  they	  observe.	  Such	  
resistance	  would	  also	  include	  countering	  the	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  sustain	  the	  regime	  by	  driving	  further	  
divisions	  between	  people,	  e.g.	  by	  distributing	  patronage	  to	  select	  groups.	  Under	  current	  conditions,	  
however,	  the	  statehood	  movement	  in	  Darjeeling	  is	  not	  a	  sign	  or	  expression	  of	  the	  “spread	  of	  
democracy”;	  rather,	  it	  is	  the	  end	  of	  democracy.	  
This	  study	  has	  made	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  deconstructing	  the	  common	  labels	  of	  “movement”,	  
“autonomy”	  and	  “democracy”.	  To	  offer	  one	  final,	  more	  positive	  contrast	  to	  this	  study’s	  gloomy	  and	  
pessimist	  overall	  outlook,	  however,	  I	  wish	  to	  stress	  that	  –	  although	  misused	  by	  the	  ruling	  elites	  –	  
these	  labels	  still	  hold	  important	  meanings	  and	  promises	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Darjeeling.	  Their	  criticism	  
of	  their	  political	  leaders’	  conduct,	  coupled	  with	  the	  continuing	  longing	  for	  a	  better	  life,	  contains	  
potential	  for	  substantial	  political	  change,	  possibly	  beyond	  the	  idea	  of	  Gorkhaland.	  After	  all,	  as	  one	  
respondent	  once	  suggested:	  “This	  is	  the	  land	  where	  the	  Gorkhas	  reside.	  Gorkhaland	  is	  already	  here.”	  








Appendix	  A.	  Timeline	  
Pre-­‐Independence	  
1780	   The	  expanding	  Gorkha	  Kingdom	  captures	  Sikkim	  and	  today’s	  Darjeeling	  
and	  Kurseong	  sub-­‐divisions	  
1814-­‐1816	   War	  between	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  and	  the	  expanding	  Gorkha	  
Kingdom	  which	  the	  EIC	  wins	  
1816	   Treaty	  of	  Sugauli	  which	  establishes	  today’s	  boundaries	  between	  East-­‐
Nepal	  and	  India	  
1817	   Treaty	  of	  Titalia;	  the	  EIC	  returns	  the	  ceded	  areas	  of	  Darjeeling	  and	  
Sikkim	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Sikkim	  in	  return	  for	  rights	  to	  cross	  over	  
Sikkimese	  territory	  into	  Tibet	  
1835	   The	  Sikkim	  King	  gives	  areas	  of	  Darjeeling	  to	  the	  EIC	  as	  a	  ‘Deed	  of	  Grant’;	  
subsequently	  Darjeeling	  becomes	  a	  ‘Hill	  Station’	  
1846	   Establishment	  of	  a	  recruitment-­‐centre	  for	  the	  British	  Indian	  Army	  in	  
Darjeeling	  
1852	   The	  commercial	  planting	  of	  tea	  in	  Darjeeling	  begins	  
1874	   Darjeeling	  attains	  status	  as	  “scheduled	  district”	  under	  British	  
governance	  
1865	   Treaty	  of	  Sinchula	  ends	  the	  Anglo-­‐Bhutan	  war;	  Bhutan	  cedes	  areas	  of	  
today’s	  Kalimpong	  sub-­‐division	  to	  the	  British;	  Darjeeling	  district	  attains	  
its	  final	  shape	  
1907	   The	  Hill	  Men	  Association	  led	  by	  S.W.	  Laden	  La	  petitions	  for	  an	  
administrative	  separation	  of	  Darjeeling	  from	  Bengal	  (reiterated	  in:	  1917,	  
1920,	  1929,	  1930,	  1934,	  1935,	  1941)	  
1919	   Government	  of	  India	  Act	  makes	  Darjeeling	  a	  “backward	  tract”	  
1924	   Foundation	  of	  the	  Nepali	  Sahitya	  Samelan	  (Nepali	  Literature	  Society)	  
1935	   Government	  of	  India	  Act	  renders	  Darjeeling	  a	  “partially	  excluded	  area”	  
1936	   Hill	  Men	  Association’s	  leader	  S.W.	  Laden	  La	  dies	  
1940	   Establishment	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI)	  in	  Darjeeling	  
1944	   Foundation	  of	  the	  All	  India	  Gorkha	  League	  (AIGL)	  in	  Darjeeling	  
1945	   The	  CPI	  opens	  its	  tea	  labour	  union	  in	  Darjeeling,	  led	  by	  Ratanlal	  Brahmin	  




1947	   AIGL	  proposes	  administrative	  separation	  from	  Bengal	  and	  merger	  of	  
Darjeeling/Dooars	  with	  Assam;	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  autonomous	  
council	  
	  
Post-­‐Independence	  till	  1979	  
1948	   AIGL	  Proposal	  to	  PM	  Nehru	  suggesting	  three	  alternatives	  	  for	  Darjeeling:	  
(i)	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  administrative	  unit	  under	  central	  government,	  
(ii)	  separate	  province	  comprising	  Darjeeling	  district	  and	  neighbouring	  
areas;	  (iii)	  Darjeeling	  district	  with	  Dooars	  to	  be	  included	  in	  Assam	  
1948	   AIGL	  president	  D.S.	  Gurung	  dies;	  Deo	  Prakash	  Rai	  becomes	  new	  AIGL	  
president	  
1949	   AIGL	  proposal	  for	  a	  separate	  “Uttarakhand”	  State	  (together	  with	  leaders	  
from	  Sikkim,	  Jalpaiguri,	  Cooch	  Behar)	  
1951	   West	  Bengal	  government	  declines	  the	  proposal	  to	  make	  Nepali	  the	  
official	  language	  of	  the	  three	  hill-­‐subdivisions	  of	  Darjeeling;	  start	  of	  the	  
language	  movement	  
1952	   Indian	  National	  Congress	  forms	  the	  first	  elected	  West	  Bengal	  
government	  under	  CM	  B.C.	  Roy	  
1952	   AIGL	  memorandum	  to	  PM	  Nehru	  in	  Kalimpong,	  demanding	  Darjeeling	  
hills’	  separation	  from	  West	  Bengal	  by	  either	  creating	  separate	  
administrative	  unit	  under	  the	  Centre,	  merging	  Darjeeling	  and	  Dooars	  
with	  Assam,	  or	  creating	  a	  separate	  province	  including	  Darjeeling	  and	  
neighbouring	  areas	  
1953	   CPI	  Darjeeling	  District	  Committee,	  demand	  regional	  autonomy	  for	  
whole	  Darjeeling	  district	  
1955	   Six	  tea	  workers	  die	  in	  police	  firing	  at	  Margret’s	  Hope	  tea	  estate	  in	  
Kurseong	  sub-­‐division	  during	  a	  labour	  movement	  jointly	  organised	  by	  
CPI-­‐M	  and	  AIGL	  
	   Members	  of	  the	  States	  Reorganisation	  Commission	  (SRC)	  visit	  
Darjeeling;	  joint	  group	  of	  hill	  organisations	  give	  memorandum	  to	  SRC,	  
demanding	  separation	  of	  Darjeeling	  (along	  with	  Jalpaiguri	  and	  Cooch	  
Behar)	  from	  North	  Bengal	  
1956	   The	  SRC	  publishes	  its	  report;	  Darjeeling	  is	  left	  outside	  of	  the	  purview	  of	  
reorganisation	  	  
1957	   B.C.	  Roy	  and	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  are	  re-­‐elected	  to	  form	  the	  West	  
Bengal	  government	  
	   DDCC,	  AIGL	  and	  CPI	  submit	  memorandum	  to	  PM	  Nehru	  demanding	  




1958	   AIGL	  demands	  autonomous	  district	  council	  for	  Darjeeling	  district	  
1961	   Formation	  of	  the	  Bhasa	  Manyata	  Samiti;	  census	  records	  show	  a	  34	  %	  
increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  Nepali	  speakers	  in	  Darjeeling	  hill-­‐subdivisions;	  
the	  West	  Bengal	  government	  includes	  Nepali	  in	  the	  Official	  Languages	  
Act	  1961	  as	  an	  additional	  language	  in	  Darjeeling	  
1962	   P.C.	  Sen	  becomes	  new	  CM	  in	  West	  Bengal	  with	  the	  Indian	  National	  
Congress	  
1967	   United	  Front	  (coalition	  of	  Left	  Parties)	  government	  in	  West	  Bengal	  
dislodges	  the	  Congress	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  State	  
	   A	  group	  of	  rebel	  CPI-­‐M	  leaders	  led	  by	  Kanu	  Sanjal	  starts	  the	  Naxalbadi	  
uprising	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  plains.	  The	  Naxals	  also	  establish	  some	  units	  in	  
the	  Darjeeling	  hills.	  
	   The	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  passes	  a	  resolution	  for	  Darjeeling’s	  regional	  
autonomy	  (without	  specifying	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  autonomy)	  
1968	   DDCC	  formulates	  resolution	  demanding	  the	  formation	  of	  autonomous	  
administrative	  setup	  for	  Darjeeling	  
	   Subash	  Ghisingh	  founds	  the	  Nilo	  Jhanda	  Party,	  and	  occupies	  properties	  
in	  Darjeeling	  town	  
1969	   United	  Front	  again	  wins	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  elections	  	  
	   Establishment	  of	  the	  Nepali	  Bhasa	  Samiti,	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
Nepali	  in	  the	  8th	  schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  
1971	  and	  1972	   Indian	  National	  Congress	  wins	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  elections	  
twice	  
1976	   West	  Bengal	  government	  creates	  a	  Hill	  Development	  Council	  with	  solely	  
nominated	  members	  
1977	   Left	  Front	  wins	  elections	  to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly;	  Jyoti	  Basu	  
becomes	  CM	  for	  the	  following	  19	  years.	  
1978,	  1981	   Left	  Front	  government	  in	  West	  Bengal	  passes	  resolutions	  demanding	  
regional	  autonomy	  in	  the	  three	  hill-­‐subdivisions	  of	  Darjeeling,	  and	  for	  
an	  inclusion	  of	  Nepali	  into	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  
1979/1980	   Ethnic	  Nepalis	  are	  ousted	  from	  Assam	  and	  Manipur	  
	  
The	  rise	  and	  reign	  of	  the	  GNLF:	  1980-­‐2007	  
1980	   Establishment	  of	  the	  Prantia	  Parishad;	  demand	  for	  “Gorkhaland”	  




and	  demands	  Gorkhaland	  
1981	   AIGL	  president	  D.P.	  Rai	  dies	  
1982	   Left	  Front	  wins	  elections	  to	  the	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  
	   CPI-­‐M/CPM	  wins	  MLA	  seats	  from	  Darjeeling	  and	  Kurseong	  sub-­‐divisions	  
1985	   Darjeeling	  CPI-­‐M	  MP	  Ananda	  Pathak	  introduces	  a	  private	  member	  bill	  in	  
the	  Indian	  parliament,	  demanding	  regional	  autonomy	  for	  Darjeeling	  
1986	   May:	  outburst	  of	  violence	  between	  GNLF	  and	  CPI/CPI-­‐M	  cadres	  during	  a	  
GNLF-­‐called	  72-­‐hours	  strike	  
	   July,	  27:	  the	  GNLF	  burns	  copies	  of	  the	  1950	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  and	  
Friendship	  between	  Nepal	  and	  India;	  nine	  GNLF	  activists	  die	  when	  the	  
police	  fires	  into	  the	  crowd	  
	   November:	  the	  government	  employs	  paramilitary	  forces	  in	  Darjeeling;	  
further	  escalation	  of	  violence	  
1987	   January:	  the	  central	  government	  calls	  Subash	  Ghising	  for	  talks	  to	  Delhi	  
1988	   August:	  after	  a	  40-­‐day	  long	  strike	  in	  Darjeeling,	  the	  GNLF	  signs	  a	  
tripartite	  agreement	  with	  the	  central	  and	  State	  government	  to	  the	  
Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  (DGHC);	  PM	  Rajeev	  Gandhi	  notifies	  the	  
citizenship	  of	  all	  Indian	  Gorkhas	  who	  came	  to	  India	  prior	  26	  January	  
1950	  	  
	   December:	  first	  elections	  to	  the	  DGHC	  are	  held;	  GNLF	  wins	  26	  out	  of	  28	  
constituencies	  
1992	   Nepali	  is	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  languages	  under	  the	  8th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  
Indian	  constitution	  
	   73rd	  Constitutional	  Amendment	  Act	  disposses	  Darjeeling	  of	  the	  three-­‐
tier	  panchayat	  system,	  leaving	  only	  the	  local	  gram	  panchayats	  as	  
elected	  bodies	  
	   Madan	  Tamang	  establishes	  the	  Gorkha	  Democratic	  Front	  (GDF)	  
1996	   Indian	  PM	  announces	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  Uttarakhand	  State.	  In	  reaction,	  
a	  splinter-­‐group	  of	  the	  Darjeeling	  CPI-­‐M	  forms	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  
Revolutionary	  Marxists	  (CPRM)	  and	  demands	  Gorkhaland	  
1996	   Formation	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  People’s	  Front	  (GPF),	  consisting	  of	  GDF,	  CPRM,	  
DDCC	  and	  AIGL	  
1999	   GNLF	  wins	  the	  3rd	  elections	  to	  the	  DGHC	  
2000	   Elections	  to	  the	  gram	  panchayats	  held	  in	  Darjeeling	  




	   Buddadeb	  Bhattacharjee	  becomes	  new	  West	  Bengal	  CM	  with	  the	  Left	  
Front	  
2005	   Ghisingh,	  the	  central	  and	  State	  government	  sign	  the	  memorandum	  to	  
bring	  Darjeeling	  under	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  
	   After	  elections	  to	  the	  DGHC	  were	  still	  not	  held,	  the	  DGHC	  councillors	  
resign	  and	  the	  State	  government	  appoints	  Ghising	  as	  “caretaker	  
chairman”	  
2007	   GNLF-­‐leader	  and	  ex-­‐DGHC	  councillor	  Bimal	  Gurung	  supports	  the	  
candidateship	  of	  Darjeeling-­‐stemming	  Prashan	  Tamang	  in	  the	  Indian	  
Idol	  singing	  competition,	  while	  Ghising	  ignores	  the	  event	  
September,	  23	   Prashant	  Tamang	  wins	  the	  Indian	  Idol	  competition	  and	  mesmerises	  the	  
masses.	  Bimal	  Gurung	  capitalises	  on	  his	  victory	  
September	  28/29	   After	  a	  derogatory	  comment	  on	  Prashant	  Tamang	  by	  a	  Delhi-­‐based	  
radio	  jockey,	  protesting	  Prashant	  fans	  clash	  with	  locals	  in	  Siliguri;	  Bimal	  
Gurung	  calls	  a	  one	  day	  strike	  in	  Darjeeling	  
October	  1	   The	  union	  cabinet	  approves	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill;	  GNLF	  celebrates	  
	   	  
From	  GNLF	  to	  GJM:	  October	  2007	  –	  July	  2014	  
2007	   	  
October	  7	   Supported	  by	  the	  All	  Gorkha	  Student	  Union	  (AGSU),	  Bimal	  Gurung	  
establishes	  the	  Gorkha	  Janmukti	  Morcha	  (GJM)	  at	  a	  massive	  meeting	  at	  
Darjeeling	  Chowk	  Bazaar/Motor	  Stand;	  the	  new	  outfits	  demands	  the	  
sacking	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  and	  Ghising,	  and	  initiates	  a	  forceful	  
movement	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  Gorkhaland	  including	  day-­‐long	  strikes,	  tax-­‐
boycotts,	  hunger-­‐strikes	  and	  gheraus	  of	  government	  offices.	  The	  new	  
movement	  leads	  to	  various	  clashes	  between	  GJM	  and	  GNLF	  activists	  in	  
the	  following	  months.	  Many	  former	  GNLF	  leaders	  flee	  the	  hills	  
subsequently.	  
November	  30	   The	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  is	  referred	  to	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  of	  Home	  
Affairs	  
December	  18-­‐27	   along	  with	  other	  regional	  parties	  the	  GJM	  attends	  the	  hearing	  on	  the	  6th	  
Schedule	  in	  Delhi;	  the	  parties	  pose	  a	  joint	  memorandum	  for	  the	  creation	  
of	  Gorkhaland;	  upon	  returning	  to	  Darjeeling	  Bimal	  Gurung	  announces	  he	  
will	  create	  Gorkhaland	  by	  March	  10,	  2010,	  or	  otherwise	  commit	  suicide	  
December	  30	   AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  demands	  “collective	  leadership”	  of	  the	  
statehood	  movement	  
2008	   	  





February	  29	   The	  West	  Bengal	  government	  gives	  in	  to	  the	  pressure	  and	  gives	  Ghisingh	  
an	  ultimatum	  to	  resign	  from	  his	  post	  as	  DGHC	  caretaker;	  the	  central	  
government	  orders	  a	  re-­‐assessment	  of	  the	  6th	  Schedule	  bill	  
March	  5	   Ghisingh	  resigns	  as	  DGHC	  caretaker;	  subsequently	  an	  IAS-­‐officer	  is	  
appointed	  as	  caretaker	  for	  the	  DGHC	  
March	  16	   Ghisingh	  secretly	  returns	  to	  Darjeeling	  hills	  
April	   The	  GJM	  demands	  the	  dissolution	  of	  all	  gram	  panchayat	  sabhas;	  last	  
elections	  had	  been	  held	  in	  2000	  
July	  25	   During	  a	  gherau	  of	  former	  GNLF	  councillor	  Deepak	  Gurung’s	  house	  in	  
Darjeeling	  town,	  the	  female	  GJM	  activist	  Pramila	  Sharma	  is	  shot	  dead	  
allegedly	  by	  a	  bullet	  fired	  from	  Gurung’s	  house.	  Following	  the	  outburst	  of	  
violence	  Ghisingh	  flees	  the	  hills	  under	  police	  protection	  
September	  1	   Bimal	  Gurung	  asks	  his	  supports	  to	  stop	  social	  boycott	  of	  GNLF	  and	  CPI-­‐M	  
supporters	  
September	  8	   The	  central	  government	  calls	  the	  State	  government	  and	  GJM	  for	  the	  first	  
of	  11	  tripartite	  meetings	  
October	  7	   The	  GJM	  orders	  people	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  to	  dress-­‐up	  in	  traditional	  
Nepali	  attire;	  those	  who	  fail	  to	  obey	  the	  order	  get	  their	  faces	  blackened	  




Clashes	  between	  GJM	  activists	  and	  Gorkhaland	  opponents	  in	  the	  Dooars	  
leaving	  hundreds	  injured;	  2	  persons	  die.	  
	   	  
2010	   	  
March	   The	  tripartite	  talks	  between	  centre,	  State	  and	  GJM	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  
of	  regional	  autonomy	  and	  an	  “interim-­‐council”.	  	  
May	  21	   AIGL	  president	  Madan	  Tamang	  is	  assassinated	  in	  broad	  daylight	  allegedly	  
by	  GJM	  activists.	  He	  had	  been	  preparing	  for	  a	  public	  meeting	  in	  
Darjeeling	  town.	  The	  murder	  sparks	  vast	  protests	  in	  Darjeeling	  against	  
the	  GJM	  and	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  
May	  30	   Bimal	  Gurung	  speaks	  at	  a	  massive	  public	  meeting	  at	  North	  Point	  College	  
and	  reinstates	  his	  authority	  after	  the	  protest	  against	  Madan	  Tamang’s	  
murder	  
September	  26	   Then	  Railway-­‐Minister	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  is	  openly	  welcomed	  by	  the	  GJM	  
during	  her	  visit	  in	  Darjeeling	  where	  she	  announces	  developmental	  
projects.	  
2011	   	  




February	  8	   In	  an	  attempt	  to	  underline	  its	  claim	  to	  the	  Dooars	  the	  GJM	  initiated	  a	  
pada	  yatra.	  When	  activists	  try	  to	  trespass	  the	  police-­‐barricades	  three	  of	  
them	  die	  in	  the	  subsequent	  police	  firing.	  	  
April	  8	   Secured	  by	  the	  Electoral	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  Subash	  Ghisingh	  returns	  to	  
Darjeeling	  hills	  and	  holds	  massive	  rallies	  in	  Darjeeling	  town	  and	  Mirik;	  
about	  four	  weeks	  later,	  after	  a	  violent	  clash	  between	  GNLF	  and	  GJM-­‐
activists	  in	  Sonada	  he	  returns	  to	  his	  exile	  in	  the	  plains.	  
May	  13	   The	  GJM	  wins	  the	  three	  MLA	  seats	  from	  the	  hill-­‐constituencies	  with	  vast	  
margins.	  TMC	  leader	  Mamata	  Banerjee	  becomes	  new	  Chief	  Minister	  in	  
West	  Bengal,	  ending	  the	  over	  three-­‐decades	  lasting	  rule	  of	  the	  Left	  Front	  
July	  18	   The	  GJM,	  central	  and	  State	  government	  sign	  a	  tripartite	  agreement	  on	  
the	  Gorkhaland	  Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA);	  the	  new	  council	  will	  
replace	  the	  DGHC	  	  
September	  2	   The	  West	  Bengal	  Assembly	  passes	  the	  GTA	  bill	  
2012	   	  
May	  1	   The	  CPRM	  holds	  a	  massive	  May-­‐Day	  rally	  in	  Darjeeling.	  Attempts	  by	  the	  
GJM	  to	  spoil	  the	  meeting	  fail	  
May	  
TMC	  announces	  to	  establish	  its	  base	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  	  
June	   The	  report	  of	  the	  Sen	  Committee	  foils	  attempts	  of	  the	  GJM	  to	  bring	  
additional	  areas	  of	  the	  Dooars	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  GTA.	  Despite	  
protesting	  against	  the	  recommendations	  the	  GJM	  ultimately	  agrees	  to	  
elections	  to	  the	  GTA.	  	  
July	   GTA	  elections;	  GJM	  wins	  all	  constituencies	  
August	   GTA	  is	  formally	  established,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  becomes	  chairman	  
2013	   	  
January	  29	   During	  a	  function	  at	  Darjeeling	  Chowrasta	  GJM	  Chief	  Minister	  Mamata	  
Banerjee	  is	  confronted	  with	  GJM	  activists	  shouting	  slogans	  in	  favour	  of	  
Gorkhaland.	  Angrily	  she	  announces	  to	  be	  “rough	  and	  tough”	  and	  leaves	  
the	  stage.	  
February	  
Five	  of	  the	  absconding	  accused	  are	  arrested	  in	  the	  Madan	  Tamang	  
murder	  case	  
	   The	  West	  Bengal	  government	  passes	  the	  bill	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
“Mayel	  Lyang	  Lepcha	  Development	  Board”	  for	  the	  Lepcha	  community	  
June	   Thirteen	  of	  the	  absconding	  accused	  in	  the	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  case	  
surrender	  
July,	  30	   The	  union	  government	  announces	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  separate	  Telangana	  
State.	  The	  granting	  of	  a	  new	  State	  entails	  widespread	  protests	  in	  regions	  
demanding	  Statehood,	  including	  Darjeeling.	  The	  GJM	  initiates	  a	  month-­‐





August	   Darjeeling	  hills	  observe	  a	  month-­‐long	  general	  strike	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
renewed	  agitation	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  One	  GJM	  activist	  dies	  after	  
immolating	  himself.	  CPRM,	  AIGL	  and	  BGP	  join	  the	  stir.	  The	  State	  
government	  deploys	  CRPF	  forces,	  more	  than	  1,200	  GJM	  activists	  and	  
leaders	  are	  arrested.	  The	  agitation	  ends	  without	  any	  compromise	  from	  
side	  of	  the	  centre	  or	  the	  State	  government.	  
	   The	  West	  Bengal	  government	  implements	  the	  “Mayel	  Lyang	  Lepcha	  
Development	  Board”	  bill	  
September	  2	   Mamata	  Banerjee	  follows	  an	  invitation	  of	  the	  Lepcha	  community	  to	  
Kalimpong	  where	  they	  convey	  the	  title	  “Kingchum	  Daarmit”	  (Goddess	  of	  
Fortune)	  to	  her.	  The	  Lepcha	  defy	  the	  GJM’s	  campaign	  of	  ghar	  bhitra	  
jantā	  (“people	  inside	  the	  houses”).	  
September	   Five	  more	  of	  the	  absconding	  accused	  in	  the	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  case	  
surrender.	  
December	  16	   Members	  of	  the	  GTA	  sabha	  pass	  a	  resolution	  seeking	  Bimal	  Gurung’s	  
reinstatement	  as	  GTA	  chief.	  Subsequently	  Bimal	  Gurung	  meets	  Mamata	  
Banerjee	  in	  Kolkata.	  
December	  26	   After	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  agitation	  in	  August,	  Bimal	  Gurung	  again	  takes	  
oath	  as	  GTA	  chief	  
2014	   	  
March	   Ghisingh	  returns	  from	  his	  exile	  to	  Darjeeling	  
	  
GJM	  announces	  an	  electoral	  alliance	  with	  BJP	  for	  the	  2014	  Lok	  Sabha	  
elections	  
April	   GNLF	  announces	  	  it	  electoral	  support	  to	  the	  TMC	  
May	   GJM/BJP	  combine	  win	  the	  Darjeeling	  seat	  in	  the	  national	  elections	  with	  
huge	  margin	  




Appendix	  B.	  List	  of	  interviews	  
(only	  formal/semi-­‐structured	  interviews;	  in	  alphabetical	  order)	  
Name	   Date	  
Anonymous	  (expert)	   6.2.2011	  
13.3.2012	  
Anonymous	  (GJM	  central	  committee)	   13.5.2013	  
Anonymous	  (GJM	  core	  committee)	   May	  2012	  
Anonymous	  (GJM	  Nari	  Morcha,	  local	  leaders)	   18.5.2012	  
11.6.2012	  
Anonymous	  (GJM	  zonal	  leader)	   9.6.2012	  
Anonymous	  (GNLF	  leader)	   23.7.2011	  
4.6.2013	  
Anonymous	  (gram	  panchayat	  secretaries)	   30.5.2012	  
15.6.2012	  
Anonymous	  (gram	  panchayat	  secretary;	  Joubari*)	   June,	  2013	  
Anonymous	  (gram	  panchayat	  worker;	  Bagargaun*)	   July	  2012	  
Anonymous	  (gram	  panchayat	  worker;	  Joubari*)	   June,	  2013	  
Anonymous	  (insider)	   22./23.3.2012	  
16.3.2013	  
Anonymous	  (journalists)	   1.4.2012	  
14.6.2013	  
Arjun	  Rai	  (GNLF	  leader)	   6.6.2013	  
Ashok	  Bhattacharya	  (CPI-­‐leader,	  former	  Urban	  Development	  minister)	   9.7.2012	  
Bharati	  Tamang	  (AIGL	  president;	  wife	  of	  late	  Madan	  Tamang)	   11.6.2013	  
Bheem	  Subba	  (GNLF	  leader,	  MLA	  candidate	  2011)	   6.5.2012	  
Bimal	  Gurung	  (president,	  GJM)	   7.7.2012	  
Dawa	  Norbula	  (Darjeeling	  Congress	  leader,	  ex-­‐MP)	   6.7.2012	  
Dinesh	  Kami,	  Padam	  Lama,	  Shyam	  Thapa	  (GJM	  leaders,	  Dooars)	   17.3.2012	  




H.B.	  Chhetri	  (GJM	  spokesperson;	  since	  2011	  MLA)	   7.2.2011	  
John	  Barla	  (leader	  ABAVP;	  JMM)	   17.3.2012	  
K.B.	  Watter	  (CPI-­‐leader;	  MLA-­‐candidate	  2011)	   7.3.2012	  
Kidan	  Lepcha	  (former	  journalist,	  Darjeeling)	   21.4.2012	  
L.M.	  Lama	  (CPRM	  central	  committee;	  former	  gram	  panchayat	  pradhan)	   12.5.2012	  
L.S.	  Tamsang	  (president	  ILTA)	   11.3.2012	  
Laxman	  Pradhan	  (General	  Secretary	  AIGL)	   18.7.2011	  
Lorez	  P.T.	  Lama	  (Darjeeling	  Congress	  leader)	   14.6.2013	  
M.P.	  Lama	  (vice-­‐chancellor	  Sikkim	  University)	   8.2.2011	  
Munis	  Tamang	  (BGP	  leader)	   8.1.2011	  
Niraj	  Lama	  (former	  journalist,	  The	  Statesman/Darjeeling)	   14.5.2013	  
Pravesh*	  (GJM	  zonal	  president;	  later	  GTA	  councillor)	   10.4.2012	  
R.B.	  Rai	  (president	  CPRM)	   17.7.2011	  
2.4.2012	  
11.6.2013	  
Rajen	  Mukhia	  (Darjeeling	  TMC	  leader)	   4.6.2013	  
Sandeep	  Mukherjee	  (DTA	  spokesperson)	   15.6.2012	  
Shyam*	  (local	  expert)	   4.3.2012	  
Suman	  Pathak	  (CPI-­‐M	  leader,	  Darjeeling	  MP	  Rajya	  Sabha)	   23.7.2011	  
Suraj	  Subba	  (GJM	  tea	  plantation	  union,	  general	  secretary)	   24.5.2012	  
United	  Nepal	  National	  Front	  (leaders)	   26.6.2011	  







Assorted	  Thougthz	  (2009):	  “General	  Election	  2009	  Result	  Analysis	  for	  Darjeeling	  PC”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://anantdhamala.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default?orderby=updated	  (accessed	  
23.6.2015)	  
Adeney,	  Katharine	  (2002):	  “Constitutional	  Centring:	  Nation	  Formation	  and	  Consociational	  Federalism	  
in	  India	  and	  Pakistan.”	  In:	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  Politics	  40	  (3):	  8–33.	  
Agnew,	  John	  (2001):	  “Regions	  in	  Revolt.”	  In:	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  25	  (1):	  103–110.	  	  
Agnew,	  John,	  and	  Carlo	  Brusa	  (1999):	  “New	  Rules	  for	  National	  Identity?	  The	  Northern	  League	  and	  
Political	  Identity	  in	  Contemporary	  Northern	  Italy.”	  In:	  National	  Identities	  1	  (2):	  117–133.	  
Alfonso,	  Isabel,	  Hugh	  Kennedy,	  and	  Julio	  Escalona	  (eds.)	  (2004):	  Building	  Legitimacy.	  Political	  
Discourses	  and	  Forms	  of	  Legitimacy	  in	  Medieval	  Societies.	  Leiden:	  Brill.	  
Alm,	  Björn	  (2006):	  The	  Un/selfish	  Leader.	  Changing	  Notions	  in	  a	  Tamil	  Nadu	  Village	  (PhD	  
Dissertation).	  Stockholm:	  Stockholm	  University.	  
Arias,	  Maria	  Fernanda	  (1995):	  “Charismatic	  Leadership	  and	  the	  Transition	  to	  Democracy:	  The	  Rise	  of	  
Carlos	  Saul	  Menem	  in	  Argentine	  Politics.”	  Texas	  Papers	  on	  Latin	  America	  No.	  95-­‐02.	  
Bagchi,	  Romit	  (2012):	  Gorkhaland.	  Crisis	  of	  Statehood.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage	  Publications.	  
Bailey,	  Frederick	  George	  (1969):	  Stratagems	  and	  Spoils.	  A	  Social	  Anthropology	  of	  Politics.	  Cambridge:	  
Westview	  Press.	  
———	  (ed.)	  (1971):	  Gifts	  and	  Poison.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Reputation.	  Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell.	  
———(1988):	  Humbuggery	  and	  Manipulation.	  The	  Art	  of	  Leadership.	  Ithaka:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  
Banerjee,	  Mukulika	  (2011):	  “Leadership	  and	  Political	  Work.”	  In:	  Power	  and	  Influence	  in	  India.	  Bosses,	  
Lords	  and	  Captains,	  edited	  by	  Pamela	  Price	  and	  Ruud	  Arild	  Engelsen.	  New	  Delhi:	  Routledge.	  
Barbora,	  Sanjay	  (2005):	  “Autonomy	  in	  the	  Northeast.	  The	  Frontiers	  of	  Centralized	  Politics.”	  In:	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Autonomy.	  Indian	  Experiences,	  edited	  by	  Ranabir	  Samaddar,	  196–215.	  New	  Delhi:	  
Sage.	  
Bardhan,	  Pranab,	  and	  Dilip	  Mookherjee	  (2003):	  “Poverty	  Alleviation	  Effort	  of	  West	  Bengal	  Panchayats	  
[Working	  Paper].”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=8CF16681FE02E2C780B7726D4DB7A
AB3?doi=10.1.1.148.1526&rep=rep1&type=pdf	  (accessed:	  15.07.2014).	  
———(2006)	  “Decentralisation	  and	  Accountability	  in	  Infrastructure	  Delivery	  in	  Developing	  
Countries.”	  In:	  The	  Economic	  Journal	  116	  (508):	  101–127.	  
Baruah,	  Sanjib	  (1997):	  “Politics	  of	  Subnationalism:	  Society	  versus	  State	  in	  Assam.”	  In:	  State	  and	  




———(1999)	  India	  against	  Itself.	  Assam	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Nationality.	  Critical	  Histories.	  Philadelphia:	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press.	  
———(2005):	  Durable	  Disorder.	  Understanding	  the	  Politics	  of	  Northeast	  India.	  New	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Basu,	  Amrita	  (2001):	  “The	  Dialectics	  of	  Hindu	  Nationalism.”	  In:	  The	  Success	  of	  India’s	  Democracy,	  
edited	  by	  Atul	  Kohli,	  163–189.	  Cambridge:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Bebbington,	  Anthony	  (2009):	  “Poverty	  Reduction	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  A	  Framework	  with	  Cases.	  
Background	  Paper	  for	  UNRISD’s	  Forthcoming	  Poverty	  Report.”	  Manchester.	  
Beck,	  Gertraud,	  Sandra	  Destradi,	  and	  Daniel	  Neff	  (2010):	  “Neue	  Bundesstaaten	  Für	  Indien	  -­‐	  Eine	  
Gefahr	  Für	  Die	  Nationale	  Einheit?”	  In:	  GIGA	  Focus	  9:	  1–8.	  	  
Beetham,	  David	  (2001):	  “Political	  Legitimacy.”	  In:	  The	  Blackwell	  Companion	  to	  Political	  Sociology,	  
edited	  by	  Kate	  Nash	  and	  Alan	  Scott,	  107–116.	  Malden:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell.	  
Benedikter,	  Thomas	  (2009a):	  “Gorkhaland:	  Autonomy	  Is	  No	  Longer	  the	  Issue.”	  In:	  Solving	  Ethnic	  
Conflict	  through	  Self-­‐Government.	  A	  Short	  Guide	  to	  Autonomy	  in	  South	  Asia	  and	  Europe,	  edited	  
by	  Thomas	  Benedikter,	  104–111.	  Bozen:	  EURAC.	  
———	  (ed.)	  (2009b):	  Solving	  Ethnic	  Conflict	  through	  Self-­‐Government.	  A	  Short	  Guide	  to	  Autonomy	  in	  
Europe	  and	  South	  Asia.	  Bozen:	  EURAC.	  
Berenschot,	  Ward	  (2011a):	  “On	  the	  Usefulness	  of	  Goondas	  in	  Indian	  Politics:	  ‘Moneypower’	  and	  
‘Musclepower’	  in	  a	  Gujarati	  Locality.”	  In:	  South	  Asia:	  Journal	  of	  South	  Asian	  Studies	  34	  (2):	  255–
275.	  	  
———(2011b):	  “Political	  Fixers	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Hindu	  Nationalism	  in	  Gujarat,	  India:	  Lubricating	  a	  
Patronage	  Democracy.”	  In:	  South	  Asia:	  Journal	  of	  South	  Asian	  Studies	  34	  (3):	  382–401.	  	  
Besky,	  Sarah	  (2013):	  The	  Darjeeling	  Distinction.	  Labor	  and	  Justice	  on	  Fair-­‐Trade	  Tea	  Plantations	  in	  
India.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  
BGP	  (2011):	  “Bharatiya	  Gorkha	  Parisangh.	  About	  Us.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.gorkhaparisangh.com/aboutus.html	  (accessed:	  20.05.2011).	  
———(2015):	  “Frequently	  Asked	  Questions.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://gorkhaparisangh.com/faq.html#q2	  (accessed:	  19.02.2015).	  
Bhattacharjee,	  Chandana	  (1996):	  Ethnicity	  and	  Autonomy	  Movement.	  Case	  of	  Bodo-­‐Kacharis	  of	  
Assam.	  New	  Delhi:	  Vikas	  Publishing	  House.	  
Bhattacharyya,	  Harihar	  (2001):	  “India	  Creates	  Three	  New	  States.”	  In:	  Federations	  1	  (1):	  w.p.	  
———(2005):	  Federalism	  and	  Regionalism	  in	  India.	  Institutional	  Strategies	  and	  Political	  
Accommodation	  of	  Identity.	  Heidelberg	  Papers	  in	  South	  Asian	  and	  Comparative	  Politics.	  
Working	  Paper	  No.	  27.	  Heidelberg:	  South	  Asia	  Institute,	  University	  of	  Heidelberg.	  
BJP	  (2014):	  Ek	  Bharat	  Shrestha	  Bharat.	  Sabka	  Saath	  Sabka	  Vikash.	  Election	  Manifesto	  2014.	  New	  




Blaydes,	  Lisa	  (2006):	  “Who	  Votes	  in	  Authoritarian	  Elections	  and	  Why?	  Determinants	  of	  Voter	  Turnout	  
in	  Contemporary	  Egypt.”	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Annual	  Meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Political	  
Science	  Foundation,	  August	  31-­‐September	  3	  2006,	  Philadelphia.	  
BOBBBC	  (2011):	  “Bangla	  O	  Bangla	  Bahasa	  Banchao	  Committee	  (official	  Website).”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://banglabanchao.org/home1.aspx	  (accessed:	  02.09.2011).	  
Bomjan,	  D.	  S.	  (2008):	  Darjeeling-­‐Dooars	  People	  and	  Place	  under	  Bengal’s	  Neo-­‐Colonial	  Rule.	  
Darjeeling:	  Bikash	  Jana	  Sahitya	  Kendra.	  
———	  (2013):	  Devil’s	  Diary	  from	  the	  CPRM's	  Birth	  Place	  to	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  Darjeeling:	  
Bikash	  Jana	  Sahitya	  Kendra.	  
Boudreau,	  Julie-­‐Anne	  (2007):	  “Making	  New	  Political	  Spaces:	  Mobilizing	  Spatial	  Imaginaries,	  
Instrumentalizing	  Spatial	  Practices,	  and	  Strategically	  Using	  Spatial	  Tools.”	  In:	  Environment	  and	  
Planning	  A	  39:	  2593–2611.	  
Brass,	  Paul	  R.	  (1984):	  “National	  Power	  and	  Local	  Politics	  in	  India:	  A	  Twenty-­‐Year	  Perspective.”	  In:	  
Modern	  Asian	  Studies	  18	  (1):	  89–118.	  
———	  (1985):	  Caste,	  Faction	  and	  Party	  in	  Indian	  Politics.	  Volume	  II	  Election	  Studies.	  Delhi:	  Chanakya	  
Publications.	  
———	  (1990):	  The	  Politics	  of	  India	  since	  Independence.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
———	  (1991):	  Ethnicity	  and	  Nationalism.	  Theory	  and	  Comparison.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage	  Publications.	  
———	  (1997):	  Theft	  of	  an	  Idol.	  Text	  and	  Context	  in	  the	  Representation	  of	  Collective	  Violence.	  
Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Brownlee,	  Jason	  (2002):	  “…And	  yet	  They	  Persist:	  Explaining	  Survival	  and	  Transition	  in	  Neopatrimonial	  
Regimes.”	  In:	  Studies	  in	  Comparative	  International	  Development	  37	  (3):	  35–63.	  
Burnell,	  Peter	  (2006):	  “Autocratic	  Opening	  to	  Democracy:	  Why	  Legitimacy	  Matters.”	  In:	  Third	  World	  
Quarterly	  27	  (4):	  545–562.	  
Caplan,	  Lionel	  (1995):	  Warrior	  Gentlemen.	  “Gurkhas”	  in	  the	  Western	  Imagination.	  Oxford:	  Berghahn	  
Books.	  
Capoccia,	  Giovanni,	  and	  R.	  Daniel	  Kelemen	  (2011):	  “The	  Study	  of	  Critical	  Junctures:	  Theory,	  Narrative,	  
and	  Counterfactuals	  in	  Historical	  Institutionalism.”	  In:	  World	  Politics	  59	  (03):	  341–369.	  
Census	  of	  India	  (2001a):	  “Abstract	  of	  Speakers’	  Strength	  of	  Languages	  and	  Mother	  Tongues.”	  
Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1
.aspx	  (accessed:	  19.02.2015).	  
———	  (2001b):	  “Darjiling	  District	  Basic	  Data	  Sheet.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://censusindia.gov.in/Dist_File/datasheet-­‐1901.pdf	  (accessed:	  28.02.2015).	  
Chadda,	  Maya	  (2002):	  “Integration	  through	  Internal	  Reorganization:	  Containing	  Ethnic	  Conflict	  in	  




Chakrabarty,	  Dyutis	  (1988):	  “Gorkhaland:	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Politics	  of	  Segretation.”	  Special	  Lecture	  X.	  
North	  Bengal	  University:	  Centre	  for	  Himalayan	  Studies.	  
Chakrabarty,	  Subhas	  Ranjan	  (2005):	  “Silence	  under	  Freedom:	  The	  Strange	  Story	  of	  Democracy	  in	  the	  
Darjeeling	  Hills.”	  In:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Autonomy.	  Indian	  Experiences,	  edited	  by	  Ranabir	  Samaddar,	  
173–195.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Chalmers,	  Rhoderick	  (2009):	  “Education,	  Institutions	  and	  Elites	  Building	  and	  Bounding	  in	  Nepali	  Public	  
Life	  in	  Early	  Twnetieth	  Century	  India.”	  In:	  Indian	  Nepalis,	  Issues	  and	  Perspectives,	  edited	  by	  
Tanka	  B.	  Subba,	  Awesh	  C.	  Sinha,	  G.	  S.	  Nepal,	  and	  D.	  R.	  Nepal,	  109–147.	  New	  Delhi.	  
Chandra,	  Kanchan	  (2003):	  Why	  Ethnic	  Parties	  Succeed:	  Patronage	  and	  Ethnic	  Headcounts	  in	  India.	  
Los	  Angeles:	  UCLA.	  
Charmaz,	  Kathy	  (2004):	  “Premises,	  Principles,	  and	  Practices	  in	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Revisiting	  the	  
Foundations.”	  In:	  Qualitative	  Health	  Research	  14	  (7):	  976–93.	  	  
Charmaz,	  Kathy,	  and	  Richard	  G.	  Mitchell	  (1996):	  “The	  Myth	  of	  Silent	  Authorship:	  Self,	  Substance,	  and	  
Style	  in	  Ethnographic	  Writing.”	  In:	  Symbolic	  Interaction	  19	  (4):	  285–302.	  
Chatterjee,	  Partha	  (1998):	  “Introduction.	  The	  Wages	  of	  Freedom:	  Fifty	  Years	  of	  the	  Indian	  Nation-­‐
State.”	  In:	  Wages	  of	  Freedom.	  Fifty	  Years	  of	  the	  Indian	  Nation-­‐State,	  edited	  by	  Partha	  
Chatterjee,	  1–22.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
———	  (2004):	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Governed.	  Reflections	  on	  Popular	  Politics	  in	  Most	  of	  the	  World.	  
New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  
———	  (2011):	  Lineages	  of	  Political	  Society.	  Studies	  in	  Postcolonial	  Democracy.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  
University	  Press.	  
Chatterji,	  Aditi	  (2007):	  Contested	  Landscapes:	  The	  Story	  of	  Darjeeling.	  Kolkata:	  INTACH.	  
Chattopadhyay,	  Suhrid	  Sankar	  (2008):	  “Fall	  from	  Grace.”	  In:	  Frontline	  25	  (6).	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2506/stories/20080328250604000.htm.	  
———	  (2014):	  “Subash	  Ghising	  Welcome	  to	  Return.”	  In:	  Frontline	  30	  (26).	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.frontline.in/the-­‐nation/subash-­‐ghising-­‐welcome-­‐to-­‐return/article5493039.ece.	  
Chettri,	  Mona	  (2013):	  “Choosing	  the	  Gorkha:	  At	  the	  Crossroads	  of	  Class	  and	  Ethnicity	  in	  the	  
Darjeeling	  Hills.”	  Asian	  Ethnicity	  (February):	  1–16.	  
———	  (2014):	  Ethnic	  Politics	  in	  the	  Nepali	  Public	  Sphere:	  Three	  Case	  Studies	  from	  the	  Eastern	  
Himalaya	  (PhD	  Dissertation).	  London:	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,	  University	  of	  
London.	  
Chima,	  Jugdep	  S.	  (2009):	  “Ethnic	  Subnationalist	  Movements	  in	  Contemporary	  South	  Asia:	  An	  
Introduction.”	  In:	  Asian	  Survey	  49	  (6):	  915–923.	  
Collins,	  Kathleen	  (2009):	  “Economic	  and	  Security	  Regionalism	  among	  Patrimonial	  Authoritarian	  




Collins,	  Peter	  (1998):	  “Negotiating	  Selves:	  Reflections	  on	  ‘Unstructured’	  Interviewing.”	  In:	  Sociological	  
Research	  Online	  3	  (3):	  1–19.	  
Corbridge,	  Stuart	  (1987):	  “Perversity	  and	  Ethnoregionalism	  in	  Tribal	  India:	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  
Jharkhand.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  Quarterly	  6	  (3):	  225–240.	  
———	  (2002):	  “The	  Continuing	  Struggle	  for	  India’s	  Jharkhand:	  Democracy,	  Decentralisation	  and	  the	  
Politics	  of	  Names	  and	  Numbers.”	  In:	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  Politics	  40	  (3):	  55–71.	  
Corbridge,	  Stuart,	  Glyn	  Williams,	  and	  Manoj	  Srivastava	  (2003):	  “Participation	  and	  Power:	  Poor	  
People’s	  Engagement	  with	  India’s	  Employment	  Assurance	  Scheme.”	  In:	  Development	  and	  
Change	  34	  (2001):	  163–192.	  
Creswell,	  John	  W.,	  and	  Dana	  L.	  Miller	  (2000):	  “Determining	  Validity	  in	  Qualitative	  Inquiry.”	  In:	  Theory	  
Into	  Practice	  39	  (3):	  124–130.	  
Croissant,	  Aurel,	  and	  Stefan	  Wurster	  (2013):	  “Performance	  and	  Persistence	  of	  Autocracies	  in	  
Comparison:	  Introducing	  Issues	  and	  Perspectives.”	  In:	  Contemporary	  Politics	  19	  (1):	  1–18.	  
Darjeeling	  District	  Magistrate	  (2013):	  “Complaints	  &	  Reports	  of	  MGNREGA.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://darjeeling.gov.in/MGNREGA_complaints_reports.html	  (accessed:	  21.10.2013).	  
Das,	  Arup	  Jyoti	  (2009):	  Kamatapur	  and	  the	  Koch	  Rajbanshi	  Imagination.	  Guwahati:	  Montage	  Media.	  
Das,	  Samir	  Kumar	  (2005):	  “Where	  Do	  the	  Autonomous	  Institutions	  Come	  From?”	  In:	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Autonomy.	  Indian	  Experiences,	  edited	  by	  Ranabir	  Samaddar,	  71–92.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Dasgupta,	  Atis	  (1999):	  “Ethnic	  Problems	  and	  Movements	  for	  Autonomy	  in	  Darjeeling.”	  In:	  Social	  
Scientist	  27	  (11/12):	  47–68.	  
Datta,	  Prabhat	  (1991):	  “The	  Gorkhaland	  Agitation	  in	  West	  Bengal.”	  In:	  The	  Indian	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Science	  52	  (2):	  225–241.	  
Davenport,	  Christian	  (2007):	  “State	  Repression	  and	  Political	  Order.”	  In:	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  
Science	  10	  (1):	  1–23.	  
Dawson,	  Lorne	  L.	  (2006):	  “Psychopathologies	  and	  the	  Attribution	  of	  Charisma:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  
to	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Charisma	  and	  the	  Explanation	  of	  Violence	  in	  New	  Religious	  Movements.”	  
In:	  Nova	  Religio:	  The	  Journal	  of	  Alternative	  and	  Emergent	  Religions	  10	  (2):	  3–28.	  
De	  Wit,	  Joop	  (1996):	  Poverty,	  Policy	  and	  Politics	  in	  Madras	  Slums.	  Dynamics	  of	  Survival,	  Gender	  and	  
Leadership.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Della	  Porta,	  Donatella	  (2013):	  “Democracy	  inside	  Social	  Movements.”	  In:	  The	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell	  
Encyclopedia	  of	  Social	  and	  Political	  Movements,	  edited	  by	  David	  A.	  Snow,	  Donatella	  della	  Porta,	  
Berg	  Klandermans,	  and	  Dough	  McAdam,	  1–4.	  Chichester,	  Malden:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell.	  
Della	  Porta,	  Donatella,	  and	  Dieter	  Rucht	  (2013):	  “Power	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Social	  Movements.”	  In:	  
Meeting	  Democracy:	  Power	  and	  Deliberation	  in	  Global	  Justice	  Movements,	  edited	  by	  Donatella	  




Denzin,	  Norman	  K.	  (2000):	  “Interpretive	  Ethnography.”	  In:	  Zeitschrift	  Für	  Erziehungswissenschaften	  3	  
(3):	  401–409.	  
Dogan,	  Mattei	  (2009):	  “Political	  Legitimacy:	  New	  Criteria	  and	  Anachronistic	  Theories.”	  In:	  
International	  Social	  Science	  Journal	  60	  (196):	  195–210.	  
Easton,	  David	  (1965):	  A	  Systems	  Analysis	  of	  Political	  Life.	  New	  York:	  Wiley.	  
Eatwell,	  Roger	  (2006):	  “The	  Concept	  and	  Theory	  of	  Charismatic	  Leadership.”	  In:	  Totalitarian	  
Movements	  and	  Political	  Religions	  7	  (2):	  141–156.	  
Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  (2007):	  “Gorkhaland:	  Fragile	  Social	  Fabric.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  
Weekly	  42	  (42):	  4196.	  
Election	  Commission	  India	  (2008):	  “No.	  56/2008/J.S.III/.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/OrdersNotifications/listapr08.pdf	  (accessed:	  
28.02.2015).	  
Falzon,	  Mark-­‐Anthony	  (2009):	  “Multi-­‐Sited	  Ethnography:	  Theory,	  Praxis	  and	  Locality	  in	  Contemporary	  
Research.”	  In:	  Multi-­‐Sited	  Ethnography.	  Theory,	  Praxis	  and	  Locality	  in	  Contemporary	  Research,	  
edited	  by	  Mark-­‐Anthony	  Falzon,	  1–23.	  Surrey:	  Ashgate.	  
Flick,	  Uwe	  (2007):	  Qualitative	  Sozialforschung.	  Eine	  Einführung.	  Reinbek:	  Rowohlt	  Verlag	  GmbH.	  
Gandhi,	  Jennifer,	  and	  Adam	  Przeworski	  (2007):	  “Authoritarian	  Institutions	  and	  the	  Survival	  of	  
Autocrats.”	  In:	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  40	  (11):	  1279–1301.	  
Gandhi,	  Jennifer,	  and	  Ellen	  Lust-­‐Okar	  (2009):	  “Elections	  under	  Authoritarianism.”	  In:	  Annual	  Review	  
of	  Political	  Science	  12	  (1):	  403–422.	  
Ganguly,	  Rajat	  (2005):	  “Poverty,	  Malgovernance	  and	  Ethnopolitical	  Mobilization:	  Gorkha	  Nationalism	  
and	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Agitation	  in	  India.”	  In:	  Nationalism	  and	  Ethnic	  Politics	  11	  (4):	  467–502.	  	  
Gerschewski,	  Johannes	  (2014):	  “The	  Three	  Pillars	  of	  Stability:	  Legitimation,	  Repression,	  and	  Co-­‐	  
Optation	  in	  Autocratic	  Regimes.”	  In:	  Democratization	  20	  (1):	  13–38.	  
Gerschewski,	  Johannes,	  Wolfgang	  Merkel,	  Alexander	  Schmotz,	  and	  Christoph	  H.	  Stefes	  (2012):	  
Warum	  Überleben	  Diktaturen?	  In:	  Politische	  Vierteljahrsschrift,	  Sonderheft	  47.	  
Giddens,	  Anthony	  (1984):	  The	  Constitution	  of	  Society.	  Outline	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Structuration.	  
Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
Giddens,	  Anthony,	  and	  Philip	  W.	  Sutton	  (2009):	  Sociology.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
Gille,	  Zsuzsa	  (2001):	  “Critical	  Ethnography	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  Globalisation:	  Toward	  a	  New	  Concept	  of	  
Site.”	  In:	  Cultural	  Studies,	  Critical	  Methodologies	  1	  (3):	  319–334.	  
GJM	  (2008):	  The	  Case	  for	  Gorkhaland.	  Creating	  a	  New	  State	  out	  of	  Darjeeling	  District	  and	  the	  Dooars.	  
Presented	  at	  the	  Tripartite	  Talks	  between	  Government	  of	  India,	  Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  





———	  (2009):	  Why	  Gorkhaland?	  Darjeeling:	  Gorkha	  Janamukti	  Morcha,	  Central	  Committee.	  
Golafshani,	  Nahid	  (2003):	  “Understanding	  Reliability	  and	  Validity	  in	  Qualitative	  Research.”	  In:	  The	  
Qualitative	  Report	  8	  (4):	  597–606.	  
Gorringe,	  Hugo	  (2006a):	  “Which	  Violence?	  Reflections	  on	  Collective	  Violence	  and	  Dalit	  Movements	  in	  
South	  Asia.”	  In:	  Social	  Movement	  Studies:	  Journal	  of	  Social,	  Cultural	  and	  Political	  Protest	  5	  (2):	  
117–136.	  
———	  (2006b):	  “‘Banal	  Violence’?	  The	  Everyday	  Underpinnings	  of	  Collective	  Violence.”	  In:	  Identities:	  
Global	  Studies	  in	  Culture	  and	  Power	  13	  (2):	  237–260.	  	  
Government	  of	  India	  (1992):	  “The	  Constitution	  (Seventy	  First	  Amendment)	  Act	  1992.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend71.htm	  (accessed:	  23.03.2015).	  
Government	  of	  West	  Bengal	  (2004):	  West	  Bengal	  Human	  Development	  Report.	  Kolkata:	  
Development	  and	  Planning	  Department,	  Government	  of	  West	  Bengal.	  
———	  (2012):	  High	  Power	  Committee	  for	  Determination	  of	  Territorial	  Jurisdiction	  of	  GTA.	  Report.	  
Kolkata.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://westbengal.gov.in/portal/banglarMukh/whatsNew	  (accessed:	  
7.9.2013)	  
———	  (2013a):	  “Resolution.	  No.	  462-­‐BCW/6S-­‐73/2011.”	  Kolkata.	  Retrieved	  from	  
www.anagrasarkalyan.gov.in	  (accessed:	  02.02.2014).	  
———	  (2013b):	  Annual	  Plan	  2013-­‐14.	  Kolkata:	  Government	  of	  West	  Bengal.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.wbplan.gov.in/docs/Annual	  Plan13-­‐14/1.	  Write-­‐up/III-­‐	  Special	  Area	  Programme.pdf	  
(accessed:	  10.02.2015).	  
———	  (2015):	  “North	  Bengal	  Development	  Department.	  Government	  of	  West	  Bengal.”	  Retrieved	  
from	  http://wbnorthbengaldev.gov.in/HtmlPage/uup.aspx	  (accessed:	  11.02.2015).	  
Greene,	  Kenneth	  F.	  (2007):	  “Why	  Dominant	  Parties	  Lose.	  Mexico’s	  Democratisation	  in	  Comparative	  
Perspective.”	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
———(2010):	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Authoritarian	  Single-­‐Party	  Dominance.”	  In:	  Comparative	  
Political	  Studies	  43	  (7):	  807–834.	  	  
Gregory,	  Derek	  (1995):	  “Imaginative	  Geographies.”	  In:	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  19	  (4):	  447–
485.	  
Gupta,	  Akhil	  (1998):	  Postcolonial	  Developments.	  Agriculture	  in	  the	  Making	  of	  Modern	  India.	  
Durham/London:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  
Gupta,	  Akhil,	  and	  James	  Ferguson	  (1992):	  “Beyond	  ‘Culture’:	  Space,	  Identity,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Difference.”	  In:	  Cultural	  Anthropology	  7	  (1):	  6–23.	  
Hachhethu,	  Krishna	  (2008):	  Local	  Democracy	  and	  Political	  Parties	  in	  Nepal.	  Edited	  by	  David	  N.	  Gellner	  
and	  Krishna	  Hachhethu.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Hage,	  Ghassan	  (2005):	  “A	  Not	  so	  Multi-­‐Sited	  Ethnography	  of	  a	  Not	  so	  Imagined	  Community.”	  In:	  




Hall,	  Peter	  A.,	  and	  Rosemary	  C.R.	  Taylor	  (1996):	  “Political	  Science	  and	  the	  Three	  New	  
Institutionalisms.”	  In:	  Political	  Studies:	  936–957.	  	  
Hannerz,	  Ulf	  (2003):	  “Being	  There...	  and	  There...	  and	  There!:	  Reflections	  on	  Multi-­‐Site	  Ethnography.”	  
In:	  Ethnography	  4	  (2):	  201–216.	  	  
Hansen,	  Thomas	  Blom	  (1996):	  “Recuperating	  Masculinity:	  Hindu	  Nationalism,	  Violence	  and	  the	  
Exorcism	  of	  the	  Muslim	  ‘Other.’”	  In:	  Critique	  of	  Anthropology	  16	  (2):	  137–172.	  
———	  (2001):	  Wages	  of	  Violence.	  Naming	  and	  Identity	  in	  Postcolonial	  Bombay.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press.	  
Hansen,	  Thomas	  Blom,	  and	  Finn	  Stepputat	  (2005):	  Sovereign	  Bodies.	  Citizens,	  Migrants,	  and	  States	  in	  
the	  Postcolonial	  World.	  Edited	  by	  Thomas	  Blom	  Hansen	  and	  Finn	  Stepputat.	  Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
———	  (2006):	  “Sovereignty	  Revisited.”	  In:	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology	  35:	  295–315.	  
Hardin,	  Russell	  (2009):	  “Compliance,	  Consent,	  and	  Legitimacy.”	  In:	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Comparative	  Politics,	  edited	  by	  Carles	  Boix	  and	  Susan	  C.	  Stokes,	  1-­‐14.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  	  
Heller,	  Patrick	  (2009):	  “Democratic	  Deepening	  in	  India	  and	  South	  Africa.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  and	  
African	  Studies	  44	  (1):	  123–149.	  







Bengal&ac_no=24	  (accessed:	  23.6.2015) 
Immergut,	  Ellen	  M.	  (1998):	  “The	  Theoretical	  Core	  of	  the	  New	  Institutionalism.”	  In:	  Politics	  &	  Society	  
26	  (1):	  5–34.	  
Jansson,	  David	  R.	  (2003):	  “Internal	  Orientalism	  in	  America:	  W.J.	  Cash’s	  The	  Mind	  of	  the	  South	  and	  the	  
Spatial	  Construction	  of	  American	  National	  Identity.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  22	  (3):	  293–316.	  
Jeffrey,	  Craig	  (2010):	  Timepass.	  Youth,	  Class	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Waiting	  in	  India.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  
University	  Press.	  
Jeffrey,	  Craig,	  and	  Jens	  Lerche	  (2000):	  “Dimensions	  of	  Dominance:	  Class	  and	  State	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh.”	  
In:	  The	  Everyday	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  Modern	  India,	  edited	  by	  C.	  J.	  Fuller	  and	  Véronique	  Bénéï,	  
91–114.	  New	  Delhi.	  
Johnson,	  Corey,	  and	  Amanda	  Coleman	  (2012):	  “The	  Internal	  Other:	  Exploring	  the	  Dialectical	  
Relationship	  between	  Regional	  Exclusion	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  National	  Identity.”	  In:	  Annals	  




Joshi,	  Deepa	  (2014):	  “Feminist	  Solidarity?	  Women's	  Engagement	  in	  Politics	  and	  the	  Implications	  for	  
Water	  Management	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  Himalaya.”	  In:	  Mountain	  Research	  and	  Development	  34	  
(3):	  243–254.	  
Kailitz,	  Steffen	  (2013):	  “Classifying	  Political	  Regimes	  Revisited:	  Legitimation	  and	  Durability.”	  In:	  
Democratization	  20	  (1):	  39–60.	  
Karateke,	  Hakan	  T.	  (2005):	  “Legitimising	  the	  Ottoman	  Sultanate:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Historical	  
Analysis.”	  In:	  Legitimising	  the	  Order.	  The	  Ottoman	  Rhetoric	  of	  State	  Power,	  edited	  by	  Hakan	  T.	  
Karateke	  and	  Marius	  Reinkowski,	  13–52.	  Leiden/Boston:	  Brill.	  
Karlsson,	  Bengt	  G.	  (2013):	  Evading	  the	  State.	  Ethnicity	  in	  Northeast	  India	  through	  the	  Lens	  of	  James	  
Scott.	  In:	  Asian	  Ethnology	  72	  (2):	  321-­‐331.	  
Katz,	  Cindi	  (1994):	  “Playing	  the	  Field:	  Questions	  of	  Fieldwork	  in	  Geography.”	  In:	  Professional	  
Geographer	  46	  (1):	  67–72.	  
Kaushik,	  Anupma	  (2009):	  “Resurgent	  Gorkhaland:	  Ethnic	  Identity	  and	  Autonomy.”	  In:	  Conflict	  Trends	  
4:	  46–54.	  
———	  (2013):	  Gorkhaland.	  A	  Study	  of	  Ethnicity	  from	  Peace	  Approach.	  Delhi:	  Kalinga	  Publications.	  
Kaviraj,	  Sudipta	  (1989):	  “Federalism.	  The	  Problem.”	  In:	  Seminar	  357:	  12–14.	  
Kawulich,	  Barbara	  B.	  (2005):	  “Participant	  Observation	  as	  a	  Data	  Collection	  Method.”	  In:	  Forum	  
Qualitative	  Social	  Research	  6	  (2):	  1–19.	  	  
Kenny,	  Judith	  T.	  (1995):	  “Climate,	  Race,	  and	  Imperial	  Authority:	  The	  Symbolic	  Landscape	  of	  the	  British	  
Hill	  Station	  in	  India.”	  In:	  Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  85	  (4):	  694–714.	  
Kitschelt,	  Herbert	  (2006):	  “Movement	  Parties.”	  In:	  Handbook	  of	  Party	  Politics,	  edited	  by	  Richard	  S.	  
Katz	  and	  William	  Crotty,	  278–190.	  London:	  Sage	  Publications.	  
Kitschelt,	  Herbert,	  and	  Steven	  I.	  Wilkinson	  (ed.)	  (2007):	  Patrons,	  Clients,	  and	  Policies.	  Patterns	  of	  
Democratic	  Accountability	  and	  Political	  Competition.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Kochanek,	  Stanley	  A.	  (2010):	  “Corruption	  and	  the	  Criminalization	  of	  Politics	  in	  South	  Asia.”	  In:	  
Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  South	  Asian	  Politics.	  India,	  Pakistan,	  Bangladesh,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Nepal,	  
edited	  by	  Paul	  R.	  Brass,	  364–381.	  Abingdon,	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  
Kohli,	  Atul	  (1997a):	  “Can	  Democracies	  Accommodate	  Ethnic	  Nationalism?	  Rise	  and	  Decline	  of	  Self-­‐
Determination	  Movements	  in	  India.”	  In:	  The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  56	  (2):	  325–344.	  
———	  (1997b):	  “From	  Breakdown	  to	  Order:	  West	  Bengal.”	  In:	  State	  and	  Politics	  in	  India,	  edited	  by	  
Partha	  Chatterjee,	  336–366.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
———	  (2001):	  “The	  Success	  of	  India’s	  Democracy.	  Introduction.”	  In:	  The	  Success	  of	  India’s	  
Democracy,	  edited	  by	  Atul	  Kohli,	  1–19.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  
Kothari,	  Rajni	  (1965):	  “The	  Congress	  ‘System’	  in	  India.”	  In:	  Asian	  Survey	  4	  (12):	  1161–1173.	  




Kraemer,	  Klaus	  (2002):	  “Charismatischer	  Habitus.”	  In:	  Berliner	  Journal	  der	  Soziologie	  2:	  173–187.	  
Kriesi,	  Hanspeter	  (1996):	  “The	  Organisational	  Structure	  of	  New	  Social	  Movements	  in	  a	  Political	  
Context.”	  In:	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  on	  Social	  Movements:	  Political	  Opportunities,	  
Mobillising	  Structures,	  and	  Cultural	  Framings,	  edited	  by	  Doug	  McAdam,	  John	  D.	  McCarthy,	  and	  
Mayer	  N.	  Zald,	  152–184.	  Cambridge.	  
Krishna,	  Anirudh	  (2003):	  “What	  Is	  Happening	  to	  Caste?	  A	  View	  from	  Some	  North	  Indian	  Villages.”	  In:	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  62	  (4):	  1171–1193.	  
———	  (2007):	  “Politics	  in	  the	  Middle:	  Mediating	  Relationships	  between	  the	  Citizens	  and	  the	  State	  in	  
Rural	  North	  India.”	  In:	  Patrons,	  Clients,	  and	  Policies.	  Patterns	  of	  Democratic	  Accountability	  and	  
Political	  Competition,	  edited	  by	  Herbert	  Kitschelt	  and	  Steven	  I.	  Wilkinson,	  141–158.	  New	  York:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Krishna,	  Sankaran	  (1994):	  “Cartographic	  Anxiety:	  Mapping	  the	  Body	  Politic	  in	  India.”	  In:	  Alternatives	  
19:	  504–521.	  
Kubik,	  Jan	  (2009):	  “Ethnography	  of	  Politics:	  Foundations,	  Applications,	  Prospects.”	  In:	  Political	  
Ethnography.	  What	  Immersion	  Contributes	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Power,	  edited	  by	  Edward	  Schatz,	  25–
52.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Kumar,	  Anup	  (2011):	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  Small	  State.	  Populist	  Social	  Mobilisation	  and	  the	  Hindi	  Press	  in	  
the	  Uttarakhand	  Movement.	  New	  Delhi:	  Orient	  Blackswan.	  
Kumar,	  Ashutosh	  (2010):	  “Exploring	  the	  Demand	  for	  New	  States.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  
xlv	  (33):	  15–18.	  
Kumar,	  Pradeep	  (2001):	  “Uttarakhand’s	  Challenge.”	  In:	  Seminar	  497.	  
Lacina,	  Bethany	  (2009):	  “The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Stability	  in	  Northeast	  India:	  Local	  Ethnic	  Autocracy	  
and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law.”	  In:	  Asian	  Survey	  49	  (6):	  998–1020.	  
———(2014):	  “India’s	  Stabilizing	  Segment	  States.”	  Ethnopolitics	  13	  (1):	  13–27.	  
Lama,	  Mahendra	  P.	  (1994):	  Gorkhaland	  Movement:	  Quest	  for	  an	  Identity.	  Edited	  by	  Mahendra	  P.	  
Lama.	  Darjeeling:	  Department	  of	  Information	  and	  Cultural	  Affairs,	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  
Council.	  
Lama,	  Niraj	  (2008):	  “Decoding	  the	  Dress	  Code.”	  Darjeeling	  Times.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.darjeelingtimes.com/news/Magazine-­‐Edition/Decoding-­‐the-­‐Dress-­‐Code.html	  
(accessed:	  02.12.2013).	  
Lauckner,	  Heidi,	  Margo	  Paterson,	  and	  Terry	  Krupa	  (2012):	  “Using	  Constructivist	  Case	  Study	  
Methodology	  to	  Understand	  Community	  Development	  Processes:	  Proposed	  Methodological	  
Questions	  to	  Guide	  the	  Research	  Process.”	  In:	  The	  Qualitative	  Report	  17:	  1–22.	  
Lefebvre,	  Henri	  (1991)	  [1974]:	  The	  Production	  of	  Space.	  Malden:	  Blackwell.	  
Leitner,	  Helga,	  Eric	  Sheppard,	  and	  Kristin	  M.	  Sziarto	  (2008):	  “The	  Spatialities	  of	  Contentious	  Politics.”	  




Lentz,	  Carola	  (1998):	  “The	  Chief,	  the	  Mine	  Captain	  and	  the	  Politician:	  Legitimating	  Power	  in	  Northern	  
Ghana.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  the	  International	  African	  Institute	  68	  (1):	  46–67.	  
Levitsky,	  Steven,	  and	  Lucan	  Way	  (2002):	  “The	  Rise	  of	  Competitive	  Authoritarianism.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  13	  (2):	  51–65.	  	  
Lincoln,	  Yvonna	  S.,	  Susan	  L.	  Lynham,	  and	  Egon	  G.	  Guba	  (2011):	  “Paradigmatic	  Controversies,	  
Contradictions	  and	  Emerging	  Confluences,	  Revisited.”	  In:	  The	  SAGE	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  
Research,	  edited	  by	  Norman	  K.	  Denzin	  and	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln,	  97–128.	  Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage.	  
Lust,	  Ellen	  (2009):	  “Competitive	  Clientelism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  Democracy	  20	  (3):	  122–
135.	  	  
Madsen,	  Douglas,	  and	  Peter	  G.	  Snow	  (1991):	  The	  Charismatic	  Bond.	  Political	  Behavior	  in	  Time	  of	  
Crisis.	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
Magaloni,	  Beatriz	  (2006):	  Voting	  for	  Autocracy:	  Hegemonic	  Party	  Survival	  and	  Its	  Demise	  in	  Mexico.	  
New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Magaloni,	  Beatriz,	  and	  Ruth	  Kricheli	  (2010):	  “Political	  Order	  and	  One-­‐Party	  Rule.”	  In:	  Annual	  Review	  
of	  Political	  Science	  13	  (1):	  123–143.	  	  
Majeed,	  Akhtar	  (2003):	  “The	  Changing	  Politics	  of	  States’	  Reorganization.”	  In:	  Publius:	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Federalism	  33	  (4):	  83–98.	  
———	  (2010):	  Clouds	  over	  Federalism.	  The	  Real	  Working	  of	  the	  Indian	  Polity.	  New	  Delhi:	  Manak	  
Publishers.	  
Manor,	  James	  (1996)	  “‘Ethnicity’	  and	  Politics	  in	  India.”	  In:	  International	  Affairs	  72	  (3):	  459–475.	  
———	  (2000):	  “Small-­‐Time	  Political	  Fixers	  in	  India’s	  States:	  ‘Towel	  over	  Armpit.’”	  In:	  Asian	  Survey	  40	  
(5):	  816–835.	  
Marcus,	  George	  E.	  (1995):	  “Ethnography	  In/of	  the	  World	  System.	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Multi-­‐Sited	  
Ethnography.”	  In:	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology	  24:	  95–117.	  
Massey,	  Doreen	  (2001):	  “Geography	  on	  the	  Agenda	  1.”	  In:	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  25	  (1):	  5–
17.	  
Mawdsley,	  Emma	  (1997):	  “Non-­‐Secessionist	  Regionalism:	  The	  Uttarakhand	  Separate	  State	  
Movement.”	  In:	  Environment	  and	  Planning	  A	  29	  (12):	  2217–2235.	  
———	  (1999):	  “A	  New	  Himalayan	  State	  in	  India:	  Popular	  Perceptions	  of	  Regionalism,	  Politics,	  and	  
Development.”	  In:	  Mountain	  Research	  and	  Development	  19	  (2):	  101–112.	  
———	  (2002):	  “Redrawing	  the	  Body	  Politic:	  Federalism,	  Regionalism	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  New	  States	  
in	  India.”	  In:	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  Politics	  40	  (3):	  34–54.	  
Mayring,	  Philipp	  (2000):	  “Qualitative	  Content	  Analysis.”	  In:	  Forum	  Qualitative	  Social	  Research	  1	  (2):	  




McAdam,	  Doug,	  John	  D.	  McCarthy,	  and	  Mayer	  N.	  Zald	  (1996):	  Comparative	  Perspectives	  on	  Social	  
Movements:	  Political	  Opportunities,	  Mobilizing	  Structures,	  and	  Cultural	  Framings.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
McAdam,	  Doug,	  Sidney	  Tarrow,	  and	  Charles	  Tilly	  (2001):	  Dynamics	  of	  Contention.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
McCarthy,	  John	  D.,	  and	  Mayer	  N.	  Zald	  (1977):	  “Resource	  Mobilization	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  A	  
Partial	  Theory.”	  In:	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  82	  (6):	  1212–1241.	  
McDonald,	  Seonaidh	  (2005):	  “Studying	  Actions	  in	  Context:	  A	  Qualitative	  Shadowing	  Method	  for	  
Organizational	  Research.”	  In:	  Qualitative	  Research	  5	  (4):	  455–473.	  
Michelutti,	  Lucia	  (2007):	  “The	  Vernacularization	  of	  Democracy:	  Political	  Participation	  and	  Popular	  
Politics	  in	  North	  India.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Anthropological	  Institute	  13:	  639–656.	  
———	  (2008):	  The	  Vernacularisation	  of	  Democracy:	  Comparisons	  across	  India	  and	  Venezuela:	  Full	  
Research	  Report	  ESCR	  End	  of	  Award	  Report.	  RES-­‐000-­‐27-­‐0091.	  Swindon:	  ESRC.	  
———	  (2010):	  “Wrestling	  with	  (body)	  Politics:	  Understanding	  ‘Goonda’	  Political	  Styles	  in	  North	  
India.”	  In:	  Power	  and	  Influence	  in	  India.	  Bosses,	  Lords	  and	  Captains,	  edited	  by	  Pamela	  Price	  and	  
Arild	  Engelsen	  Ruud,	  44–69.	  Delhi:	  Routledge.	  	  
Middleton,	  Townsend	  (2010):	  Beyond	  Recognition:	  Ethnology,	  Belonging,	  and	  the	  Refashioning	  of	  the	  
Ethnic	  Subject	  in	  Darjeeling,	  India	  (PhD	  Dissertation).	  Cornell	  University.	  
———	  (2013a):	  “States	  of	  Difference:	  Refiguring	  Ethnicity	  and	  Its	  ‘Crisis’	  at	  India’s	  Borders.”	  In:	  
Political	  Geography	  35:	  14–24.	  	  
———	  (2013b):	  “Scheduling	  Tribes:	  A	  View	  from	  inside	  India’s	  Ethnographic	  State.”	  In:	  Focaal	  -­‐	  
Journal	  of	  Global	  and	  Historical	  Anthropology	  65:	  13–22.	  	  
———	  (2013c):	  “Anxious	  Belongings:	  Anxiety	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Belonging	  in	  Subnationalist	  
Darjeeling.”	  In:	  American	  Anthropologist	  115	  (4):	  608–621.	  	  
Middleton,	  Townsend,	  and	  Sara	  Shneiderman	  (2008):	  “Reservations,	  Federalism	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Recognition	  in	  Nepal.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  May	  10:	  39–45.	  
Mills,	  Jane,	  Ann	  Bonner,	  and	  Karen	  Francis	  (2006):	  “Adopting	  a	  Constructivist	  Approach	  to	  Grounded	  
Theory:	  Implications	  for	  Research	  Design.”	  In:	  International	  Journal	  of	  Nursing	  Practice	  12	  (1):	  
8–13.	  	  
Mines,	  Mattison,	  and	  Vijayalakshmi	  Gourishankar	  (1990):	  “Leadership	  and	  Individuality	  in	  South	  Asia:	  
The	  Case	  of	  the	  South	  Indian	  Big-­‐Man.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  49	  (4):	  761–789.	  
Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development	  (2008):	  The	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Act	  (NREGA)	  2005.	  
Operational	  Guidelines	  2008.	  Edited	  by	  Government	  of	  India.	  New	  Delhi.	  
———	  (2013a):	  “Gram	  Panchayat.”	  The	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  National	  Rural	  Employment	  Guarantee	  Act	  




———	  (2013b):	  “Letter	  dated	  28th	  January	  2013.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://nrega.nic.in//Netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/name_awardees_Award_2011_2012.p
df	  (accessed:	  14.12.2014).	  
Moktan,	  R.	  (ed.)	  (2004):	  Sikkim:	  Darjeeling.	  Compendium	  of	  Documents.	  Kalimpong:	  R.	  Moktan	  
Sumaralaya.	  
Nadai,	  Eva,	  and	  Christoph	  Maeder	  (2005):	  “Fuzzy	  Fields.	  Multi-­‐Sided	  Ethnography	  in	  Sociological	  
Research.”	  In:	  Forum	  Qualitative	  Social	  Research	  6	  (3):	  1–13.	  
Nightingale,	  Andrea	  (2009):	  “Triangulation.”	  In:	  International	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Human	  Geography,	  
Volume	  11,	  edited	  by	  Rob	  Kitchin	  and	  Nigel	  Thrift,	  489–492.	  Oxford:	  Elsvier.	  
Nilsen,	  Alf	  Gunvald	  (2007):	  “On	  New	  Social	  Movements	  and	  ‘the	  Reinvention	  of	  India.’”	  In:	  Forum	  for	  
Development	  Studies	  34	  (2):	  271–293.	  	  
Ó	  Tuathail,	  Gearoid,	  and	  John	  Agnew	  (1992):	  “Geopolitics	  and	  Discourse	  -­‐	  Practical	  Geopolitical	  
Reasoning	  in	  American	  Foreign-­‐Policy.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  11	  (2):	  190–204.	  	  
O’Malley,	  L.	  L.	  S.	  (1907):	  Bengal	  District	  Gazetteers:	  Darjeeling.	  New	  Delhi:	  Logos	  Press.	  
Oommen,	  Tharailath	  Koshy	  (ed.)	  (2010):	  Social	  Movements	  I.	  Issues	  of	  Identity.	  New	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Paasi,	  Anssi	  (2002a):	  “Place	  and	  Region:	  Regional	  Worlds	  and	  Words.”	  In:	  Progress	  in	  Human	  
Geography	  26	  (6):	  802–811.	  
———	  (2002b):	  “Bounded	  Spaces	  in	  the	  Mobile	  World:	  Deconstructing	  ‘Regional	  Identity.’”	  In:	  
Tijdschrift	  Voor	  Economische	  En	  Sociale	  Geografie	  93	  (2):	  137–148.	  
Pappas,	  Takis	  S.	  (2008):	  “Political	  Leadership	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Radical	  Mass	  Movements	  in	  
Democracy.”	  In:	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  41	  (8).	  
Patton,	  Michael	  Quinn	  (2002):	  Qualitative	  Research	  and	  Evaluation	  Methods.	  Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  
Sage.	  
Paul,	  Bappaditya	  (2014):	  The	  First	  Naxal.	  An	  Authorised	  Biography	  of	  Kanu	  Sanyal.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Pepinsky,	  Thomas	  (2007):	  “Autocracy,	  Elections,	  and	  Fiscal	  Policy:	  Evidence	  from	  Malaysia.”	  In:	  
Studies	  in	  Comparative	  International	  Development	  42	  (1-­‐2):	  136–163.	  	  
Perera-­‐Mubarak,	  Kamakshi	  N.	  (2012):	  “Reading	  ‘Stories’	  of	  Corruption:	  Practices	  and	  Perceptions	  of	  
Everyday	  Corruption	  in	  Post-­‐Tsunami	  Sri	  Lanka.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  31	  (6):	  368–378.	  	  
Phadnis,	  Urmila,	  and	  Rajat	  Ganguly	  (2001):	  Ethnicity	  and	  Nation-­‐Building	  in	  South	  Asia	  (Revised	  
Edition).	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
philippe	  freedive	  (2010):	  “Madan	  Tamang	  Murder	  in	  Darjeeling.MOV.”	  YouTube.	  Retrieved	  from	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1M10_LcKjY	  (accessed:	  14.01.2015).	  




Piliavsky,	  Anastasia	  (ed.)	  (2014a):	  Patronage	  as	  Politics	  in	  South	  Asia.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.	  
———	  (2014b):	  “Introduction.”	  In:	  Patronage	  as	  Politics	  in	  South	  Asia,	  edited	  by	  Anastasia	  Piliawsky,	  
1–38.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Pinto,	  António	  Costa,	  and	  Stein	  Ugelvik	  Larsen	  (2006):	  “Conclusion:	  Fascism,	  Dictators	  and	  Charisma.”	  
In:	  Totalitarian	  Movements	  and	  Political	  Religions	  7	  (2):	  251–257.	  
Poletta,	  Francesca	  (2002):	  Freedom	  Is	  an	  Endless	  Meeting:	  Democracy	  in	  American	  Social	  
Movements.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Price,	  Pamela	  (1989):	  “Kingly	  Models	  in	  Indian	  Political	  Behavior:	  Culture	  as	  a	  Medium	  of	  History.”	  In:	  
Asian	  Survey	  29	  (6):	  559–572.	  
———	  (1999):	  “Cosmologies	  and	  Corruption	  in	  (South)	  India	  –	  Thinking	  Aloud.”	  In:	  Forum	  for	  
Development	  Studies	  26	  (2):	  315–327.	  
———	  (2007):	  “Honor	  and	  Morality	  in	  Contemporary	  Rural	  India.”	  In:	  New	  Perspectives	  in	  Political	  
Ethnography,	  edited	  by	  Lauren	  Joseph,	  Matthew	  Mahler	  and	  Javier	  Auyero,	  88–109.	  New	  York:	  
Springer.	  
Price,	  Pamela,	  and	  Arild	  Engelsen	  Ruud	  (eds.)	  (2010a):	  Power	  and	  Influence	  in	  India.	  Bosses,	  Lords	  
and	  Captains.	  Exploring	  the	  Political	  in	  South	  Asia.	  New	  Delhi:	  Routledge.	  
———	  (2010b):	  “Introduction.”	  In:	  Power	  and	  Influence	  in	  India.	  Bosses,	  Lords	  and	  Captains,	  edited	  
by	  Pamela	  Price	  and	  Arild	  Engelsen	  Ruud,	  xix–xxxiv.	  New	  Delhi.	  
Radcliffe,	  Sarah	  A.	  (1998):	  “Frontiers	  and	  Popular	  Nationhood:	  Geographies	  of	  Identity	  in	  the	  1995	  
Ecuador-­‐Peru	  Border	  Dispute.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  17	  (3):	  273–293.	  
———	  (2001):	  “Imagining	  the	  State	  as	  a	  Space.	  Territoriality	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  the	  State	  in	  
Ecuador.”	  In:	  States	  of	  Imagination.	  Ethnographic	  Explorations	  of	  the	  Postcolonial	  State,	  edited	  
by	  Thomas	  Blom	  Hansen	  and	  Finn	  Stepputat,	  123–143.	  Durham/London:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  
Radcliffe,	  Sarah	  A.,	  and	  Sallie	  Westwood	  (1996):	  Remaking	  the	  Nation.	  Place,	  Identity	  and	  Politics	  in	  
Latin	  America.	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  
Ram,	  F.,	  S.	  K.	  Mohanty,	  and	  Usha	  Ram	  (2009):	  “Understanding	  the	  Distribution	  of	  BPL	  Cards:	  All-­‐India	  
and	  Selected	  States.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  xliv	  (7):	  66–71.	  
Ramachandran,	  Sudha	  (2011):	  “Gorkhas	  Divided	  over	  Autonomy	  Accord.”	  In:	  Asia	  Times.	  Retrieved	  
from	  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MG21Df01.html	  (accessed:	  15.11.2011).	  
Rangan,	  Haripriya	  (2004):	  “From	  Chipko	  to	  Uttaranchal:	  The	  Environment	  of	  Protest	  and	  
Development	  in	  the	  Indian	  Himalaya.”	  In:	  Liberation	  Ecologies:	  Environment,	  Development,	  
Social	  Movements.	  2nd	  Edition,	  edited	  by	  R.	  Peet	  and	  M.	  Watts,	  371–393.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
Reddy,	  G.	  Ram,	  and	  G.	  Haragopal	  (1985):	  “The	  Pyraveekar:	  ‘The	  Fixer’	  in	  Rural	  India.”	  In:	  Asian	  Survey	  




Reuber,	  Paul	  (1999):	  Raumbezogene	  Politische	  Konflikte.	  Geographische	  Konfliktforschung	  Am	  
Beispiel	  von	  Gemeindegebietsreformen.	  Reihe	  Erdkundliches	  Wissen	  131.	  Stuttgart:	  Franz	  
Steiner	  Verlag.	  
Rhodes,	  Nicholas,	  and	  Deki	  Rhodes	  (2006):	  A	  Man	  of	  the	  Frontier.	  S.W.	  Laden	  La	  (1876-­‐1936).	  His	  Life	  
&	  Time	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  Tibet.	  Kolkata:	  Mira	  Bose.	  
Rose,	  Gillian	  (1997):	  “Situating	  Knowledges:	  Positionality,	  Reflexivities	  and	  Other	  Tactics.”	  In:	  
Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography	  21	  (3):	  305–320.	  
Roy,	  Barun	  (2012):	  Gorkhas	  and	  Gorkhaland.	  A	  Socio-­‐Political	  Study	  of	  the	  Gorkha	  People	  and	  the	  
Gorkhaland	  Movement.	  Darjeeling:	  Parbati	  Roy	  Foundation.	  
Rubongoya,	  Joshua	  B.	  (2007):	  Regime	  Hegemony	  in	  Museveni’s	  Uganda.	  Pax	  Musevenica.	  New	  York:	  
Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
Rudolph,	  Llyod	  I.,	  and	  Susanne	  Hoeber	  Rudoloph	  (2010):	  “The	  Old	  and	  the	  New	  Federalism	  in	  
Independent	  India.”	  In:	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  South	  Asian	  Politics.	  India,	  Pakistan,	  
Bangladesh,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  Paul	  R.	  Brass,	  147–161.	  Oxon:	  Routledge.	  
Ruud,	  Arild	  Engelsen	  (2000):	  “Talking	  Dirty	  about	  Politics:	  A	  View	  from	  a	  Bengali	  Village.”	  In:	  The	  
Everyday	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  Modern	  India,	  edited	  by	  C.	  J.	  Fuller	  and	  Véronique	  Bénéï,	  115–
136.	  New	  Delhi:	  Social	  Science	  Press.	  
Sadanandan,	  Anoop	  (2012):	  “Patronage	  and	  Decentralization.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Poverty	  in	  India.”	  In:	  
Comparative	  Politics,	  January:	  211–228.	  
Said,	  Edward	  (1978):	  Orientalism.	  Harmontsworth:	  Penguin.	  
———	  (2000):	  “Invention,	  Memory,	  and	  Place.”	  In:	  Critical	  Inquiry	  26	  (2):	  175–192.	  
Samaddar,	  Ranabir	  (2002):	  “South	  Asia:	  Self-­‐Determination,	  Forms	  of	  Autonomy	  and	  Democratic	  
Argument.”	  In:	  Ethnicity	  and	  Polity	  in	  South	  Asia,	  edited	  by	  Girin	  Phukon,	  20–34.	  New	  Delhi:	  
South	  Asian	  Publishers.	  
———	  (2005):	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Autonomy:	  An	  Introduction.”	  In:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Autonomy.	  Indian	  
Experiences,	  edited	  by	  R.	  Samaddar,	  9–34.	  New	  Delhi:	  Sage.	  
Samanta,	  Amiya	  K.	  (2000):	  Gorkhaland	  Movement.	  A	  Study	  in	  Ethnic	  Separatism.	  New	  Delhi:	  A.P.H.	  
Publishing	  corporation.	  
Sangvai,	  Sanjay	  (2007):	  “The	  New	  People’s	  Movements	  in	  India.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  
December	  1:	  111–117.	  
Sarkar,	  Dilip	  Kumar,	  and	  Dhrubojyoti	  Bhaumik	  (2000):	  Empowering	  Darjeeling	  Hills.	  An	  Experience	  
with	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council.	  Delhi:	  Indian	  Publishers	  Distributers.	  
Sarkar,	  R.	  L.,	  and	  Mahendra	  P.	  Lama	  (eds.)	  (1986):	  Tea	  Plantation	  Workers	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Himalayas.	  
A	  Study	  on	  Wages,	  Employment	  and	  Living	  Standards.	  Delhi:	  Atma	  Ram	  &	  Sons.	  
Sarkar,	  Swatahsiddha	  (2010):	  “The	  Land	  Question	  and	  Ethnicity	  in	  the	  Darjeeling	  Hills.”	  In:	  Journal	  of	  




———	  (2012):	  “Autonomy,	  Self-­‐Rule	  and	  Community	  in	  Darjeeling	  Hills:	  A	  Review	  of	  Gorkhaland	  
Territorial	  Administration	  (GTA).	  Occassional	  Paper	  VI.”	  In:	  SSRN	  Electronic	  Journal.	  Siliguri:	  
Department	  of	  Sociology.	  University	  of	  North	  Bengal.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038225	  	  
———	  (2013):	  Gorkhaland	  Movement.	  Ethnic	  Conflict	  and	  State	  Response.	  New	  Delhi:	  Concept	  
Publishing.	  
Schatz,	  Edward	  (2009):	  “Ethnographic	  Immersion	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Politics.”	  In	  Political	  Ethnography.	  
What	  Immersion	  Contributes	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Power,	  edited	  by	  Edward	  Schatz,	  1–18.	  Chicago:	  
The	  Univeristy	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Schetter,	  Conrad,	  and	  Markus	  Weissert	  (2007):	  “Die	  Macht	  des	  Raumes.	  Wahrnehmung,	  Legitimation	  
und	  Gewalt	  Zwischen	  Ethnoscape	  und	  Nationalem	  Territorium.”	  In:	  Peripherie	  108:	  376–392.	  
Schmidt,	  Manfred	  G.	  (2012):	  “Legitimation	  durch	  Performanz?	  Zur	  Output-­‐Legitimität	  in	  
Autokratien.”	  In:	  Totalitarismus	  Und	  Demokratie	  9:	  83–100.	  
Scott,	  James	  C.	  (1969):	  “The	  Analysis	  of	  Corruption	  in	  Developing	  Nations.”	  In:	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  
Society	  and	  History	  11	  (3):	  315–341.	  
———	  (1989):	  “Everyday	  Forms	  of	  Resistance.”	  In:	  Copenhagen	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  4:	  33–62.	  
———	  (1990):	  Domination	  and	  the	  art	  of	  Resistance:	  Hidden	  Transcripts.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  
Press.	  
———	  (2009):	  The	  Art	  of	  Not	  Being	  Governed:	  An	  Anarchist	  History	  of	  Upland	  Southeast	  Asia.	  New	  
Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  
Seale,	  Clive	  (1999):	  “Quality	  in	  Qualitative	  Research.”	  In:	  Qualitative	  Inquiry	  5	  (4):	  465–478.	  
Shah,	  Alpa	  (2012):	  “Who	  Cares	  for	  a	  New	  State?	  The	  Imaginary	  Institution	  of	  Jharkhand.”	  In:	  The	  
Politics	  of	  Belonging	  in	  India.	  Becoming	  Tribal,	  edited	  by	  Daniel	  J.	  Rycroft	  and	  Sangeeta	  
Dasgupta,	  217–230.	  Oxon:	  Routledge.	  
Shah,	  Manali	  (2010):	  “Governance,	  Identity	  and	  Statehood.	  India’s	  Balkanization?”	  In:	  Friedrich-­‐
Naumann-­‐Stiftung.	  Bericht	  aus	  aktuellem	  Anlass	  22	  (10):	  1–4.	  
Shani,	  Ornit	  (2010):	  “Bootlegging,	  Politics	  and	  Corruption:	  State	  Violence	  and	  the	  Routine	  Practices	  of	  
Public	  Power	  in	  Gujarat	  (1985–2002).”	  In:	  South	  Asian	  History	  and	  Culture	  1	  (4):	  494–508.	  	  
Sharma,	  Anuradha	  (2012):	  “A	  Conversation	  with:	  Gorkha	  Leader	  Bimal	  Gurung.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/a-­‐conversation-­‐with-­‐gorkha-­‐leader-­‐bimal-­‐
gurung/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0	  (accessed:	  12.4.2012).	  
Shastri,	  Amita,	  and	  A.	  Jeyaratnam	  Wilson	  (eds.)	  (2001):	  The	  Post-­‐Colonial	  States	  of	  South	  Asia.	  
Democracy,	  Identity,	  Development	  and	  Security.	  Surrey:	  Curzon.	  
Shneiderman,	  Sara	  (2010):	  “Are	  the	  Central	  Himalayas	  in	  Zomia?	  Some	  Scholarly	  and	  Political	  




Shneiderman,	  Sara,	  and	  Louise	  Tillin	  (2015):	  “Restructuring	  States,	  Restructuring	  Ethnicity:	  Looking	  
across	  Disciplinary	  Boundaries	  at	  Federal	  Futures	  in	  India	  and	  Nepal.”	  In:	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies	  
49	  (1):	  1–39.	  
Shor,	  Thomas	  K.	  (2014):	  The	  Master	  Director.	  A	  Journey	  through	  Politics,	  Doubt	  and	  Devotion	  with	  a	  
Himalayan	  Master.	  Noida:	  HarperCollins.	  
Simon,	  Gregory	  L.	  (2009):	  “Geographies	  of	  Mediation:	  Market	  Development	  and	  the	  Rural	  Broker	  in	  
Maharashtra,	  India.”	  In:	  Political	  Geography	  28	  (3):	  197–207.	  
Singh,	  Bhai	  Nahar,	  and	  Bhai	  Kirpal	  Singh	  (1987):	  History	  of	  All	  India	  Gurkha	  League.	  New	  Delhi:	  
Nirmal	  Publishers	  &	  Distributors.	  
Sinha,	  Awesh	  C.	  (2009):	  “Introduction.”	  In:	  Indian	  Nepalis,	  Issues	  and	  Perspectives,	  edited	  by	  Tanka	  
Subba,	  A.C.	  Sinha,	  G.S.	  Nepal,	  and	  D.R.	  Nepal,	  3–27.	  New	  Delhi:	  Concept	  Publishing.	  
Sinha,	  Awesh	  C.,	  and	  Tanka	  B.	  Subba	  (eds.)	  (2003):	  The	  Nepalis	  in	  Northeast	  India.	  A	  Community	  in	  
Search	  of	  Indian	  Identity.	  New	  Delhi:	  Indus	  Publishing	  Company.	  
Smith,	  Anthony	  D.	  (1996a):	  “Anthony	  Smith’s	  Opening	  Statement.	  Nations	  and	  Their	  Pasts.”	  In:	  
Nations	  and	  Nationalism	  2	  (3):	  358–365.	  
———	  (1996b):	  “LSE	  Centennial	  Lecture:	  The	  Resurgence	  of	  Nationalism?	  Myth	  and	  Memory	  in	  the	  
Renewal	  of	  Nations.”	  In:	  British	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  47	  (4):	  575–598.	  
———	  (1996c):	  “Culture,	  Community,	  and	  Territory.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Ethnicity	  and	  Nationalism.”	  In:	  
International	  Affairs	  72	  (3):	  445–458.	  
———	  (1996d):	  “Culture,	  Community	  and	  Territory:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Ethnicity	  and	  Nationalism.”	  In:	  
International	  Affairs	  72	  (3):	  445–458.	  
Snow,	  David	  A.,	  and	  Robert	  Benford	  (1988):	  “Ideology,	  Frame	  Resonance,	  and	  Participant	  
Mobilisation.”	  In:	  International	  Social	  Movements	  Research	  1:	  197–217.	  
Sonntag,	  Selma	  K.	  (1999):	  “Autonomous	  Councils	  in	  India:	  Contesting	  the	  Liberal	  Nation-­‐State.”	  In:	  
Alternatives	  24	  (4):	  415–434.	  
Spencer,	  Jonathan	  (2007):	  Anthropology,	  Politics	  and	  the	  State.	  Democracy	  and	  Violence	  in	  South	  
Asia.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Stake,	  Robert	  E.	  (2006):	  Multiple	  Case	  Study	  Analysis.	  New	  York:	  Guilford.	  
Stillman,	  Peter	  G.	  (1974):	  “The	  Concept	  of	  Legitimacy.”	  In:	  Polity	  7	  (1):	  32–56.	  
Straßenberger,	  Grit	  (2013):	  “Autorität:	  Herrschaft	  ohne	  Zwang	  –	  Anerkennung	  ohne	  Deliberation.”	  In:	  
Berliner	  Journal	  für	  Soziologie	  23	  (3-­‐4):	  493–509.	  
Subba,	  Tanka	  B.	  (1989):	  Dynamics	  of	  a	  Hill	  Society.	  The	  Nepalis	  in	  Darjeeling	  and	  Sikkim	  Himalayas.	  
Delhi:	  Mittal	  Publications.	  
———	  (1992):	  Ethnicity,	  State	  and	  Development.	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  the	  Gorkhaland	  Movement	  in	  




———	  (2003):	  “The	  Nepalis	  in	  Northeast	  India:	  Political	  Aspirations	  and	  Ethnicity.”	  In:	  The	  Nepalis	  in	  
Northeast	  India.	  A	  Community	  in	  Search	  of	  Indian	  Identity,	  edited	  by	  A.	  C.	  Sinha	  and	  Tanka	  B.	  
Subba,	  54–66.	  New	  Delhi:	  Indus	  Publishing	  Company.	  
Subba,	  Tanka	  B,	  A.	  C.	  Sinha,	  G.	  S.	  Nepal,	  and	  D.	  R.	  Nepal	  (eds.)	  (2009):	  Indian	  Nepalis,	  Issues	  and	  
Perspectives.	  New	  Delhi:	  Concept	  Publishing.	  
Tamang,	  Madan	  (2010):	  “No	  Title.”	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cu2FlhetkPk	  
(accessed:	  11.05.2012).	  
Tambiah,	  Stanley	  J.	  (1997):	  “Friends,	  Neighbors,	  Enemies,	  Strangers:	  Aggressor	  and	  Victim	  in	  Civilian	  
Ethnic	  Riots.”	  In:	  Social	  Science	  &	  Medicine	  45	  (8):	  1177–88.	  
Tamlong,	  D.	  T.	  (2010):	  “Mayel	  Lyang	  &	  the	  Lepchas	  (About	  Sikkim	  and	  Darjeeling).”	  In:	  Aachuley.	  A	  
Bilingual	  Journal	  Illustrating	  the	  Lepcha	  Way	  of	  Life.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://aachulay.blogspot.in/2010/07/mayel-­‐lyang-­‐lepchas-­‐about-­‐sikkim-­‐and.html	  (accessed:	  
21.2.2015).	  
Tanneberg,	  Dag,	  Christoph	  Stefes,	  and	  Wolfgang	  Merkel	  (2013):	  “Hard	  Times	  and	  Regime	  Failure:	  
Autocratic	  Responses	  to	  Economic	  Downturns.”	  Contemporary	  Politics	  19	  (1):	  115–129.	  
Thulung,	  Alok	  (2008):	  “Why	  Gorkhaland.	  Interview	  with	  Alok	  Thulung,	  GJM	  Youth	  Wing.”	  Edited	  by	  
Darjeeling	  Times.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.darjeelingtimes.com/news/Interviews/Why-­‐
Gorkhaland.html	  (accessed:	  18.10.2011).	  
Tillin,	  Louise	  (2011):	  “Statehood	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Intend.”	  In:	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly	  xlvi	  
(20):	  34–38.	  
———	  (2013):	  Remapping	  India.	  New	  States	  and	  Their	  Political	  Origins.	  London:	  Hurst	  &	  Company.	  
Timsina,	  Suman	  Raj	  (1992):	  Nepali	  Community	  in	  India.	  Delhi:	  Manak	  Publications.	  
Travares,	  David,	  and	  Marc	  Brosseau	  (2006):	  “The	  Representation	  of	  Mongolia	  in	  Contemporary	  
Travel	  Writing:	  Imaginative	  Geographies	  of	  a	  Travellers	  ‘Frontier.’”	  In:	  Social	  &	  Cultural	  
Geography	  7	  (2):	  299–317.	  
UNDP	  (2011):	  “India	  Factsheet	  Economic	  and	  Human	  Development	  Indicator.”	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.in.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/india_factsheet_economic_n_hdi.pdf	  
(accessed:	  28.02.2015).	  
Unnithan,	  Sandeep	  (2011):	  “Gunrunners	  of	  North-­‐East.	  Chinese	  Agents	  Smuggle	  Arms	  to	  Revive	  
Militancy	  in	  North-­‐Eastern	  India.”	  In:	  India	  Today,	  May	  28.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chinese-­‐agents-­‐smuggle-­‐arms-­‐to-­‐spread-­‐militancy-­‐in-­‐north-­‐
east/1/139538.html	  (accessed:	  19.10.2011).	  
Vaishnav,	  Milan	  (2011a):	  Doing	  Good	  by	  Doing	  Bad:	  Why	  Indian	  Voters	  Support	  Criminal	  Politicians.	  
Working	  Paper.	  New	  York.	  
———	  (2011b):	  “The	  Market	  for	  Criminality:	  Money,	  Muscle	  and	  Elections	  in	  India.”	  In:	  SSRN	  





———	  (2012):	  The	  Merits	  of	  Money	  and	  “muscle”:	  Essays	  on	  Criminality,	  Elections	  and	  Democracy	  in	  
India.	  Columbia	  University.	  
Van	  Schendel,	  Willem	  (2012):	  “The	  Dangers	  of	  Belonging.	  Tribes,	  Indigenous	  People	  and	  Homelands	  
in	  South	  Asia.”	  In:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Belonging	  in	  India.	  Becoming	  Tribal,	  edited	  by	  Daniel	  G.	  Rycroft	  
and	  Sangeeta	  Dasgupta,	  19–43.	  Oxon:	  Routledge.	  
Véron,	  René,	  Stuart	  Corbridge,	  Glyn	  Williams,	  and	  Manoj	  Srivastava	  (2003):	  “The	  Everyday	  State	  and	  
Political	  Society	  in	  Eastern	  India :	  Structuring	  Access	  to	  the	  Employment	  Assurance	  Scheme.”	  In:	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Studies	  39	  (5):	  1–28.	  
Véron,	  René,	  Glyn	  Williams,	  Stuart	  Corbridge,	  and	  Manoj	  Srivastava	  (2006):	  “Decentralized	  
Corruption	  or	  Corrupt	  Decentralization?	  Community	  Monitoring	  of	  Poverty-­‐Alleviation	  Schemes	  
in	  Eastern	  India.”	  In:	  World	  Development	  34	  (11):	  1922–1941.	  	  
Wakode,	  P.T.	  (2011):	  “Criminalization	  of	  Indian	  Politics:	  A	  Critical	  Review.”	  In:	  Political	  Science	  10	  
(88):	  88–89.	  
Way,	  Lucan	  A,	  and	  Steven	  Levitsky	  (2006):	  “The	  Dynamics	  of	  Autocratic	  Coercion	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.”	  
In:	  Communist	  and	  Post-­‐Communist	  Studies	  39	  (3):	  387–410.	  	  
Weber,	  Max	  (1972):	  Wirtschaft	  und	  Gesellschaft.	  Grundriss	  der	  Verstehenden	  Soziologie.	  5th	  ed.	  
Tübingen:	  J.C.B.	  Mohr	  (Paul	  Siebeck).	  
Wehler,	  Hans-­‐Ulrich	  (2007):	  “Das	  Analytische	  Potential	  des	  Charisma-­‐Konzepts:	  Hitlers	  
charismatische	  Herrschaft.”	  In:	  Max	  Webers	  Staatssoziologie:	  Positionen	  und	  Perspektiven,	  
edited	  by	  Andreas	  Anter	  and	  Stefan	  Breuer.	  Baden-­‐Baden:	  Nomos.	  
Weiner,	  Myron	  (1965):	  “India:	  Two	  Political	  Cultures.”	  In:	  Political	  Culture	  and	  Political	  Development,	  
edited	  by	  Lucian	  W.	  Pye	  and	  Sidney	  Verba,	  199–244.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
Weingrod,	  Alex	  (1968):	  “Patrons,	  Patronage,	  and	  Political	  Parties.”	  In:	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  
and	  History	  10	  (4):	  377–400.	  
Wenner,	  Miriam	  (2013):	  “Challenging	  the	  State	  by	  Reproducing	  Its	  Principles.”	  In:	  Asian	  Ethnology	  72	  
(2):	  199–220.	  
———(2014):	  “Legitimization	  through	  Patronage?	  Strategies	  for	  Political	  Control	  beyond	  Ethno-­‐
Regional	  Claims	  in	  Darjeeling	  ,	  India.”	  In:	  Geoforum:	  1–10.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.002.	  
———	  2015	  (forthcoming).	  “Diasporic	  Imaginations	  of	  Darjeeling.	  Gorkhaland	  as	  an	  Imaginative	  
Geography.”	  In:	  Nepali	  Diaspora	  in	  a	  Globalised	  Era,	  edited	  by	  Tanka	  B.	  Subba	  and	  A.C.	  Sinha.	  
Delhi:	  Routledge	  India.	  
Werlen,	  Benno	  (1995):	  Sozialgeographie	  Alltäglicher	  Regionalisierungen.	  Bd.	  2:	  Globalisierung,	  Region	  
und	  Regionalisierung.	  Reihe	  Erdkundliches	  Wissen	  119.	  Stuttgart:	  Franz	  Steiner	  Verlag.	  
Wilkinson,	  Steven	  I.	  (2006):	  The	  Politics	  of	  Infrastructural	  Spending	  in	  India.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  




Wintrobe,	  Ronald	  (2009):	  “Dictatorship:	  Analytical	  Approaches.”	  In:	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Comparative	  Politics,	  edited	  by	  Carles	  Boix	  and	  Susan	  C.	  Stokes,	  1–23.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press.	  	  
Wittel,	  Andreas	  (2000):	  “Ethnography	  on	  the	  Move:	  From	  Field	  to	  Net	  to	  Internet.”	  In:	  Forum	  
Qualitative	  Social	  Research	  1	  (1):	  Art.	  21.	  
Wyatt,	  Andrew,	  John	  Zavos,	  and	  Vernon	  Hewitt	  (2002):	  “Decentring	  the	  Indian	  Nation.”	  In:	  





List	  of	  cited	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  blogs	  
Business	  Standard	  (2012,	  July	  7):	  GJM	  assaults	  CPM	  nominees,	  demands	  scrapping	  of	  TMC	  
candidature.	  	  
Business	  Standard	  (2013,	  September	  1):	  Strike	  cripples	  Darjeeling.	  Probal	  Basak.	  	  
Darjeeling	  Times	  (2014,	  April	  10):	  “The	  dream	  of	  Gorkha	  brothers	  is	  our	  dream”	  -­‐	  Narendra	  Modi.	  
Retrieved	  from	  http://darjeelingtimes.com/the-­‐dream-­‐of-­‐gorkha-­‐brothers-­‐is-­‐our-­‐dream-­‐
narendra-­‐modi/	  (accessed:	  12.4.2014)	  
Darjeeling	  Times	  (2008,	  August	  23):	  One	  to	  one	  with	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.darjeelingtimes.com/news/Interviews/One-­‐to-­‐One-­‐with-­‐Bimal-­‐Gurung.html	  
(accessed:	  17.12.2012)	  
Hamro	  Prajashakti	  (2012,	  August	  30):	  GTAlai	  rāmrosãnga	  sañchāalan	  garna	  sakenou	  bhane	  
bipakshīlai	  chhoḍidinechou:	  Bimal	  Gurung.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.hamroprajashakti.com/upload/13463030871.pdf	  	  
Himalaya	  Darpan	  (2010,	  May	  22):	  Madan	  Tamangko	  nirman	  hatya.	  	  
Indian	  Express	  (2010,	  March	  19):	  Tripartite	  talks	  agree	  upon	  interim	  authority.	  	  
KalimNews	  (2012,	  February	  10).	  Local	  cable	  TV	  news	  channel	  transmission	  stopped.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://kalimpongonlinenews.blogspot.in/2012/02/9-­‐onkar-­‐shaini.html	  (accessed:	  3.5.2015)	  
SME	  Times	  (2011,	  October	  12):	  Mamata’s	  sops	  to	  “turn	  Darjeeling	  into	  Switzerland.”	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2005,	  March	  20):	  Gorkha	  Hill	  Council	  members	  may	  resign	  today.	  
The	  Hindu	  (2008,	  March	  15):	  New	  drumbeats	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills.	  Marcus	  Dam.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2012,	  July	  2):	  GJM’s	  decision	  to	  facilitate	  new	  era	  in	  Darjeeling:	  Mamata.	  Marcus	  Dam.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2012,	  July	  14):	  We	  will	  work	  with	  GTA:	  Mamata.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2013,	  May	  6):	  Darjeeling	  tense	  after	  GJM	  and	  GNLF	  clash.	  Ananya	  Dutta.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2013,	  March	  13):	  Mamata	  urges	  for	  peace	  in	  Darjeeling	  hills	  and	  plains.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2013,	  July	  15):	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  case:	  SC	  stays	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2014,	  April	  9).	  With	  hindsight,	  BJP	  includes	  Gorkhaland	  in	  its	  manifesto.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2014,	  June	  8):	  BJP	  eyes	  West	  Bengal.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  (2014,	  July	  18):	  Mamata	  announces	  Tamang	  board	  in	  Darjeeling.	  	  
The	  Hindustan	  Times	  (2013,	  February	  15):	  CBI	  arrests	  5	  in	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  case.	  Amitava	  
Banerjee.	  	  




The	  Statesman	  (2008,	  December	  2):	  Bail	  order	  pending	  for	  GNLF	  leaders.	  
The	  Statesman	  (2013,	  September	  6):	  Five	  accused	  in	  Madan	  Tamang	  murder	  case	  surrender.	  
Retrieved	  from	  http://www.thestatesman.com/news/13727-­‐five-­‐accused-­‐in-­‐madan-­‐tamang-­‐
murder-­‐case-­‐surrender.html	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2005,	  March	  24):	  Ghisingh	  keeps	  crown,	  courtesy	  Kathmandu.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  September	  8):	  Celebrities	  throng	  Darjeeling	  in	  idol	  support.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  September	  24):	  Darjeeling	  idol	  wins	  over	  India	  -­‐	  The	  voice	  that	  united	  hill	  
people.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  September	  25):	  Idol	  win	  starts	  off	  carnival	  in	  the	  hills.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  September	  28):	  Hill	  strike	  against	  RJ	  remark	  -­‐	  Kalimpong	  shut	  for	  a	  day.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  September	  29):	  Idol	  worship	  to	  war	  -­‐	  Rumours	  spark	  Siliguri	  riot.	  
———	  SILIGURI	  EXPLODES	  -­‐	  Rumours	  fuel	  riot	  on	  streets.	  
———	  Day	  of	  brick,	  baton	  &	  bullet	  -­‐	  Shots	  and	  teargas	  to	  quell	  warring	  crowd.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  October	  2):	  Sweets	  &	  crackers	  say	  it	  all	  -­‐	  GNLF	  supporters	  thank	  Ghisingh	  &	  
governments.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  October	  3):	  Ghisingh	  ignores	  rebel	  talk.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  October	  5):	  Rebel	  leader	  expelled.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  October	  6):	  ABGL	  joins	  statehood	  call	  -­‐	  Rivals	  chalk	  action	  plan	  as	  Gurung	  
harps	  on	  Ghisingh	  ‘treachery’.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  October	  8):	  Idol	  mania	  blow	  to	  Ghisingh	  -­‐	  Gurung	  and	  a	  crowd	  of	  20000.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  1):	  Two	  CMs	  to	  keep	  hills	  busy	  next	  month.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  3):	  GNLF	  strike	  to	  press	  for	  special	  status.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  5):	  GNLF	  calls	  off	  48-­‐hour	  bandh	  -­‐	  Party	  threatens	  longer	  
shutdowns	  after	  Diwali.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  6):	  Siege	  plan	  altered	  to	  fit	  in	  Diwali.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  7):	  GJM	  siege	  plan	  nipped	  by	  police.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  23):	  Special	  status	  challenge	  for	  GNLF	  bandhs	  brew	  tension.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  26):	  GNLF	  refuses	  to	  budge	  from	  bandh	  -­‐	  Cry	  for	  khukuri	  stab	  
justice.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  November	  28):	  Hills	  find	  voice	  of	  protest.	  




The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  December	  3):	  Indefinite	  Morcha	  fast	  from	  today	  -­‐	  Legal	  experts	  to	  join	  fast	  
against	  Sixth	  Schedule	  as	  minister	  explains	  special	  status.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  December	  19):	  GNLF	  refuses	  to	  clear	  stand	  on	  Dec	  20	  meet.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  December	  21):	  Ghisingh	  message	  for	  Delhi	  panel.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  December	  28):	  ‘Battle’	  plan	  to	  be	  ready	  by	  Jan	  6	  -­‐	  Fight	  for	  Gorkhaland	  will	  be	  
democratic:	  Morcha.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2007,	  December	  31):	  Tamang	  for	  ‘collective	  leadership’.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  January	  24):	  Illegal	  gun	  heat	  on	  GNLF	  leader	  -­‐	  Wife	  held.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  January	  25):	  Morcha	  bandh	  peaceful,	  torch	  rallies	  to	  come.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  January	  26):	  Pradhan	  caught	  in	  Sukna	  –	  Injured	  GNLF	  leader	  off	  to	  hospital	  
after	  arrest.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  January	  29):	  Chinks	  in	  opposition	  front	  in	  hills.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  January	  31).	  Morcha	  chief	  admits	  bandh	  concern.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  12):	  GNLF	  bastion	  in	  Morcha	  grip	  -­‐	  Subash	  Ghisingh’s	  supporters	  
blame	  rivals	  for	  social	  boycott.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  16):	  Siege	  test	  for	  civic	  body	  -­‐	  Patrols	  to	  keep	  out	  Ghisingh	  as	  hills	  
gear	  up	  for	  ‘economic	  blockade’.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  22):	  Hunger	  strike	  line	  lengthens	  -­‐	  Suicide	  cry	  opens	  door.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  24):	  ‘King	  of	  hills’	  clings	  to	  crown	  -­‐	  Ghisingh	  meets	  CM,	  rules	  out	  
resignation	  from	  Darjeeling	  council.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  26):	  More	  support	  trickles	  in.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  February	  28):	  Ghisingh	  a	  poison:	  Gurung	  -­‐	  Making	  most	  of	  the	  12-­‐hour	  relief.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  March	  1):	  10	  days	  for	  Ghisingh.	  
———	  Bimal	  claws	  at	  cats	  crossing	  the	  path.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  March	  12):	  Morcha	  youths	  for	  change.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  March	  17):	  Ghisingh	  slips	  in,	  hills	  unaware.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  March	  18):	  Morcha	  demands	  high-­‐powered	  probe.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  March	  29):	  Focus	  on	  support	  base	  before	  statehood	  fight.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  April	  14):	  March	  to	  push	  statehood	  limit.	  




The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  April	  25):	  Plea	  to	  dissolve	  rural	  bodies.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  April	  29):	  Morcha	  to	  start	  fast.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  April	  9):	  Morcha	  hits	  back	  with	  shutdown	  call	  -­‐	  Hills	  caught	  off	  guard	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  May	  8):	  Morcha	  deadline	  for	  CPM	  arrests.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  August	  22):	  Dress	  to	  show	  ‘different’	  hills.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  September	  1):	  Gurung	  deal	  to	  end	  GNLF	  ‘boycott’.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  September	  5):	  ‘Deal’	  to	  end	  boycott	  gets	  first	  taker.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2008,	  October	  15):	  Faces	  blackened	  after	  dress	  code	  defiance	  -­‐	  Poster	  warning	  
precedes	  brush	  attack.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2010,	  April	  24):	  DGHC	  head	  hints	  at	  nexus.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2011,	  January	  8):	  Protection	  cell	  prop	  for	  GNLF	  comeback	  -­‐	  Resistance	  groups	  for	  
“social	  work.”	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2011,	  May	  17):	  Ghisingh	  leaves	  hills	  at	  night	  -­‐	  Morcha	  supporters	  assaulted,	  finger	  at	  
GNLF	  chief’s	  provocative	  speeches.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2011,	  October	  12):	  Mamata	  serenades	  Dar(jee)ling.	  Arnab	  Ganguly.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  February	  7):	  Beware	  of	  Maoists	  and	  Chhatrey	  brain:	  Gurung.	  Rajeev	  Ravidas.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  February	  8):	  Rivals	  challenge	  Gurung	  on	  Maoist	  slur	  
-­‐‘Prove	  camp	  claim	  or	  withdraw	  remarks.	  Rajeev	  Ravidas.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  May	  3):	  May	  Day	  boost	  for	  CPRM.	  Morcha	  retreats,	  rival	  holds	  rally.	  Vivek	  
Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  June	  10):	  Sen	  solution:	  five	  out	  of	  398	  -­‐	  Morcha	  rejects	  formula,	  key	  meeting	  
today.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  June	  29).	  Gurung	  seeks	  jobs	  for	  GLP.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2012,	  November	  12):	  Scanner	  on	  jobs	  for	  GLP-­‐cadres.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2013,	  January	  30):	  Hills	  wipe	  the	  CM’s	  smile	  –	  Mamata	  livid	  after	  slogans	  greet	  
Darjeeling	  declaration.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2013,	  May	  7):	  Morcha	  no	  to	  strike.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  	  
The	  Telegraph;	  (2013,	  June	  11):	  GNLF	  revives	  cells	  for	  protection	  of	  cadres	  -­‐	  Boost	  for	  voluntary	  
force	  in	  backdrop	  of	  alleged	  threats	  from	  Morcha.	  Vivek	  Chhetri.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2013,	  June	  18).	  13	  Madan	  Tamang	  accused	  surrender	  -­‐	  Hope	  for	  speedy	  release	  




The	  Telegraph.	  (2013,	  July	  29):	  Tea	  belt	  vote	  breaks	  union	  pattern.	  	  
The	  Telegraph	  (2014,	  January	  30):	  Madan	  case	  bail	  plea	  rejected	  -­‐	  HC	  turns	  down	  prayer	  of	  Morcha	  
13	  as	  CBI	  probe	  is	  still	  on.	  	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1946,	  June	  27):	  Bengal	  Assembly	  Elections:	  results	  and	  analysis.	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1955,	  June	  12):	  Darjeeling.	  Cinderella	  of	  Bengal.	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1955,	  September	  8):	  Rift	  in	  Gorkha	  League	  over	  Darjeeling	  issue.	  Directive	  to	  break	  
with	  Congress	  ignored.	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1969,	  August	  18):	  200,000	  men	  to	  strike	  in	  Bengal	  tea	  gardens.	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1972,	  November	  10):	  Darjeeling	  Gorkha’s	  plea	  might	  be	  heeded.	  
Times	  of	  India	  (1987,	  February	  1):	  “The	  truth,	  nothing	  but	  the	  truth”	  
Times	  of	  India	  (2009,	  January	  20):	  Tribals,	  Gorkhas	  clash	  in	  Dooars.	  	  
Times	  of	  India	  (2013,	  March	  7):	  TMC	  leaders	  attacked	  in	  Kalimpong.	  Deep	  Gazmer.	  	  
Times	  of	  India	  (2013,	  September	  1):	  Kalimpong	  Lepchas	  defend	  invite	  to	  Mamata.	  	  
Times	  of	  India	  (2014,	  April	  9):	  Gorkha	  demands	  find	  place	  in	  BJP	  manifesto.	  	  
	  
